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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction  
 
 
This dissertation provides a quantitative impact evaluation of a community-based 
development (CBD) project, the Mahila Samakhya programme in India. CBD projects have 
become increasingly popular in development cooperation, attracting a growing amount of 
funds. So far, the popularity of such projects has not been matched with an equal attention for 
quantitative evidence on their effectiveness. This study investigates the impact of Mahila 
Samakhya using a unique dataset.  
The results show that Mahila Samakhya has significantly improved trust and 
cooperation among participants, as well as immunization rates, schooling and access to 
informal credit. Moreover, the evaluation finds evidence of substantial externalities on 
households who do not participate in the programme themselves but who live in a village 
where the programme is active. Not taking into account such spillover effects would seriously 
underestimate the impact of the programme. However, the study does not find evidence of the 
hypothesized self-reinforcing mechanism between social capital and collective action. 
 
 
 
1.1 An impact evaluation of the Mahila Samakhya programme 
 
 The involvement of local communities in project management and design is a 
growing trend in development cooperation. Organizations all over the world actively involve 
community members in their projects to build on the existing capacity for cooperation in 
villages. This community-based development (CBD) approach is claimed to have many 
advantages compared to traditional, top-down development programmes (World Bank, 
2000b). Among them, participation in projects would enhance social interactions, increase 
trust between community members and further strengthen their propensity to engage in 
collective action.  
However, up to now few quantitative impact evaluations of CBD projects exist to 
support these claims, despite their increasing popularity as a means of channelling 
development aid funds (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Qualitative studies are a lot more common, 
but they are less appropriate than quantitative surveys to draw generalizable conclusions 
about a programme’s impact. This dissertation provides a quantitative, quasi-experimental 
impact evaluation of the Mahila Samakhya programme in India. The evaluation focuses 
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specifically on the programme’s impact on social capital and cooperation, as well as on three 
socio-economic outcomes: immunization, education and access to credit.  
Mahila Samakhya is a typical example of a CBD project. This women’s empowerment 
programme aims to mobilize women from the lowest castes and poorest families in rural 
Indian villages to set up women’s groups in their community. With support from Mahila 
Samakhya, the women are encouraged to identify their most urgent needs and demands, and 
to come up with solutions to jointly address these issues. It is particularly well suited as a 
starting point to the study of social capital and cooperation. The programme strongly 
emphasizes trust, solidarity and collective action among the women to improve their own 
living circumstances. It puts a lot of attention on the initial period of sensitization and trust-
building. Once the women’s groups are formed and functioning, they take up a large range of 
issues, from health trainings to establishing informal primary schools, campaigning against 
domestic violence or setting up rotating savings and credit groups.  
Since the initial successes of the 1986 pilot, Mahila Samakhya has been expanded to 
ten states in India, currently covering more than nine thousand villages (Government of India, 
2002). Nonetheless, not all women in a programme village decide to participate in the 
women’s group, and not all groups are equally successful. The variations in implementation, 
participation and success allow for an econometric analysis of the determinants and 
consequences of cooperation. 
 
 
Box 1.1 A Tale of Two Villages 
 
We get out of the car at the village entrance. The sun is burning. As far as the eye 
can see we are surrounded by agricultural fields, dotted here and there with small villages in 
the distance. They consist mainly of small mud houses with thatched roofs scattered along 
the dirt roads. These are settlements where mostly low caste families reside. The faded 
colors of the women’s saris and the almost empty huts betray the daily situation of poverty 
faced by the villagers.  
Within a few minutes, a crowd gathers to accompany us further into the community. 
At an open spot, villagers have set up an informal preschool for their youngest children. 
They jointly selected the teacher, prepared the spot and keep it clean. The preschool 
consists of not much more than a plastic blanket in the middle, self-made toys and a teacher 
with some training on early childhood development. But the children are happy to be there, 
not realizing that the funny games are appropriate activities to stimulate their cognitive 
development. In the meantime, their mothers are able to work on the field.  
That same day, some twenty kilometers away, we enter another village. A dead dog 
is lying in the middle of the road. Bare-feeted children run over it. Not a single adult seems 
compelled to put the dead animal away. We start talking about community life and joint 
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Box 1.1 shows an illustration of two villages that are geographically close to each 
other and that suffer from similar difficult economic circumstances. Their inhabitants both 
belong to disadvantaged groups in Indian society. However, they have a completely opposite 
approach to problems that all the community members are confronted with day by day. In one 
of the villages, Mahila Samakhya is implemented, while in the other it is not. But is the 
difference between the two villages just described really due to the presence of the 
programme or do other factors play an equally important role?  
To answer such questions, a large-scale dataset is necessary that includes a sufficient 
number of villages and households to isolate the impact of the programme from the effect of 
potentially confounding factors. Our unique data set, specifically collected for the purpose of 
this study, encompasses almost two thousand households in more than one hundred villages. 
In two thirds of the villages, the programme has been implemented. The other third of the 
villages serves as the control group. Notwithstanding the merits of using a quantitative 
dataset, qualitative research methods such as observations and focus group interviews can 
Box 1.1 (Continued.) 
 
community projects. People look at us with a puzzled expression. “No, no one has 
participated in a community project lately. What do you mean?” When asked if there are 
no problems to solve, the women point to the green, slimy well on the village square. It 
smells bad and is filled with frogs. This is the water used to wash food, dishes and 
clothes. For drinking water, they use the public hand pump which reaches not even half of 
the required depth. The water tastes very bad. Another major problem is the yearly floods 
that wash away the roads. No one in the village takes up these issues. The village leader 
should do so, the people argue. But he does not do anything either and the community 
members do not see how they could change anything about the situation. We press on. 
“Why don’t you cooperate with each other to solve these issues?” One man says that he 
tried to organize a meeting last year. “But”, he turns reproaching to the others, “no one of 
the village showed up. I am not organizing a meeting again. I know I should not expect 
anything from you guys!” 
During the discussion, men are doing most of the talking. The women are shy and 
silent although they are the ones confronted daily with the problem. What a stark contrast 
to the women in the first community! They tell us how they feel more and more in control 
of their own lives. They have set up a savings and credit group which allows them to 
receive cheap financial funds in case of emergency. This makes them less dependent on 
the moneylender. Perhaps before not too long they will apply as a group for a loan from 
the bank so that they can start a small business together. Although life is tough in this 
remote village, hope shines through the conversations.  
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help in understanding underlying processes. To the extent possible, we will therefore 
complement the quantitative results with anecdotal evidence.  
The next section will discuss in more detail the expected advantages and 
disadvantages of community-based development projects. Section 1.3 will then discuss the 
importance of cooperation especially in the context of developing economies. The subsequent 
section gives a brief overview of the theoretical foundations of the dissertation. In particular, 
the concept of social capital will play a central role throughout the chapters to explain the 
emergence or absence of cooperation. The main research questions are discussed in section 
1.5 together with a description of the research methodology. The last section provides an 
overview of the structure of the thesis and summarizes the main results. 
 
1.2 Community-based development  
 
Community-based development is increasingly recognized as a valuable alternative to 
the more traditional, top-down mechanisms of development (World Bank, 2000b). In 2004, 
the World Bank alone was spending 7 billion dollars on its CBD portfolio (Mansuri and Rao, 
2004). The common element in CBD projects is their involvement of community members 
either in project design, in project management or both (Dongier et al., 2002). Participation of 
the beneficiaries may range from mere consultations in the early phases of project proposals 
to complete control over key project decisions, project management and resources. The latter 
approach is also called community-driven development.1  
The potential benefits of actively involving local communities in development projects 
are large (Dongier et al., 2002). As local community members are better able to identify their 
own needs and demands than outsiders, their involvement in project design would improve 
demand responsiveness and aid effectiveness. In addition, targeting may improve when local 
communities instead of central authorities identify the beneficiaries. Responsibility for 
implementation of projects would create ownership, thereby enhancing longer-term 
sustainability. Also, efficiency and effectiveness may be increased when resources are spent 
by villagers themselves who can directly monitor implementation activities. 
Apart from these project-related benefits, many advocates of CBD projects believe 
that such projects have the additional advantage of creating more intangible benefits that are 
not directly related to the delivered services or facilities (World Bank, 2000a; Grootaert and 
van Bastelaer, 2002). The involvement of community members in development projects will 
result in increased empowerment and voice. In addition, CBD projects are often argued to 
strengthen the social capital of the poor, i.e. their propensity to cooperate and engage in 
collective action, which will further enable them to improve the community environment. 
                                                 
1 See Binswanger and Aiyar (2003) for numerous examples of community-driven development projects. 
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Although such benefits are less easily measurable, their long-term effect might be at least as 
important as the immediate impact of a programme. If CBD projects are indeed able to 
generate a reinforcing cycle of enhanced social capital and collective action, impact may 
multiply over time as community members become increasingly willing to cooperate and take 
matters in their own hands. 
Despite the growing budgets devoted to CBD projects, surprisingly few quantitative 
evaluations exist to support the claims on the expected benefits. A number of recent surveys 
indicates that the evidence is not as conclusive and unambiguous as one might wish, being 
sometimes in support of the benefits while underscoring serious drawbacks of community 
participation in other cases (Bardhan, 2002; Conning and Kevane, 2002; Mansuri and Rao, 
2004).  
The downsides attached to community-based development tend to be overlooked or 
too easily dismissed. First, it may be very difficult to prevent the elite from capturing the 
benefits (Platteau and Abraham, 2002; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). Also, when existing 
social structures and power relations are not appropriately taken into account, there is a real 
danger that minorities will continue to be excluded (Bardhan, 2002; Conning and Kevane, 
2002). A number of studies find that better educated individuals (Gugerty and Kremer, 2000; 
Rao and Ibanez, 2003) or the higher castes and non-poor (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005) tend to 
dominate the participation process. Whenever minorities do not receive enough support and 
training to adequately participate and keep the elite or the local government accountable, it is 
not clear whether CBD projects will indeed deliver the benefits as promised (Platteau, 2003).  
Keeping in mind the potential downsides of CBD projects, this dissertation will 
investigate their impact on social capital, cooperation and socio-economic outcomes. In 
particular, we will investigate whether the Mahila Samakhya programme has been able to set 
in motion a virtuous cycle of increasing trust and cooperation in programme villages. If so, 
does this impact remain restricted to programme participants or does it spill over to other 
community members? And what effects do such changes have on socio-economic outcomes 
in the community? 
 
1.3 The social dilemma inherent to cooperation 
 
People in all times and all places have helped each other and worked together to 
improve community life. Whether it be help in building a house, jointly repairing a damaged 
road or organizing a neighborhood festival, examples of cooperation abound. As long as 
people will personally benefit from cooperation or value it for other people’s sake, it seems 
natural to assume that they will indeed contribute their share of effort. Still, intuitive as this 
might seem, there are equally many cases where people do not work together for the common 
goal, although cooperation would make all better off.  Despite the great efforts and good 
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intentions of many development organizations, too often they fail to achieve their goals as 
community members do not participate as hoped for. Free-riding behavior and coordination 
problems can be insurmountable barriers to collective action. The strong social dilemma 
inherent to collective action is central to this study.  
A separate but related issue concerns the cooperation between households when 
markets, such as the credit market or the labor market, are not functioning adequately. Many 
communities overcome such market failures relatively well. During the busy harvest season, 
neighbors often organize labor parties and work on each others’ land in turns. Gifts and 
transfers of money or goods between households are important and widespread means to deal 
with sudden shocks in income or to start up a small business. But not all households have 
equal access to such forms of informal assistance.  
Why do the levels of cooperation among households differ tremendously from one 
village to another? Why are there so many examples where collective action is not undertaken 
while other communities benefit from a vibrant community life? The answers to these 
questions are very important to guide policy decisions with respect to government 
interventions and CBD projects. Without understanding the causes and consequences of (a 
lack of) cooperation, it is very difficult to formulate sound policies that support communities’ 
development. In developing countries, where governments are not always capable to provide 
adequate social services and where missing markets are a common feature of the economy, 
the need for cooperation among community members – and hence understanding of the 
failure to cooperate – is especially urgent. If CBD projects are indeed capable of enhancing 
social capital and collective action, their impact might multiply over time and spill over to the 
broader community. Not taking into account such dynamics and externalities would seriously 
underestimate their potential impact. 
 
1.4 Social capital and cooperation 
 
The concept of social capital plays a central role throughout this dissertation. Social 
capital captures the trust, shared norms and values arising within informal social networks 
that affect expectations and behavior, thereby generating externalities for the members of a 
group (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). That is, we consider social capital to encompass 
cognitive components (trust, norms, values) as well as structural components (social 
networks, voluntary associations, roles and rules).  
A crucial aspect of social capital is that it generates externalities. That is, the outcomes 
for an individual are not only determined by the endowments, knowledge and behavior of the 
individual herself, but also affected by the endowments, knowledge and behavior of others. 
This last aspect is commonly mentioned in the social capital literature (Coleman, 1988; 
Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). But for a few exceptions, the measurement of externalities is 
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surprisingly absent both in studies of social capital and in impact evaluations of development 
programmes. Our empirical chapters will explicitly take up this issue.  
Throughout the dissertation, we will investigate four different mechanisms through 
which social capital affects outcomes. First, trust, norms and networks affect community 
members’ willingness to engage in collective action and provide public goods from which the 
entire community may benefit. Second, they shape the willingness of households to share 
resources such as money, labor or time with each other. Hence, a household’s access to 
resources will not only depend on its own endowments but also on the resources embedded in 
its social network. Third, high levels of trust and effective monitoring in a social network will 
decrease transaction costs and facilitate economic exchanges in situations of limited 
enforcement and information asymmetries. Finally, social networks and social norms affect 
information diffusion and social learning within communities.  
Following Putnam (1993), CBD programmes concerned with social capital mainly 
refer to social capital as a community’s propensity to engage in collective action (see for 
example World Bank, 2005).2 However, the exact mechanisms underlying the relationship 
between social capital and cooperation are generally poorly spelled out. In fact, empirical 
research on social capital often lacks a coherent theoretical framework with testable 
hypotheses.   
In this thesis, we take a behavioral approach to social capital based on recent advances 
in theories of cooperation. Although such theories often do not use the term social capital 
explicitly, they increasingly take into account the different dimensions of social capital such 
as trust, norms and networks (Ostrom, 1998; Ostrom and Ahn, 2002). Dependent on the 
behavior and outcomes under consideration, different aspects will be of relevance (Portes, 
1998). Strong norms may be beneficial for one outcome but detrimental for other outcomes. 
High levels of trust may foster cooperation within a group, but lead to exclusion of outsiders 
to the group.  
Research on cooperation has a long tradition, both in economic and sociological 
sciences. Whereas early sociological theories focused mainly on explaining how cooperation 
arises, the early economic literature used a rational choice perspective to show how collective 
action would fail. In reality of course, people and communities do engage in cooperative 
behavior, but not as often as one might wish. Likewise, universal and persistent outcomes of 
economic experiments contradict the grim predictions of mainstream rational choice theories, 
although cooperation levels remain below optimal.3   
Explaining the logic behind collective action remains a challenge for economists and 
sociologists alike. The traditional economic theories that explain (the absence of) collective 
                                                 
2
 Sometimes, CBD projects are argued to strengthen social capital at the individual level, or as the ability of 
individuals to secure benefits as a result of their membership in social networks (Dongier et al., 2002). 
3
 For references, see for example Ledyard (1995), Ostrom (2000), Van Winden (2002), Cardenas and Carpenter 
(2004), or Gaechter et al. (2004). 
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action are generally based on game-theoretic models. Human agents are considered to be 
rational, self-interested, utility-maximizing actors that choose the best among all alternative 
strategies, taking into account the behavior of the others. These models focus on individual 
incentives, endowments, expectations and prior beliefs. Since the first rational choice models 
predicted that collective action would mostly fail to materialize (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968), 
subsequent models have been adapted to allow for (rational) behavior that leads to 
cooperation.4 Infinitely repeated interactions, reputation effects, reciprocal strategies and 
social sanctions and rewards explain how cooperation can be sustained even in a selfish 
world. A common element remains their forward-looking approach5 in which individuals 
make educated decisions, taking into account all possible consequences of different actions 
and choosing the action that serves their interest best.  
The traditional sociological approach to (the emergence of) collective action is 
strongly rooted in socialization and norms for behavior. One of the first authors to explicitly 
model the forces leading to cooperation was Schelling (1978) who describes collective action 
as a “band-wagon effect” or a “chain reaction” to the initial participation of a few willing 
cooperators, which increasingly activates other people. Granovetter (1978) introduces the 
concept of “thresholds”. As soon as the number of cooperators reaches an individual’s 
threshold, the individual will contribute to the collective good as well. This in turn increases 
the number of cooperators, triggering cooperation of people with ever-higher thresholds. Both 
authors assume a predisposition towards cooperation, albeit dependent on a certain threshold. 
Network density, social cohesion, norms of compliance and other sociological concepts play 
an important role.6 In contrast to the economic models, many of the sociological theories on 
collective action are based on learning from past experience. They depict human behavior as a 
stimulus-response mechanism, in which actions are reinforced when the outcome is beneficial 
and abandoned when outcomes are negative. As such they could be labeled ‘backward-
looking’ models.  
Recently, it has become common both for economists and sociologists to explicitly 
incorporate networks in the analysis (Gould, 1993; Bala and Goyal, 1998; Chwe, 2000; Goyal 
and Vega-Redondo, 2005). Networks play an important role in transmitting information and 
in applying social sanctions or rewards. A second promising direction uses evolutionary 
models that abandon the strong rationality assumptions but retain a focus on utility-
maximization and incentives (Bardhan, 1993; Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Sethi and 
Somanathan, 2003). They are particularly well-suited to explain the emergence or decline of 
norms of cooperation and reciprocity over time.  
Hence, the distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘sociological’ models of cooperation is 
not as sharp anymore as it used to be, although a general distinction between forward-looking 
                                                 
4
 For an overview of such game-theoretic models, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) or Gibbons (1992).  
5
 The terminology of ‘forward’- versus ‘backward-looking’ models is taken from Flache (1996). 
6
 See for example Marwell and Oliver (1993), Macy (1991), Macy and Flache (1995) or Chwe (1999). 
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and backward-looking assumptions continues to exist. Most theories can be placed along a 
continuum between the two extreme positions. The concept of social capital can be 
interpreted as a bridge between the two traditional disciplines. It emphasizes the importance 
and influence of social networks, trust and norms of behavior on the preferences, incentives 
and constraints that guide human behavior.  
 
1.5 Research questions and methodology 
 
 Despite the increasing number of studies on social capital, an adequate explanation 
and description of the dynamics and processes of cooperation is often not given. As a result, 
many empirical studies of social capital focus on explanatory variables such as trust or the 
number of voluntary organizations in a community without clearly explaining the 
mechanisms through which these variables would enhance outcomes. Endogeneity and 
simultaneity problems are often not adequately addressed, such as the fact that high levels of 
trust may be both a cause and a consequence of cooperation. Although such studies have been 
successful in showing that social capital dimensions matter, they do not provide much 
guidance for policy recommendations. Theoretical models on cooperation on the other hand 
explicitly describe behavior and decision-making processes. However, their validation often 
rests on computer simulations or evidence from the laboratory. Relatively few large-scale 
empirical studies have investigated whether such models’ hypotheses hold in reality, even less 
so in developing countries. 
The main contribution of this thesis to the literature is to fill in the gap in quantitative 
empirical evidence on social capital, cooperation and community-based development. It tests 
the theoretical mechanisms that foster or inhibit cooperative behavior using empirical data 
from the field. It quantifies the determinants as well as the consequences of social capital, 
taking into account potential endogeneity and simultaneity to separate causality from mere 
correlations. It measures the impact of a community-based development programme, 
explicitly estimating the spillover effects on others.  
The first general research question investigates the dynamics between social capital 
and cooperation. Is cooperation indeed affected by levels of trust and norms of reciprocity? 
Are levels of trust in turn determined by past levels of cooperation in the village? Do we find 
evidence that the Mahila Samakhya programme has affected social capital or cooperation or 
both in programme villages? Does this imply that the programme has set in motion a virtuous 
cycle of increased cooperation and social capital? 
Of course, cooperation and social capital may be valuable in itself if people derive 
utility from interactions with others. However, ultimately the goal of most development 
programmes is to alter living circumstances and improve socio-economic outcomes. The 
second main research question therefore looks at the impact of the Mahila Samakhya 
  
10 
programme on three outcome indicators, i.e. immunization rates, school enrolment rates and 
access to credit. Interviews with programme officials, programme participants as well as 
others in programme communities repeatedly identified these three issues as capturing the 
main benefits of Mahila Samakhya. The analysis will include all four mechanisms of social 
capital as discussed in the previous section: collective action for a common good, cooperation 
and assistance among households, the dissemination of information and the reduction of 
transaction costs in economic exchanges.  
The literature on social capital not only emphasizes the role of trust, norms and social 
networks in enhancing cooperation, but also highlights potential externalities on others. The 
third main research question explicitly analyzes the spillover effects on the broader 
community, i.e. the effect of the programme on households who do not participate in the 
programme themselves, but who live in a village where a Mahila Samakhya group is active. 
Each of the empirical chapters will look specifically at the externalities generated by the 
programme on social capital, cooperative behavior and/or subsequent socio-economic 
outcomes.  
Our survey is specifically designed to answer these types of questions. The dataset 
encompasses 1991 households in 102 villages. It consists of 74 villages where the programme 
is active, and 28 comparable control villages where the programme is not yet implemented. 
The slow scaling up of the programme provides a highly comparable control group to serve as 
counterfactual for the treatment group. In all villages, a random sample of 20 households was 
selected. Within programme villages, 10 of the interviewed households participate in the 
programme and 10 households do not participate. This survey design allows us first of all to 
study outcomes in control villages only, as a baseline. Second, by comparing programme with 
control villages, we can measure the impact of the programme on the community as a whole. 
Finally, by separating the effects on participants and non-participants, we can explicitly 
measure the externalities through a comparison of the latter group with the control group, an 
opportunity largely foregone throughout the impact literature.7 The importance of such a 
design for impact studies cannot be emphasized enough. If spillover effects are not taken into 
account, this may lead to seriously biased impact estimates.  
 
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter will start with a 
review of the social capital literature and point out the findings and limitations of existing 
social capital studies. It will then turn to four mechanisms through which social capital affects 
                                                 
7
 A notable exception is Miguel and Kremer’s (2004) study that finds significant externalities of a Kenyan 
deworming programme on children in neighboring schools. In addition, several studies measure spillovers of the 
PROGRESA programme in Mexico on school enrolment of non-eligible children (Behrman et al., 2001; Schultz, 
2004; Lalive and Cattaneo, 2006). However, their results are inconclusive. 
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development outcomes. The first mechanism relates to the propensity to engage in collective 
action. The second mechanism deals with the informal assistance and resource-sharing among 
households. The third mechanism concerns the effect of trust, norms and networks on 
transaction costs in economic exchanges. Finally, the chapter will briefly discuss information 
diffusion and social learning within social networks. 
Chapter three starts with a description of the Mahila Samakhya programme and the 
local context of the study region: the North-Indian state Bihar. Bihar is one of the poorest 
states in India with the lowest socio-economic indicators. Hence, it is particularly in need of 
development programmes. The second half of chapter three outlines the survey design and 
sample methodology. It pays considerable attention to the comparability of the programme 
villages and the control villages that will serve as a counterfactual throughout the rest of the 
thesis. Chapter three also includes a comparison of participants and non-participants within 
programme villages, and discusses some of the potential drawbacks of community-based 
development in relation to Mahila Samakhya.  
Chapter four is the first empirical chapter. Based on a dynamic model, it analyses the 
relationship between social capital and cooperation, and investigates whether Mahila 
Samakhya has been able to set in motion a virtuous cycle. Social capital is measured as trust 
in community members and norms of reciprocity, both at the individual and at the village 
level. Cooperation in this chapter is measured with three indicators: an index of informal 
assistance given to other households, contributions to the construction and maintenance of 
schools, and contributions to the construction and maintenance of infrastructure. The evidence 
of a reinforcing cycle between trust and cooperation is significantly less strong than expected, 
although Mahila Samakhya has been able to increase trust and collective action directly, both 
among participants and non-participants in programme villages.  
Whereas chapter four does not explicitly distinguish between participants and non-
participants in programme villages, this distinction is the core of the subsequent chapter. 
Chapter five explicitly measures the externalities of the Mahila Samakhya programme on 
non-participants. In particular, we evaluate the impact of the programme on immunization and 
school enrolment rates of children who live in a programme village, but whose mothers do not 
participate in the women’s group themselves. We find substantial spillover effects on three of 
the four types of immunization and on school enrolment of girls. In the final section of the 
chapter, we hypothesize that the driving forces behind the externalities are the social 
interactions within programme villages that disseminate newly gained knowledge, the 
awareness raising campaigns organized by the women’s groups, and the joint community 
efforts to establish informal schools.  
Chapter six examines the role of social capital in the access to informal loans. 
Moneylenders are the main source of credit for most households although they are notorious 
for charging extremely high interest rates. Formal bank loans or informal loans among 
households are not very frequent. Heterogeneity is often argued to decrease monitoring and 
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enforcement opportunities in economic transactions, but it is usually not explicitly 
incorporated in studies of informal lending and borrowing. This chapter investigates whether 
caste and religious heterogeneity decreases the number of loan transactions among friends, 
neighbors and relatives. It finds strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. However, 
heterogeneity also increases the likelihood that households obtain investment loans in contrast 
to consumption loans. This suggests that diversity may have two opposite effects on the total 
number of credit transactions. A comparison of programme with control villages shows that, 
although the effect of heterogeneity on informal lending remains significantly negative, the 
Mahila Samakhya programme has been able to attenuate this negative relationship.  
In short, chapter four showed that the programme has had significant positive effects 
on trust and cooperation, although these effects are not self-reinforcing. The results from 
chapter five and chapter six show that trust and cooperation in turn yield significant benefits 
for participants and non-participants alike. Chapter seven summarizes the findings of the 
empirical chapters. It discusses some methodological issues, identifies a number of limitations 
to the study, and suggests directions for further research. It ends with a discussion of the 
policy implications. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Social Capital and Cooperation:  
Theoretical Background 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Two central features of many developing economies are the malfunctioning or absence 
of markets such as the credit market, and the low capacity of governments to provide social 
services and other public goods. Both issues have in common that households will have to 
cooperate with each other if they want to overcome the market failure and improve their well 
being. Indeed, joint efforts to manage common resources are widespread despite the notorious 
tragedy of the commons. Many communities undertake collective activities to repair roads or 
to reconstruct the primary school after the monsoon. Similarly, households all over the world 
engage in intricate informal arrangements to exchange resources, share risks and help each 
other in difficult times. Nonetheless, the examples of communities that fail to undertake 
collective action are innumerable as well. And the extent of assistance among households 
shows considerable differences across and within communities.  
To explain the observed variations in cooperative behavior, the early model of the 
homo economicus in mainstream economics was inadequate. People do not (only) behave as 
rational, self-interested, utility maximizing individuals without social ties, moral obligations 
or feelings towards other people. Such a model of behavior has proven a useful abstraction of 
reality in market settings with complete information and perfectly enforceable contracts, 
where people behave ‘as if’ they make decisions in this atomized way.8 But it is unable to 
explain the countless examples of cooperative behavior that occur outside the formal market, 
when contracts are not perfectly enforceable or when free-riding poses a serious threat to joint 
action.  
A missing but crucial factor in the analysis of cooperative behavior was the level of 
social capital in a community. Social capital has been described using a wide array of terms 
ranging from trust, shared values and norms via social networks and voluntary organizations 
to “the glue that holds society together”. There is considerable debate regarding the usefulness 
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 Even in such settings, entrepreneurs with an extended social network will perform better than others for 
example.  
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of social capital as a concept. However, neglecting social relations, trust, norms of behavior 
and other-regarding preferences in economic analyses not only diminishes the ability to 
understand and predict behavior, but could also lead to wrong policy recommendations, with 
little impact at best or effects completely opposite from intended at worst. 
This chapter reviews the literature on social capital and cooperation, with a specific 
focus on developing countries. It singles out a number of issues that lack quantitative 
empirical evidence in support of the theoretical models, and that are taken up further in the 
remainder of the thesis. The next section discusses the origins of the concept, the sources or 
determinants of social capital as well as a number of potential downsides. Social capital 
generates externalities through a number of mechanisms that can be classified into four broad 
categories: the propensity to engage in collective action, the informal exchange of resources, 
the enforcement of contracts, and the dissemination of information. In the subsequent sections 
these mechanisms are discussed in turn.   
 
2.2 Determinants of social capital 
 
2.2.1  Origins of social capital 
Originally, the concept of social capital referred to the resources that individuals can 
access through their social network. Bourdieu  introduced the term as one of three fungible 
forms of capital that an individual can invest in – economic capital, cultural capital (including 
human capital) and social capital.9 In his view, social capital represents an often hidden but 
powerful mechanism for advancement in society. Bourdieu  describes social capital as follows 
: “The volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the 
network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital 
(economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is 
connected”.  
Similarly, Coleman (1988) initially described social capital as a resource available to 
actors –whether persons or corporate actors– within a social structure. Social networks, 
trustworthiness, norms and sanctions facilitate the achievement of goals that otherwise would 
have been achieved only at a higher cost. Moreover, these different forms of social capital 
facilitate cooperation within groups to provide collective goods (Coleman, 1990). 
Putnam (1993) took this initial reference to beneficial group outcomes one step further 
and argued that differences in social capital lie at the core of the different levels of economic 
development between North and South Italy. Likewise, the rise in crime and other ails of 
modern-day society in the United States are attributed to declining levels of social capital 
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 In fact, the notion of “social capital” existed long before Bourdieu used it, see for example Portes and 
Sensenbrenner (1993) for a short overview of social, political and economic contributions. However, social 
capital as a concept became popular mainly through the seminal work of the authors mentioned in this section.  
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(Putnam, 2000). He defines social capital as the “features of social organization, such as 
networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.” 
(p. 167). In Putnam’s work, social capital is not so much a resource for individuals as it is an 
asset of communities, regions or even entire nations that enhances the efficiency of society 
and promotes development.  
The approach to social capital as a ‘stock’ for societies soon became highly popular. 
Descriptions of social capital as the ‘fabric of society’ initiated a new direction in the social 
capital literature towards analyses at the aggregate level. Particularly influential in 
development circles has been the work of Narayan and Pritchett (1999). They use social 
capital variables at the community level, such as the quantity and quality of associational life 
and aggregate measures of trust in strangers and government officials, to explain individual 
level outcomes. Their main finding is that household level income is significantly related to 
community social capital, regardless of a household’s own contribution to the social capital 
level.10 This type of research suggests that social capital may produce considerable 
externalities for the members of a community.  
Compelling as these studies are, a few reservations are in place. First, the proxies used 
to measure the ‘stock’ of social capital often lack a sound theoretical foundation, which 
makes it difficult to interpret the results. In particular, a failure to disentangle sources and 
consequences of social capital can lead to tautological reasoning or truisms, leaving little 
room for empirical testing (Portes, 1998, 2000; Sobel, 2002).  
Second, and more generally, studies that aim to measure the effect of group level 
behavior on individual behavior often run into problems of causality (Manski, 2000; Durlauf, 
2002; Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). 11 Many empirical studies of social capital do not 
adequately deal with issues such as endogeneity, simultaneity or spurious effects. As a result, 
it remains unclear whether the correlations reflect a causal relationship from higher social 
capital to better outcomes, whether they capture reverse causality or the effect of a third 
outside factor for example.  
 
2.2.2 Working definition of social capital 
Since these early works, the term “social capital” has been embraced by economists, 
sociologists and political scientists alike. The subsequent surge in literature was paralleled by 
a wide variety in definitions. Nonetheless, there has been convergence in the literature 
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 Similar studies have been replicated in other countries, such as Indonesia (Grootaert, 1999) or Burkina Faso 
(Grootaert et al., 2002), with broadly comparable results. 
11
 In particular, group and individual behavior may be correlated because of three distinct effects (Manski, 1993, 
2000): group behavior influences individual behavior and outcomes (‘endogenous’ interactions), group 
characteristics influence individual behavior and outcomes (‘contextual’ interactions), and both the group and 
the individual have similar characteristics or face similar institutional environments and hence behave similarly 
(‘correlated’ effects). Only the first case can generate true spillover effects when the behavior of some 
individuals affects the others in the group. 
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towards a general meaning of the term. Three aspects are, explicitly or implicitly, common to 
most definitions (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004, p. 5):  
1) Social capital generates (…) externalities for members of a group;12 
2) These externalities are achieved through shared trust, norms, and values and their 
consequent effects on expectations and behavior;  
3) Shared trust, norms, and values arise from informal forms of organization based on 
social networks and associations. 
The first aspect refers to the expected outcomes of social capital. Externalities arise 
whenever the behavior and decisions of some individuals (unintentionally) affect the 
outcomes of others that are not involved in the original behavior. The externalities related to 
social capital have been analyzed in a large range of contexts such as families and youth 
behavior, schooling and education, community life, work and organizations, democracy and 
governance, collective action, public health and environment, crime and violence, and 
economic development (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).  
The second and third aspects capture the determinants of social capital. Shared trust, 
norms and values can also be termed cognitive social capital (Uphoff, 2000). They are based 
in mental processes and are often difficult to observe. Social networks, informal 
organizations, and voluntary associations –the third component– together constitute structural 
social capital (Uphoff, 2000). Structural social capital is more easily observed, and hence has 
received most attention in empirical work.  
Not all studies of social capital restrict themselves to informal forms of organization. 
Norms and trust arise (and may play important roles) within formal institutional settings such 
as the market. In this thesis however, we will deal mainly with social capital embedded in 
social networks outside the domain of the market or the state. More precisely, we look at 
social capital especially in situations where markets are imperfect or governments are not 
capable or willing to provide a collective good.  
Many studies of social capital include a notion of positive outcomes in their definition 
of social capital. However, this is problematic as it may lead to circular reasoning.  Especially 
studies that consider social capital to be an attribute of communities often define social capital 
in terms of its beneficial effect on cooperation while at the same time measuring the presence 
of social capital by the levels of cooperation (Portes, 2000). For empirical analyses, a 
definition should clearly distinguish between determinants and outcomes. An underlying 
theoretical framework that specifies the causal relationship between the two is necessary to 
provide hypotheses to be tested (Durlauf, 2002). For economic analyses of household 
behavior, a framework based on individual incentives and decision-making seems most 
appropriate (Glaeser et al., 2002).  
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 In their working paper, Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) note that most definitions implicitly or explicitly 
assume that social capital generates positive externalities. This issue is discussed in more detail later in this 
section.  
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A number of authors have criticized the concept of social capital as being too vague, 
an umbrella term to be used at each one’s discretion, or a new label for old goods (e.g. 
Manski, 2000). But being an umbrella term is not necessarily a disqualification. Both 
financial and human capital for example can be decomposed in many forms as well 
(Coleman, 1990). What matters is whether social capital as a concept is sufficiently distinct 
and has substantial added value to physical, natural and human capital (Collier, 1998; Paldam 
and Svendsen, 2000; Uphoff, 2000). 
Others, while recognizing the importance of social networks and trust for economic 
behavior, have questioned whether social capital is actually a form of capital (Arrow, 2000; 
Solow, 2000; Sobel, 2002). Although social capital may not be alienable, and its value 
appreciates instead of depreciating with use, again these characteristics also apply to some 
forms of human capital (Ostrom and Ahn, 2002). In addition, social capital is a resource, 
albeit not the property of an individual but residing in social relations, that can be employed 
to increase utility. Although many social relations and social norms are not a product of 
instrumental behavior, individuals can invest in social capital such as social relations or a 
reputation of trustworthiness in order to improve future outcomes (Paldam and Svendsen, 
2000; Glaeser et al., 2002). To the extent that social capital produces externalities, there may 
be under- or overinvestment in social capital (Collier, 1998). 
The remainder of the thesis will use Durlauf and Fafchamps’ (2004) second and third 
component as the basis for a working definition of social capital. That is, social capital 
consists both of a cognitive and structural dimension. Taken together, these two broad groups 
of determinants of social capital influence individual expectations and behavior that in turn 
affect individuals’ own outcomes as well as the outcomes of others in their social network or 
community. This allows for an analysis based on the core economic concepts of preferences, 
expectations, constraints and equilibrium (Manski, 2000).13 However, given the wide range of 
outcomes that social capital may affect, it is unfeasible to provide one theoretical framework 
that captures all processes at work. Instead, it is more useful to outline a framework for the 
particular outcome under investigation and describe for each specific determinant how it 
would affect behavior.  
 
2.2.3  The mechanisms behind social capital 
Many empirical studies include social capital proxies in a regression to explain a 
particular outcome, without formulating a clear theoretical framework of how social capital 
affects outcomes.14 Although initially such studies were useful in showing that trust or 
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 An individual’s norms and values affect her preferences and strategy set. Trust is closely related to 
expectations and beliefs, as we will see. Opportunities and constraints are partly determined by one’s social 
relations and their available resources, and shaped by the prevailing norms in a community.  
14
 See for example Durlauf and Fafchamps (1997) for a review of empirical studies in both OECD and 
developing countries. 
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networks matter, they do not provide much guidance in understanding the underlying 
dynamics. Following Ostrom (1998) and Ostrom and Ahn (2002), I use a behavioral approach 
to study social capital. In fact, numerous theoretical models exist to explain the relationship 
between trust, norms, networks and cooperation, although these models are usually not placed 
within a social capital framework.  
This thesis focuses on four mechanisms through which social capital affects individual 
outcomes and wellbeing. First of all, a large body of literature is based on the assumption that 
social capital influences a community’s propensity to engage in collective action. It has 
become increasingly clear that the classical rational choice approach is not fully able to 
explain the emergence of collective action. Social sanctions, norms (of reciprocity, fairness, 
cooperation) and communication in social networks are of particular importance. They play a 
decisive role in fostering trust and cooperation.  
A second mechanism centers on the informal exchange of resources. When essential 
markets are functioning at a suboptimal level, most people fall back on each other to gain 
access to labor, child care, financial aid or other forms of assistance. Especially in times of 
crisis such informal support networks can mean the difference between falling into destitute 
poverty and coping until better times arrive. The structure of social networks and the 
resources residing in those networks are of particular importance to determine whether 
households are able to cope with risks. However, norms and values will influence whether 
others want to share their resources with a particular household. And since an act of assistance 
today is usually not immediately reciprocated, trust and trustworthiness are essential as well.   
The third mechanism refers to contract enforcement and in particular to the reduction 
of transaction costs and monitoring costs in economic exchanges. In case of asymmetric 
information or when contracts are not perfectly enforceable, norms prevalent in a community 
may decrease the risk of moral hazard or rent-seeking. The need for costly monitoring 
decreases when the trustworthiness of actors increases. Social networks are important means 
of transmitting information on actual behavior (monitoring) and of applying social sanctions 
for default, which in turn increases the value of upholding a good reputation. This mechanism 
has been the central focus of many studies on economic development. In this thesis, we 
restrict our attention to the relationship between social capital and access to credit.  
Finally, a fourth mechanism through which social capital influences outcomes is the 
diffusion of knowledge and information. Often information, such as knowledge on 
agricultural techniques or on the benefits of contraceptives, is difficult or costly to acquire, 
especially in underdeveloped and remote areas. In those cases, social networks play important 
roles in transmitting information on new technologies and experiences. Mimicry, herding 
behavior or the evolution of social norms reinforce the process of adoption.  
A combination of mechanisms may be at work simultaneously to influence a particular 
outcome. For example, collective efforts of parents to improve the school facilities may 
enhance school enrolment, but increased information or changing norms regarding the value 
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of girls’ education may be of equal importance (see chapter 5). The informal provision of 
credit from one household to another in order to set up a small business constitutes informal 
assistance. But if third parties in the social network keep an eye on the use of the money and 
the efforts deployed to repay the loan, the monitoring costs and hence the risk of default for 
the lender will decrease (see chapter 6).  
Additional mechanisms of social capital exist beyond the four mentioned above. For 
example, research on social capital and governance often looks at civic attitudes and 
accountability issues. However, the four mechanisms just described are the main focus of this 
thesis. A review of the literature on each of them will be discussed in detail in section 2.3 and 
onwards. The relationship between social capital and collective action will receive most 
attention. It includes an elaborate discussion of the role of social sanctions, the evolution of 
norms, and potential network effects. To a large extent this discussion is equally applicable to 
the other mechanisms. 
Social capital can improve on everyone’s outcomes only in situations where the 
decentralized equilibrium without social capital is not Pareto-efficient in the first place 
(Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). The previous discussion mentions a number of reasons why 
an equilibrium may be suboptimal (e.g. externalities, free riding in social dilemmas, imperfect 
information or enforcement). Under such circumstances social capital may improve upon the 
equilibrium, for example by solving a coordination failure, or changing individual incentives. 
But this implies that any other mechanism apart from social capital with a similar effect could 
also be a solution to solve the inefficiency, such as the development of legal institutions or 
state interventions. On the other hand, it also suggests that the use of social capital may be the 
best (temporary) solution whenever states do not have the capacity to adequately intervene or 
when markets are still underdeveloped. 
 
2.2.4  Downsides of social capital 
As already mentioned in section 2.2.2, many studies assume that social capital 
generates positive externalities for members of a group. The one-sided emphasis on the 
beneficial effects of social capital is problematic for a number of reasons (Portes, 1998; 
Woolcock, 1998). First of all, it ignores the externalities on individuals that are not member of 
the group in question. The well-known example of the mafia with goals counterproductive to 
society illustrates that such externalities need not always be positive.  
More important however is the fact that groups by definition have boundaries. Strong 
within-group trust and cooperation indeed yield benefits for the included individuals. But 
strong within-group trust is often accompanied by low interaction with and trust in outsiders 
to the group (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). Inevitably, other individuals will be excluded from 
access to resources and voice in the network. The tendency for exclusion of outsiders is 
especially harmful to minorities and other vulnerable groups. Especially in unequal societies 
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with pronounced power asymmetries, strong social capital can reinforce the status quo of 
exclusion (Narayan, 1999). 
Even within groups the externalities are not always positive. Strong norms of behavior 
can put serious restrictions on individual freedom. In India this is for example the case for 
people belonging to the lowest castes, for women, and for widows in particular (Nabar, 1995). 
Other social norms allow the elite to appropriate relatively large parts of resources available 
to the community, often endorsed by the poorer members of a community (Platteau, 2003).  
Downward leveling norms in a community may prohibit individuals from 
advancement in society. Such norms will hamper the entire community’s progress. Additional 
downsides of social capital stem from excessive claims from close and distant relatives on 
well-off individuals. This might serve a good purpose in hard times. But excessive claims also 
dilute the incentives for individuals to undertake new initiatives and start a business for 
example (Platteau and Abraham, 2002). That is, “communities are good in enforcing norms, 
but whether that is good depends on what the norms are” (Bowles and Gintis, 2002, p. F428). 
Thus, what matters are the specific norms that people adhere to, as well as the 
boundaries and structure of social networks. Social capital might have a negative impact if 
norms restrict freedom, restrain initiatives or exclude outsiders. But overall, trust and social 
norms of cooperation or fairness are likely to be beneficial for individuals and communities. 
Or, as Woolcock and Narayan (2000) put it, the social ties of a person can both have positive 
and negative effects, while the ties that one does not have can deny access to resources. This 
has an important implication for the analysis of social capital. Since social capital can 
generate negative as well as positive externalities, it is difficult to measure the impact of 
social capital at an aggregate level.15 Therefore, the levels of analysis in the empirical chapters 
of this thesis will be confined to individuals and the communities they live in.  
 
 
2.3 Social capital and the propensity to engage in collective 
action 
 
The first important mechanism through which social capital may improve wellbeing is 
through its influence on the propensity of communities to engage in collective action. This 
definition of social capital is widely used throughout the literature and in the world of 
                                                 
15
 In a cross-country study of 29 western economies, Knack and Keefer (1997) find a significant correlation 
between trust, civic norms and economic development, but not between the number of group memberships and 
growth. They conjecture that the dataset does not allow them to distinguish between socially efficient and 
inefficient memberships and activities, which may increase trust but also facilitate rent-seeking.  
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development aid. It is for example the official World Bank definition of social capital.16 
Economic research on collective action has mostly evolved outside the social capital domain. 
However, as this section will show, the majority of recent insights with respect to the 
emergence or absence of collective action fall neatly within the categories called cognitive 
and structural social capital in section 2.2.2.  
The following sections will give an overview of collective action theories. We start 
with a discussion of the social dilemma inherent to collective action (2.3.1). The classical 
rational choice theories, translated into game-theoretic models, have been leading in 
explaining why collective action may fail even if universal cooperation would make all 
individuals better off (2.3.2). They have been less successful however in explaining the 
experimental findings that systematically deviate from game-theoretic predictions (2.3.3). A 
number of finding facts from experimental research points to new theoretical directions. A 
first important addition comes in the form of social sanctions and the evolution of social 
norms (2.3.4). Second, communication in social networks is essential to transmit information 
on intentions as well as actual behavior (2.3.5). It increases the importance of reputation and 
the effectiveness of (the threat of) social sanctions. Section 2.3.6 discusses the interpretation 
of trust. Finally, section 2.3.7 provides a framework for the role of community-based 
development projects in enhancing trust and collective action.  
 
2.3.1  The social dilemma inherent to collective action 
Collective action in its broadest sense is the behavior of a group of individuals aimed 
at reaching a common goal. This goal can be the provision of a good or service, such as joint 
agricultural production or the renovation of a primary school. It might be more intangible, 
such as enabling a safe environment to walk around at night. Sometimes it consists of 
preventing a bad outcome from occurring, such as over-grazing. A common element in all 
collective actions is that the benefits accruing to each individual, or the costs necessary to 
reach the goal, depend not only on one’s own efforts but to a large extent on the number of 
others that cooperate. That is, collective action produces externalities.  
When a group of individuals has a common objective and if all will benefit from 
cooperation, then it follows logically that rational and self-interested individuals will indeed 
cooperate to provide the collective good. At least, that is what early group theorists assumed 
(e.g. Bentley, 1949). This reassuring thought was shattered with the publication of Mancur 
Olson’s  seminal work The Logic of Collective Action (1965). Olson convincingly argued that, 
if individuals cannot be excluded from consumption of the collective good, and if the 
marginal benefits to an individual of his own contribution are small, then individuals will 
rationally choose not to contribute. Without external coercion, there are only two solutions to 
                                                 
16 The World Bank defines social capital as “the norms and networks that enable collective action. It 
encompasses institutions, relationships, and customs that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social 
interactions.” (www.worldbank.org/socialcapital)  
  
22 
solve the collective action problem. Either the group is ‘privileged’ with members interested 
enough to supply the good by themselves, or else selective incentives (i.e. private benefits and 
costs attached to cooperation) are necessary to induce individuals to contribute. 
Shortly after Olson’s publication, Garrett Hardin (1968) outlined the now popular 
concept of the “Tragedy of the Commons”. In a world with common but limited resources, it 
is beneficial to everyone to jointly restrict use of the resource in order to prevent exhaustion. 
But when individuals use a common resource, they do not bear the entire costs of their 
actions. Without external regulation or collective rules to restrict use, each will rationally 
maximize individual use and the commons are threatened with overexploitation.  
These so-called social dilemmas, where individual incentives contrast with the optimal 
behavior for the group as a whole, are central to most of the collective action literature. Public 
goods are the best known examples of social dilemmas in economics. They are characterized 
by two elements: non-excludability and jointness of supply17 (Samuelson, 1954). However, 
most collective action problems do not refer to pure public goods. Often, non-excludability is 
the only issue, such as is the case for common property resources. In other cases collective 
goods are underprovided, not because people cannot be excluded, but because a certain 
minimum number of individuals are necessary for the benefits to materialize. Here, the lack of 
collective action is essentially a coordination failure. In such situations a group can be 
‘trapped’ in a sub-optimal equilibrium instead of the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. If a critical 
mass of individuals would simultaneously decide to contribute, all participants would be 
better off. 
 
2.3.2  Collective action from a rational choice perspective 
Social dilemmas were soon formalized in game-theoretic terms. The standard 
approach translated the collective action problem into the classical Prisoner’s Dilemma.18 In 
such a dilemma, a self-interested utility-maximizing individual will always defect, since this 
will provide him with the highest pay-off regardless of the action of the other player. Hence, 
the unique Nash-equilibrium of this game is joint defection but both would have been better 
off if they had both cooperated. That is, the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto-efficient. 
Collective action problems generally involve more than two persons that have to decide 
whether to cooperate or not. An extension of the analysis to an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma 
                                                 
17 Jointness of supply refers to the characteristic that the consumption of a good by one individual does not 
diminish the amount available to others. Essentially, it means that the costs of providing a public good are fixed. 
18
 Dependent on the payoff structure, five types of games exhaustively describe the choices that individuals face 
in social dilemmas (Heckathorn, 1996). These are the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Assurance Game, the Chicken 
Game and two trivial games (the Altruist Dilemma and No Dilemma). In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the main 
problem is trust or more precisely, the lack of trust if one suspects the other to free-ride. In the Assurance Game, 
the essential problem is coordination on the most efficient action. This type of dilemma will be discussed in 
more detail in section 2.3.5. In the Chicken Game, the problem is a bargaining process. Each individual would 
prefer to cooperate if the other defects but prefers even more to defect himself while the other cooperates. This 
situation is usually dealt with in the bargaining literature and will be left out of consideration in this thesis.  
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yields the same unique and Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium in which none of the 
individuals cooperates (Hardin, 1971, 1982). 
The unsettling Nash prediction of universal defection in social dilemmas started off an 
enormous literature on collective action. The logic behind (the lack of) collective action 
seemed irrefutable at first sight. But how then could the theory explain the innumerable cases 
where collective action in fact took place?  From our daily lives and from hundreds of case 
studies, we know that reality is not as grim as the discussion above suggests. The main 
question therefore is how individuals overcome the free-riding problem. Why are some 
groups successful in providing collective goods, while others consistently fail to cooperate? 
Why do some communities successfully cooperate for generations, but does cooperation all of 
a sudden break down not to be restored? 
The most straightforward extension of the static Prisoners’ Dilemma involves the 
introduction of dynamics into the model.19 Usually, social dilemmas are not one-time events. 
The same collective action problem occurs regularly over time. At each new encounter, 
individuals will have to decide whether to cooperate or not. Repeating the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma a finite number of times however still yields a single and Pareto-inefficient Nash 
equilibrium in which both individuals defect.  
If uncertainty regarding the ending of the interaction is introduced (i.e. if interactions 
are continuous over time or if individuals do not know exactly when interactions will end), 
the results change dramatically. Infinitely repeated games open the door for strategic 
interactions that can support continued cooperation. Once individuals can act strategically, 
reputation starts to matter. A ‘grim trigger’ strategy for example would specify that an 
individual always cooperates until the other defects, and defect forever after. Individuals 
dealing with others who follow this strategy will have to make a trade-off between the one 
time higher pay-offs from defection and the discounted value of the future high pay-offs from 
continued cooperation (see for example Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). If both individuals 
follow a grim trigger strategy, this is a Nash equilibrium in which both will cooperate.  
A grim trigger strategy, however, is very unforgiving. If one individual defects, 
cooperation is ruled out forever. Another well-known and more realistic strategy is tit-for-tat 
in which an individual starts with cooperating and thereafter imitates the behavior of the other 
player. Cooperation of the other player is rewarded by cooperating in the next round, and 
defection is punished by defecting in the next round. If the shadow of the future is large 
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 Other assumptions underlying the basic model that have been relaxed over time are the payoff- and cost-
structure (Prisoner’s Dilemma vs. coordination failure), rationality (vs. bounded rationality), self-interest (vs. 
other-regarding preferences), known time-horizon (vs. uncertainty), independence (vs. thresholds), simultaneous 
decision-making (vs. sequentiality), symmetry (vs. heterogeneous resources, interests, preferences, types), 
anonymity (vs. communication in social networks), and the absence of institutions (vs. the presence of rules, 
social norms, social monitoring). 
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enough, such a norm of reciprocity represents a Nash equilibrium that can support continuous 
cooperation.20  
In fact, in infinitely repeated games an infinitely large number of Nash equilibria exist, 
as postulated in the Folk Theorem. In other words, any amount of cooperation can be 
sustained in equilibrium. This shows that rational self-interested individuals can indeed 
cooperate forever, refuting Olson’s pessimistic stance. But it offers little help in explaining 
why we would find a certain outcome in one group but not in another, nor how these different 
levels of cooperation come about. 
 
2.3.3  Insights from experimental economics 
A look at the evidence from laboratory experiments reveals a number of systematic 
deviations from the early theoretical predictions (Ostrom, 1998; Van Winden, 2002). An 
analysis of these discrepancies gives insights in the assumptions that need adjustment.21 
Cardenas and Carpenter (2004) provide an extensive overview of public good experiments in 
developing countries. Ledyard (1995) reviews such experiments in industrialized countries. 
The most important findings will be discussed in turn. 
A first consistent finding is that individuals cooperate consistently more often in one-
shot and finitely repeated public good experiments22 than would be expected from a rational 
choice perspective, with average contributions between 40 and 60 percent of endowments 
(Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). 23 This result is found with student and non-student populations in 
both industrialized countries and in developing countries such as Russia and Belarus 
(Gaechter et al., 2004), Zimbabwe (Barr, 2001), or for example Papua New Guinea, 
Mongolia, Tanzania, and Ecuador (Henrich et al., 2001).   
A second important finding is that the introduction of the opportunity to punish 
defectors dramatically increases contribution levels (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gaechter, 
2000; Barr, 2001). This result is also found in Southeast Asian urban slums, where even 
                                                 
20In a famous tournament, Axelrod (1984) invited game theorists to submit strategies for a repeated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. The tit-for-tat strategy consistently emerged as the winning strategy with the highest average score of 
all submissions. Two conditions were necessary: substantial probabilities of future interaction and selective 
cooperative interaction with other strategies.  
21
 This approach is also called behavioral economics (Camerer, 1997). 
22
 In a typical public good experiment, the pay-off function πi for each individual i from a group with n members 
has the form πi = p(z-xi)+gΣjxj with j = 1, …, n. z is the total initial endowment for each individual, xi is the 
number of tokens that individual i allocates to the public good, and p and g are the returns for each individual on 
the private and public good respectively. Since gn > p > g > 0, it is rational for each individual to contribute 
nothing, although each individual would have received a higher payoff if all had contributed their full 
endowment to the public good.  
23
 Towards the end of finitely repeated games, cooperation levels decline towards zero although a small 
proportion remains positive (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Some have suggested that the declining trend shows the 
learning curve of people over time (Ledyard, 1995). The more rounds they have played, the better they would 
understand the game and the implications of each choice. However, this is not consistent with the finding of 
Isaac et al. (1994) that cooperation remains at substantial levels until the end of the game comes in sight, 
regardless of the number of rounds (i.e. 10, 40, or 60 rounds) to be played (Ostrom, 1998). 
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informal sanctions without monetary consequences are effective in increasing cooperation 
(Cardenas, 2003). In rural villages in Zimbabwe, Barr (2001) finds that not only victims but 
also witnesses of criticism make subsequent adjustments in their contributions. When players 
have the ability to expel non-cooperators from the group, contributions increase to almost 100 
percent (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005). 
Individuals sanction free-riders even if it comes at a cost to themselves and in the last 
round of experiments (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). This suggests that behavior is not only 
guided by strategic motives. Moreover, individuals not only punish defectors but also 
cooperators who do not punish defectors themselves (Seinen and Schram, 2006). Essentially, 
such behavior represents a second-order social dilemma or a so-called meta-norm (Axelrod, 
1986). When the opportunity of punishing non-punishers is included in an experiment, 
cooperation levels increase even further towards the optimal or socially efficient level. 
Similarly, individuals are also inclined to punish others for selfish behavior even if they are 
not affected by this behavior themselves, so called third-party punishment (Fehr et al., 2002). 
Third, not all individuals are equally likely to cooperate or to sanction non-
cooperators. As experiments show, individuals can generally be divided in defectors, 
unconditional cooperators, conditional cooperators who reciprocate cooperative behavior, and 
enforcers who not only reciprocate cooperative behavior but also punish defectors (Ostrom, 
2000). Dependent on the relative proportions of these types in a group, different levels of 
cooperation will emerge.  
Finally, numerous experimental studies show that communication significantly raises 
cooperation.24 From a game-theoretic perspective however, communication without the means 
of enforcement is merely ‘cheap talk’ and should not affect decisions. In an experimental 
study of a common resource game in rural Colombia, Cardenas et al. (2004) find that 
communication served at least four purposes in sustaining cooperation. Communication 
helped to identify and clarify the group goal to all group members. Conversations extracted 
agreements and ratifications from players to choose the optimal behavior (i.e. they produced 
commitment). Communication facilitated type-detection. And it reinforced the agreements, 
among others through criticism of defectors.   
In sum, people do not behave as predicted by traditional game theory. Instead, they are 
significantly more inclined to cooperate than predicted. They care about others’ utility and 
reciprocate unfair behavior. They are willing to punish defectors and non-punishers even at a 
substantial cost to themselves. When people can communicate, cooperation increases 
substantially. The challenge is to incorporate these systematic findings into theoretical models 
that describe (bounded rational) behavior and yield testable hypotheses without becoming too 
complex. Norms of reciprocity are often advanced to explain behavior such as a tit-for-tat 
strategy, that rewards other individuals for good acts, but punishes them for selfish or 
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 See Sally (1995) for a meta-analysis of over one hundred experimental studies on communication in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
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negative acts (Bowles and Gintis, 2002). The following section reviews the literature that 
attempts to explain the evolution of norms and other-regarding preferences. Section 2.3.5 will 
discuss the theoretical models that explicitly take into account the role of networks and 
communication in solving problems of collective action.  
 
2.3.4  The evolution of norms  
Norms are often interpreted as behavioral strategies for given settings, which are 
partly sustained by feelings of embarrassment, guilt or shame that a person may experience if 
violating them. When such codes of conduct are shared within a group of people, and 
sustained by social approval and disapproval, they are called social norms (Elster, 1989). In 
the context of collective action, norms of cooperation, fairness and reciprocity are especially 
relevant. The widespread use of sanctions in experiments is a reflection of such norms. In 
order to explain the dynamics of collective action, it is necessary to have an understanding of 
how norms arise and how they are sustained within a group.25 
Evolutionary models are increasingly popular to explain the emergence or decline of 
norms (Bardhan, 1993; Basu, 1995; Macy and Flache, 1995; Heckathorn, 1996; Bendor and 
Swistak, 2001).26 In such models individuals do not behave according to the strong rationality 
assumptions of traditional game theory. Rationality implies that an individual has the capacity 
to oversee all the potential strategies at hand and calculate all the consequences of his 
behavior given the reactions of others to his behavior. But in reality people have a limited 
mental capacity to look ahead, to reason strategically and to deal with probabilities (Van 
Winden, 2002). Instead, they use rules-of-thumb –such as conventions learned during early 
socialization or through experiences later in life, to decide whether they want to retain their 
current strategy or change it to more successful behavior.  
In the basic model, individuals are randomly matched in each round with another actor 
to play a symmetric 2-person game, such as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Individuals will adjust 
their behavior if it performs worse than a benchmark, usually the mean population pay-off.27 
Dependent on how much the pay-off of an individual’s strategy is below (above) the 
population average, there is an increasing (decreasing) probability that the strategy is 
abandoned and replaced with a better performing strategy. Thus, although the decision is 
based on an evaluation of outcomes, the outcomes considered are not the consequences of 
future behavior but the observed consequences of past behavior.  
Strategies are not interpreted as potential actions, but instead reflect the type of a 
player that can ‘survive’ in a population because effective types are either more likely to have 
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 For an interesting discussion on the rationale behind the existence of norms, see Elster (1989)  
26
 See Sethi and Somanathan (2003) for a clear and intuitive discussion of the dynamics of norms of reciprocity 
in evolutionary models and a review of the literature.  
27
 Such models are also called observational evolutionary models. In learning models on the other hand, the 
benchmark for the evaluation of a strategy is the aspiration level of the individual himself and individuals learn 
by trial-and-error (Macy and Flache, 2002).  
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offspring or less likely to adjust their strategy over time. In contrast to traditional game-
theoretic models that focus on strategies in equilibrium, evolutionary models specifically 
analyze how the distribution of strategies in a population changes over time. An equilibrium 
strategy is called evolutionary stable when it is immune28 against invaders into the 
population.29  
An extension to the basic model is the incorporation of sanctions for defection in 
addition to a mere withdrawal of cooperation. In the model of Bendor and Swistak (2001) for 
example, the strength of social sanctions depends on the number of cooperators who punish 
defectors (i.e. on the number of enforcers), and on the weight attached to social approval and 
disapproval. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) develop a particularly insightful evolutionary 
model to explain behavior in common resource dilemmas with a dynamic natural resource 
stock. Without sanctions for non-cooperation, no individual will restrain his use of the 
resource, resulting in overexploitation. Once voluntary (but costly) sanctions are introduced, 
the population can evolve towards two possible stable states: either an individualistic society 
of defectors, or a norm-guided society of cooperators and enforcers. A small or temporary 
change in payoffs can result in an irreversible change of behavior towards overexploitation. 
Both a decline in the intensity of social sanctions –for example when villages become less 
isolated– and a rise in the net returns from resource extraction may cause the breakdown of a 
norm of restraint.  
In the previous discussion, norms where interpreted as behavioral strategies. Another 
strand of literature includes norms directly in the preference function instead of in the strategy 
set. Again, individuals learn from experience and adapt their preferences and behavior 
accordingly. This is also called the indirect evolutionary approach (Ostrom, 2000). In the 
model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), an aversion against inequality leads to a lower utility 
when payoffs are unfair, especially but not solely when the inequality is to an individual’s 
own material disadvantage. Social sanctions are a response to the violation of fairness norms. 
Such preferences can explain for example why people reject unfair offers (Cardenas and 
Carpenter, 2004) but also why in some cases high contributors are punished as well (Barr, 
2001). Güth and Kliemt (1998) incorporate norms into subjective preferences that differ 
across types, which are then endogenized. Although the objective payoffs from defecting are 
equal among all types, trustworthy types subjectively value these payoffs less than rational 
egoists and are therefore less likely to betray trust. In a similar vein, Bowles (1998) introduces 
a preference for cultural conformity in the utility function. Early socialization, exposure, or 
learning-by-doing are all mechanisms for cultural transmission. Again, an evolutionary stable 
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 Consider a population where all individuals are of type p. The strategy p is immune to the strategy q if: 1) 
V(p,p) ≥ V(q,p) where V(q,p) is the payoff of playing strategy q when the other player plays strategy p; and 2) if 
V(p,p) = V(q,p), then V(p,q) ≥ V(q,q). 
29
 Computer simulations of evolutionary prisoner’s dilemmas show that, if matching is non-random and 
cooperative types are more likely to interact with each other, a population of conditional cooperators is immune 
against an invasion of defectors but not the other way round (Axelrod, 1981, 1984; Heckathorn, 1996). 
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equilibrium of cooperation can emerge that does not require equal pay-off among types 
because individuals with a preference for a certain norm will be satisfied with lower objective 
(but not subjective) pay-offs.  
Norms and emotions have been incorporated in preference functions in non-
evolutionary models as well. Hollander (1990) motivates cooperation in public good settings 
in part by status orientation and preferences for social approval, which depend on one’s 
relative contributions to the public good. Rabin (1993) proposes a model based on norms of 
fairness and reciprocity where sanctions depend crucially on the intentions of the defector as 
well as on the context. Moreover, punishment levels will not be the same for a one-time 
defection as for structural free-riding. This allows for a system of gradual sanctioning 
dependent on the severity and prevalence of defection, as is commonly encountered in the 
field (Ostrom, 1990, 2000).  
In sum, evolutionary models have come a considerable way in explaining a number of 
the systematic findings from experiments and experience from the field. First of all, people 
are not all the same. They differ in their willingness to contribute to collective action and in 
their subjective valuation of the outcomes of cooperation. Some individuals are intrinsically 
more motivated than others to contribute to a public good or restrict use of a common 
resource. Once a small group of cooperative people have identified each other and benefit 
from their joint efforts, this can induce others to cooperate as well if the perceived payoffs are 
sufficiently high. On the other hand, when the majority of a population fails to participate, 
initial contributors may become disappointed and stop cooperating as well. In other words, 
dependent on the number of types in a community, collective action may thrive or fail. 
Sanctions play an important role in sustaining collective action, either in the form of 
withdrawal of future cooperation or as immediate punishment.   
Chapter 4 provides a quantitative empirical analysis of the role of norms in enhancing 
collective action. It will examine to what extent individuals’ norms of reciprocity induce them 
to contribute to public good provision and whether village level norms of reciprocity –
reflecting a threat of social sanctions on defection, increase individual cooperation. 
 
2.3.5  Network models and coordination failures  
In the models just described, people observe the actions or outcomes of all others. 
Similar to direct observation, communication on behavior enables individuals to know how 
others behaved in third-party interactions. This increases the threat of social sanctions and 
strengthens the value of a good reputation. Communication is also important to the extent that 
it transmits information on the intentions of others. This facilitates coordination and shapes 
beliefs regarding the types of people in a group. But if communication matters that much, 
then it is important to understand who talks to whom and how this affects cooperation. The 
evolutionary models in the previous section do not explicitly take into account the structure of 
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social ties among group members. Network models on the other hand focus precisely on the 
social structure to understand behavior and outcomes. 
Raub and Weesie (1990) develop a model in which social ties transmit information 
about the behavior of others in prisoner’s dilemmas. If an individual cheats on one person, 
communication about this behavior will reach others in the (sub-)group who may 
subsequently withdraw their cooperation with the defector. A shorter time lag of information 
diffusion enhances cooperation, such as in communities with a lot of daily gossip and social 
control. In Gould’s (1993) model of public good production, individuals match (part of) the 
average contributions made by others in their social subgroup out of fairness considerations. 
Initial volunteers in such a setting can stimulate others to participate, whereas conversely, 
defectors can negatively influence their neighbors.  
Many network models do not analyze collective action in terms of a prisoner’s 
dilemma but as a coordination failure (Macy and Flache, 1995). In coordination dilemmas the 
temptation to free ride is essentially assumed away. Everybody is better off with joint 
cooperation, but if individuals doubt that enough others will cooperate, they might play safe 
and decide not to contribute themselves.30 This in turn can result in suboptimal equilibria in 
which no one contributes and all are worse off.  
Such studies are often based on threshold models of collective action (Granovetter, 
1978; Oliver et al., 1985; Macy, 1991). Thresholds are understood as the individual 
characteristic that indicates how many others need to participate before it becomes beneficial 
for a given actor to participate as well.31 Initial contributors or ‘zealots’ (Coleman, 1990) may 
cause a chain reaction that spreads over the entire population as individuals with ever higher 
thresholds decide to participate.32 Especially when a public good has an S-shaped production 
function (i.e. high start-up costs), a critical mass of early contributors has to coordinate their 
actions for the initial provision. This in turn can trigger a band wagon effect when additional 
contributions become more attractive (Marwell and Oliver, 1993). Sequential rather than 
simultaneous decision-making in network models allows for the observation of the actions of 
others (Macy, 1991). In Chwe’s (1999; 2000) models instead people communicate about the 
thresholds themselves, i.e. about their intentions. Again, this information travels through the 
network from node to node.  
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 Early theorists showed how conventions (Hardin, 1982) and focal points (Schelling, 1978) support coordinated 
action when a population has no preference for a particular action, but individuals would all prefer to choose the 
same strategy as others. Such conventions or focal points could be interpreted as the prevailing norms in a 
society regarding the most appropriate behavior.  
31
 Thresholds can also be incorporated in stochastic (evolutionary) learning models. This essentially comes down 
to replacing the low propensity to volunteer of some behavioral strategies with a high threshold of cooperation 
(Macy and Flache, 2002). In other words, thresholds capture different types in a population. 
32
 Potters et al. (2005) provide another interpretation for such chain reactions, based on findings from a public 
good experiment with uncertainty about the value of the public good and sequential decision-making. Individuals 
with superior information are first in deciding whether to contribute or not. Other individuals without such 
information may mimic early contributors if they interpret this as a signal of the true value.  
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Of particular interest in thresholds models is the impact of group size. As Olson 
(1965) argued, in ‘privileged’ groups less interested individuals can free ride on the efforts of 
the most interested group members, leading to an ‘exploitation of the small by the great’. The 
larger the group, the more likely it is that a sufficient number of highly interested or highly 
resourceful individuals are willing to take the first step. 33 For such a critical mass to exist, the 
population should be heterogeneous with respect to its preferences or endowments, ideally 
with a positive correlation between interests and resources (Oliver et al., 1985; Oliver and 
Marwell, 1988). On the other hand, social sanctions become less effective with increasing 
group size since it is more difficult to stay informed of the behavior of all others. The weight 
of social sanctions will also decrease when the social distance between people in a network 
becomes larger, for example when heterogeneity increases.  
The overall architecture of the network considerably affects the resulting equilibria in 
coordination games (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Jackson and Watts, 2002). In a full 
network, everybody knows about the behavior of everybody else in the population. This is 
comparable to the implicit assumption of complete information on average population 
outcomes in many evolutionary models. At the other extreme, perfect isolation yields a 
situation similar to simultaneous decision-making in traditional game-theoretic models. Once 
individuals have information only on others in social or spatial proximity, network structure 
and density become important variables. Many authors argue that dense networks (‘closure’) 
create local common knowledge regarding the number of willing participants or active 
cooperators that may induce further cooperation (Coleman, 1988; Raub and Weesie, 1990; 
Chwe, 1999). In addition, dense networks increase the quality and reliability of third-party 
monitoring and sanctions (Bendor and Swistak, 2001).  
Density and closure are closely related to the concept of strong and weak ties 
(Granovetter, 1973, p.1361): “The strength of a tie is a (…) combination of the amount of 
time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services 
which characterize the tie”. Since strong ties between two individuals A and B imply that they 
spend more time together and/or are more similar to each other, it is likely that the friends of 
A will be friends of B as well. Hence, strong ties represent clusters of social relations within a 
network. Weak ties on the other hand are social relations that span or bridge such clusters. 
Whereas strong ties may be necessary for collective action to emerge in the first place, weak 
ties are more effective in spreading information.   
A recent development in network models is to endogenize the formation of social ties 
themselves. Whenever maintaining links with others is costly, people will decide with whom 
they want to form a new link and whether to remove an old link. This can significantly alter 
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 Oliver and Marwell (1988) argue that in collective action dilemmas, the problem is often not the size of the 
group but the connection of the most interested individuals with each other. Therefore, they argue, social 
organization that brings together early initiators is crucial to provide a public good.  
  
31 
the evolving patterns of cooperation (Bala and Goyal, 2000; Vega-Redondo, 2003; Goyal and 
Vega-Redondo, 2005; Ule, 2005).  
In sum, network models yield a number of interesting insights in the emergence or 
absence of collective action. Since people are heterogeneous with respect to their interests, 
resources and overall disposition towards cooperation, collective action is usually initiated by 
a small number of highly motivated individuals. Once a few people join in a common project, 
others may be induced to cooperate as well, creating a snowball effect. However, for joint 
action to emerge at all, it is necessary that the potential initiators know each other and 
communicate about their intentions to ascertain that enough others will participate. In 
addition, network structure, density and size have an important influence on the strength of 
social sanctions and the value of reputation. The Mahila Samakhya programme in Bihar 
stimulates a small number of women to act collectively. Chapter 4 examines whether this 
cooperative behaviour spills over to others outside the women’s group as well. In addition, the 
chapter will examine in more detail the effect of network size on the strength of sanctions. 
 
2.3.6  The role of trust 
An essential component in explaining collective action has been left out of the 
discussion so far: the role of trust. Trust captures the expectation that others will not betray 
you or cheat on you. Individuals often have to decide whether to cooperate or not before they 
know what the behavior of others will be. Especially in the case of asymmetric information on 
intentions and preferences, the uncertainty regarding others’ behavior can form a major 
barrier to collective action. To avoid the risk of betrayal, otherwise cooperative individuals 
may decide not to participate. Individuals with higher trust in their fellow community 
members expect this risk to be lower than individuals who are less trusting. Hence, more 
trusting individuals are more likely to contribute to a community effort. Indeed, numerous 
empirical studies on collective action as well as public good experiments find substantial 
correlations between individuals’ trusting attitudes and contributions to a public good.34  
Expectations in turn depend to a large extent on the beliefs regarding the types of other 
individuals that one interacts with. If an individual suspects that most others in the community 
are chronic free riders, it is unlikely that he or she will initiate collective action since it will 
cost time and effort with little likelihood of success. On the other hand, if one believes that 
the proportion of (conditional) cooperators in a community is sufficiently large, contributions 
to collective action are more likely to yield a positive pay off.35  
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 See Yamagishi and Cook (1993) and Gaechter et al. (2004) for references. 
35
 Thus, individuals in the same population may have different levels of trust, i.e. different beliefs regarding the 
true state of the world. Hence, such beliefs are subjective. However, as Ostrom and Ahn (2002) argue, subjective 
beliefs cannot be sustained in the long run, unless they are regularly confirmed by actual behavior. “Therefore, a 
society that enjoys high levels of trust in essence is a society in which people are quite trustworthy.” (p. 19). 
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Beliefs are regularly updated. Therefore, past experiences regarding the cooperative 
behavior of others will influence trust. If these experiences are positive, i.e. if individuals 
witness considerable cooperation in their group, their beliefs regarding the number of 
cooperative types will be adjusted upwards. On the other hand, a few disappointing 
experiences where others failed to reciprocate cooperation may induce the individual to lower 
his expectations regarding the trustworthiness of others. Thus, successful collective action is 
likely to increase trust whereas failed cooperation would have a negative impact on trust 
levels. 
Communication can lift some of the uncertainty regarding the behavior of others to be 
expected. Even when verbal agreements are not enforceable, they create commitment and 
reveal others’ preferences (Cardenas et al., 2004). Similarly, the presence of strong norms in a 
community (i.e. widely accepted behavioral strategies) can substantially reduce uncertainty. If 
norms of cooperation are highly valued in a social group, backed up by social esteem if 
followed or social disapproval if not, then the risk that people in the group will decide to 
defect becomes considerably smaller. 
However, strong norms of reciprocity do not automatically imply high levels of 
cooperation. If a community is stuck in a low equilibrium, such norms of reciprocity will 
reinforce the lack of cooperation as none of the conditional cooperators will decide to 
cooperate if the others do not cooperate either. In other words, a population that consists 
entirely of conditional cooperators may end up with high levels of collective action in one 
community and a complete absence of joint action in another community.  
Heterogeneity is of particular interest in understanding levels of trust in a community. 
People often have a preference to act with others like themselves (Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2000), and trust across social groups is often substantially lower than within groups (Bardhan, 
1993). In societies with sharp class distinctions, social sanctions across groups will be less 
effective if people do not care very much about the opinion of others or if reputation loss 
outside one’s own subgroup does not lead to serious consequences. In addition, socio-
economic heterogeneity is often closely related to heterogeneity of interests and preferences 
(Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2001; Ahn et al., 2003). This may lead to conflict when the 
collective action problem becomes in fact a bargaining problem instead of a prisoner’s 
dilemma. On the other hand, in heterogeneous communities, the powerful may enjoy the 
benefits of the public good in a disproportional way and act as leaders in the collective effort. 
That is, sometimes heterogeneity is a necessary condition to create a critical mass of early 
cooperators (Bardhan, 1993; Marwell and Oliver, 1993). So far, the empirical evidence on 
heterogeneity and cooperation is inconclusive. Chapter 6 discusses this issue in more detail 
and provides additional findings.  
In sum, theoretical models of collective action emphasize the importance of social 
capital in terms of trust, norms and social networks to sustain cooperation. Conversely, 
experience with successful collective action strengthens expectations regarding the 
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trustworthiness of others. The above suggests that an outside shock that leads a few people to 
cooperate could potentially set in motion a positive cycle of increasing trust and collective 
action. Once early initiators start cooperating, this may induce other individuals (with higher 
thresholds) to update their beliefs and expectations, with a positive impact on their levels of 
trust and willingness to contribute. Social capital itself is understood as the propensity of a 
community to engage in collective action. It is a latent resource. Whether or not a community 
undertakes collective action will also depend on contextual and structural variables, including 
the need for the public good, heterogeneity in a community, the presence of volunteers and 
leaders, and the role of external actors. 
 
2.3.7  Community-based development and collective action 
This leads us to the role of community based development (CBD) projects. Many 
CBD projects aim to increase social capital and hence the propensity of communities to 
improve community life through collective action. Although these projects are not always 
very explicit on the mechanisms that would yield this result, the previous discussion suggests 
that CBD might work through the following dynamics. A CBD project could motivate a 
number of people to work together, either because the project offers additional resources 
(which lowers the marginal costs of contributions when the production function is S-shaped), 
or because it raises awareness regarding the public good (which increases the perceived 
benefits of the good). It could also start a discussion in a community about the possibility and 
benefits of collective action. This creates focal points of action and induces people to reveal 
their preferences and intentions. Such discussions will reduce uncertainty regarding the 
expected behavior of others, hence creating trust. In addition, the explicit statement of 
intentions creates a commitment of trustworthiness, especially when backed up by social 
sanctions. Once a few people start cooperating with success, this in turn enhances the 
willingness of others to participate in future collective action. 
However, a note of caution is in place. CBD projects introduce additional incentives in 
existing social networks. Externally induced changes in incentives can have unintended and 
dramatic consequences. A well-known example is the substantial decrease in blood donations 
as soon as the previously voluntary donors receive a monetary compensation to give blood 
(Titmuss, 1971). Other examples are the break down of well-functioning informal irrigation 
systems once outside organizations start to subsidize them (Ostrom, 1990), or external 
funding to community organizations that crowds out precisely the vulnerable group that the 
funding was meant to target in the first place (Gugerty and Kremer, 2000). In addition, 
Mulder et al. (2005) show that the mere presence of a sanctioning system creates pessimistic 
expectations regarding the cooperative behavior of others. Experimental evidence suggests 
that weak enforcement of external rules may crowd out pre-existing cooperative behavior 
(Cardenas et al., 2000) and that such sanctions can lead to a collapse in cooperation when 
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incentives are removed at a later stage (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005). Thus, installing a 
sanctioning system may create the need for one, and have irreversible effects. 
Many empirical studies analyze the relationship between trust, collective action and 
exogenous household and community characteristics. A review of their findings is given in 
chapter 4. However, to our knowledge, few studies exist that econometrically test the 
dynamics and reinforcement mechanisms between trust, norms and collective action using a 
large-scale quantitative dataset in order to disentangle the directions of causality. Moreover, 
quantitative impact evaluations of CBD projects are relatively limited in number. Even 
scarcer are evaluations that explicitly measure the effect of CBD projects on a community’s 
propensity to engage in collective action (Mansuri and Rao, 2004). Chapter 4 presents 
precisely such an impact evaluation of the Mahila Samakhya programme. It estimates the 
effect of the programme on social capital and collective action, and examines whether it has 
been able to set in motion a virtuous cycle between trust and cooperation.  
 
 
2.4 Social capital and informal assistance  
 
2.4.1  Social capital as a resource for individuals 
Section 2.2.3 outlined four broad mechanisms through which social capital can 
generate externalities for individuals and households. The previous section discussed the first 
mechanism: social capital influences the propensity of a community to engage in collective 
action. This section will look at the second mechanism, i.e. social capital facilitates the 
informal exchange of resources between households.36 Both mechanisms relate to cooperation 
among households and contain characteristics of a prisoner’s dilemma. However, in collective 
action households cooperate to provide a common good. Social capital in that case yields 
benefits for the entire social network since exclusion of non-contributors is practically 
unfeasible. In contrast, acts of informal exchange yields benefits that are targeted to a specific 
household.  
In standard household decision models, endowments consist of physical capital such 
as money, a house, an inventory of seeds; of human capital such as labor and education; and 
of natural capital such as land or a fishing pond. However, it is increasingly recognized that 
these three types of assets are not sufficient to fully explain differences in household 
wellbeing. Many households have access to additional resources through their social 
networks. Such informal exchange covers the entire spectrum of resources from time and 
labor (e.g. child care, labor sharing parties, constructing a house), goods (e.g. sharing food), to 
money (gifts and informal credit). Those resources are not part of the household’s own 
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 Issues specifically related to contract enforcement are not discussed here but in section 2.5. 
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endowments but are the property of other individuals they know. The extent to which 
households can rely on assistance from others will affect their opportunities and constraints, 
and thus their decisions, behavior and wellbeing. Although many social relations do not stem 
from instrumental motives, individuals can invest in social capital just as they can invest in 
human capital (Glaeser et al., 2002). 
In this context, social capital is usually defined as the ability of individuals to mobilize 
resources through their social relations. Or, in the words of Woolcock and Narayan (2000): 
“The basic idea of social capital is that a person’s family, friends, associates constitute an 
important asset, that can be called on in times of crises, enjoyed for its own sake or leveraged 
for material gain.” Whether or not an individual is able to mobilize resources depends on four 
basic factors (Snijders, 1999): 
- the (number and type of) social relations that an individual has access to; 
- the resources that those relations possess; 
- the willingness of those relations to share resources with the individual; and  
- the (number and type of) other individuals that those relations are connected with. 
The willingness of individuals to share their resources –the third factor– depends 
crucially on trust, mutual obligations and reciprocal behavior (Coleman, 1988), i.e. on 
cognitive social capital. The other factors essentially reflect structural social capital.  
The distinction between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital is particularly relevant 
in this respect (Narayan, 1999). It resembles the idea of ‘strong’ versus ‘weak’ ties in the 
network-literature (section 2.3.5). Bonding social capital refers to the social network of 
closely related individuals, such as families, friends, or neighbors that all know and trust each 
other. Especially for the poorest in society, bonding social capital provides the daily safety net 
that helps out with smaller and larger problems. These are the people you can go to when you 
feel sad, who will look after your children, or help build your house. Where the more affluent 
in society could theoretically buy such goods as child care or construction services, poor 
people fortunately can often rely on each other.  
Bridging social ties on the other hand are network relations with individuals that live 
in other neighborhoods, have other jobs, or move in other social circles. Bridging social 
relations are less homogeneous than bonding ties, both with respect to individual 
characteristics and resources. Such ties may be necessary to get ahead when the resources in 
one’s direct social network are limited. As an example, Loury (1977; 1999) and Fernandez 
Kelly (1995) discuss the effects of social exclusion, i.e. a lack of bridging ties, for African-
Americans. Sometimes, ‘vertical ties’ or ‘linking ties’ are added as a third category, referring 
especially to relations with politically more powerful individuals. These ties are especially 
important for more disadvantaged minorities to move ahead. See for example Bebbington and 
Perreault (1999) for a discussion of the decisive importance of political influence on the 
socio-economic position of indigenous farmers in Ecuador.  
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2.4.2  Trust, norms, preferences and informal assistance 
Many acts of help are motivated out of altruistic or other-regarding preferences. 
Parents care for their children and vice versa. Friends are there for each other. People help 
strangers whom they will never meet again. But often, such altruistic behavior is backed by 
social norms. If a community condemns the denial of assistance in particular settings, 
households will be more likely to help others to avoid social disapproval. In addition, people 
often help each other in the implicit expectation that when the need arises in the future, they 
will receive similar assistance. The stronger the norms of reciprocity and cooperation in a 
group, the more likely it is that an individual will indeed trust others to reciprocate in the 
future.  
Future assistance could come either from today’s beneficiary or from someone else 
belonging to the same social network. Yamagishi and Cook (1993) make the insightful 
distinction between restricted exchange and generalized exchange. The former category refers 
to bi-directional exchanges between two parties in which the resources that one individual 
provides to the other are contingent on the assistance provided in return. Generalized 
exchange on the other hand lacks such a one-on-one correspondence. All giving (receiving) 
members in the network are expected to receive (give) benefits at some point in time, either 
from (to) the group as a whole or from (to) an actor who belongs to the network but who need 
not necessarily be involved in the original exchange. ‘Group-generalized’ exchanges in this 
sense refer to contributions to public goods, discussed in section 2.3. ‘Network-generalized’ 
exchanges flow from one individual to another rather than between an individual and the 
group. Both types of generalized exchange suffer from free-riding, although the temptation 
will be smaller in situations of informal assistance because of more effective social sanctions 
and less ‘diffusion of responsibility’ (Yamagishi and Cook, 1993). 
Experimental evidence clearly indicates that individuals commonly display and 
reward trust in situations of assistance-giving (Castillo and Carter, 2003; Cardenas and 
Carpenter, 2004)37. Third parties uninvolved in the original exchange reciprocate and sanction 
behavior in subsequent interactions (Fehr et al., 2002; Seinen and Schram, 2006). However, 
differences in social class and wealth can have a strong impact on the trust and reciprocity 
that individuals display towards each other (Cardenas, 2003). In ultimatum games, receivers 
consistently reject offers that they consider too low, strongly suggesting the existence of 
norms of reciprocity and fairness in situations of gift-giving (Castillo and Carter, 2003).38 
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 In a trust game or gift-exchange game a sender, the ‘trustor’, receives an initial endowment x. He decides 
which amount g of x to send to a receiver, the ‘trustee’, and which amount x - g to keep for himself. The amount 
g is multiplied with a before it reaches the receiver. The receiver then has to decide which amount p of a * g to 
send back to the trustor and which amount a * g – p to keep for himself. Such games are used to measure the 
trust and trustworthiness of individuals, although Karlan (2005) argues that the decision of senders actually 
reflects a preference for risk-taking instead of trust. 
38
 In the ultimatum game, a ‘proposer’ receives a sum of money a part of which he can offer to a ‘receiver’. The 
receiver can either accept or reject the offer. If he accepts it, both receive their part. If he rejects it, neither one 
receives money. 
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Anticipating this reaction, most offers are well above zero. The motivation to send such high 
amounts stems from a fear of rejection as well as from altruistic preferences, as the results 
from dictator games suggest (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2004).39 Despite these general trends, 
there are large variations in trust and trustworthiness across different societies. Similarly, 
which offer levels are thought to be acceptable is highly culture-specific  (Henrich et al., 
2001; Carpenter et al., 2004).  
Many of the theoretical foundations that explain informal assistance and gift-giving 
from a ‘cognitive’ perspective are rooted in the same models as discussed in section 2.3, 
especially the repeated prisoner’s dilemmas. To test the empirical validity of the models also 
outside the laboratory, chapter 4 examines whether trust and norms play a significant role in 
supporting assistance among households in the rural Indian communities of our study area. It 
also discusses whether the findings confirm the existence of a dynamic interaction between 
social capital and informal cooperation.  
 
2.4.3  Mutual risk-sharing arrangements 
Empirical studies that look at social capital from an individual or household point of 
view generally attempt to distill the characteristics of social ties and networks that are 
particularly important in explaining whether, why and which households help each other or 
not. Most of them are anthropological in nature. See for example Platteau (2000) for a wealth 
of evidence in this respect. A growing body of economic literature focuses specifically on 
mutual risk-sharing arrangements among households. In the absence of financial markets and 
social safety nets, such informal assistance can be of crucial importance for households to 
prevent them from falling into chronic poverty after health, natural, economic, political or 
other shocks.  
Households can adopt a broad range of strategies to manage risk.40 A useful 
classification distinguishes strategies according to whether they help households to prevent, 
mitigate or cope with a shock (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 2001).41 Preventive strategies are 
taken ex-ante, before a shock occurs, and are aimed to reduce the risk of occurrence. Think 
for example of preventive health care, increased hygiene or child immunization to reduce the 
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 In the dictator game, the proposer offers a division of a sum of money between himself and the receiver. 
However, the receiver cannot reject the offer. 
40
 Morduch (1999) and Dercon (2002; 2005) provide surveys of the literature. See Morduch (1995) for additional 
references to studies that investigate risk management strategies such as the reduction of nutritional intake, 
income diversification, less risky agricultural technologies etc. in India and other countries. For models and 
empirical evidence on child labor as a self-insurance mechanism, see for example Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) 
for Indian evidence or Beegle et al. (2005) for evidence from Tanzania.  
41
 The classification can further be divided into informal, market and public strategies (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 
2001). We focus on informal strategies, i.e. the strategies open to households. Risk management through market 
institutions such as banks or microfinance is limited in our study area, as we discuss in chapter 6. Public policies 
to prevent, mitigate or cope with risks, such as economic stabilization, social safety nets or public works are left 
out of the analysis. 
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risk of illness or death. Other examples are the investment in low-risk types of crop or 
migration to less flood-prone areas. Mitigation strategies are also taken before a shock hits the 
household, but their main purpose is to reduce the impact of a shock, in case it would occur. 
Examples of risk mitigation are for example income diversification, increased education to 
enhance labor market opportunities in case of unemployment or informal insurance 
mechanisms within a community. Finally, coping strategies are ex-post strategies that help the 
household to overcome the impact of a shock after it has occurred. It can consist of individual 
risk coping mechanisms such as dissaving, borrowing, sale of assets, increased labor supply 
including that of children, temporary migration of household members or the reduction of 
consumption. In addition, households can assist each other in coping with the effects of a 
shock through the provision of informal loans and other transfers.  
Mutual risk-sharing arrangements among households can thus take the form of  
informal insurance or assistance on the one hand and informal lending on the other hand 
(Fafchamps, 1999). Strictly speaking, informal insurance and informal credit are two distinct 
issues. Insurance refers to the transfer of resources after a shock occurred, such as gifts of 
money or food, from more fortunate to less fortunate households. Such transfers usually do 
not require one-on-one repayment, except when the current giver is hit by a shock in the 
future. Moreover, obligations are usually implicit and shared across a pool of households. A 
defining characteristic of credit on the other hand is the explicit understanding of repayment 
from the borrower to the lender; otherwise it would be a gift.  
Nonetheless, in practice the distinction is not always that sharp. Udry (1994) and 
Fafchamps and Lund (2003) show that repayment of loans can be state-contingent. Borrowers 
pay back less when they experience an adverse income shock, and repay a higher amount if 
the lender experiences a negative shock. Such flexible repayment amounts and schedules 
provide an insurance mechanism for both lender and borrower against future income shocks, 
and has been termed ‘quasi-credit’ (Platteau and Abraham (1987) in Fafchamps (1999, p. 
1)).42 In addition, a household may lend money to its neighbor today with the implicit 
expectation of future reciprocity would the need arise, either from the current borrower or 
others in the network. Under such circumstances, lending money today is also an insurance 
strategy to secure future access to resources in case of distress.  
Of particular relevance for the effectiveness of informal arrangements among 
households is the difference between idiosyncratic and covariate shocks. The former type of 
shocks hit an individual household but not others, such as the loss of a job, theft of cattle or 
death of a family member. Covariate shocks on the other hand, such as droughts, economic 
crises or the outbreak of an epidemic, are correlated over a larger group of households. 
Essentially, this implies that households who face an idiosyncratic shock may get assistance 
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 Conversely, Senegalese fishermen are found to step out of insurance arrangements if they have contributed 
very often without ever benefiting. Subsequently, the others compensate them for their past contributions 
suggesting a norm of ‘balanced reciprocity’ instead of ‘conditional reciprocity’(Platteau, 1997). 
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from friends, relatives or neighbors to deal with the loss of income. In case of covariate 
shocks that hurt the entire community, such informal arrangements may instead break down.  
If households would fully pool risk in their community, household consumption 
should not be affected by idiosyncratic shocks to household income but only co-move with 
community income (i.e. covariate shocks). Several authors have examined the extent of risk-
pooling among households within communities. In general, such ‘full insurance’ tests reject 
the hypothesis that risk is completely shared within villages, although the studies find 
evidence of considerable partial insurance (Townsend, 1994; Udry, 1994; Ravallion and 
Chaudhuri, 1997; Jalan and Ravallion, 1999).  
These studies use the (geographical) community as unit of analysis. An increasing 
number of studies focuses on informal social networks to explain access to insurance and 
credit, such as networks built on ethnic ties (Grimard, 1997), marriage relations (Dekker and 
Hoogeveen, 2002), friendship and kinship (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003), or the geographical 
proximity of neighbors (Murgai et al., 2002; Park, 2006). The empirical evidence strongly 
suggests that insurance arrangements do not strictly follow community boundaries but instead 
are based on households’ networks, be it in terms of social, geographic or ethnic proximity. In 
addition, such networks are not necessarily clustered but may be overlapping (Dercon and De 
Weerdt, 2002). But again, even within social networks households generally do not fully pool 
risk.  
The most important reasons put forward to explain the lack of risk-sharing 
arrangements within social networks are limited monitoring and enforcement opportunities 
(Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Udry, 1994; Ligon et al., 2002; Murgai et al., 2002; La Ferrara, 
2003). A lack of legal enforcement opportunities, combined with insufficient information on 
other’s behavior and characteristics, increases the risk of default. When individuals cannot 
trust others to repay a loan or reciprocate an act of assistance in the future, they will be less 
willing to share their resources. To avoid risk stemming from imperfect information, most 
informal arrangements mainly include households that know each other well and can observe 
each other’s behavior and efforts fairly accurately, hence the prevalence of insurance 
networks that encompass relatives, friends, or neighbors. To solve enforcement problems, 
social norms and sanctions in the community can come a long way.  
Theoretical models that explain the emergence of informal risk-sharing arrangements 
in situations of limited enforcement either rest on the assumption of repeated transactions, on 
(informal) penalties on default or on both. They mostly ignore information asymmetries, 
implicitly assuming that information flows freely in the social network under consideration. 
For example, Udry (1994) models an informal credit arrangement in which a third-party 
authority in the village enforces direct penalties for default (such as public admonitions). 
Given the penalty, a household will only default on repayments if it receives a particularly 
severe income shock. Coate and Ravallion (1993) develop a game-theoretic model for non-
enforceable insurance arrangements between two households. If the benefits of continued 
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cooperation and future insurance outweigh the benefits of a current defection, risk-sharing 
arrangements may be sustained in the absence of direct penalties although they diverge from 
the optimal complete income-pooling equilibrium.43 Ligon et al. (2002) extend this model and 
let current transfers depend not only on current incomes, but also on the history of past 
transfers. This allows for the inclusion of ‘quasi-credit’ –loans without collateral whose 
repayment may be delayed or even forgiven in case of adverse income shocks to the 
borrower.44 In addition to the threat of exclusion from future transactions, their model includes 
a direct penalty on default (without further details) to sustain the insurance arrangement. 
Similarly, Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) develop a model of sustainable insurance in which 
current transfers depend partly on past transfers. Instead of direct penalties on defaults, they 
include altruistic motives that facilitate risk-sharing among family members. 
In contrast to the theories that take networks as given, an increasing number of models 
endogenizes the formation of network links or insurance relationships between households 
and individuals. La Ferrara (2003) for example presents an overlapping generations model of 
informal credit arrangements that explains the decision to lend money to specific households 
but not to others. Sustainability rests on the threat of exclusion of households’ children from 
future credit transactions, not on immediate sanctions for default. Fafchamps and Gubert 
(2005) present a model of endogenous network formation based on the benefits that 
households can expect from cooperating with others. Using data from the Philippines they 
find that geographical proximity is a strong predictor for the existence of links, but not social 
proximity. This would be consistent with pooling health risks as opposed to income risks, but 
also with easier monitoring and enforcement among neighbors.  
Chapter 6 takes up this issue further with an emphasis on informal credit arrangements 
among households. It examines the role of community level heterogeneity, in terms of caste 
and religious divisions, on access to informal loans from social relations. If heterogeneity 
decreases the effectiveness of social sanctions within the community, informal lending is 
expected to decrease accordingly. The second part of chapter 6 evaluates the impact of the 
Mahila Samakhya programme on access to informal credit. 
 
 
2.5 Social capital and contract enforcement 
 
Section 2.3 looked at the mechanisms through which social capital enhances collective 
action. Section 2.4 dealt with the role of social capital in supporting informal assistance and 
the exchange of resources among households. The third effect of social capital is its impact on 
                                                 
43
 The feasibility of such arrangements depends crucially on the likelihood that households will continue 
interacting. 
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 Such flexible contract arrangements are also found for payments among firms in countries with weak legal 
institutions. See for example Bigsten et al. (2000) for African evidence. 
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contract enforcement, i.e. on the transaction and monitoring costs of economic exchanges. 
Whereas the previous section focused mainly on informal assistance with implicit obligations 
of reciprocity, this section looks at explicit exchange agreements between two parties, i.e. 
restricted exchange in the terminology of Yamagishi and Cook (1993). Note that the informal 
credit arrangements described above could also be included in this section, since repayment is 
an explicit component of the agreement.  
Whenever information is asymmetric and contracts are not perfectly enforceable, 
moral hazard, adverse selection and rent-seeking are serious threats to the outcomes of 
agreements. As a result, transaction and monitoring costs will be high in order to reduce risk. 
Many economic studies on social capital that aim to explain variations in the levels of 
regional or national economic development focus on the role of social capital precisely in 
reducing such threats. High levels of (generalized) trust, reputation effects, monitoring in 
social networks and effective social sanctioning mechanisms can substantially reduce the 
related costs.  
As early as 1972, Arrow noticed that repeated social interaction “can substitute for 
missing, or expensive, legal structures in facilitating investment and other financial 
transactions”.45 Greif’s (1994) detailed historical account of the differences in social structure 
between medieval North-African and Italian merchants offers a compelling explanation for 
the subsequent divergence in developmental paths between the two regions. Looking at 
contemporary data on 29 economies, Knack and Keefer (1997) econometrically analyze the 
relationship between trust, civic norms, associational activity and economic development. 
Whereas the relationship between associational activity and economic development is not 
significant, they find strong correlations between development and trust and norms of civic 
cooperation. To give an example at a more disaggregate level, Fafchamps (2000) shows how 
embeddedness in business networks significantly increases entrepreneurs’ access to both 
supplier credit and bank credit in Kenya in Zimbabwe. In other words, a lack of social 
connections can seriously restrict the growth opportunities of companies.   
Since this thesis is not directly concerned with market transactions, it will not offer a 
full account of the literature in this respect. Enforcement problems and the role of sanctions in 
informal credit exchanges between households are discussed in depth in chapter 6.  
 
 
2.6 Social capital and the diffusion of information 
 
The final mechanism explored in this thesis, through which social capital generates 
externalities, is the diffusion of information within social networks. When information is 
costly or difficult to acquire for an individual, social relations –especially the ‘weak’ ties 
                                                 
45
 Arrow (1972) in Glaeser et al. (2002, p. F437). 
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(Granovetter, 1985) or ‘structural holes’ (Burt, 1992), can provide valuable information on 
job openings (Lin et al., 1981; Lin, 1999) or entrepreneurial reputation and opportunities for 
example (Barr, 2000; Fafchamps, 2000). In such cases, information is a resource that is 
passed from one individual of a social network to another, similar to the informal assistance 
discussed in section 2.4. 
Information diffusion can also alter outcomes and behavior through social learning 
and social influence (Behrman et al., 2002). Social learning refers to the diffusion of 
information with respect to the knowledge on and evaluation of new technologies or 
innovations.46 This is especially relevant in situations of uncertainty where the benefits of a 
particular technology are not fully known. For example, numerous studies analyze how the 
adoption of new agricultural technologies depends on the experiences of farmers’ neighbors 
(Besley and Case, 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Bandiera and Rasul, 2003; Munshi, 
2004).  
Social influence captures the influence of the direct social environment on an 
individual’s norms, attitudes and preferences. Social groups can alter or reinforce social 
norms when the behavior displayed by some of its members is ‘copied’ by others in the 
group. There is abundant evidence of the influence of neighborhoods and peers on outcomes 
such as child health, education and behavior (Loury, 1977, 1981; Bourdieu, 1986; Case and 
Katz, 1991; Runyan et al., 1998; Katz et al., 2001) or student performance for example 
(Sacerdote, 2001; Lalive and Cattaneo, 2006). Sometimes individuals’ behavior is affected 
simultaneously through social learning and social influence, as in the case of the adoption of 
family planning techniques and contraceptive use (Kohler et al., 2001; Behrman et al., 2002; 
Munshi and Myaux, 2002). 
In order to study the effect of social interactions, some studies use a partial 
introduction of a treatment to identify the spillover effects. For example, Duflo and Saez 
(2002) analyze the externalities on retirement plan decisions of employees who did not 
receive additional information on the benefits of the plan themselves, but who worked in a 
department where colleagues received such information. These employees were significantly 
more likely to adopt the plan than others working in a department where no one had received 
information. In a similar vein, Lalive and Cattaneo (2006) analyze peer effects on school 
attendance using the random assignment of a conditional cash subsidy (the PROGRESA 
programme in Mexico) to some students but not to others. They find that ineligible students 
are positively influenced by the increased school attendance of their friends when a large 
fraction of their peer group is eligible for the subsidy.47 
In other words, there is overwhelming evidence that social spillovers exist and have 
potentially large effects on a wide range of outcomes. This suggests that development 
                                                 
46
 See Goyal (2005) for a survey of learning in networks.  
47
 However, PROGRESA does not yield significant spillovers on the enrolment of the average ineligible child  
(Behrman et al., 2001). 
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programmes that enhance knowledge, awareness or behavior could have an impact beyond the 
direct effect on participants if information and attitudes are disseminated throughout the 
community. However, the number of impact evaluations that actually measure such 
externalities is extremely limited. Chapter 5 therefore explicitly measures the spillover effects 
of the Mahila Samakhya programme on non-participants. In particular, it examines the impact 
of the programme on the immunization and school enrolment rates of children whose mothers 
do not participate in the programme themselves, but who live in a village where the 
programme is active. Such externalities could be generated through increased knowledge and 
awareness or changing norms regarding health and educational issues, as discussed in this 
section. However, spillover effects could also be the result of the collective activities that 
participants initiate in their community. Chapter 5 discusses the potential underlying 
mechanisms in more detail. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation considers social capital to be an umbrella term for two broad 
components or aspects of social relations: a structural and a cognitive component. Whereas 
the former relates to the structure of social networks, patterns of social interactions and the 
presence of (voluntary) associations for example, the latter captures more intangible aspects 
that affect social behavior such as trust in others, social norms, or other-regarding preferences. 
Together, these sources of social capital affect the wellbeing of the members of a group. 
However, the externalities generated through social capital need not necessarily be beneficial 
for all affected individuals, dependent on the outcome under consideration. Moreover, social 
capital can reinforce exclusionary mechanisms that may hurt especially the already vulnerable 
groups in society.  
This chapter identified four broad channels through which social capital within a 
group can affect outcomes for the individual group members. Social capital can enhance a 
community’s capacity to engage in collective action. It encourages the informal exchange of 
resources among members of a group. It facilitates economic transactions when enforcement 
opportunities are limited and monitoring information is difficult or costly to acquire. Finally, 
it supports information diffusion, social learning and social influence. Interactions within 
social networks or informal organizations are crucial to obtain these outcomes. Such 
interactions create trust among individuals of the group, reinforce social norms and 
preferences, and increase the effectiveness of social sanctions and rewards for violation of or 
compliance with the norms. Higher trust, strong norms and the threat of sanctions in turn 
affect incentives and expectations of individuals and, as a consequence, their propensity to 
cooperate with others or to contribute to a public good.  
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Many of these theoretical models are supported by evidence either from the laboratory 
or from case-studies in the field. However, the number of studies that econometrically test the 
models using large-scale quantitative datasets is still relatively limited. In view of their 
prominent position in current development policies, community-based development 
programmes in particular could benefit enormously from additional evidence with respect to 
their impact on social capital and cooperation.  
This dissertation aims to add to the knowledge on social capital, cooperation and the 
impact of community-based development projects in three ways. Chapter 4 measures the 
effect of the Mahila Samakhya programme on trust, norms of reciprocity and cooperation in 
programme communities, focusing on the dynamics that would lead to the expected virtuous 
cycle of increased social capital and increased cooperation. Cooperation is measured both as 
collective action (discussed in section 2.3) and as informal assistance among households 
(discussed in section 2.4).  
However, what really matters is not cooperation itself but the effect of cooperation on 
outcomes and wellbeing. Chapter 5 therefore proceeds to analyze the effect of the programme 
on immunization and school outcomes of children living in programme villages. It explicitly 
takes into account potential externalities on the broader community, generated either through 
increased collective action (section 2.3) or the increased availability of information that is 
passed on in the community (section 2.6). To measure the externalities, the chapter looks not 
only at children whose mothers participate in the programme, but also at children whose 
mothers do not participate themselves but who live in a programme village.  
Chapter 6 integrates the theories discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5. It examines the 
informal provision of credit among households in communities with varying levels of caste 
and religious heterogeneity. To the extent that norms and trust are substantially weaker across 
than within social groups, we would expect that increased heterogeneity in the community has 
a negative effect on the possibility of obtaining informal loans from other community 
members. However, if the Mahila Samakhya programme has been able to enhance trust and 
cooperation, it may counteract the negative impact of heterogeneity on informal credit.  
Before starting with the analytical chapters, the next chapter first describes the context 
of Bihar, the objectives and characteristics of the Mahila Samakhya programme, and the 
sampling methodology and data collection process. Since the problem of ‘the missing 
counterfactual’ is central to all impact evaluations, the chapter will pay detailed attention to 
the comparability of the programme and the control group. It will also give a short 
comparison of participants and non-participants in programme villages, as well as a brief 
description of the characteristics of the women’s groups. 
 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
Data description and research methodology 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the general research questions of this thesis. What is the 
relationship between social capital and cooperative behavior? Can community-based 
development programmes increase social capital, cooperation, or both? To what extent do 
community-based development programmes thereby affect socio-economic outcomes and 
generate externalities for the wider community? To answer these questions, I collected a 
unique large-scale quantitative dataset in the Indian state Bihar, encompassing 1,991 
households in 102 rural villages.  
In two thirds of the villages, the Mahila Samakhya programme has been implemented. 
This is a women’s empowerment programme that emphasizes the building of trust and the 
importance of collective action. The main objective of Mahila Samakhya (literally meaning 
‘women interacting as equals’) is to educate and empower women in rural areas, especially 
women from socially and economically marginalized groups such as the Scheduled Castes.48 
It stimulates women to set up groups in their village and to cooperate with each other in order 
to improve their own living circumstances.  
The Mahila Samakhya programme is implemented through autonomous non-
governmental organisations that are financed by the government as well as bilateral and 
multilateral international donors. In Bihar, it started in 1992 as a component of a UNICEF 
educational programme. It is perceived to be successful, as acknowledged for example 
through UNESCO’s 2001 Literacy Award’s “Honorable Mention”. Nonetheless, there is 
considerable variation in success across villages, which makes the project particularly suited 
for our research purposes.  
Moreover, not all villages in the region are as of yet covered due to the slow scaling up 
of the programme. The inclusion of both villages with and without the Mahila Samakhya 
programme enables a comparison of outcomes across treatment and control villages to 
                                                 
48
 Scheduled Castes (SC) is a classification in the Indian Constitution. It refers to the Indian people from 
historically disadvantaged communities, who were considered to be ‘untouchables’ in India for centuries 
(Ramachandran, 1998). ‘Dalit’ is another common term for Scheduled Castes. 
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measure the programme’s impact. Finally, not all women in a village decide to participate in 
the women’s group, providing the ‘non-cooperators’. Both participants and non-participants 
in programme villages were interviewed. This unique feature of the dataset allows for an 
explicit analysis of the generated externalities through a comparison of non-participants with 
households in the control group.  
The next section starts with a description of the current socio-economic situation in 
Bihar and the position of women in the state. The chapter then proceeds with a short account 
of the history of Mahila Samakhya as well as the objectives and characteristics of the 
programme. Section four discusses in detail the sample selection methodology. The study is 
limited to three districts in the north of Bihar where the programme has been active since 
1992, 1993 and 1998 respectively. Within districts, the methodology first selects blocks, then 
villages within blocks and finally households within the selected villages. Based on a 
comparison of the characteristics of the programme and the control group, the following 
section argues that indeed the control group provides a good counterfactual for the treatment 
group. Section six discusses the characteristics of the participants versus the non-participants 
in programme villages and gives more information about the women’s groups in the sample. 
The final section concludes.  
 
3.2 Bihar 
 
3.2.1  Description of Bihar 
The Mahila Samakhya programme is implemented throughout India, but our study 
focuses solely on Bihar. Bihar is one of the poorest states of India with the lowest 
socioeconomic indicators. The scope and need for collective action, and hence the importance 
of understanding underlying mechanisms, are large. Whereas many development projects fail 
in this struggling state, Mahila Samakhya performs relatively well, making it an interesting 
case.49 Moreover, in contrast to the many studies on Mahila Samakhya in other states, little 
research on the programme is available for Bihar, increasing the added value of the study.50 
The limited number of other women’s empowerment programmes in Bihar compared to other 
states also substantially reduces potential interference when measuring impact. Finally, the 
early implementation of the programme in 1992 ensures sufficient variation in the existence 
of women’s groups for the analysis. 
                                                 
49
 Based on discussions with World Bank project managers and the Development Cooperation department of the 
Dutch Embassy in New Delhi. 
50
 Information on Mahila Samakhya in Bihar is found mainly in project reports published by Mahila Samakhya 
(1995; 2002) or by government institutions such as the Ministry of Human Resource Development (Government 
of India, 2002). 
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Bihar is situated in the northeastern part of India, entirely landlocked between Nepal in 
the north and the states of Uttar Pradesh in the west, Jharkhand in the south, and West-Bengal 
in the east (see Figure 3.1). The river Ganga flows through the middle of the Bihari plain from 
west to east. It is a 
predominantly rural state with a 
large and rapidly growing 
population. The percentage 
urban population is a mere 11 
percent compared to the 
national average of 28 percent. 
Total population reaches almost 
83 million people.  This makes 
Bihar the third largest state in 
terms of population size, 
accounting for 8 percent of total 
Indian population. Its 
population density is relatively 
high at 880 people per square 
kilometer compared to a 
national density of 324. The 
population continued to grow 
with 28 percent over the last 
decade, whereas the average 
Indian state grew at a rate of 21 
percent. Because of the steep 
population growth one fifth of 
Bihari population is in the age group of 0 to 6 years. Slightly more than 43 million males and 
somewhat less than 40 million females make a sex ratio of only 921 females per 1000 males 
(Census Office, 2001a, 2001b). 
Society in Bihar is agrarian and still largely feudal in nature. Although the Zamindari 
system of landlords and bonded labor does not officially exist anymore, most landless 
laborers live under extremely harsh circumstances.51 Society is very caste conscious with the 
lower castes facing innumerable social and economic deprivations. Society is also strongly 
rooted in traditionally held beliefs and superstition. Resistance to change is considerable. The 
gender bias against women and girls is persistently strong (Mahila Samakhya, 2002). 
                                                 
51
 Zamindar literally means “holder of real estate”. Under British colonial rule, the Zamindar or landlord would 
collect taxes from the peasants on his land, hand over most of the money to the British authorities, and keep a 
portion for him self. The Zamindari system was abolished in India soon after independence 
(www.wikipedia.org). 
Source: http://www.censusindia.net/results/2001maps/index.html 
Figure 3.1 Map of India 
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The pronounced social 
stratification results in severe 
disadvantage in school enrolment for 
female and lower caste children. Drop 
out and retention rates are high. 
Learning achievement of those 
completing primary school is very low 
(World Bank, 1997). This leads among 
others to the lowest literacy levels of the 
entire country. The overall literacy rate 
in Bihar is only 48 percent compared to 
the national literacy rate of 65 percent 
(Census Office, 2001a, see Figure 3.2). 
Disaggregation by gender shows that 60 
percent of the male population can read 
and write, but only 34 percent of the female population. This is an alarmingly low percentage, 
also when compared to the national female literacy rate of 54 percent. 
The poor social conditions in Bihar are accompanied by severe material poverty for a 
majority of the population. Almost two thirds of all people, 64 percent, lived below the 
poverty line of US$1 per day in 1993/1994 (World Bank, 1997). This situation of extreme 
poverty, especially in rural areas, forces many of the impoverished peasants to live from 
subsistence agriculture. Families migrate en masse for seasonal work at the brick kilns and in 
the fields. The yearly floods in the northern districts of the state increase these migration 
patterns (Mahila Samakhya, 1995). 
Social services in this part of India are in similar need of improvement. There is an 
acute lack of infrastructure for communication and transport especially in the vast hinterlands 
of the state. Electricity failure is a daily recurring phenomenon. Corruption is widespread. 
Public sector institutions are often weak. Banditry is prevalent all over Bihar, making it one of 
the most criminal states of India. A recent ranking of the Indian States in the weekly “India 
Today”, that compared the performance of 19 Indian states on business environment as well 
as quality of life, systematically ranked Bihar at the bottom of the list.52 
Needless to say, in an environment of such deprivation and social segregation, the 
position of the rural poor is extremely difficult. This underscores the importance and potential 
scope of collective action to improve families’ living conditions in Bihar. It also gives an 
impression of the many obstacles faced when trying to organize collective action at all, 
especially among women. 
                                                 
52
 The article (India Today, 2003, 19 May) shows a ranking of 19 Indian states on eight indicators. Bihar’s 
ranking on each indicator: Prosperity & budget: 18, Law & order: 19; Education: 19; Agriculture: 16; Health: 16; 
Infrastructure: 19; Investment scenario: 19; Consumer markets: 19. 
Figure 3.2 Literacy levels 2001
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3.2.2 The position of women in Bihar 
Due to the very high illiteracy rates among women in Bihar, in many rural villages it is 
difficult to find even a single educated female. The majority of girls continue to be excluded 
from education, as female children are kept at home for domestic work. Once they marry, 
girls move to the village (often the house) of their parents-in-law, further decreasing the 
benefits of female education for their parents. 
This leads to continued social isolation, and marginalization in the political and 
economic spheres (Government of Bihar, 1996). Because parents want to get rid of their 
‘burden’ as soon as possible, early marriage and early child-bearing are not exceptional. 
Dowry payments are still common practice and put many families in severe debt. Women 
face additional problems if they divorce, or when they become widow. The practice of 
declaring widows as ‘witches’ and persecuting them continues to exist in several parts of the 
state. Many women are kept in purdah53, their percentage increasing from the poorest to 
middle-class families. Domestic violence and suppression by male family members are 
widespread (Bihar Education Project, 1998). 
The lack of access to knowledge and information combined with the social isolation 
keeps women in a vicious cycle, excluded from the decision making processes within the 
family and within the broader community. In their daily struggle for food, water and fuel, they 
are not able to perceive education as a need. Nor do they acknowledge their own potential role 
in changing their lives (Government of Bihar, 1996). Not surprisingly, the Mahila Samakhya 
programme in Bihar faced many hurdles during the first years. Even to find programme 
facilitators was very hard in the beginning: “… it was especially difficult to get rural women 
who were sufficiently literate, sufficiently motivated and who possessed leadership qualities, 
acceptability, and most important, the freedom of mobility to take on this all important role” 
(Mahila Samakhya, 1995, p. 10). The deep rooted customs and traditions cannot be eradicated 
in a day or two. It takes time, persistence and patience to change the attitude of passive, 
unquestioning acceptance of the status quo (Bharti, 2003). 
 
3.3 The Mahila Samakhya programme 
 
In its 1986 New Policy of Education (NPE), the government of India explicitly 
recognized the traditional gender imbalances in educational access and achievement. It 
acknowledged the need to focus on the empowerment of women to redress educational 
                                                 
53
 Living in ‘purdah’ could be described as ‘behind the curtain’, where a woman spends her life between the four 
walls of the (mostly her family-in-law’s) house, since she is not allowed to go outside, nor to talk to men from 
outside the household. 
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inequalities. Conversely, increased education for women would further strengthen their status 
in society (Government of India, 1986). The subsequent Programme for Action strongly 
emphasized the importance of solidarity and group action to set in motion the process of 
empowerment as envisaged by the Ministry of Education (Government of India, 1992). In 
1988, the government launched the Mahila Samakhya programme as a pilot to support its 
NPE. The pilot started in three states and, because of its success, was soon expanded to 
additional states. In 2002, the programme covered more than 9000 villages spread over 61 
districts in 10 states (Government of India, 2002).  
Mahila Samakhya was introduced in the state of Bihar in 1992. It started as a 
component of the UNICEF-sponsored Bihar Education Project. From 1998 to 2003, it was 
financed through the World Bank-sponsored Third District Primary Education Project and 
currently it is part of the national Sarva Shiksha Abhijan programme (Movement for 
Education for All). Because of its inclusion as a component in educational programmes, 
Mahila Samakhya in Bihar initially aimed primarily at educational issues.54 Appendix 3A 
provides an overview of the objectives of the Mahila Samakhya programme. The participating 
women obtained literacy and numerical skills, were motivated to increase school enrolment of 
their children, especially their daughters, and to become active members of Village Education 
Committees (Mahila Samakhya, 2002).  
Over time however, the groups have taken up additional initiatives to address a large 
number of issues (see box 3.1). These range from meeting daily minimum needs through 
income-generating activities, obtaining better health and hygiene knowledge, entering local 
politics, improving village level infrastructure, settling conflicts in the village, campaigning 
against domestic violence and child marriage, establishing savings and credit groups, and 
setting up informal preschools and primary schools for girls.55  
The programme’s emphasis on the process of empowerment distinguishes it from 
many other development programmes that focus on the fulfillment of targets. The programme 
does not prescribe the kind of activities that a group has to engage in. Instead, it aims to 
empower women and assist them in identifying their own needs and priorities as well as 
solutions.56 Nonetheless, programme facilitators may suggest new issues that the group might 
not have thought of yet, such as political empowerment, economic activities, education issues 
                                                 
54
 This led to strong reservations from the Mahila Samakhya Societies in other states, which implemented the 
programme from a feminist, socio-political perspective instead of an educational perspective (Mahila Samakhya, 
2002). 
55
 Information gathered during the group interviews in 2003. 
56
 A large number of women’s empowerment programmes in India aim to change women’s perceptions about 
themselves and their own abilities, and to address the disadvantaged position of women in Indian society. 
Purushothaman (1998) for example provides a thorough case study of an informal network of NGOs and 
women’s collectives comparable to the Mahila Samakhya women’s groups, in the Indian state Maharashtra. See 
Patel (1998) for an analysis of the relationship between the women’s movement and women’s education. Lahiri-
Dutt and Samanta (2002) discuss the effectiveness of state initiatives on rural women’s empowerment. Agarwal 
(2001) analyses how seemingly participatory institutions and community groups in India can nonetheless 
exclude women to a significant extent. 
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or sanitation. The programme offers support in accessing government subsidies such as the 
SGSY scheme (Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana), a credit and subsidy programme to 
enhance self-employment of the poor, or the DWCRA scheme (for the Development of 
Women and Children in Rural Areas). It also provides training on demand on topics such as 
literacy, health, legal issues, financial management, non-traditional skills or group leadership 
(Mahila Samakhya, 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
The central component of the Mahila Samakhya programme is the ‘mahila samooh’, 
the women’s group. Usually a few times per month the women meet to discuss problems and 
issues that they encounter in their daily lives. For many of them, the initial discussions in the 
group are the first time that they reflect on their situation, ask questions, and feel confident 
enough to articulate their needs and think about solutions through initiating collective action. 
Most of the women have never come out of their house before to discuss public issues, let 
Box 3.1 Examples of the wide variety of activities that the women’s groups engage in. 
 
The first activity of the women’s group in Rampurjaipal village was to organize a 
literacy course. The motivation came not from a desire to read and write per se but from 
the malpractices of local moneylenders. The women could not read or write and signed by 
putting their thumb. The moneylenders abused their trust and falsified contracts and 
lending agreements, e.g. registering a loan of Rs. 100 as Rs. 500. Their second main 
activity was an awareness raising campaign to increase primary school enrolment. One of 
the Mahila Samakhya members joined the Village Education Committee, further 
strengthening their voice in the community and substantially increasing school enrolment. 
Currently, they are involved in business development. With help from the Mahila 
Samakhya facilitator, the women have received funds from DWCRA, a government 
scheme. They have set up many types of small businesses such as selling different types 
of vegetables, or making satu, a wheat-based drink.  
The women’s group in Shantipur village also learned how to approach government 
officials regarding subsidies. This enabled them to receive funding to pave several 
kilometers of road all the way through their village. Next, they decided to address the 
water problem and received training on how to build and maintain the water pumps in 
their village. More recent activities of the group are the informal courts they have set up 
to settle internal village disputes, participation in a literacy course, and the very successful 
savings and credit group that has lessened their dependence on the local moneylenders.  
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alone to address village leaders or local administrative bodies. The possibility to unite and 
change their fate simply did not occur to them.57 
Key to the strategy of Mahila Samakhya are the facilitators, called ‘sahyogini’, who 
each support a cluster of ten villages. They are also the link between the villages and the 
programme institutions at the district level. Each facilitator is the initial mobilizing force in a 
village. The organization of women into a group is not an easy process, especially since the 
Mahila Samakhya programme does not offer clear-cut and immediate benefits: the women’s 
group has to produce these benefits itself. Or, as one of the current members says: “Initially, 
half of the women in our village asked why they should join. They did not see the benefits. 
The sahyogini answered that there was no reason at all except for information and knowledge. 
Only afterwards, when you have the knowledge, you will know what you would like to do 
through the Mahila Samakhya group and be able to do many things.”58 
Regularly, the facilitator has to overcome considerable mistrust on the side of the 
women or even overt hostility of the entire community (Mahila Samakhya, 1995; 2002). She 
gains trust among the women through regular visits to their homes, the fields and their work 
place. During these visits she talks and listens to the women, assists in solving small issues, 
such as treating diarrhea in a child, and helps them to articulate their problems and needs. 
Slowly, the women of the villages learn new things, gain information, become aware of the 
issues around them, and decide on the first activities of collective action to improve their 
lives. As the group gets stronger, it starts to set its own agenda and meeting times, and the 
facilitator participates less and less in the meetings. This process usually takes between 6 and 
12 months.59 See box 3.2 for illustrations. 
Before the 2001 bifurcation into the two states of Bihar and Jarkhand, Bihar consisted 
of 55 districts. Currently, Mahila Samakhya is active in 7 out of the 37 remaining districts of 
Bihar. In March 2002, 1890 mahila samooh groups were active in Bihar, covering 51,977 
women at an average of 27.5 women per group. These groups had 3564 trained group leaders, 
so-called ‘sakhi’s’, almost two per group. 196 facilitators were working in the State, each 
taking care of about 10 groups (Mahila Samakhya, 2002).  
The ultimate goal of the Mahila Samakhya programme is its own phasing out with the 
emergence of federations of women’s groups at the district levels. Ultimately, the women 
themselves are expected to organize and manage these federations without the support of the 
Mahila Samakhya staff. However, setting up well-functioning federations is a slow process. 
The majority of Mahila Samakhya participants comes from the most disadvantaged parts of 
society and has only recently started to mobilize and cooperate. It is unlikely, especially in 
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 Based on discussions during a training week for new Mahila Samakhya group leaders in Muzaffarpur, October 
2002. 
58
 Idem. 
59
 Based on the data collection at the Mahila Samakhya district offices in 2003. 
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Bihar, that they will be fully and effectively independent from the programme in the near 
future.60 
 
 
 
3.4 Sample selection and data collection 
 
After an exploratory field visit in October 2002, the primary data collection occurred 
in the period March–June 2003 in three northern districts of Bihar. The next section describes 
the districts in more detail. Section 3.4.2 gives a general description of the sample 
methodology. The subsequent sections explain the methodology in more detail for each of the 
sampling levels: blocks, villages and households. Appendix 3B describes the process of data 
collection from a practical instead of methodological point of view. 
 
                                                 
60
 Less than one third of the women’s groups in our sample is currently strong enough to meet the programme 
criteria for registration within a federation (own data collection, 2003). 
Box 3.2 Mobilization of the women is a difficult process. 
 
Group meetings and discussions with Mahila Samakhya members show the 
difficulties that the facilitators have to overcome during their initial mobilization efforts.  
 
“The sahyogini had to come for six months to our village before we started to trust 
her and get interested. Initially, we distrusted her enormously, throwing her out of our 
houses, fearing that she was being nice to the women during day time in order to come 
after our husbands at night.” (Sultanpur village) 
 
“Eight years ago, three of us met the sahyogini on their way to work. They did not 
want to sit down with her to talk. They had to make money and had no time to waste. Ten 
days later, they met her again. This continued four or five times. Finally, they became 
curious, wondering what she had to say since she was so insisting. After this first meeting, 
the three women told the rest of the village. At that moment, we still had extremely little 
self-confidence. We could not go out of the village, did not know any government 
officials nor programmes nor even the government structure. We earned very little, had to 
walk behind our husband and be silent in public. Initially, we doubted whether we would 
be able to do the things the sahyogini had been talking about. This was discussed 
extensively among the women of the village. Finally, we decided we should try.” 
(Kansanpally village). 
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3.4.1 Geographical boundaries to the study area 
Because of time and financial constraints, the survey was limited to three of the seven 
Mahila Samakhya districts in Bihar: Muzaffarpur, Sitamarhi and Dharbanga (see Figure 3.3). 
The Muzaffarpur district is relatively easy to reach from the capital Patna at approximately 
two hours by bus. The other two districts are geographically close to Muzaffarpur, facilitating 
travel between them. Whereas Sitamarhi and Muzaffarpur represent the older districts from 
the start of the Mahila Samakhya programme in 1992 and 1993 respectively, Dharbanga is a 
relatively new programme district where Mahila Samakhya started in 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The three study districts are situated in the plains north of the Ganga and have three 
distinct seasons: the cold winter from November up to February, the summer with its hottest 
temperatures during May when temperatures can sore up to 45 degrees, and the rainy season 
starting in the middle of June when temperature falls and humidity rises. They are prone to 
Figure 3.3 Mahila Samakhya districts in Bihar 
Source: http://www.censusindia.net/results/2001maps/bihar01.html 
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flooding (see figure 3.4) but are also regularly hit by severe droughts. The three districts are 
more rural and more densely populated than the rest of the State (see Table 3.1 panel A. for 
details).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the three, Muzaffarpur is closest to the capital and relatively well connected 
through a system of highways and railways. It is one of the centers of political activity in 
Bihar. Its plains consist of relatively fertile soil. Muzaffarpur is famous for its production of 
lychees. About one third of the land lies beneath the level of the river beds. This area floods 
often during the monsoon season. The main industries of the district are cloth trading, bangles 
production and production of rail wagons. Electricity failure remains a serious problem. 
Muzaffarpur has higher literacy rates than Sitamarhi and Dharbanga, but also a larger 
Scheduled Castes population than the other two districts. The district struggles with a number 
of problems, mainly due to the unequal distribution of land between castes, the migration of 
laborers, and social and caste discrimination (Bihar Education Project - Muzaffarpur, 2001).  
Figure 3.4 Flood affected districts of Bihar (2004) 
Source: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc100?OpenForm 
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Table 3.1 Characteristics of the districts in the study region 
 Darbhanga Muzaffarpur Sitamarhi BIHAR 
Panel A. Census 2001     
Total population 3,285,473 3,743,836 2,669,887 82,878,796 
% Decadal population 
growth rate (1991-2001) 
30.9 26.7 32.6 28.4 
% Urbanization 8.1 9.3 5.7 10.5 
Population density ( No. 
pop. per square km) 
1442 1180 1214 880 
% male 52.3 51.9 52.8 52.1 
% female 47.8 48.1 47.2 47.9 
% 0-6 age group 19.1 19.2 20.2 19.6 
Sex ratio (# of females per 
1000 males) 
914 928 893 921 
Sex ratio 0-6 age group 885 925 896 938 
% Total literacy 44.3 48.2 39.4 47.5 
% Male literacy 57.2 60.2 51.0 60.3 
% Female literacy 30.4 35.2 26.4 33.6 
% Scheduled Castes 14.7 15.8 11.7 14.5 
     
Panel B. Census 1991     
% Female literacy (1991) 20.1 22.3 15.5 22.0 
% Scheduled Castes (1991) 14.6 15.7 11.7 15.5 
% Below Poverty Line 
(1991) 
66.3 … 60.1 55.0 
Source panel A: Census Office India (2001a; 2001b).  
Source panel B: Census data 1991 on the Government of Bihar website (http://gov.bih.nic.in/ 
). % Below Poverty Line (1991) for Muzaffarpur is unavailable. 
 
Sitamarhi is the most rural of the three districts with the highest population growth. It 
also has the lowest sex ratio and lowest female literacy rates. Nearly 88 percent of workers are 
dependent on the agricultural sector. Brick plants are an important industrial sector in 
Sitamarhi. The land is crossed by many rivers. It is fertile but the district suffers from severe 
flooding during the monsoon season, which devastates the agricultural fields. This results into 
large-scale migration of agricultural laborers every year. The floods also cause erosion of the 
roads. The main problems faced by the district are law and order problems due to the open 
border with Nepal, sensitivity for the outbreak of communal riots, the yearly floods and 
earthquake proneness. Sitamarhi is relatively isolated as a district. It has a very poor road 
network, both internally and with respect to external connections, only one single railway line 
and very few trains (Bihar Education Project - Sitamarhi, 2001).  
Darbhanga consists of vast plains without any hills, parts of which get flooded every 
year. The district is known for its mango orchards. The industrial sector is small in Dharbanga 
with a few sugar and flour mills and one paper mill, although tiny traditional artisanal 
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industries abound. Darbhanga has a large Muslim population compared to the other two 
districts. The combination of dense population, low literacy, lack of industry, traditional 
cropping patterns, and migration has led to a weak state of the economy. Other problems are 
the need for upgrading the roads, the drainage system, and electricity supply. The district has 
20 railway stations with trains to Patna, Delhi, and Nepal. The 1982 road to Patna has 
considerably increased traffic to and from the district (Bihar Education Project - Darbhanga, 
2001). 
 
3.4.2 Sample size and survey design 
The sample size for the survey was set at 105 villages (35 per district) and 20 
households per village, i.e. 2100 households in total. Interviews with Mahila Samakhya 
programme officers in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh suggested that the variation in behavior and 
outcomes across villages would be much larger than the variation within villages.61 In that 
case, relatively few households are needed to represent a given village adequately, although a 
larger number of villages is needed to represent adequately the diversity among villages 
(Deaton, 1997; Babbie, 2001).  
The survey is based on a stratified clustered sample design. The sample is stratified 
along six strata: 25 programme villages and 10 control villages in each of the three districts. 
In the first stage, we randomly selected the programme and the control villages in each 
district. These villages are the 'clusters'. In the second stage, we randomly selected 20 
households in each village. In programme villages, we randomly selected 10 participating 
women and 10 households who do not participate in a Mahila Samakhya women’s group, to 
ensure a sufficiently large sample of participants. The next sections spell out the sampling 
methodology per stage in more detail.  
Three villages and an additional 49 interviews were dropped from the sample because 
of incomplete or unreliable data.62 This represents 3% of the sampled villages and 5% of the 
sampled households. The final sample consists of 74 programme villages and 28 control 
villages, 718 respondents participating in the programme, 714 respondents living in 
programme villages but not participating themselves (nor anyone from their household), and 
559 control respondents living in villages where the programme is not active. 
 
                                                 
61
 Interviews with Ms Pushpa, State Programme Officer in Bihar, on 26 October 2002 and with Ms Nandini, 
State Programme Director in Andhra Pradesh, on 28 October 2002. 
62
 In one village, an argument between the supervisor and the local facilitator prevented the survey from taking 
place. In two other villages, the supervisor of the interviewers had not been present during the survey resulting in 
problems with the questionnaires. See Appendix 3B for more details. We do not expect that the omission of 
these particular observations from the sample will lead to a sample bias.  
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3.4.3 Selection of programme and control blocks  
The Mahila Samakhya programme in Bihar eventually aims to cover the entire state. 
However, because of the time-consuming process of capacity building and women’s 
mobilization, the programme initially focuses on a few districts and on a few blocks within 
districts that are particularly disadvantaged.63 Only after these blocks are (almost) fully 
covered, that is, when facilitators have visited almost all villages, the programme expands to 
new blocks in the district. The general selection criteria of Mahila Samakhya for districts and 
for programme blocks within districts are threefold: a low level of female literacy, a high 
percentage of population living below the poverty line (BPL), and a high percentage of 
population belonging to the Scheduled Castes.64  
The Muzaffarpur district office follows this general selection rule for blocks. In 
Muzaffarpur, the Mahila Samakhya programme is currently active in five blocks (see table 
3.2). However, two of them were entered only recently. They are not included as programme 
blocks in the survey because the groups in these blocks were still in the emerging phase and 
most of them did not start their own activities yet at the time of the survey. In Sitamarhi, the 
programme has started in most blocks at the same time, but it is active in only a limited 
number of villages in each block. Two programme blocks in Sitamarhi are excluded from the 
sample because the presence of another women’s empowerment programme would 
potentially confound the results. Darbhanga is another exception to the general selection rule. 
Based on travel considerations, the programme started in the two blocks that are closest to the 
district capital. 
The programme blocks in each district are matched with control blocks in the same 
district where the programme has not yet started its mobilization activities. As control blocks, 
we choose blocks that are closely comparable in selection criteria to the programme blocks in 
each district. In Muzaffarpur, the two selected control blocks are relatively comparable in the 
key Mahila Samakhya indicators to the programme blocks. In Darbhanga, the two next closest 
blocks to the district capital were chosen to serve as a control group. For Sitamarhi, the three 
blocks where no or only a few groups had started so far served as a control. A comparison of 
1991 block level female literacy rates shows that the average in the programme blocks is 15.7 
versus a female literacy rate of 18.2 in the control blocks (p-value .233). The 1991 percentage 
Scheduled Castes population in programme blocks is 14.8 versus 14.9 in the control blocks 
(p-value .998). Unfortunately, we do not have the 1991 percentage Below Poverty Line 
population for all blocks to allow for a comparison. 
 
                                                 
63
 The administrative structure divides states in districts, districts in blocks, and blocks in revenue villages. 
Revenue villages cover one or a few villages dependent on their size.  
64
 Table 3.1 panel B. shows these indicators for the three districts in our study region. Whereas Sitamarhi and 
Darbhanga have low female literacy rates but a below-average Scheduled Castes population, the situation in 
Muzaffarpur is reversed. Caste issues play a prominent role in Muzaffarpur political and social life. The three 
districts score high on the Below Poverty Line indicator (the exact score for Muzaffarpur is missing).  
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Table 3.2 Mahila Samakhya statistics per district 
 Darbhanga Muzaffarpur Sitamarhi 
    
Year of start 1998 1993 1992 
Total # of blocks 18 16 17 (13) 
Total # of blocks with Mahila 
Samakhya (MS) 
2 5 13 (8) 
Total # of villages 1269 1833 846 
Total # of villages with MS 250 409 300 (192) 
% of village covered by MS 19.7 22.3 22.7 
Nr of active groups (not 
including emerging groups) 
190 374 345 65 
Source: Mahila Samakhya District Project Offices in Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, and 
Sitamarhi (March 2003). The number of active groups is taken from Mahila Samakhya 
(2002), data as of March 2002. The numbers in brackets for Sitamarhi reflect the remaining 
numbers after an administrative bifurcation of the district in 2003. 
 
 
3.4.4 Selection of villages within blocks 
Within programme blocks, all villages are eligible for inclusion in the Mahila 
Samakhya programme. The mobilization sequence depends partly on the facilitators’ 
residence and partly on the key programme selection criteria. The vacancy of facilitator jobs 
is widely announced in the entire block (or district as in the case of Sitamarhi).66 Facilitators 
start with the mobilization process in their own village and four neighboring villages. After 
one year, they expand their working area to five additional villages in the block that score 
high on the Mahila Samakhya selection indicators. Due to difficult travel circumstances, in 
Darbhanga all ten villages lay close to the facilitator’s own village.  
Prior to the 2001 local elections, the Mahila Samakhya programme in Sitamarhi had 
been expanded to a few additional villages after political pressure from local leaders. 
Unfortunately, we do not have the names of these villages. Hence we do not know whether 
they are included in our sample. The large number of groups in Sitamarhi however (over 300 
groups in 2003), combined with the small number of relatively young groups in our sample 
(only 5 communities that had existed for less then five years in 2003) suggests that the 
potential bias is likely to be very small. 
The programme and the control villages were randomly selected from exhaustive 
village lists per district of the included blocks. The lists were received from the DPEP 
                                                 
65
 In some villages more than one group is active. This may happen in large villages where the programme 
focuses on the smaller units or so-called ‘tolas’, or when very successful groups grow fast and are split up in 
two.  
66
 After an initial training, only the women who pass a theoretical and a skills test are hired. During the training 
special attention is paid to detect caste prejudices among applicants. 
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(District Primary Education Project) offices, i.e. all communities in our sample, both 
programme and control, are also included in the educational programme. All programme 
villages where a women’s group had been active for at least six months were included in the 
sample frame. Due to their remoteness, flooding or inaccessibility, three of the selected 
control villages and four selected programme villages were replaced. In addition, three 
programme villages in Muzaffarpur were dropped from the sample. Antagonistic and 
suspicious attitudes towards outsiders after conflicts with their facilitator effectively ruled out 
the interviews. To the extent that the main cause of break-down of these groups lies not in 
their own initial interests and abilities but in the poor performance of their facilitator, as was 
argued by the district officers, their replacement should not have a noticeable effect on the 
results. Otherwise, our impact estimates might be slightly overestimated.  
 
3.4.5 Selection of households within villages 
The last level of selection occurs within programme villages. Except for the 
participants, households were sampled from the most recent 2001 voter lists from each 
selected village, that were collected from the block offices in Muzaffarpur and Sitamarhi, and 
from the Panchayat Raj institutions in Darbhanga.67 The weighted average adult population 
size in the villages is 513. It is 540 in programme villages and 344 in control villages (p-value 
.009).68 The discrepancy between the two groups is most likely due to the fact that one of the 
supervisors initially obtained the voter lists of the entire revenue village, instead of the 
specifically selected villages or tola’s within the larger revenue village. The communities at 
the top of the list were all programme communities. For subsequent communities, the 
supervisor corrected this and obtained the specific village lists. Omission of these four 
communities yields an average adult population size of 407, not significantly different 
between the programme and the control group. The inclusion of the four revenue villages in 
the sample could potentially lead to an underestimation of the impact of the programme on 
the broader community, since it is likely that spillovers dilute when the area of analysis 
increases. However, their exclusion from the analyses in chapters 4 to 6 does not substantially 
change the results.  
The voter lists contain all adults per household registered at the local block 
administration. This implies that recent migrants to the village may not be included in the 
sample, nor households without a dwelling. It is less relevant for individual women who have 
married since 2001 and moved to the village of their family-in-law, since their ‘new’ 
household is registered already. The procedure was to randomly select households instead of 
                                                 
67
 The Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) are the local levels of elected government. They comprise three levels: 
the gram panchayat at the village level, the panchayat samity at the block level and the zilla parishad at the 
district level (Alsop et al., 2000). 
68
 Unweighted averages are 419 adults per village for the entire sample, 443 adults per programme village and 
355 adults per control village. Differences are not statistically significant. 
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individual women.69 Given the ‘priority’ of older women over their daughters and daughters-
in-law, it was deemed more appropriate to leave this to the discretion of the household 
members. Although this might lead to an overrepresentation of older women, older women 
generally also have more knowledge about and a larger influence within the household. 
The member lists of the women’s groups were used for the random selection of 
participants in the sample. Non-participants sometimes attend group meetings without being 
on the member list. Our methodology would assign a direct impact from non-participant 
attendance in the group to the spillover effects. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
after such orientation visits non-participants either decide to become a member if they are 
interested, or else stop attending.70 Hence, we expect the direct impact of non-participant 
attendance to be limited.  
Replacement occurred upon refusal to participate, when the dwelling was not found, 
when the household did not contain any female household members, when one of the female 
household members was a participant in the Mahila Samakhya group (only for non-
participants), or when no female household member was present at the time of the interview 
nor during a second visit. Overall, the percentage of replacements is relatively high at 10 
percent for the participants, 18 percent for the non-participants and 13 percent for the control 
respondents. This stems mostly from the fact that the survey fell in the middle of the harvest 
period and many women were working in the field. Thus, female agricultural workers not 
living with their extended family are likely to be underrepresented in our sample. Sampled 
non-participants are more likely to be replaced than the other two groups because of the 
inclusion of participants in their sample frame. Remarkable is the very low percentage of 
refusals of 1 percent or less in each of the three sample groups. Indeed, enumerators reported 
that many women were surprised but very pleased with the fact that outsiders were actually 
interested in their opinions, instead of their husbands’. Approximately 10 percent of the 
replacements stem from the inability of the enumerator to find the dwelling of the sampled 
household. 
 
 
 
                                                 
69
 This could potentially lead to a sample bias since in larger households, it is more likely that at least one 
woman is at home during the visit of the enumerator. However, women living in larger households had a 
relatively smaller probability of being selected in the sample, yielding an opposite effect. 
70
 The external audience at group meetings seems to apply mostly to isolated cases, such as a woman whom 
villagers consider to be ‘crazy’ and who is kept out of the group, or another woman who is waiting for the credit 
group to get access to a government revolving fund before she wants to participate. Occasionally, non-members 
may attend a meeting if it concerns a topic that is particularly interesting to them, such as domestic violence, but 
they are not allowed to participate in training programmes and courses.  
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3.5 Comparison of programme and control villages 
 
3.5.1 Comparison of household characteristics 
To what extent do the control villages represent a good counterfactual for the 
programme villages? As described in the previous section the control villages are chosen from 
blocks that are comparable in selection criteria to programme blocks. The slow scaling up of 
the programme within districts offers the opportunity to construct an adequate control group, 
as this section will argue.  
A comparison of the characteristics in the control and programme blocks is given in 
Table 3.3. Panel A of the table compares household characteristics in control and programme 
villages.71 These characteristics include caste and religion, measures of income and wealth, 
education and the composition of the household. The differences between the two groups are 
small and none are significant, either individually or jointly.  
The recruitment method for facilitators could potentially have favored the villages 
with a higher female literacy rate, since those villages might be more likely to provide 
suitable applicants for the job. However, we do not find a systematic difference in female 
education between programme and control villages (Table 3.3 panel A). Also the pre-
programme 1991 village-level female literacy rates are virtually identical among the 
programme and control villages at 14.4 percent and 14.2 percent respectively (Census Office, 
2001b).72  
Alternatively, facilitators may be more widely available in villages that are more 
active and engaged in voluntary organizations from the onset. We do not have baseline data to 
rule out this possibility. However, the data suggest that this effect is limited. The average 
number of community organizations that are active in programme and control villages 
(excluding Mahila Samakhya-related groups) is similar at 1.6 groups per community (p-value 
.926).73  
Likewise, pre-programme membership levels do not significantly differ between 
programme and control households. While we have no baseline data on associational 
membership, we can construct a retrospective panel using the variation in membership  
                                                 
71
 All descriptive statistics throughout the dissertation take into account the stratified, clustered survey design 
through appropriate weighting of observations, i.e. according to the reciprocals of sampling probabilities 
(Deaton, 1997; Babbie, 2001). Standard errors are corrected accordingly. Weights also take into account the 
choice-based sampling of participants and non-participants in programme villages (Manski and Lerman, 1977; 
Deaton, 1997).  
72
 The Census is based on revenue villages that encompass one or more villages. Hence, the 1991 literacy rates 
reflect female literacy in the surrounding area of our sample villages. Not all sample villages could be matched 
to a 1991 Census village because administrative boundaries have changed in the last decade. In the estimations, 
missing values are replaced with average literacy rates in the block.  
73
 Community organizations include religious, funeral, women’s, credit, cultural, sports, youth, and common 
resource groups as well as agricultural and non-agricultural production groups, self-help groups, labor unions, 
political parties and other groups. 
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Table 3.3 Comparison of programme and control villages 
 Control 
villages 
Programme 
villages 
P-value of the 
difference 
PANEL A.    
    
Population characteristics (n=559) (n=1432)  
    
% Scheduled Castes / Scheduled Tribes 23.4 23.3 0.980 
% Other Backward Castes 45.6 53.2 0.210 
% General Castes 13.8 10.1 0.426 
% Muslim 18.7 11.5 0.216 
Mean income quintile74 3.1 3.3 0.266 
Average land ownership (in acres) 0.4 0.4  0.786 
Highest education level in household75 3.1 3.3 0.473 
Highest female education level in 
household 
1.8 2.0 0.339 
Average household size 6.7 6.9 0.606 
Average # children < 14 years of age 2.2 2.4 0.158 
Average child dependency ratio76 0.6 0.7 0.191 
% households with female head 5.7 5.1 0.683 
Test of joint significance   0.222 
    
PANEL B.    
    
Village characteristics (n=28) (n=74)  
    
% with flood in last three years 90.9 78.1 0.066* 
% with drought during last three years 46.5 45.8 0.944 
Average road quality 1.5 1.5 0.972 
Availability of public transport 48.8 56.4 0.531 
Average child wage 29.0 25.0 0.152 
Average distance to nearest town (km) 24.8 12.8 0.000*** 
Test of joint significance (excluding distance to town)  0.220 
    
    
    
(see next page)    
                                                 
74
 The income quintile is derived from a principal component analysis based on 18 household assets and 
facilities. The poverty index, with mean zero, is calculated using the factor loadings of the first factor. Based on 
the poverty index, quintiles were constructed where the first quintile represents the poorest 20% of the 
households. For a motivation of using a score to proxy Indian household wealth based on weightings for 
household assets, see Filmer and Pritchett (2001). 
75
 Highest education level of adult household members: 1 = no schooling; 2 = primary school incomplete; 3 = 
primary school completed; 4 = middle school completed; 5 = high school completed or higher education. 
76
 The children who are less than fourteen years of age as a fraction of the total number of adults in the 
household. 
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(PANEL B. continued) Control 
villages 
Programme 
villages 
P-value of the 
difference 
    
% of villages with facility available    
Market 44.2 40.5 0.743 
Post office 45.5 25.6 0.071* 
Telephone 71.1 62.2 0.299 
Bus stop 27.2 31.2 0.723 
Bank 17.8 12.7 0.582 
Health center 36.4 41.6 0.659 
Test of joint significance   0.644 
    
Distance to nearest facility if not available within community 
boundaries (km) 
 
Market 2.1 2.6 0.133 
Post office 2.1 2.2 0.717 
Telephone 4.6 2.9 0.313 
Bus stop 2.7 2.9 0.681 
Bank 3.2 3.4 0.703 
Health center 3.3 2.9 0.516 
Test of joint significance   0.253 
    
Average number of villages that have at least one school of the type specified: 
Primary school 88.1 85.5 0.760 
Middle school 24.3 23.0 0.905 
High school 3.3 6.4 0.526 
Test of joint significance   0.879 
    
Test of joint significance (all village characteristics excluding distance to 
town) 
0.640 
Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors 
corrected accordingly.  *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
 
duration and in years of programme start in the village. For example, we can compare the 
percentage of households that were member of an organization for at least two years in 
control villages and in programme villages where the group had been active for at most one 
year. This comparison shows programme and control participation rates of 3 and 4 percent 
respectively (p-value .754). Similarly, the percentages of households with membership 
durations of at least three years are 4 and 2 percent in the respective groups (p-value .548), 
etcetera.77 Overall, these rates are extremely low. Remember that even the programme 
                                                 
77
 Going further back in time, 5 percent of non-participant households have been member of a group for at least 
four or five years compared to 2 percent in the control group. Again, the differences are not significant with p-
values of .140 and .144 for four and five year-durations respectively. Longer membership durations are rare with 
percentages below 3 and 1, and p-values significant at the 10 but not the 5 percent level.  
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participants were initially very difficult to mobilize. It usually takes between half a year and 
one year of weekly facilitator visits before a group emerges that is strong enough to set its 
own agenda.  
In short, the findings suggest that programme and control households do not 
significantly differ from each other with respect to their household characteristics, either 
individually or jointly. In addition, pre-programme female literacy rates are virtually identical 
as are the number of other community organizations in the villages. The data also suggest that 
the two groups do not differ significantly with respect to associational activity prior to the 
arrival of the programme. Chapter five will give additional information on the comparability 
of retrospective baseline immunization and preschool data. Chapter six will discuss the 
comparability of demand for credit and financial assistance between the programme and the 
control group. 
 
3.5.2 Comparison of community characteristics 
An examination of village characteristics in Panel B shows a similar picture. Again the 
differences between programme and control villages are small and very few are statistically 
significant, either individually or jointly. Control villages are slightly more likely to have 
experienced a flood in the last three years. Differences regarding the occurrence of droughts, 
the quality of the roads, and availability of public transport are not significant.  
The only notable exception is distance to the nearest town, which is considerably 
larger for control villages. This is likely to result from the programme block selection 
procedure, especially in Darbhanga. However, the larger distance to a town does not seem to 
affect the overall access to the facilities that are generally considered to be relevant indicators 
of village level development. The percentage of villages with a market, post office, telephone, 
bus stop, bank or health center within their boundaries is relatively equal among programme 
and control villages. Likewise, in those cases where the facility is not available, we do not 
find any significant differences in the distance to the nearest facility outside the community. 
Also the percentage of villages with at least one primary, middle and/or secondary school 
available is highly comparable between the two groups.  
Nonetheless, distance to town may reflect other unobserved influences that are not 
captured by the presence of facilities. For example, distance to town may affect the 
availability of supplies in health centers. But probit estimations of immunization rates for the 
programme and control villages separately show that distance to town does not significantly 
affect the probability of immunization in either treatment group.78 Similarly, distance to town 
is significantly and positively correlated with child wages, which in turn may influence the 
opportunity costs of schooling. But again, neither distance to town nor the child wage level 
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 The only exception is polio immunization among control children which is significantly more prevalent in 
villages far away from town, which would underestimate programme impact. However, as will be discussed in 
chapter 5, polio is a special case and is excluded from the analysis.  
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has a statistically significant effect on school enrolment rates in the baseline situation of 
control communities.79 This provides further support to the validity of the control group in the 
impact evaluation of chapter 5. In addition, distance to town is not significantly related to 
credit from social relations in control villages, i.e. to the variable of interest in chapter 6. Nor 
is it significantly related to trust, norms of reciprocity and informal assistance in control 
villages, i.e. to the majority of the dependent variables in chapter 4. It has a statistically 
significant but positive relationship with contributions to collective action. If anything, this 
would bias the impact estimates in chapter 4 downwards. In sum, the one important difference 
between programme and control communities, proximity to town, does not appear to affect 
the variables of interest in any significant way, controlling for the other exogenous 
community characteristics. 
Overall, the descriptive statistics show that the programme and control villages are 
very comparable to each other on a large number of household as well as village 
characteristics. Thus, it seems plausible to assume that in the absence of the programme, 
outcomes in the programme villages would have been similar to those in the control villages. 
On the basis of the above evidence, the rest of the dissertation will assume that the control 
group represents a good counterfactual for the programme villages.  
 
3.6 Description of Mahila Samakhya participants in programme 
villages 
 
3.6.1 Comparison of participants and non-participants 
On average, a weighted 5.4 percent of the total adult female population in the 
programme villages participates in a Mahila Samakhya women’s group. This ranges from a 
mere 1 percent in one village to over 26 percent in another community. In principle every 
woman who is interested can join the women's group. However, the facilitators gear their 
efforts particularly towards poor women from the Scheduled or Other Backward Castes. As 
table 3.4 indicates, the majority of the participants belongs to the target group. Of the 
participants, 39 percent belong to the Scheduled Castes and 49 percent to the Other Backward 
Castes. Only 2 percent of the participants come from General Castes. The percentage Muslim 
population is a bit lower among participants at 9 percent than among the non-participant 
population with 12 percent, although the difference is not statistically significant.  
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 Children in programme villages are significantly more likely to go to primary or middle school when they live 
far away from town. This suggests that programme impact may be largest when distance to town is largest. 
Hence our impact estimate of school enrolment might be slightly underestimated.  
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The average participant belongs to a lower income quintile than the average non-
participant80, and owns significantly less land. The highest education levels in participants’ 
households are substantially lower than in non-participants’ households. They have slightly 
less household members but more children under the age of 14, resulting in a larger child 
dependency ratio for participants than for non-participants. The percentage of female-headed 
households is equal among the two groups.  
 
Table 3.4 Comparison of participants and non-participants in programme villages 
 Participants Non-
participants 
P-value of the 
difference 
between 
participants and 
non-participants 
 
% Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes 39.0 22.4 0.005*** 
% Other Backward Castes 49.2 53.4 0.419 
% General Castes 2.3 10.5 0.002*** 
% Muslim 9.2 11.6 0.568 
    
Average income quintile 2.9 3.4 0.002*** 
Average area of land owned (acres) 0.2 0.4 0.000*** 
Highest level of education in household 2.8 3.3 0.032** 
Highest female level of education in 
household 
1.6 2.0 0.003*** 
    
Household size 6.5 6.9 0.083* 
Number of children < 14 years of age 2.6 2.4 0.074* 
Child dependency ratio 0.8 0.7 0.001*** 
% with female head of household 5.7 5.1 0.703 
Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors 
corrected accordingly.  *: p-value < 0.10; **: p-value < 0.05; ***: p-value < 0.01. 
 
In sum, women who decide to join a women's group belong to the target group of the 
poorer and socially more disadvantaged segments of society. However, representation of 
Muslims among the participants is below average, although they often lead a marginalized 
life. The discussion about immunization rates of Muslim versus Hindu children in chapter 5 
takes up this issue further. Another exclusionary force affects upper caste women. Although 
some activities such as literacy trainings may not benefit them much, other group activities –
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 Participants live in houses with walls, floors, and roofs of lesser quality. They have less access to private water 
facilities or electricity. They more often use biomass as fuel for cooking. They own fewer assets such as a radio 
or a television. Participants also have less access to adequate sanitation facilities. However, the availability of 
sanitation is alarmingly low overall. Only 17 percent of the population in the study area have access to sanitation 
facilities such as a pit toilet or a latrine. 
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especially activities related to domestic violence, girl marriage or women’s status for 
example, could be equally beneficial for them. Nonetheless, it appears that they face large 
hurdles and strict social norms that prevent them from participating. For example, upper caste 
women are sometimes not allowed to participate in activities outside the village that would 
entail eating or even sleeping in the same location as lower caste women.81 Also, higher caste 
women are disproportionately kept in purdah (i.e. in seclusion), which effectively prevents 
them from participating in the group meetings. Some women manage to circumvent these 
restrictions. They arrange for others to pick up the monthly contributions, which enables them 
to at least participate in the savings and credit group. 
 
3.6.2 Reasons for (not) participating 
At the time of the survey, the sampled participants had been a member of Mahila 
Samakhya for four and a half years on average. Most of them, 63 percent, joined in the same 
year that the group was established in their village. Another 16 percent joined one year later. 
Initial motivations of women to participate relate mainly to women’s issues and access to 
funds (see box 3.3).  
These issues overlap partly but not entirely with the most important benefits that 
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 On the other hand, an interview with Ms Nandini Prasad, Mahila Samakhya State Project Director in Andhra 
Pradesh (October 2002) suggests that the participation of upper caste women gradually increases as the group 
gets older and more accepted within the community. In such cases, higher class women mostly join in the 
activities that directly concern themselves, but not in other group meetings. 
Box 3.3 Reasons to join the Mahila Samakhya programme 
 
During a training week for forty new group leaders in Muzzafarpur (October 2002), the 
following reasons emerged as most important motivations for the women to join the 
Mahila Samakhya programme:  
- to lessen dependence on moneylenders 
- to ban early marriage 
- to fight wife beating and violence against women 
- to stimulate female empowerment, increase equal participation in society and 
eradicate sex discrimination 
- to unite for strength and increase legal rights 
- to uplift the social status and living standards of the deprived castes 
- to educate women 
- to participate in government schemes and subsidies (to learn about which programs, 
which criteria, which prerequisites) 
- to increase voice towards government officials 
- to gain right of speech in public and in front of men 
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members identify after having participated for some time. The most common benefits that 
participants get from joining the women’s group are learning how to read and write 
(mentioned as a benefit by 76 percent of the participating respondents), learning about health 
and hygiene issues (72 percent) and access to the credit and savings group (70 percent). Other 
important benefits are to empower as a woman in the community (46 percent) and to share 
personal and emotional issues (40 percent). 13 percent of respondents mention the improved 
access to government services and schemes. 12 percent value the improved status in the 
household as an important benefit of participation.  
The majority of current participants (71 percent) indicate that their husbands were 
supportive from the beginning when the women told them that they would like to participate 
in the women’s group. Only 7 percent of husbands were doubtful and 16 percent directly 
opposed to the idea. Especially among the early initiators, who joined the women’s group 
when there were less than five other members, husbands appear to have been very supportive 
right from the start. Over time, skeptical husbands changed their mind such that, at the time of 
the survey, 96 percent of the participating women said that their husband was currently 
supportive of their membership in Mahila Samakhya. The most important reason for the 
increasingly favorable attitudes of husbands (mentioned by 67 percent of the respondents) is 
that husbands saw that their wife learned a lot such as reading, writing, or gaining health 
knowledge. Fifty-nine percent of the women think that the good accomplishments of the 
group with respect to collective projects for the community are important as well to change 
men’s perceptions. Bringing in money through the credit group was important in gaining 
spousal support in 47 percent of the families. Better education and health for the children 
mattered in 38 percent of the cases. Finally, 36 percent of the respondents feel that the 
increased status of the women’s group in the community has had a substantial and positive 
effect on their husband’s opinion of their participation. Indeed, 61 percent of the non-
participants agree that the social status of participating women has increased in the 
community (see box 3.4).  
Given the many benefits that participants derive from their membership, it may be 
surprising that not more women decide to participate. In fact, 39 percent of the non-
participants at some point thought about joining the women’s group. The most important 
reason for them not to participate is first of all a lack of time (as 51 percent of non-
participants mention). The time constraint is an important barrier to participation especially 
among respondents who work as agricultural or unskilled laborers as opposed to domestic 
workers or skilled laborers. The second main reason is that husbands do not want their wife to 
participate (33 percent). A third reason is a lack of interest (31 percent). Skilled laborers are 
most likely to mention a lack of interest as their main reason not to participate. Indeed, many 
of the private benefits such as literacy trainings are not very useful for them. However, they 
are also the group most likely to mention problems with their husband as an obstacle to 
participation, which corroborates the anecdotal evidence mentioned in the previous section 
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that middle and upper class women face specific barriers to participation. Note that 
approximately three percent of the non-participants participated in the past but dropped out, 
which is relatively more common among women with skilled occupations. Their main reason 
not to participate anymore is a lack of time, followed by a lack of interest. Discussions in the 
field suggest that a failure to receive credit is an important trigger for individuals to drop-out. 
This stems mostly from an unsuccessful application of the group to a government revolving 
fund subsidy, which is given only if the group meets certain strict criteria such as some 
accounting principles but also a minimum percentage of Scheduled Castes participants for 
example. 
 
Nonetheless, according to a quarter of the non-participants, households who do not 
participate also benefit from the programme. Such benefits for non-participants come in the 
form of increased knowledge about health and hygiene (mentioned by 86 percent of them), 
increased access to credit (71 percent), improved education (62 percent) and increased 
security (32 percent). The latter benefit most likely stems from the fact that many women’s 
groups start to settle conflicts in their community (see box 3.5).  
In short, participation in the programme is voluntary and motivated out of a number of 
reasons. This implies that there are probably unobserved differences between participants and 
non-participants, in terms of motivation, awareness or ability for example, that both affect the 
Box 3.4 The social status of Mahila Samakhya members  
 
The social status of Mahila Samakhya members increases over time in many villages after 
the other community members start to realize how much the women are actually capable 
of accomplishing. Stories told during focus group discussions illustrate this process:  
 
“Most families in our village belong to the Scheduled Castes. If a household needs to go 
to the hospital or is in need, then the Mahila Samakhya group helps the household. This 
has substantially increased the status of the group in the village. Now, there are five 
groups active.” (Kanara Ragu village)   
 
 “The group leader has been involved from the start eight years ago. She is now perceived 
by the rest of the village to be so active, to be able to access government subsidies and to 
know all the politicians and government officials without being one herself. This has led 
to her unanimous election, by women and men, as a representative in our local Panchayat 
Raj (i.e the village council) to represent the village in the larger community. Currently, 
the women’s group is popular and has sixty members.” (Shantipur village) 
 
 “A girl and a boy from one family were both ill. The girl got better, the boy died. The 
husband got angry and beat up his wife and wanted to send her away. The Mahila 
Samakhya group intervened and settled the domestic dispute. Since then, the status of the 
group and its influence in the village has increased.” (Chandan Bakri village) 
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likelihood of participation and other outcomes at the household level. In other words, when 
evaluating the impact of the programme on participants versus non-participants, participation 
selection bias needs to be taken into account, for example through the use of instrumental 
variables. 
 
3.6.3 A closer look at the women’s groups characteristics 
The Mahila Samakhya women’s groups in the three study districts existed on average 
for 4.7 years at the time of the survey. The length of existence of sampled groups is spread out 
relatively evenly over durations from less than one to ten years.82 They have on average 28 
members with a minimum of 10 members in two villages and a maximum of 80 members in 
two other communities. Two thirds of the participants think that the group would be more 
successful if it would be larger, although as expected their fraction diminishes for larger 
group sizes.  
During the focus group meetings and the household interviews, and from programme 
reports (Mahila Samakhya, 1995; Mahila Samakhya, 2002), a broad range of issues emerged 
that the groups have addressed since their start, such as: 
- improving education of girls and boys (e.g. organizing enrolment campaigns, 
setting up informal girls’ schools or preschools, literacy camps for women, 
entering Village Education Committees, participating in school activities and 
curriculum) 
- meeting daily minimum needs (e.g. through income generating activities, lobbying 
for minimum wages) 
- protection against financial shocks (informal savings and credit groups) 
- improving village level infrastructure (roads, bridges, water, sanitation, electricity) 
- gaining control over their health (through traditional health or hygiene training) 
- actively accessing resources (e.g. through government schemes and subsidies) 
- entering the political sphere (active participation in the Panchayat Raj institutions) 
- tackling social issues (such as domestic violence, girl teasing, alcoholism, dowry, 
witch hunt or child marriage) 
- settling conflicts in the village (such as family feuds, land disputes, inter-religious 
or inter-caste conflicts) 
- conducting ‘clean village’ campaigns and action for environmental protection 
- constructing community facilities (such as a community center, a temple, a school 
or a health center) 
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 The number (percentage) of groups in the sample that existed for zero, one, two,…, ten years at the time of the 
survey is 2 (3%), 7 (9%), 11 (15%), 13 (18%), 6 (8%), 8 (11%), 3 (4%), 9 (12%), 8 (11%), 1 (1%), 6 (8%) 
respectively. Seven missing values are replaced with the years of membership of the ‘oldest’ interviewed 
member in the community. 
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- learning non-traditional skills (such as masonry or hand pump mechanic). 
 
Surprisingly, the majority of participants (78 percent) does not think that individuals 
can make a significant contribution or a large difference for the success of the group. This 
percentage is especially high among the older groups. In the new groups that started in the 
year before the survey only 33 percent of participants think that individuals cannot make a 
(small or substantial) difference. This suggests that individuals are initially very enthusiastic 
 
Box 3.5 Domestic violence and conflict settling 
 
Many women’s groups engage in informal conflict settling within their community. They 
are often perceived as less partial and/or corrupt than the local police or village council. 
The following two cases, handled by the women’s group in Sangupeta village (Andhra 
Pradesh), illustrate their approach (based on a group meeting in October 2002): 
 
Murder The son of a Mahila Samakhya woman was murdered by a group of people. The 
local police took some time, finally arrested one man, and released him soon thereafter. 
The villagers knew the police had been bribed. Moreover, it was common knowledge in 
the village who had been the main murderer and that the arrested man had only played a 
minor role. However, people did not dare to give testimony against him as there were too 
many relations between the guilty group and themselves. So the murderer went free. 
The women’s group decided they could not let this happen. Together they went to the 
local police again. Nothing happened, corruption won. They then went repeatedly to the 
Collector (i.e. a higher administrative level), who finally ordered the local police to 
arrest the guilty man. But again, bribes were stronger and the man was released. 
Ultimately, the women decided to set up a large rally in front of the Collector’s house, 
involving also members from other women’s groups of the entire block. The rally took 
thirteen days of demonstrations, sit-ins and protests for justice and against corruption. 
Finally the Collector ordered a police force of another unit without so many connections 
to the local community to arrest the man again. At the moment of our group discussion, 
the legal system was working on the case. 
 
Domestic violence A woman of the Mahila Samakhya group was regularly and severely 
beaten by her husband. She talked about it but initially the group did not respond: every 
wife is beaten from time to time. Then came the moment the woman left her husband and 
children and fled to her mother in another village. Now the group understood that this 
was more than ‘average’ beating. The women had an urgent discussion with the husband, 
telling him to take up responsibility for her domestic peace. They also visited the woman 
at her mother’s and convinced her to go back to the husband. The women’s group still 
keeps an eye on the situation but everything is going well now. The husband has stopped 
beating her (at least not severely anymore) and the woman is happy that she went back to 
her family. 
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and convinced about the importance of their own contributions, but over time realize that you 
need the collaboration of the entire group to really accomplish something.  
The group interviews indicate that most of the groups are relatively homogeneous in 
terms of age, educational and occupational backgrounds of the participants. They are 
somewhat more heterogeneous with respect to caste and religion. In 49 percent of the groups, 
the most prevalent caste is the Other Backward Castes. In 43 percent, the Scheduled Castes 
are most common and in 5 percent Muslims are the majority. However, 63 percent of the 
groups indicate that other castes are represented as well. Although 95 percent of the groups 
mostly consist of Hindu members, 27 percent of them indicate that some of the participants 
belong to other religions (mostly Islam). This mixture of castes and religions in the groups is 
a positive finding in view of the efforts of the programme to eradicate caste and community 
prejudices among project functionaries and participants.  
All groups in the sample have at least two group leaders or ‘sakhi’s’. Eight groups 
have three leaders. In 89 percent of the groups, the leaders are selected through elections, 
whereas in 8 percent of groups the current leaders have been appointed by the facilitator. Half 
of the ‘first’ leaders are between 36 and 49 years of age. A quarter is between 25 and 35 and a 
quarter is above 50. The ‘second’ leader is mostly younger than the first leader. They are 
often illiterate or have learned to read and sign their name but did not follow formal 
education. The first leader belongs generally to the same caste as the most prevalent caste in 
the group. Although this is also true for the second leader, she comes relatively more often 
from a different caste compared to the first leader. The first leader always has the same 
religion as the most common religion in the group. These findings suggest that leaders are 
selected such that the first leader is a good representative of the median group member. The 
background of the second leader sometimes reflects other social classes found within the 
group. Thus, we do not find evidence that leadership roles are taken up relatively more 
frequently by women from the higher socio-economic classes.  
Half of the groups meet at least once a week, an additional third meets at least twice or 
three times per month. During those meetings the majority of the group members is usually 
present. A mere 10 percent of the groups indicate that only half or less than half of the 
members usually attends the group meetings. Only eight percent of the groups in the sample 
receive weekly visits from the facilitator. In the majority of cases, the facilitator comes two or 
three times per month (42 percent), or only once per month (41 percent). The remaining 
groups indicate that they receive visits less than once per month. Roughly half of the groups is 
confident enough to respond that their group would function just as well if the facilitator 
would visit less. The other half fears that their functioning would deteriorate without the 
regular assistance from the facilitator. 
Finally, a look at the relationship between the Mahila Samakhya groups and outsiders 
gives some suggestive evidence regarding the linking social capital that the programme 
creates between the mostly lower class participants and the elite and/or the local government. 
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Thirty-five percent of the women’s groups indicate that the more prosperous families or elites 
in the community do not participate in the activities of the women’s groups. However, an 
even higher 45 percent of the groups report that quite a lot of upper class women sometimes 
participate in activities. Indeed, in 51 percent of the villages the relationship with the elite is 
supportive or cooperative. In 39 percent of the cases, the elite is indifferent towards the group 
and only 8 percent of the groups report an interfering or adversarial attitude of the elite. 
Similarly, 24 percent of the local governments accept the women’s group in their community 
and 31 percent even consult the group. Nonetheless, 36 percent of the groups say that the 
government behaves indifferently towards the group or ignores them.  
Overall, the findings suggest that many of the disadvantages often attached to 
community based development are not reflected in the Mahila Samakhya programme. It 
targets its intended beneficiaries relatively well. Better-educated, richer or higher caste 
women do not crowd out the beneficiaries when they realize the programme offers access to 
funds. Muslims are somewhat underrepresented. But the one group that may be seen as 
‘excluded’ from the programme are the women from the higher castes. Nevertheless, 
relationships with the elite and the local government appear to improve over time. Also, the 
programme seems to level instead of reinforce caste and religious barriers. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
Bihar can be a very difficult state to live in, especially for women belonging to the 
lower castes. The Mahila Samakhya programme aims to strengthen their position through 
enhancing solidarity and facilitating group action. This makes the programme particularly 
well suited for our analysis of the impact of community-based development programmes on 
social capital and cooperation. The slow scaling-up of the programme within districts allows 
for a quasi-experimental survey design. The detailed comparison of programme and control 
villages in this chapter strongly suggests that the matched control group indeed represents a 
good counterfactual for the programme villages.  
The dataset encompasses not only households in control villages and participants in 
programme villages, but also non-participants in programme villages. This unique feature of 
the survey design enables us to explicitly measure spillover effects of the programme on 
households who do not participate themselves but who live in a community where a women’s 
group is active. Indeed, more than a quarter of the non-participants indicate that they too 
benefit from the presence of the programme in their community. To translate these qualitative 
responses into quantitative impact estimates, the three analytical chapters that follow will 
explicitly estimate the externalities on the broader community. 
A comparison of participants and non-participants in the final section of this chapter 
shows that the former belong mostly to the target group. The Muslim population however, 
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another marginalized section of Bihari society, remains underrepresented among the 
participants. The women’s groups are fairly homogeneous with respect to educational and 
occupational characteristics but encompass women from various castes and religions. This 
may be one step towards a decrease in caste and communal conflicts in the region. We do not 
find evidence that the better educated or higher castes are more likely to take up leadership 
roles within the groups.  
The groups engage in a wide variety of activities. Improved literacy and education, 
increased health knowledge and access to (cheap) credit are among the most important 
benefits that members derive from participation in the women’s group. Each of these benefits 
will be analyzed in greater detail in the remainder of this dissertation.  
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APPENDIX 3A. Objectives of the Mahila Samakhya programme  
 
 
1) To enhance the self-image and self-confidence of women and thereby enabling them to 
recognize their contribution to society and the economy as producers and workers, 
reinforcing their need for participating in educational programmes.  
 
2) To create an environment where women can seek knowledge and information and thereby 
empower them to play a positive role in their own development and development of 
society.  
 
3) To establish a decentralized and participative mode of management, with the decision 
making powers developed to the district level and to the Mahila Samoohs which in turn 
will provide the necessary conditions for effective participation. 
 
4) To enable the Mahila Samoohs to actively assist and monitor educational activities in the 
villages - including the primary school, early childhood education centers and facilities for 
continuing education.  
 
5) To provide women and adolescent girls with the necessary support structure and an 
informal learning environment to create opportunities for education.  
 
6) To set in motion circumstances for larger participation of women and girls in formal and 
non- formal education programmes, and to create an environment in which education can 
serve the objectives of women's equality.  
 
Source: Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India (2002) 
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APPENDIX 3B. Practical organization of the survey  
 
Questionnaire design 
A first, exploratory field visit took place in October 2002. During this field visit, 
meetings were scheduled with the national director of Mahila Samakhya, with World Bank 
officials responsible for DPEP in Bihar, and with the Dutch Embassy as co-financer of the 
Mahila Samakhya programme in the other Indian states. Also, the Mahila Samakhya 
programme was visited in the two states of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. In both states, 
discussions with Mahila Samakhya officials at the state and district level contributed to an 
overview of the characteristics and functioning of the programme. Many interviews with 
women in the villages added to the understanding of the impact of the Mahila Samakhya 
programme. 
This initial field visit combined with the hypotheses of the literature review in chapter 
2 resulted in a first draft of the survey.83 The survey consists of two components: a household 
questionnaire and a village questionnaire. The household questionnaire includes modules on 
socio-economic household information; education; health; social exclusion; cooperation and 
collective action; trust, norms and values; female bargaining power; credit and savings; and 
separate modules for each of the three treatment groups (participants, non-participants and 
control) on the benefits of cooperation and Mahila Samakhya. The village questionnaire 
includes a general module on facilities, community groups and other village characteristics, as 
well as a specific module with respect to the women’s group for programme villages. In the 
programme villages, members of the Mahila Samakhya group were interviewed for the 
village questionnaire. In control villages, the village leader and other community members 
that were present answered those questions.  
The actual field survey in Bihar took place during four months from March 2003 to 
June 2003. In Bihar, the first draft of the questionnaires was discussed with the Mahila 
Samakhya District Teams of Muzaffarpur and Sitamarhi.84 The results from these discussions 
were incorporated in a second draft of the survey, which was then translated into Hindi for the 
pilot. 
 
Pilot of the questionnaire  
The next step in the survey design was a pilot in Muzaffarpur district. It was 
considered enough to perform the pilot in only one district. A pilot team was set up consisting 
of the researcher, a senior Mahila Samakhya trainer, a research assistant closely involved in 
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 The design of the first draft was also based on the World Bank handbook “Designing household survey 
questionnaires for developing countries” (Grosh and Glewwe, 2000) and on the World Bank’s “Measurement of 
Social Capital” database (Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002). 
84
 The District Team of Darbhanga was not able to attend the discussion weekend. 
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designing the second draft, an experienced interviewer from the Bihar Education Project 
(BEP) Muzaffarpur, and two interviewers from the Mahila Samakhya programme in 
Muzaffarpur. The pilot took seven days in which we visited 8 villages, performed 7 group 
interviews and 20 household interviews. The pilot villages were selected from the remaining 
list after the sample selection for the research had taken place. The pilot started with a training 
for the interviewers about the purpose of the research, the contents of the questionnaire, the 
purpose of the pilot, and instructions. Each day ended with a discussion of the problems and 
issues that the interviewers had encountered during the day. Comments were incorporated in 
the draft, to be tested again the next day. 
The facilitators of the villages were informed beforehand and asked to accompany the 
pilot team and introduce them to the community members. This facilitated the interaction and 
participation, especially since during the pilot the household interviews were still relatively 
long and elaborate and could take up to two and a half hours. The importance of a good 
facilitator became clear in the villages of Basauli Jagarnath and Basauli Nankar. In both 
villages, she had not visited the groups in a long time, not given them adequate information 
about the benefits of saving, about accessing training programs or government schemes, nor 
helped them in formulating group projects. In short, she had done a bad job. This resulted in 
an extremely apathic and uninformed group in Basauli Jagarnath. It was very difficult to 
complete the group interview as they were little aware of the answers. The group in Basauli 
Nankar was very suspicious of the pilot team (as of any outsiders) and refused to cooperate in 
the interview at all. Note that this was one of the reasons why the three ‘dead’ groups in 
Muzaffarpur were removed from the sample list (see section 3.4.2). 
The pilot resulted in a third draft in Hindi with the accompanying draft in English. The 
BEP project director (psychologist and former researcher) checked the third draft and the 
translation into Hindi. The District Team in Muzaffarpur cooperated in the proof reading of 
the third draft to take out spelling and other mistakes. The resulting fourth and final draft was 
printed in a booklet, with a first extra-large page containing the household roster that could be 
folded out for reference during the interview. 
 
Enumeration process 
The enumerators had all been involved in the Mahila Samakhya programme at the 
district level, for example as trainers or interviewers. As such, they were aware of the specific 
circumstances under which rural women live, sensitive and skilled in approaching the 
respondents and in making them feel comfortable during the interview. We hired female 
interviewers to facilitate the contact with the respondents. Only the Darbhanga interview team 
included one male interviewer, who had worked with Mahila Samakhya on a recent survey 
regarding sanitation and hygiene practices. The enumerators had all finished high school, 
most had a Bachelor’s degree and some had a Master’s degree. A considerable number of 
them had recently been involved in a baseline survey for a UNICEF programme. They all 
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received training on the questionnaire including field trials. The best trainees were selected to 
become enumerators. 
In each district, teams of four to five enumerators per supervisor were formed. The 
tasks of the supervisors consisted of planning the implementation of the actual survey, i.e. 
decide on the sequence of villages to visit, collect the voter lists, randomly select the 
respondents from the lists, conduct the village interviews with the Mahila Samakhya members 
or the village leader, ensure that the interviewers perform their tasks well, and write a report 
each day. Also, for security reasons they might accompany the enumerators on an interview if 
the household was living far away in the forest for example. In Muzaffarpur one supervisor 
left two enumerators alone to conduct the survey in two villages. When it became clear that 
the interviewers had filled in the formats themselves, these two villages were dropped from 
the sample (see section 3.4.2). Moreover, all the other questionnaires of the instigator of this 
action were dropped from the sample as well.  
Hindi was the main language used. In the rural areas, villagers usually speak a dialect 
but they are all able to communicate well in Hindi. In Muzaffarpur and Sitamarhi, the 
enumerators came from the district itself, further facilitating communication. The Darbhanga 
interview team consisted of a mix of enumerators from Darbhanga and Muzaffarpur. 
Transport during the survey was not always easy. Often, enumerators could take local 
transport such as a bus or a riksja only up to some point, after which they had to walk for 
another few kilometers. To minimize travel time, most teams stayed overnight in the villages, 
usually in the house of one of the Mahila Samakhya members or of a (preschool) teacher. 
Initially, we considered giving the respondents a small gift in return for their 
cooperation. However, the Mahila Samakhya district offices strongly advised against such 
practice. This would create expectations on the part of the villagers for participation in future 
surveys, thereby making work more difficult for the programme that does not have enough 
funds to provide gifts. In the field, gifts turned out to be unnecessary. In general, the survey 
was extremely well received in the villages. For many of the female respondents, this was the 
first time that an outside organization was interested in their opinions instead of their 
husband’s. They all took the time to sit down and respond, and showed considerable patience 
with the enumerators, especially during the first few days when speed of interviewing was 
still low. After the initial days, an interview lasted on average between half an hour and one 
hour.  
However, the timing of the survey was not ideal. Especially in Sitamarhi, the survey 
period coincided with the harvest when many women were working on the fields. The 
supervisors solved the problem of non-response as well as possible by changing interview 
hours to the early morning, during lunchtime and after dinner.  
The Mahila Samakhya district teams of Muzaffarpur and Sitamarhi were very 
involved and supportive of the research project. They felt it would not only increase their 
knowledge about their own programme, but also that the training and interview experience 
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would increase local skills. The Darbhanga district team however was more reluctant to 
cooperate in the evaluation exercise and did not fully support the enumeration teams in the 
district. Among others, this led to a conflict between one enumeration team and a facilitator. 
As a consequence, the Mahila Samakhya group in that particular village refused to cooperate 
with the survey. The village was dropped from the sample (section 3.4.2). 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
Dynamics of trust, reciprocity and cooperation 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
To explain the absence or emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas, economic 
theories increasingly incorporate concepts such as trust and norms of reciprocity in their 
models. Trust in others, or the expectation that others will not betray you, is a necessary 
prerequisite for cooperative behavior to arise in situations that suffer from a temptation to 
free-ride. Reciprocity reflects a threat of social sanctions or the promise of social rewards, 
which enhance the sustainability of cooperative arrangements. Positive experiences with 
cooperation in turn will increase an individual’s trust in others. This suggests the possibility 
of an upward spiral between trust and cooperation, supported by norms of reciprocity.  
Quantitative studies that investigate these hypotheses do often not go beyond finding 
evidence of correlations. Few try to disentangle cause and effect. But for a reinforcing 
mechanism to exist there should be a positive link from trust to cooperation as well as a 
positive link from cooperation to trust. Given the large number of theories that rely on the 
concepts of trust and/or reciprocity to explain cooperation, the dearth of quantitative empirical 
evidence in this respect is surprising. The general aim of this chapter is therefore to 
investigate the dynamics between trust, reciprocity and cooperation.  
The emergence of the literature on social capital has given a new impetus to the 
academic and policy discussions on issues of cooperation. Is it possible for outsiders such as 
the government or NGOs to invest in social capital and thereby promote collective action 
within a community? This question is especially relevant in the context of developing 
countries where cooperation among households is of utmost importance to overcome 
hardships in daily life related to poverty, limited public goods provision and missing markets. 
It has come to the forefront with the renewed interest in Community-Based Development 
(CBD) projects in the past decades. Such projects actively involve community members in 
project design and/or management. An optimistic view on people’s willingness and ability to 
cooperate is inherent in the basic philosophy of CDB projects. Moreover, CBD projects are 
often claimed to strengthen social capital, which would enhance a community’s propensity to 
engage in collective action even further.  
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Quantitative empirical evidence of the impact of CBD projects on social capital and 
cooperation is very limited, despite the increasingly large budgets devoted to development aid 
channeled through local communities. If a reinforcing mechanism indeed exists, the impact of 
CBD projects would multiply over time, providing a strong rationale for further investments 
in this type of programmes. Its absence on the other hand would reduce the perhaps all too 
ambitious expectations regarding their impact. This chapter will therefore specifically 
examine how a particular CBD project –the Mahila Samakhya programme in Bihar– 
influences the levels and dynamics of trust, reciprocity and cooperation in programme 
communities.  
 Some of the defining characteristics of Mahila Samakhya are its initial focus on trust-
building and its continuous emphasis on the importance of solidarity and joint action. That is, 
the programme explicitly stresses the building of social capital to generate collective action, 
providing a good case study for our research question. The programme also offers additional 
resources to the communities, either directly for certain specific activities such as informal 
preschools, or indirectly through its support in accessing government subsidies. This will 
affect the marginal costs and benefits of individual contributions. Moreover, the programme 
increases awareness on the importance of issues such as education, which may influence the 
perceived benefits of collective action. Finally, a strong component of the programme is the 
empowerment of disadvantaged women coupled to increased self-confidence. Thus, beyond 
its impact via strengthened social capital, the programme may have an additional effect on 
cooperation through increased resources, greater awareness and empowerment.  
This chapter measures social capital with a trust-index and an individual and a 
community reciprocity-index. Cooperation is measured in terms of assistance among 
households, as well as contributions to school projects and to infrastructure projects in the 
community. A two-stage instrumental variables approach allows for a disentanglement of 
cause and effect to investigate the existence of a dynamic cycle between trust and 
cooperation. Our quasi-experimental survey design allows not only to estimate the overall 
impact of Mahila Samakhya on social capital and cooperation in programme villages, but also 
to examine any spillover effects of the programme on non-participants who live in a 
community where the programme is active but who do not participate in the programme 
themselves.  
The next section will review the quantitative empirical evidence on the relationship 
between social capital and cooperation. The theoretical framework, based on the literature 
review of chapter 2, is briefly recaptured in section three. Section four describes the 
measurement of the variables of interest and the econometric model. It also discusses the 
instrumental variables. The main results on the expected two-sided link between trust and 
cooperation are presented in section five. Section six pays a closer look at the reciprocity 
variables. Section seven discusses in more detail the impact of Mahila Samakhya on the 
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enhancement of trust and cooperation within the communities. The final section summarizes 
and discusses the policy implications of the findings. 
 
4.2 Empirical evidence 
 
Abundant evidence from qualitative studies documents the effect of social capital on 
cooperation.85 This chapter will mainly focus on the more limited evidence based on 
quantitative data sets. A first strand in the empirical literature does not look at the 
determinants of social capital separately but instead constructs a composite social capital 
index based on measures of trust, norms, past levels of cooperation, and/or quality and 
quantity of voluntary group memberships (Krishna and Uphoff, 1999; Krishna, 2001; Isham 
and Kahkonen, 2002). It relates the index to community levels of collective action and 
generally finds a positive correlation between social capital and cooperation. However, it is 
difficult to test hypotheses with and deduct policy implications from composite indices. More 
importantly, such studies mostly measure correlations instead of causal relationships.  
Another direction in the empirical literature relates survey measures of trust to trusting 
behavior in experiments instead of the field, i.e. cooperation in Prisoner’s and other social 
dilemmas replicated in the laboratory. Up to date, the evidence regarding the relationship 
between attitudinal trust questions and cooperative behavior is mixed, being at times positive, 
but not significant in other instances (Yamagishi and Cook, 1993; Glaeser et al., 2000; 
Gaechter et al., 2004). Some studies have related trusting/trustworthy behavior in experiments 
to trusting/trustworthy behavior in real-life situations, such as in informal lending groups in 
Peru (Karlan, 2005) or cooperation in soil and water conservation in India (Bouma et al., 
2005). Again, they yield ambiguous results in terms of signs of the relationship as well as 
statistical significance.  
To our knowledge only a handful of quantitative studies try to disentangle the 
direction of causality between trust and cooperation, using field data from large-scale surveys. 
For example, Brehm and Rahn (1997) find evidence of a two-sided relationship between trust 
and participation in voluntary organizations in the United States. The causal direction from 
civic engagement to trust in their study is stronger than from trust to civic engagement. Parqal 
et al. (1999) on the other hand, do not find a significant relation in Bangladesh from collective 
action in waste management to trust, reciprocity or the number of voluntary organizations. 
Nor do they find a significant relation from trust to collective action. However, their 
reciprocity index is a significant determinant of cooperation. In sum, empirical field evidence 
on the dynamic relationship between trust and cooperation is scarce and inconclusive.  
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 For numerous references and reviews of qualitative research and case studies, the reader is referred to Ostrom  
(1990), Platteau (2000) or Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000).  
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The importance of social norms and social sanctions in sustaining cooperation receives 
much more support throughout the research literature. In most situations where social 
dilemmas are effectively solved, community members will sanction people who try to shirk or 
otherwise evade the norm of cooperation (Ostrom, 1990). Social sanctions might range from 
gossip to ostracizing or even the destruction of property. For example, Miguel and Gugerty 
(2005) find a positive and significant relationship between social sanctions and public 
contributions to school projects and the maintenance of public wells in Kenya. In their study 
of 178 forest user groups in Nepal, Gibson et al. (2004) find that forest condition is not so 
much related to whether rules and sanctions exist, but to whether and how such rules are 
actually enforced. Monitoring of household contributions in cash or labor is also correlated 
with participation in community water systems in Indonesia (Isham and Kahkonen, 1999), Sri 
Lanka and India (Bardhan, 2000; Isham and Kahkonen, 2002). Ostrom (1998) provides a set 
of design principles, emerging from the large amount of studies on common property 
resources, that most of the successful community systems have in common. These principles 
relate to issues such as clear group boundaries, graduated sanctions dependent on the severity 
and context of the violation of rules, and allocation of benefits proportional to inputs. 
Thus, the (cor)relation between social capital variables and outcomes is often positive, 
although not always as clear-cut as expected. In addition, a long list of structural and 
contextual variables affects the success of collective action. These are variables such as the 
size of the group and the community, the shape of the production function, the biophysical or 
geographical conditions of a natural resource, the technical complexity of decisions, 
heterogeneity of community members, leadership characteristics, connectedness to the 
market, presence of refugees, migration,  the presence of external agents and relationships 
with the government and the elites (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Bardhan, 2000; Dayton-
Johnson, 2000; Khwaja, 2000; Krishna, 2001; Dewald et al., 2004; Khwaja, 2004; Agrawal 
and Chhatre, 2006). To the extent possible, such contextual variables should be included as 
control variables in quantitative studies that examine the relationship between social capital 
and cooperation.  
Studies that examine whether CBD projects create social capital spin-offs are limited. 
See Mansuri and Rao (2004) for an extensive overview of impact evaluations of CBD 
projects. An interesting exception is Rao and Ibañez (2005) who combine qualitative and 
quantitative methods in their impact evaluation of Social Funds in Jamaica. Their results 
suggest a causal and positive impact of the Social Funds on trust as well as on collective 
action, especially for the elites. On the other hand, Tripp et al. (2005) find no evidence from 
their case study that Farmer Field Schools in Sri Lanka produce the expected social capital 
spillovers in the community. Westermann et al. (2005) analyze thirty three different natural 
resource management programs in twenty countries with a specific focus on gender 
differences in social capital and effectiveness of CBD. Women’s groups tend to show more 
solidarity towards fellow members in case of emergency, suggesting a strengthening of 
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bonding social capital, whereas male groups rely more on formal and institutionalized 
networks. However, they do not find evidence of spillovers to cooperation in other spheres of 
community life. None of these CBD impact studies provides conclusive evidence that a CBD 
project has set in motion a reinforcing cycle between trust and cooperation. 
 
4.3 The theoretical link between social capital and cooperation 
 
Chapter two discusses at length the potential mechanisms underlying cooperation, and 
the role of social capital therein. In short, we expect that more trusting individuals are more 
likely to cooperate with others and participate in collective action because they have more 
optimistic beliefs regarding the presence of cooperative types in the population. Hence, they 
expect the risk of betrayal to be lower.  
Cooperation is also dependent on norms of reciprocity. More reciprocal individuals are 
more likely to match others’ contributions and to withdraw cooperation when others defect, 
all things equal. Village level norms of reciprocity capture the threat of social sanctions and 
the promise of social rewards. They thereby directly affect the pay-off function and as a 
consequence the likelihood of cooperation. Such norms are strongest in small communities 
where everybody knows each other well and communication is fast, although large 
communities are more likely to contain a critical mass of early initiators to create a snowball 
effect of increasing cooperation.  
Trust in turn is to a large extent shaped by past experiences with respect to the 
cooperative behavior of others in the community. Such experiences induce individuals to 
update their beliefs regarding others. Village level norms of reciprocity reinforce the 
expectations that others will join in collective action, once initiated, and thus strengthen trust.  
We assume that norms of reciprocity, both at the individual and the village level, are 
relatively stable over time. That is, in our framework reciprocity is not expected to change 
over the relative short time span of one year that we consider. Section 4.4.2 will come back to 
this assumption.  
These hypotheses yield the following dynamic model: 
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In this model, the cooperation decision igY of individual i in village g at time t=1 
depends on the expected benefits and costs of the good. This is captured by the exogenous 
household and community characteristics ( igX  and gW ) that affect preferences and resources. 
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The decision also depends on the individual’s norms of reciprocity igR , the village level 
norms of reciprocity gR* , and the individual’s trust igT in her community members at time 
t=1. An individual’s trust at time t=1 is a function of her exogenous household and 
community characteristics, the village level norms of reciprocity and average village levels of 
cooperation *gY  at time t=0. Exclusion restrictions will be discussed in section 4.4.2. 
A CBD project may impact on trust and cooperation through either equation or both. If 
a CBD project provides additional resources or increases awareness on the benefits of 
cooperation, then its effect will run mainly through the first equation. On the other hand, if a 
project mainly emphasizes the building of community trust, it will have a substantial effect in 
the second equation. This can be tested by introducing a dummy variable equal to one if the 
programme is present in a community and zero otherwise, in both equations and examining its 
coefficients in the estimations.  
If the empirical evidence indicates that the relationship between trust and cooperation 
runs in both directions, CBD projects could set in motion a positive cycle of increasing trust 
and cooperation either way. On the other hand, if the causality runs only in one direction 
(either from trust to cooperation, or from cooperation to trust), this has implications for 
project design. In order to increase collective action, the programme should particularly focus 
on the ‘engine’ of cooperation. 
 
4.4 Econometric model 
 
4.4.1 Measurement of social capital and cooperation 
Before proceeding with an outline of the econometric model, this section will describe 
the main variables. Cooperation is measured using three outcome variables: assistance among 
households, cooperation in community school projects and cooperation to improve 
community infrastructure. Social capital is measured as trust in community members and as 
norms of reciprocity at the individual and at the village level.  
The measurement of assistance among households is based on the following questions: 
“In the past year, did any member of your household give assistance to any other household 
without getting paid: a) look after children; b) share food; c) work without getting paid; d) 
build a house; and e) give financial assistance.” Each item was coded as 1 if the household 
had given that type of assistance and 0 otherwise. The average number of items on which a 
household has given assistance is 2.4 (see Table 4.1).86 Only 9 percent of the households in 
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 Of the households in the study area, 76% have helped others with looking after children, 73% have shared 
food with other households, 19% have helped building a house, 37% have worked for other households without 
getting paid and 33% have assisted another household financially. The statistics are weighted for the stratified, 
clustered sample design.  
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the study region have not given assistance to other households on any of the five items in the 
past year. Unfortunately, the dataset contains no further information on the frequencies of 
cooperation, nor on the amount of resources (time, food, money) shared. Therefore, we 
construct an assistance index based on a factor analysis of the five items that reflects a 
household’s underlying propensity to give assistance to others. In section 4.5.3, we will 
indicate how the results for the individual items differ from the results of the combined index. 
The other two measures of cooperation reflect collective action in terms of 
participation in community projects. The lack of adequate government services and the poor 
quality of infrastructure in Bihar suggest that the scope for joint action is large. Nonetheless, 
only few households engage in a joint effort to improve facilities.87  The two most common 
types of joint action refer to school projects and to infrastructural projects. We measure the 
participation in collective action with two dummy variables that equal 1 if, in the past year, 
any member of the household contributed to, respectively, the construction/ maintenance of a 
school and to the construction/maintenance of a road or bridge. On average, 21 percent of the 
households in the survey area have contributed to the improvement of a school (or a non-
weighted 28 percent of the respondents in the sample).88 At 11 percent (or a non-weighted 19 
percent of respondents), the percentage of contributors to infrastructural projects is 
substantially lower.89 Table 4.1 gives more details.  
Again, this outcome variable does not measure the intensity and frequency of 
participation, nor does it imply that the collective effort has been successful or sustainable. 
The majority (85 percent) of the contributors to school maintenance and to bridge renovation 
rated the cooperation as very successful. Cooperation with respect to roads was rated as very 
successful by 76 percent of the contributors. However, households tend to evaluate the state 
of a community facility to be of better quality once they have contributed to its improvement. 
For example, in communities that have worked together to maintain infrastructure, 29 percent 
of the contributors evaluate the roads to be in a good state in contrast to only 17 percent of the 
non-contributors. 
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 For example, only 5% of all households have contributed to the delivery of community water services in the 
past year, 4% have cooperated to build a fence or a wall, 3% have worked together with others to construct a 
cattle dip, 2% of households have engage in tree-planting or managing a wood plot and only 1% has contributed 
to a community fish pond. Statistics are weighted for the stratified, clustered sample design. 
88
 When households participate in a school improvement project, they mostly do so through labor (82 percent). 
Fifteen percent of contributions were in cash and 3 percent in kind.   
89
 Eighty-six percent of contributions to infrastructural project were in labor, 10 percent in cash and 4 percent in 
kind. 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics of cooperation, trust and reciprocity  
 # obs. Mean Standard 
error 
Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Rotated factor 
loadings 
PANEL A. COOPERATION VARIABLES∆        
       
 
Assistance index  1989 .740 .018 .306 0 1 Eigenvalue: 1.203 
- children 1988 .759 .019 .331 0 1 .749 
- food 1989 .726 .023 .361 0 1 .746 
- work 1987 .372 .034 .498 0 1 .145 
- build house 1988 .187 .021 .454 0 1 .211 
- financial assistance 1988 .332 .030 .465 0 1 .139 
        
Contribution to school construction/maintenance 1980 .211 .030 .447 0 1  
        
Contribution to infrastructure construction/maintenance 1991 .111 .017 .390 0 1  
        
PANEL B. SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES†        
        
Trust in community members 1985 .422 .026 .409 0 1 Eigenvalue: 2.253 
- People here look out mainly for the welfare of their own families, and 
they are not much concerned with community welfare 
1978 1.819 .054 .989 1 3 .755 
- Most people in this community are basically honest and can be trusted‡ 1975 2.012 .045 .963 1 3 .746 
- In this village one has to be alert or someone is likely to betray you 1978 1.704 .073 .989 1 3 .798 
- Whenever it is to their advantage, people will not tell the truth 1976 1.905 .038 .977 1 3 .699 
        
Reciprocity 1985 .688 .011 .240 0 1 Eigenvalue: .180 
- If you help someone, then whenever you need help in the future, that 
person should return a favor to you‡ 
1974 2.785 .051 .676 1 3 .199 
- Even if someone is not polite to me, I will still be polite to him or her 1942 1.782 .108 .925 1 3 .298 
- Whenever I treat someone badly, I can expect the other to treat me bad as 
well‡ 
1922 2.583 .058 .693 1 3 .226 
Missing variables were imputed for the indices constructed with factor analysis. This is 1.31% of all observations for the trust index, 4.12% for the reciprocity 
index and 0.25% of observations for the assistance index. Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected 
accordingly. 
∆: Cooperation variables equal 1 if any of the household members has cooperated on the specific item in the past year, and 0 otherwise. 
†: Social capital statements receive the following value: agree=1, neutral=2, disagree=3, don’t know = missing.  
‡: Answers for these statements are recoded to reflect increasing trust or reciprocity: disagree=1, neutral=2, agree=3, don’t know = missing.  
 
Table 4.2 Correlation matrix of cooperation, trust and reciprocity  
 Assistance  Schools  Infra-
structure 
 Village 
assistance 
(without 
self) 
Village 
schools 
(without 
self) 
Village 
infra. 
(without 
self) 
 Trust Reciprocity   Village 
trust 
(without 
self) 
Village 
reciprocity 
(without 
self) 
 PANEL A             
              
Assistance  
 
1.000             
Schools 0.108 
(.000)*** 
1.000            
Infrastructure 0.111 
(.000)*** 
0.499 
(.000)*** 
1.000           
              
Village 
assistance 
(without self) 
0.292 
(.000)*** 
0.129 
(.000)*** 
0.123 
(.000)*** 
 1.000         
Village 
schools 
(without self) 
0.085 
(.000)*** 
0.560 
(.000)*** 
0.417 
(.000)*** 
 0.220 
(.000)*** 
1.000        
Village infra. 
(without self) 
0.090 
(.000)*** 
0.463 
(.000)*** 
0.485 
(.000)*** 
 0.235 
(.000)*** 
0.788 
(.000)*** 
1.000       
              
              
 PANEL B        PANEL C     
              
Trust 0.157 
(.000)*** 
0.414 
(.000)*** 
0.279 
(.000)*** 
 .0128 
(.000)*** 
0.466 
(.000)*** 
0.337 
(.000)*** 
 1.000     
Reciprocity 0.041 
(.067)* 
-0.198 
(.000)*** 
-0.111 
(.000)*** 
 0.088 
(.000)*** 
-0.187 
(.000)*** 
-0.124 
(.000)*** 
 -0.317 
(.000)*** 
1.000    
              
Village trust 
(without self) 
0.088 
(.000)*** 
0.488 
(.000)*** 
0.317 
(.000)*** 
 0.239 
(.000)*** 
0.809 
(.000)*** 
0.586 
(.000)*** 
 0.525 
(.000)*** 
-0.223 
(.000)*** 
 1.000  
Village 
reciprocity 
(without self) 
0.074 
(.001)*** 
-0.235 
(.000)*** 
-0.140 
(.000)*** 
 0.180 
(.000)*** 
-0.394 
(.000)*** 
-0.260 
(.000)*** 
 -0.268 
(.000)*** 
0.402 
(.000)*** 
 -0.490 
(.000)*** 
1.000 
     P-values are given in brackets below the correlation coefficients. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
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Overall, people that are more likely to contribute to school projects are also more 
likely to participate in a community infrastructural project (Table 4.2 panel A). The 
correlation between the two collective action variables is .499 with a p-value of .000. The 
correlations between the assistance index on the one hand and contributions to schools and to 
infrastructure on the other hand are much smaller but nonetheless statistically significant at 
.108 (p-value .000) and .111 (p-value .000) respectively. The correlation matrix clearly shows 
that on average people are significantly more likely to cooperate in a certain activity when the 
average level of cooperation in the village (excluding one self) is high.  
The determinants of social capital are measured as trust in community members and 
norms of reciprocity. Trust in community members is based on an index constructed from a 
factor analysis of four trust statements90, 91 : 
- “People here look out mainly for the welfare of their own families and they are not 
much concerned with community welfare.” 
- “Most people in this community are basically honest and can be trusted.” 
- “In this village one has to be alert or someone is likely to betray you.” 
- “Whenever it is to their advantage, people will not tell the truth.” 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.1 panel B. As discussed in the theoretical 
section, this trust index captures expectations regarding the behavior of others, based on past 
experience.  
In contrast to trust that reflects past experiences regarding how others did behave in 
situations of social interaction, norms of reciprocity capture attitudes regarding how one 
should behave. They usually include an appropriate response if someone does or does not 
behave accordingly. That is, norms are behavioral rules that contain an (implicit) notion of 
sanctions for non-conformance to the norm (Bendor and Swistak, 2001). We measure norms 
of reciprocity as the index constructed from a factor analysis of three reciprocity statements92, 
93: 
- “If you help someone, then whenever you need help in the future that person 
should return a favor to you.”  
- “Even if someone is not polite to me, I will still be polite to him or her.” 
- “Whenever I treat someone badly, I can expect the other to treat me bad as well.”
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 The trust statements are a combination of the widely used General Social Survey trust questions (National 
Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, www.norc.org) and the trust questions of the World Bank’s 
Social Capital Measurement Tool (Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002).  
91
 Respondents could agree, be neutral, disagree or not know. Not knowing was translated to a missing variable. 
The index was rescaled to have a value of 0 for the least trusting and a value of 1 for the most trusting 
respondents in the sample. 
92
 The reciprocity statements are an adapted subset from an “Exchange Orientation” questionnaire received from 
the Department of Social Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, in 2003. 
93
 The reciprocity index is constructed following the same procedure as used for the trust index (see previous 
footnote). Disagreement with the second statement reflects a stronger norm of reciprocity. 
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Table 4.1 panel B gives more details. Note the low eigenvalue of the first rotated factor that is 
used to construct the reciprocity index. This reflects that the three statements each have a 
large unique component. To test the sensitivity of the results to the reciprocity measure, we 
also constructed an index as the sum of the statements (with one point for each reciprocity 
attitude). The results are robust to this change in specification.94  
There is a clear difference between individual norms of reciprocity and the average 
norms of reciprocity in the village (without one self). Individual reciprocity implies that you 
will cooperate if others did, but you will not cooperate if others did not do so. Thus, it relates 
an individual’s reaction to others’ behavior. Village level reciprocity on the other hand 
reflects how others will treat you if you do or do not cooperate. Hence, it captures others’ 
(potential) reaction to the individual’s behavior. In villages where such norms are strong and 
broadly shared, households know that they can expect retaliation once they refuse to 
cooperate themselves (either in the form of social sanctions or denial of future cooperation).  
Both levels of trust and norms of reciprocity show large correlations with the village 
averages, excluding one self (see Table 4.2 panel C). The correlation of an individual’s trust 
index with the average index in the village is .525 (p-value .000). Similarly, an individual’s 
norms of reciprocity are highly correlated with the average norms in the village without self at 
.402 (p-value .000).  
The descriptive statistics show a large and negative correlation between trust and 
reciprocity with a coefficient of -.317 and a p-value of .000. Apparently, people that are more 
focused on a tit-for-tat strategy are less confident in the trustworthiness of others. Perhaps the 
causality runs in the other direction: if you strongly believe in the trustworthiness of others, 
you may not want to resort to a tit-for-tat strategy. Section 4.5.2 will provide a more detailed 
discussion on the relationship between trust and reciprocity.  
 
4.4.2 The econometric model 
To test the full model as outlined in section 4.3, we would need a panel data set, 
whereas the data collection is based on a cross-section. Trust ( igT ) and norms of reciprocity 
( igR ) of individual i living in village g are measured at the time of the survey. The 
cooperation variables ( igY ) refer to the year preceding the survey. The dataset does not 
contain baseline information on past levels of social capital. This effectively rules out a 
dynamic econometric estimation. We can measure the influence of past levels of cooperation 
on current levels of trust, but to measure the relation from trust to cooperation we will use a 
two-stage instrumental variables (2SIV) approach.  
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 Replacing the index with the three individual statements repeats the results in all estimations. Whenever the 
index is significant, at least one of the statements is as well, with the same sign. The results are mainly driven by 
the politeness question and the help question, i.e. the positive statements.  
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To measure the first direction of causality, from past levels of cooperation to trust, we 
estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) model with trust igT  of individual i in village g as 
the dependent variable. The average past level of cooperation gY *  in village g (excluding the 
individual herself) is one of the explanatory variables, in addition to household characteristics 
igX , community characteristics gW , average village level norms of reciprocity 
*
gR  and a 
programme dummy variable gMS  (compare equation 4.2).  
This specification reflects that, controlling for household and community 
characteristics, trust in the cooperative behavior of community members is a function of past 
levels of cooperation as well as norms in the village. The former influences beliefs in the 
trustworthiness of others. The latter captures the threat of social sanctions for non-
cooperation. Trust may also increase because of the presence of the Mahila Samakhya 
programme, which could influence trust levels independently from its potential impact on 
cooperation or norms. Chapter 3 argued that the control villages represent a good 
counterfactual for the programme villages. In other words, if the programme has no impact on 
trust, we would expect to find similar levels of trust in both treatment groups, and hence a 
small and statistically insignificant coefficient on the village dummy variable. Since past 
levels of cooperation and the presence of the Mahila Samakhya programme are likely to be 
correlated, we will also include an interaction term between the two variables in one of the 
specifications. In addition, we will estimate the model for control villages separately, to 
capture the baseline situation.  
Norms, interpreted either as behavioral strategies or preferences, change slowly over 
time. We make the explicit assumption that norms of reciprocity at the time of the survey 
were similar to individuals’ norms one year before the survey (i.e. prior to last year’s 
cooperation decisions). A Hausman test does not reject exogeneity of the reciprocity index. In 
addition, we do not find that the Mahila Samakhya programme has influenced the norms of 
reciprocity in programme villages. A regression of the individual reciprocity index on a 
programme dummy variable and the exogenous household and community characteristics 
yields a coefficient of .000 (standard error of .050) on the programme variable. This yields 
additional support for the assumption of (relatively) stable norms.  
The econometric model assumes that past village level cooperation gY *  is independent 
of past individual cooperation igY . That is, we assume that the decision of one individual is of 
negligible influence on the average levels of cooperation reached; otherwise a significant 
coefficient of gY *  might merely reflect that more cooperative individuals are more trusting. 
We will also test whether the results are robust to this assumption.  
A number of additional econometric issues should be taken into account when 
measuring the effect of group behavior on individual behavior (Manski, 1993, 2000; Durlauf, 
2002). This is also known as the reflection problem. A significant correlation between village 
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level cooperation and individual trust could indicate three distinct mechanisms (Manski, 
2000). First, individual trust may be affected directly by the aggregate group behavior with 
respect to cooperation. This is what we want to measure. Second, the individual trust levels 
may be related to exogenous group characteristics that also influence aggregate group 
behavior. Finally, both an individual’s trust and the cooperative behavior of community 
members may be correlated because they share similar exogenous characteristics or face 
similar institutional settings. When such third factors are not taken into account, a significant 
coefficient reflects merely a spurious relation caused by omitted variable bias. Only in the 
first case, changes in levels of cooperation of community members will directly affect an 
individual’s trust in community members.95 This measurement issue will be further taken up 
in the empirical section 5. 
To estimate the second part of the dynamic model, i.e. the impact of trust on 
cooperation, we instrument for trust and estimate the following 2SIV model (based on 
ordinary least squares (OLS) for assistance and linear probability (LP) for collective action in 
the second stage)96: 
 
 
First stage: iggggigigig MSRWXZT
11*11111 µpiφγβλα ++++++=
 
Second stage: igggiggigigig MSRRWXTY
22*22222
ˆ µpiφδγβρα +++++++=  
 
where: 
igT  : The trust index of respondent i in village g 
igY  : Cooperation of respondent i in village g  
igZ : Instrumental variables 
igX : Household characteristics of household i in village g: Age of respondent (squared), 
caste, religion, land ownership (squared), household and female education levels 
(squared), household size (squared), child dependency ratio (squared), and gender of 
head of household 
gW : Community characteristics of village g: Village development index97, availability of a 
primary school, prevalence of floods, prevalence of droughts, road quality, village 
population (squared), distance to town (squared), Census 1991 village female literacy 
                                                 
95
 Castillo and Carter (2003) provide an interesting and effective experimental set up to isolate social effects such 
as mimicry from other reasons for correlated cooperative behavior within groups.  
96
 Using a probit estimation instead of a linear probability estimation in the second stage for contributions to 
school projects and infrastructure yields similar results. 
97
 The village development index is constructed with a principal component analysis of the distance to the 
nearest health center, market, post office, telephone, bus stop, and bank, as well as the availability of public 
transport in the village. 
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rates, Census 1991 block female literacy rates and percentage Scheduled Castes, 
district dummies 
igR : Reciprocity index of individual i living in village g 
*
gR : Average reciprocity index in village g (excluding the reciprocity index of the 
individual herself) 
igTˆ : Instrumented trust variable  
gMS : Dummy variable equal to 1 if the Mahila Samakhya programme is implemented in 
village g; and 0 otherwise. 
ig
1µ , ig2µ : Unobserved component of trust and cooperation respectively for 
individual i in village g, assumed to be normally and identically distributed.  
 
That is, the decision to cooperate, igY , depends on the benefits and costs of 
cooperation (proxied by the household and community characteristics igX and gW ), the 
individual’s reciprocal attitudes igR , village norms of reciprocity 
*
gR , the presence of Mahila 
Samakhya gMS and the trust of the individual regarding the cooperative behavior of others in 
the community igT .98  
All estimations weigh the observations to correct for the outcome-based sampling in 
programme villages. Standard errors throughout the paper are robust and corrected for 
clustering at the village level. In addition, the results from the 2SIV estimations are 
bootstrapped with 200 replications.  
 
4.4.3 Identification of the instruments 
The instrumental variables for trust in community members should be non-trivially 
correlated with the trust index. A second requirement is that they are not directly correlated 
with assistance to other households (or contributions to schools or infrastructure), but only 
indirectly through their relationship with trust. In our model, cooperation is determined by the 
trade-off of benefits and costs for a given level of participation in the community on the one 
hand, and by trust, i.e. the expectations regarding the number of others that will participate, on 
the other hand. Thus, the instruments should not affect the benefits and costs of participation 
directly, but only through their effect on trust.  
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 The reciprocity variables igR  and 
*
gR  will be in- or excluded from the first stage, dependent on whether they 
are in- or excluded in the second stage of the various specifications, i.e. only the variables in igZ  are used as 
instruments. The results are not sensitive to the alternative specification of the first stage where *gR   is always 
included and igR always excluded. 
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Our first set of instruments is an inequality measure and its squared value to capture 
non-linear effects. A large literature argues that heterogeneity decreases trust (see for example 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) for references). Land inequality in Bihar reflects the 
polarization in society between the rich, often high caste land owners, and the poor, often low 
caste landless laborers. Many disputes in Bihari society concern land issues. Thus we would 
expect that more heterogeneity with respect to land is associated with decreased trust. This 
may affect the number of initial contributors and hence expectations regarding the number of 
others that will participate. But it does not directly affect the benefits and costs of a certain 
community facility for a given individual. Inequality in land ownership is measured as the 
Gini coefficient of land ownership.99  
The third instrumental variable is the village average of donations (excluding one self) 
to the construction or maintenance of religious facilities, such as the temple, mosque or 
church. Again, we find a strong correlation with trust in community members. That is, in 
villages where others contribute relatively more to religious facilities, individuals are more 
likely to agree that their community members do not only think of their own welfare, will not 
take advantage of you, etc.  
Since ‘average religious donations’ is a decision variable (although not from the 
individual herself), we should be more careful to use it as an instrument. If other community 
members’ donations to religious facilities increase the likelihood that an individual will 
contribute as well (perhaps through social pressure), this could increase the marginal costs of 
contributing to other projects such as school construction or road maintenance. However, this 
effect, which would bias the results for trust downwards, is likely to be negligible. Most 
donations to religious facilities are in the form of money, whereas collective action and 
cooperation is usually in the form of labor. It also seems unlikely that average village level 
religious donations directly influence the expected benefits for a household of joining in a 
community effort to repair the school or roads. For example, others’ religious outings do not 
affect the benefit that one will derive from filled potholes in the main road. However, 
religious donations could decrease the marginal costs of contribution if the temple or mosque 
uses the money to initiate community projects, such as an informal school. But in regressions 
of each of the three cooperation variables on this instrument as well as the other explanatory 
variables, the coefficients on village level religious donations are not statistically significant. 
This providence strong support for the assumption that the instrument does not affect 
cooperation directly, and hence, satisfies the second requirement.100  
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 An advantage of using land inequality over income inequality is its relative stability over time, which makes 
the index less vulnerable to endogeneity problems as compared to income measures. We do not have exact data 
on household income or expenditures. Our income variable in the estimations is derived from a factor analysis of 
assets and housing quality. The correlation between land ownership and income quintile at the household level is 
31 percent (p-value = .000). 
100
 The impact of the Mahila Samakhya programme on religious donations is not significant either. Results are 
available upon request. 
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Table 4.3 shows a regression of trust in community members on the instruments. They 
satisfy the first requirement of non-trivial correlation. A test of overidentifying restrictions for 
each of the cooperation variables does not reject the null hypothesis, hence providing support 
for the second requirement. The Chi-squared values (with p-values for two degrees of 
freedom) are 3.331 (.189), 1.518 (.468) and 3.326 (.190) for the assistance index, for 
contributions to school construction/maintenance, and for contributions to infrastructure 
respectively.  
 
4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Benefits and costs of cooperation: the role of exogenous factors 
Before starting with the analysis of the relationship between cooperation, trust and 
reciprocity, we briefly examine the relationship between cooperation and the exogenous 
household and community characteristics. These characteristics proxy in part for the benefits 
and costs of cooperation (for a given level of other contributors) that are the main factors 
driving cooperative behavior. To avoid a confounding effect of the programme, this analysis 
is done in control villages only.  
It seems likely that especially the poorest households in Bihar would assist each other 
to deal with the rampant poverty situation and the difficulties in accessing the formal financial 
market. As Table 4.4 shows, assistance between households is indeed most common among 
the lower castes and the Muslim population. This finding emphasizes the importance of 
bonding social capital for the most disadvantaged groups (Narayan, 1999). Larger households 
give more assistance to others, but this is attenuated by the number of children per adult. Both 
results reflect the importance of the availability of resources (e.g. time, labor) for giving 
assistance. Households with higher female levels of education assist others more as well.  
In small villages assistance among households is most common, perhaps because of 
stronger feelings of group identity and solidarity. Cooperation is also most likely in villages 
with many facilities. It is unclear why the presence of a primary school in a community has a 
negative coefficient in the estimation.  
In contrast to assistance among households, collective action for a public good is 
independent of most household characteristics, except for the characteristics that capture 
household resources. Household size and household size squared, reflecting available labor, 
are jointly significant both for school projects and for infrastructure. The same result is found 
for wealth in terms of land ownership. However, the latter may also capture the relatively 
large benefits that land owners expect to gain from improved infrastructure. 
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Table 4.3 Correlation of trust with the instrumental variables  
Dependent variable: Trust in community members 
 coefficient s.e. 
Programme village dummy .249 .080*** 
   
Instruments   
Village average of religious 
contributions (without self) 
.496 .156*** 
Land inequality 1.790 .685** 
Land inequality squared -1.672 .588*** 
   
Individual characteristics   
Age .001 .010 
Age squared -.000 .000 
SC/ST  .006 .101 
OBC .016 .087 
Muslim .028 .113 
Land ownership .001 .001* 
Land ownership squared -.000 .000** 
Household education .218 .090** 
Household education squared -.034 .015** 
Female education -.127 .108 
Female education squared .021 .019 
Female household head -.003 .089 
Dependency ratio -.040 .099 
Dependency ratio squared .014 .040 
Household size .008 .029 
Household size squared -.000 .002 
   
Community characteristics   
Village development .016 .023 
Primary school -.142 .089 
Village population total (x100) -.026 .027 
Village population squared .000 .001 
Flood  .074 .096 
Drought .120 .098 
Paved roads .028 .065 
Distance to town .014 .012 
Distance to town squared -.000 .000* 
1991 village female literacy -.008 .004* 
Block var./district dummies Yes  
   
R-squared .229  
# observations 1879  
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust standard errors are 
corrected for clustering at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 
Table 4.4 Relationship between cooperation/trust/reciprocity and exogenous characteristics (control villages only) 
Dependent variable: Assistance (OLS) Schools (probit) Infrastructure (probit) Trust (OLS) Reciprocity (OLS) 
 coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e. 
Individual characteristics           
Age -.012 .014 .062 .028** .042 .041 .003 .016 -.005 .008 
Age squared .000 .000 -.001 .000* -.000 .000 -.000 .000 .000 .000 
SC/ST  .512 .183** -.200 .413 -.009 .547 -.047 .175 -.047 .091 
OBC .299 .158* -.053 .349 .052 .489 -.139 .150 -.059 .072 
Muslim .375 .160** -.171 .397 .136 .513 -.325 .214 -.019 .075 
Land ownership .001 .001 .004 .002** .004 .002** .002 .001* .000 .000 
Land ownership squared -.000 .000 -.000 .000** -.000 .000*** -.000 .000** -.000 .000* 
Household education .091 .167 .337 .322 -.497 .363 .265 .141* -.007 .070 
Household education squared -.019 .026 -.062 .059 .076 .058 -.045 .026* .002 .011 
Female education .405 .167** .580 .465 -.275 .450 -.202 .194 -.052 .115 
Female education squared -.065 .027** -.095 .077 .068 .084 .040 .035 .009 .021 
Female household head -.001 .148 -.570 .474 .074 .359 .073 .191 .027 .064 
Dependency ratio -.380 .162** -.044 .594 -.169 .444 -.021 .221 .048 .072 
Dependency ratio squared .177 .082** -.153 .280 .022 .213 -.024 .098 .001 .032 
Household size .136 .045*** .209 .169 .220 .115* .032 .055 .002 .018 
Household size squared -.008 .003** -.010 .009 -.010 .007 -.000 .003 -.001 .001 
           
   Community characteristics           
Village development .071 .034** -.120 .049** -.067 .049 -.035 .030 .044 .010*** 
Primary school -.303 .102*** -1.451 .249*** .360 .411 -.459 .148*** .136 .031*** 
Village population (x100) -.266 .110** .809 .199*** .331 .220 .055 .115 -.053 .043 
Village population squared .027 .010** -.076 .020*** -.027 .025 -.003 .011 .005 .004 
Flood  .151 .211 -.197 .142 1.683 .255*** -.046 .188 .150 .075* 
Drought -.048 .168 1.106 .439** …  .257 .233 -.073 .058 
Paved roads -.016 .038 -.237 .072*** -.010 .088 -.242 .055*** .076 .019*** 
Distance to town -.006 .020 .062 .019*** .257 .047*** .016 .016 .002 .007 
Distance to town squared .000 .000 -.001 .000*** -.004 .001*** -.000 .000 -.000 .000 
1991 village female literacy .001 .004 -.020 .010** .001 .015 -.002 .005 .001 .001 
Block  var. / district dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
R-squared .221      .134  .314  
# observations 513  511  534  512  511  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level. Drought is dropped in the estimation of infrastructure 
because of multicollinearity. 
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Contributions to school projects are largest in communities that are least developed, 
have no formal primary school yet, with low literacy levels, that are further away from a town 
and that do not have paved roads. These characteristics reflect the lack of alternative options 
for school enrolment. Contributions to infrastructure are also most common in communities 
that need such projects most. When a village has experienced a flood (with the subsequent 
damage to roads and bridges), its inhabitants are substantially more likely to have joined 
forces to repair local infrastructure. Similarly, communities that are further away from town 
invest in their roads and bridges more. Collective action with respect to both types of projects 
is most likely to emerge in larger communities. In both estimations, the coefficients for 
village population and population squared are jointly significant at the 1 percent level. Given 
the theoretical discussion on group size, this finding supports the hypothesis that larger groups 
are more likely to contain a few highly motivated individuals that initiate collective action. 
However, later estimations that include the threat of social sanctions will shed a different light 
on this issue (section 4.6). The findings thus suggest that joint community action is mostly 
determined by household resources and community circumstances. 
Finally, the fourth and fifth columns in Table 4.4 show the results of the regressions of 
trust and reciprocity on the exogenous characteristics. Trust in community members is largest 
among the better off, i.e. the households with more land and higher education levels. This 
finding, consistent with Glaeser et al. (2000), may reflect the more advantaged position, and 
accompanying privileges and respect that the elite enjoy in rural villages.101 The coefficients 
for the distance to the nearest town and its squared value are jointly highly significant. This 
suggests that in remote areas, where people are highly dependent on each other and know 
each other well, social control is larger and more effective. Conversely, it would imply that 
integration with the outside world and increased mobility may have a negative impact on 
trust.   
Reciprocity is largely independent from household characteristics. Note that the signs 
of the coefficients for community characteristics are opposite those in the trust estimation. 
This pattern is in line with the negative correlation coefficient between trust and norms of 
reciprocity found in section 4.4.1.   
In sum, exogenous household characteristics such as caste, religion, education and 
household composition explain assistance among households to a large extent. In contrast, 
participation in collective action is determined mostly by (a lack of) household resources and 
by village characteristics. Whereas trust is largest in the richest and better educated 
households, reciprocity seems to be independent from most characteristics. The exogenous 
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 Glaeser et al. (2000) offer several alternative interpretations. For example, the better-off may interact more 
often with others with a high social status who might be more trustworthy than poorer, less educated individuals, 
either because being trustworthy is a luxury good or because education increases one’s social skills. 
Alternatively, individuals with a high status may have more capacity to punish and reward others.  
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variables are included in all following estimations, although their estimates are not shown in 
the tables with the results. 
 
4.5.2 The impact of past cooperation on trust 
We start our analysis with an estimation of the relationship between trust as the 
dependent variable and past levels of cooperation as the explanatory variables. In addition, we 
include as regressors the exogenous household and community characteristics, the programme 
dummy variable and village average norms of reciprocity (without one self). The results are 
given in column (i) of Tables 4.5a, 4.5b and 4.5c for each type of cooperation. The level of 
trust in community members that a respondent expressed at the time of the survey is 
positively related to the average levels of assistance and average contributions to school 
projects in the community over the last year. It is not significantly related to last year’s 
participation levels in infrastructure projects. These results suggest that indeed experience 
with cooperative behavior of other individuals increases trust, but that not all cooperation is as 
effective in producing this effect.  
Again, we find a significant and negative relationship between (village level) 
reciprocity and trust. These results might in fact corroborate some experimental findings that 
the mere presence of sanctions decreases trust in others’ cooperative intentions (Mulder et al., 
2005), and that the introduction of sanctions in a system of collective action can lead to a 
strong decline in cooperative behavior. The subsequent removal of sanctions does not bring 
back cooperation to previous levels, suggesting a break-down of cooperative (and trusting?) 
behavior (Cinyabuguma et al., 2005). This would suggest that trust and norms of reciprocity 
are not complements, as implied by our theoretical framework, but instead substitutes for each 
other.  
The previous section discussed a number of implicit assumptions underlying the 
econometric model that estimates the relationship between group cooperative behavior and 
individual trust. First of all, we assumed that the effect of an individual’s cooperation decision 
on group behavior is negligible. If not, the relationship between group cooperation and 
individual trust may actually reflect the mobilizing influence of early initiators. Therefore, in 
columns (ii) we control for own past cooperative behavior. A second problem may arise if the 
relationship between individual trust and group cooperation is caused by exogenous group 
characteristics that influence both. To test this further, we control for additional group level 
household characteristics in columns (iii).102 Third, omitted variable bias will arise if a third 
factor influences both group level cooperation and individual trust. It is always difficult to test 
for omitted variable bias due to data constraints and because it is literally impossible to 
include all potential influences in a regression. But likely candidates are the heterogeneity 
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 That is, we control for the percentage of Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Castes and Muslims, for the 
average area of land owned, for average household and female education levels, average household sizes and for 
average child dependency ratios in the community.  
Table 4.5a Trust in community members as a function of past village levels of assistance 
Dependent variable: Trust 
As a function of past village level: Assistance 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
       
Programme dummy .220 
(.074)*** 
.230 
(.073)*** 
.262 
(.082)*** 
.186 
(.076)** 
.216 
(.071)*** 
 
Interaction term (programme 
dummy)*(past village assistance) 
    .515 
(.189)*** 
 
       
Village average assistance 
(without self) 
.231 
(.124)* 
.191 
(.123) 
.195 
(.126) 
.191 
(.109)* 
-.097 
(.173) 
-.212 
(.285) 
       
Own past assistance  .095 
(.025)*** 
    
       
Village average household characteristics   Yes    
       
Heterogeneity variables     Yes   
       
Village average norms of reciprocity 
(without self) 
-.798 
(.178)*** 
-.827 
(.176)*** 
-.679 
(.181)*** 
-.807 
(.178)*** 
-.702 
(.168)*** 
.185 
(.783) 
       
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block var. / district dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
# obs. 1879 1877 1879 1879 1879 512 
R-squared .230 .240 .239 .237 .237 .135 
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust standard errors are corrected for clustering 
at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.  
  
Table 4.5b Trust in community members as a function of past village level participation in school projects 
Dependent variable: Trust 
As a function of past village level: Participation in school projects 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
       
Programme dummy .073 
(.080) 
.077 
(.080) 
.106 
(.083) 
.039 
(.083) 
-.030 
(.095) 
 
Interaction term (programme dummy) 
*(village average participation in school 
projects) 
    .981 
(.374)** 
 
       
Village average participation in school 
projects (without self) 
.846 
(.228)*** 
.606 
(.223)*** 
.877 
(.207)*** 
.811 
(.234)*** 
-.231 
(.479) 
-2.924 
(.666)*** 
       
Own past participation in school projects  .410 
(.063)*** 
    
       
Village average household characteristics   Yes    
       
Heterogeneity variables     Yes   
       
Village average norms of reciprocity 
(without self) 
-.440 
(.166)*** 
-.436 
(.165)** 
-.295 
(.176)* 
-.463 
(.167)*** 
-.411 
(.174)** 
-.630 
(.598) 
       
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block var. / district dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
# obs. 1879 1869 1879 1879 1879 512 
R-squared .239 .272 .249 .245 .242 .153 
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust standard errors are corrected for clustering 
at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
Table 4.5c Trust in community members as a function of past village level participation in infrastructure projects 
Dependent variable: Trust 
As a function of past village level: Participation in infrastructure projects 
 (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
       
Programme dummy .258 
(.081)*** 
.245 
(.082)*** 
305 
(.098)*** 
.226 
(.086)** 
.193 
(.089)** 
 
Interaction term (programme 
dummy)*(village average participation in 
infrastructure projects) 
    .862 
(.788) 
 
       
Village average participation in 
infrastructure projects (without self) 
.032 
(.260) 
-.145 
(.253) 
-.000 
(.279) 
-.029 
(.253) 
-.785 
(.883) 
-1.618 
(.790)* 
       
Own past participation in infrastructure 
projects 
 .352 
(.074)*** 
    
       
Village average household characteristics   Yes    
       
Heterogeneity variables     Yes   
       
Village average norms of reciprocity 
(without self) 
-.687 
(.173)*** 
-.677 
(.172)*** 
-.581 
(.178)*** 
-.727 
(.176)*** 
-.641 
(.173)*** 
.324 
(.803) 
       
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block var. / district dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
# obs. 1879 1879 1879 1879 1879 512 
R-squared .226 .243 .236 .234 .228 .142 
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust standard errors are corrected for clustering 
at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.
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measures of land inequality (squared), fragmentation with respect to caste (squared) and with 
respect to religion (squared).103 Column (iv) shows the results of the estimation including 
heterogeneity. As columns (i) to (iv) show, these changes in the specification do not yield 
substantially different results although the levels of significance for village level assistance 
decrease slightly. 
Finally, as noted before, the Mahila Samakhya programme may affect both individual 
trust and cooperation in the community directly. In columns (v) we introduce an interaction 
term between the programme dummy variable and village level cooperation. This changes the 
findings dramatically. Although we still find a positive impact of past cooperation on trust, 
this result is found only in the programme villages. In other words, the observation that others 
cooperate is in itself not sufficient to increase trust. It appears that the presence and activities 
of the Mahila Samakhya programme are essential in adjusting expectations regarding others’ 
trustworthiness as a response to cooperation in the community. Which mechanisms lay at the 
basis of this finding is further discussed in section 4.7 on the impact of Mahila Samakhya.  
In fact, if we estimate the impact of past village level cooperation on trust in control 
villages only, we find negative coefficients for all the past cooperation variables, that are 
statistically significant in the case of collective action (columns (vi)). This is in stark contrast 
to theoretical predictions. A potential explanation may be found in the low absolute levels of 
cooperation in control villages. Households that participate in collective action are 
consistently in the minority, often a very small minority. On average, only 12 and 9 percent of 
households in control villages participate in school and infrastructure projects respectively 
(with a median of 0 percent and a maximum of 45 and 40 percent respectively).104 In such 
situations, it appears sensible to expect that most others do not care about the common good 
but about their own welfare only. Such a perception may be more salient in communities with 
some levels of collective action where a large majority refuses to cooperate than in 
communities where contributions are virtually absent overall.  
  
4.5.3 The impact of trust on cooperation  
To understand the relationship from trust and reciprocity to cooperation, we start with 
an OLS (or linear probability) estimation of the partial correlations. The results are shown in 
the first five columns of Tables 4.6a, 4.6b and 4.6c for assistance, school projects and 
infrastructure projects respectively. We find a strong and positive correlation between an 
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 Fragmentation in the community is measured with the heterogeneity index as used in Alesina and La Ferrara 
(2000): Fragmentationg = 1 – Σk Skg 2 where g represents a given village g, and k represents the two religions (i) 
Hindu and (ii) Muslim (or the four ‘caste’-groups: (i) Scheduled Castes, (ii) Other Backward Castes, (iii) 
General Castes, and (iv) others, mainly Muslims). Skg is the share of religion (caste) k in village g. 
104
 In contrast, the average participation levels in programme villages are 33 percent for school projects and 22 
percent for infrastructural projects, with maximums levels reaching 85 percent and 80 percent respectively.  
  
105 
individual’s cooperative behavior and her trust in community members.105 However, these 
estimates are biased since the trust variable is endogenous in these estimations. Therefore, we 
instrument for trust using a 2SIV approach. If the coefficient of the instrumented trust variable 
remains significant, this will provide evidence of a positive influence from trust on 
cooperation. However, if the coefficient becomes insignificant in the 2SIV estimation, the 
direction of causality must run mainly from (past) cooperation to trust.  
The instrumented estimation results for assistance among households are presented in 
the final four columns of Table 4.6a. The coefficients on the trust variable remain positive and 
significant at the 10 % level. In other words, trust in community members significantly 
increases a household’s propensity to assist other households. The results also show that 
strong village norms of reciprocity are important in explaining a household’s propensity to 
give assistance. The higher the average norms of reciprocity in a village (and hence the larger 
the threat of social sanctions or denial of future help), the larger the assistance index of a 
household living in that village. In addition, households that adhere to strong reciprocity 
norms themselves are more likely to assist others. Perhaps this assistance was a favor in return 
for received help. Indeed, the correlation between the sum of assistance given and the sum of 
assistance received is very large at .790 (p-value .000). We do not find an indication of an 
impact of the programme on assistance. The positive signs in the OLS estimations are 
negative in the 2SIV estimations, but the programme dummy variable is not significant in any 
of the specifications.  
Thus, the findings for the assistance index among households support the hypothesis 
that trust in community members enhances cooperation. In combination with the results from 
the previous section, this yields evidence for the existence of a dynamic cycle between trust 
and assistance among households in programme villages. Similarly, norms of reciprocity 
within households enhance informal exchange. Village norms of reciprocity that capture 
social sanctions and rewards are equally conducive to cooperation.  
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 Marginal effects from a probit instead of a linear probability estimation are similar. For example, the marginal 
effects (standard errors) of the programme dummy and the trust variable on school contributions are .120 (.023) 
and .103 (.015) respectively; marginal effects on infrastructural contributions are .083 (.021) and .058 (.014) 
respectively. Compare column (ii) in Tables 7b and 7c. 
Table 4.6a OLS and 2SIV estimations of assistance 
 
Dependent variable: Giving assistance to other households 
 (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS) (OLS)  (2SIV) (2SIV) (2SIV) (2SIV) 
           
Programme dummy .034 
(.068) 
.006 
(.072) 
.001 
(.068) 
.033 
(.068) 
.027 
(.068) 
 -.111 
(.102) 
-.110 
(.097) 
-.052 
(.088) 
-.061 
(.089) 
           
Trust in community 
members (instrumented) 
 .099 
(.031)*** 
.119 
(.032)*** 
.115 
(.029)*** 
.127 
(.031)*** 
 .484 
(.294)* 
.483 
(.272)* 
.429 
(.255)* 
.435 
(.252)* 
           
Reciprocity   .171 
(.064)*** 
 .111 
(.065)* 
  .356 
(.166)** 
 .255 
(.151)* 
Village level reciprocity, 
without self 
   .672 
(.192)*** 
.607 
(.195)*** 
   .886 
(.245)*** 
.719 
(.195)*** 
           
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community charac. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block var. / district 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
           
# observations106 1883 1877 1875 1877 1875  1877 1875 1877 1875 
R-squared .121 .130 .135 .143 .145  .013 .037 .067 .075 
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust standard errors in brackets are corrected for 
clustering at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 2SIV results are bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
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 The number of observations may change from one specification to another due to missing values. 
Table 4.6b Linear probability (LP) and 2SIV estimations of participation in school projects  
 
Dependent variable: Participation in school projects 
 (LP) (LP) (LP) (LP) (LP)  (2SIV) (2SIV) (2SIV) (2SIV) 
           
Programme dummy .154 
(.031)*** 
.123 
(.028)*** 
.125 
(.028)*** 
.118 
(.026)*** 
.120 
(.027)*** 
 .139 
(.041)*** 
.139 
(.040)*** 
.128 
(.036)*** 
.130 
(.037)*** 
           
Trust in 
community 
members 
(instrumented) 
 .100 
(.016)*** 
.095 
(.016)*** 
.097 
(.016)*** 
.093 
(.016)*** 
 .049 
(.100) 
.049 
(.093) 
.059 
(.088) 
.058 
(.088) 
           
Reciprocity   -.045 
(.027) 
 -.033 
(.027) 
  -.069 
(.051) 
 -.050 
(.047) 
Village level 
reciprocity, without 
self 
   -.140 
(.077)* 
-.119 
(.076) 
   -.166 
(.076)** 
-.132 
(.067)** 
           
Household 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block var. / district 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
 
          
# observations 1874 1869 1867 1869 1867  1869 1867 1869 1867 
R-squared .259 .293 .294 .295 .296  .284 .288 .291 .292 
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust standard errors in brackets are corrected for 
clustering at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 2SIV results are bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
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Table 4.6c Linear probability (LP) and 2SIV estimations of participation in infrastructure projects  
 
Dependent 
variable: 
Participation in infrastructure projects 
 (LP) (LP) (LP) (LP) (LP)  (2SIV) (2SIV) (2SIV) (2SIV) 
           
Programme 
dummy 
.113 
(.028)*** 
.094 
(.028)*** 
.096 
(.028)*** 
.093 
(.028)*** 
.096 
(.029)*** 
 .144 
(.039)*** 
.139 
(.037)*** 
.131 
(.034)*** 
.134 
(.035)*** 
           
Trust in 
community 
members 
(instrumented) 
 .064 
(.015)*** 
.058 
(.015)*** 
.063 
(.015)*** 
.058 
(.016)*** 
 -.106 
(.107) 
-.087 
(.096) 
-.082 
(.093) 
-.077 
(.091) 
 
          
Reciprocity   -.051 
(.027)* 
 -.052 
(.027)* 
  -.125 
(.055)** 
 -.116 
(.051)** 
Village level 
reciprocity, 
without self 
   -.020 
(.068) 
.012 
(.069) 
   -.120 
(.073) 
-.038 
(.060) 
           
Household 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community 
characteristics 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block var. / 
district dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
# observations 1885 1879 1877 1879 1877  1879 1877 1879 1877 
R-squared .203 .220 .222 .220 .222  .093 .136 .130 .148 
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust standard errors in brackets are corrected for 
clustering at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 2SIV results are bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
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Table 4.7 shows the estimation results for the items underlying the assistance index 
separately. The findings for food sharing and child care are very comparable to the results of 
the combined index. The Mahila Samakhya programme does not have an impact on these 
forms of assistance. More trusting individuals in a community are more likely to assist others 
with food or child care, although the coefficients are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. The coefficients on both individual and village level norms of reciprocity 
are positive. In contrast, the presence of the programme appears to have a significant and 
positive effect on the other three items: building a house, work without pay and giving 
financial aid. Surprisingly, the least trusting individuals are most likely to give money to or 
work without pay for another household. This points out to a limitation of our trust measure. 
In low-trust villages, people may conclude that they have to rely on a small group of close and 
trustworthy friends. Our trust measure does not distinguish between different social sub-
networks in a community. But it is not clear why we find these results for only two of the 
items.  
 
Table 4.7 2SIV estimations of assistance by item 
Dependent variable: Food 
sharing 
Child 
care 
Build 
house 
Work 
without 
pay 
Financial 
assistance 
      
Programme dummy -.013 
(.040) 
-.028 
(.036) 
.180 
(.044)*** 
.341 
(.050)*** 
.139 
(.049)*** 
      
Trust in community members 
(instrumented) 
.168 
(.116) 
.164 
(.101) 
-.007 
(.115) 
-.219 
(.134)* 
-.262 
(.114)** 
 
     
Reciprocity .107 
(.067)* 
.091 
(.060) 
.030 
(.066) 
-.135 
(.078)* 
-.055 
(.069) 
Village level reciprocity 
(without self) 
.352 
(.084)*** 
.219 
(.079)** 
.319 
(.081)*** 
.247 
(.114)** 
.075 
(.100) 
      
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block var. / district dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
# observations 1875 1874 1874 1873 1874 
R-squared .055 .095 .131 … ... 
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust 
standard errors in brackets are corrected for clustering at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: 
p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Results are bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
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The 2SIV findings for collective action in Tables 4.6b and c yield a number of results 
that run contrary to the theoretical hypotheses.107 Although the sign of the trust variable 
remains positive in the estimation for school projects, the variable is not significant any more 
once we instrument for it. Likewise, once instrumented the coefficient on trust is not 
significant in the estimation for infrastructural projects either.108 Thus, we do not find a 
significant relationship from trust to enhanced participation in collective action.  
A number of explanations could underlie these findings. A first possibility is related to 
the temptation to free-ride. Even if an individual trusts that her fellow community members 
will not betray her but join in the community project, she may still decide to free-ride herself. 
In fact, the more one trusts and expects others to join, the higher the temptation to defect may 
be. This suggests that the original hypothesis is based on a too optimistic view of behavior 
and should be reversed. Trust would have a negative coefficient in estimations of collective 
action, as we find for contributions to infrastructure. 
Second, trust may not matter at all because highly interested individuals that value the 
public good greatly may decide to provide it regardless of whether others participate. 
Similarly, enthusiastic early initiators may decide to work for the common good even if they 
are not certain about the number of others that cooperate. For example, Oliver (1984) finds 
that very active participants are more pessimistic about the contributions of others (“If I don’t 
do it, nobody will”). Some suggestive evidence supports these explanations. In programme 
villages, participants in the women’s groups cooperate significantly more often in collective 
action than non-participants. The externalities of their actions are well understood. Eighty-
four percent of the participants think that non-participants benefit from the programme as 
well. However, their concern with free-riding appears very limited. Of them, 99 percent report 
that they do no mind others benefiting from the programme.109 
Third, trust may not matter for collective action because most instants of joint action 
consist of simultaneous decision-making processes in which the behavior of others can be 
observed and discussed directly and immediately. This would also explain why we do find a 
positive relationship for assistance among households, which is clearly based on a sequential 
decision-making model.  
Alternatively, our examples of collective action (school and infrastructure 
construction/maintenance) may represent more closely a coordination failure than a prisoner’s 
                                                 
107
 Using probit instead of linear probability in the second stage yields similar results. For example, the marginal 
effects of the programme dummy and trust variable are .128 and .072 on school contributions, and .129 and -.103 
respectively on infrastructure contributions. The programme effects are significant at the 1% error level. The 
trust effects are not statistically significant. Compare column (vi) in Tables 7b and 7c. 
108
 An alternative specification substitutes the individual trust index with the average trust index in the village 
(excluding one self) and the individual deviation from average trust. Again, the coefficients on the instrumented 
trust variables are insignificant. 
109
 When the non-participants were asked whether others benefit, 38 percent think they do and of those 38 
percent, 98 percent think this is fair. When asked whether they would join the group if they were excluded from 
these benefits, 48 percent say they would join. 
  
111 
dilemma. In that case, not trust but a lack of communication would be the main obstacle to 
cooperation. Mahila Samakhya increases collective action because it brings people together 
and stimulates discussions on preference and intentions, creating focal points. The early 
cooperators subsequently set in motion a snow-ball effect. 
Finally, our measurement of trust may not be adequate for our purposes. Some authors 
argue that survey measures of trust do in fact not measure trust but the trustworthiness of the 
respondent (Glaeser et al., 2000) or a propensity for gambling (Karlan, 2005). However, in 
that case, we would expect an even stronger positive relationship from the trust variable to 
cooperation. It has also been argued that there is a low correlation between attitudes and 
behavior in general (Carter and Castillo, 2003; Karlan, 2005; Poppe, 2005). To actually 
measure trust, one should therefore ask questions about past trusting behavior (which in our 
case would capture the causal link from cooperation to trust) or use the results from 
experimental trust or dictator games as a proxy for trust. A considerable number of other 
authors however find a direct and positive relation between survey trust questions and trusting 
behavior in public good experiments (see Yamagishi and Cook (1993) or Gaechter et al. 
(2004) and references therein). Since we do not have experimental data, we cannot test these 
alternative options. 
Whatever the underlying reason, we do not find a significant relationship from trust to 
collective action. That is, the results do not yield support for the existence of a positive and 
reinforcing cycle between this social capital variable and contributions to public goods.  
Village level norms of reciprocity on the other hand are strongly significant for school 
projects. However, they have a negative sign instead of the positive sign that we found for 
assistance. Village level norms also have a negative sign in the infrastructure estimation, 
although the coefficient is not statistically significant. Individual reciprocity has a negative 
sign for both dependent variables as well, although the coefficient is only statistically 
significant in the estimation for infrastructure. These perhaps counterintuitive findings will be 
discussed further in the next section. 
Finally, the Mahila Samakhya programme turns out to have a strong impact on both 
contributions to school projects and participation in road projects. The coefficient of the 
programme dummy variable remains strongly significant in all specifications. This indicates 
that the programme substantially increases collective action, but not through its influence on 
trust. The introduction of an interaction term with the programme variable shows that 
programme impact is largest among the least educated households. Moreover, contributions to 
school projects increase especially among households with a high child dependency ratio and 
contributions to infrastructure especially among households with much land. 
 
 
  
112
4.6 Reciprocity reconsidered 
 
Tables 4.6a, b and c have shown a mixed picture of the role of individual reciprocity 
and village level reciprocity. Whereas the variables are positive and significant as expected 
for the propensity to give assistance, their sign is negative in the estimations for collective 
action. This section will look at the role of reciprocity in more detail. 
 
4.6.1 The strength of norms and social sanctions  
Average norms of reciprocity in the village capture the threat of social sanctions for 
defection or the promise of social esteem for cooperation. However, a large body of literature 
emphasizes the importance of group size for social sanctions and rewards to be effective. In 
small networks, information about the actual behavior of individuals is passed on much more 
easily. This enhances the threat of sanctions and the effect on social status. In addition, the 
smaller the social network, the more likely people are to care about what others think of them 
since people are more dependent on each other and more likely to meet one another again. A 
straightforward extension therefore takes into account the size of the village. That is, we 
include an interaction term between village level norms of reciprocity and village population 
totals. The results are given in Table 4.8. They confirm the expectations.  
Strong norms of reciprocity in the community are positively related to all three forms 
of cooperation. Their coefficients are statistically significant in the estimations for assistance 
and contributions to school projects. The interaction term with village population totals is 
consistently negative and statistically significant in the two collective action estimations. In 
other words, the threat of social sanctions is less effective in larger communities. 
 
4.6.2 Individual norms of reciprocity as a tit-for-tat strategy 
Similarly, a closer look at the individual reciprocity index indicates that the negative 
sign on its coefficient is perhaps not so counterintuitive after all. In general, reciprocity 
indicates that people will cooperate if others do so as well, but will not cooperate if others do 
not either. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the histograms of village levels of collective action with 
respect to school construction and infrastructure respectively. On average, the percentages of 
households in a community that join in a community project are extremely low. In such 
communities, one would indeed expect a correlation between reciprocal attitudes and low 
levels of cooperation. On the other hand, levels of assistance are much higher in most 
communities. Figure 4.3 gives the histogram of the average sum of assistance items in 
communities. Not surprisingly, in such situations individuals will reciprocate received favors 
and assistance, hence the positive correlation between reciprocity and assistance. 
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Table 4.8 The importance of village size 
 
Dependent variable: Assistance Schools Infrastructure 
    
Programme dummy -.064 
(.088) 
.126 
(.037)*** 
.133 
(.035)*** 
    
Trust in community members 
(instrumented) 
.452 
(.239)* 
.083 
(.084) 
-.066 
(.087) 
 
   
Reciprocity .257 
(.149)* 
-.047 
(.047) 
-.115 
(.050)** 
    
Village level reciprocity, without self .952 
(.368)*** 
.227 
(.126)* 
.146 
(.122) 
Interaction of village level reciprocity with 
village population 
-.065 
(.111) 
-.100 
(.035)*** 
-.052 
(.031)* 
Village population -.040 
(.025) 
-.012 
(.010) 
-.021 
(.009)** 
    
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Community characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Block var. / district dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
Joint significance of village level 
reciprocity, village population and 
interaction term (p-value) 
.039** .379 .417 
    
# observations 1875 1867 1877 
R-squared .067 .301 .162 
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust 
standard errors in brackets are corrected for clustering at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: 
p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Results are bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
 
 
These findings show that strong norms are not necessarily a ‘good’ thing. This is 
important to note, especially with respect to the discussion about social capital. In fact, 
whether or not norms of reciprocity are favorable to the emergence of collective action 
depends to a large extent on the point of departure. Communities may be trapped in a 
suboptimal level of low cooperation although every single community member could be a 
‘conditional cooperator’ willing to participate if others do so as well.  
In sum, strong norms of reciprocity in a community facilitate cooperation, especially 
in smaller villages. But such norms are not necessarily productive. Reciprocal individuals will 
decide whether to cooperate or not, dependent on the actual levels of cooperation of others. 
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Figure 4.1 Histogram of average village participation levels in school projects  
0
5
10
15
20
Fr
e
qu
en
cy
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
% participation in school projects per community
 
The x-axis represents the percentage of households in a village that contributed to school 
projects in the past year. Number of observations (communities): 103 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Histogram of average village participation levels in infrastructure projects  
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The x-axis represents the percentage of households in a village that contributed to 
infrastructure projects in the past year. Number of observations (communities): 103 
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Figure 4.3 Histogram of average village level assistance among households 
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NB: The histogram is not based on the index constructed from factor analysis, but as a simple 
sum of the underlying items. This sum has a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 5. 
The x-axis represents the average sum over the households per community. Number of 
observations (communities): 103 
 
 
4.7 The impact of the Mahila Samakhya programme 
 
4.7.1 Do we find evidence of a virtuous cycle? 
First of all, trust in community members is significantly higher in programme villages 
than in control villages. Norms of reciprocity on the other hand do not differ between the two 
treatment groups. Third, collective action in school projects and infrastructure are 
significantly more common in programme villages than in control villages. But we do not find 
such a difference for assistance among households. We will now discuss whether or not these 
effects are related to the programme’s initiation of a virtuous cycle between trust and 
cooperation. 
The previous sections showed that positive past experiences with cooperative behavior 
of others in the community significantly increases current levels of trust, although not all 
types of cooperation are equally relevant. However, this effect was mainly found in villages 
where Mahila Samakhya is active. In control villages with very little collective action at all, 
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this relationship is absent or even reversed. Thus, one direction of the cycle is partly 
confirmed, in programme villages only.  
The difference between programme and control villages may be due to the explicit and 
continuous attention for trust-building within Mahila Samakhya groups that translates positive 
past experiences into updated beliefs. It is also possible that a certain level of collective action 
should be reached before individuals start reconsidering their opinion about the 
trustworthiness of others. The maximum percentage of households that participates in 
collective action in any of the control communities is 45 percent. Hence, when asked whether 
“most people in this community can be trusted (…)”, people are right if they disagree. That is, 
the Mahila Samakhya programme may have lifted cooperation in the programme villages 
above a certain threshold necessary to increase trust.  
Mahila Samakhya also has a direct positive impact on trust, beyond its effect through 
cooperation, which is significant in two of the three tables. Most likely, the programme 
directly increases trust among community members because it brings them together, enhances 
social interactions within the community, and stimulates communication and discussion 
across caste and religious boundaries.  
Next, the results showed that more trusting individuals in a community are 
significantly more likely to assist others. This confirms the other direction of the cycle for 
one-on-one cooperation among households. However, we do not find a direct effect of the 
programme itself on assistance, even in specifications that exclude trust. Our measure of 
assistance may be limited as it only captures whether or not households have assisted others 
in the past year, not how often they have done so. For example, our measure would not pick 
up an increase in food-sharing among households who did share food already. Moreover, for 
three of the underlying items, the results do suggest an increase. In sum, trust increases 
assistance and assistance increases trust, supporting the hypotheses. This positive cycle is 
found especially in programme villages, although programme impact is not statistically 
significant.  
Finally, the results show that trust has no direct impact on subsequent participation in 
collective action. This indicates that the self-reinforcing mechanism between social capital 
and collective action is not as easily set in motion as often assumed. It also emphasizes the 
importance of looking beyond positive correlations and dig into causality relationships to 
really understand underlying processes. Given that one link of the expected cycle is non-
existent the programme will not be able to initiate an upward spiral of increasing joint action, 
at least not through its effect on trust.  
Nonetheless, we find a positive coefficient of the programme dummy variable in all 
specifications for schools and infrastructure. This indicates that the programme has a direct 
effect on community action unrelated to trust-building. There are a number of pathways 
through which the programme could influence a community’s propensity to engage in 
collective action directly.  
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First of all, the Mahila Samakhya programme stimulates women to reflect on their 
situation and articulate their needs and demands. Before the arrival of the programme, most 
women accept their situation as just the way it is (Mahila Samakhya, 1995). Once common 
needs (and the potential for changes) become clear, this would increase awareness of the 
benefits of a joint effort such as the importance of setting up schools for girls. Awareness is 
also enhanced through trainings and workshops that educate women with respect to health, 
human capital and women’s rights. 
Second, the programme provides additional resources, either directly (in paying the 
honorarium of teachers for informal girls’ schools) or indirectly through its support in 
accessing government schemes. In the year prior to the survey, 16 out of the 74 women’s 
groups in the sample had received at least one government subsidy. The programme also 
facilitates communication with government officials. Mahila Samakhya facilitators initially 
accompany the women who want to address public issues. Thereafter they become more 
confident to approach government representatives themselves. Over time, these effects appear 
to be strengthened. The longer a group has been active, the more likely it is that it has tried to 
influence policy, or to change an existing or newly announced rule. The correlation 
coefficient between the number of years that a group has existed and their involvement in 
policy issues is .265 (p-value .023).110 The correlation between group years and whether such 
an effort was successful is .371 (p-value .074). The correlation between group years and a 
supportive relationship with local government officials is also significantly positive at .286 
(p-value .016).111 Similarly, the relationship with the local elite seems to improve over time 
with a correlation coefficient of .340 (p-value .003).112  
Third, a potentially important mechanism through which the programme increases 
collective action is through its impact on the confidence and empowerment of women. Table 
4.8 shows the coefficients of a number of statements that were added in turn to the full 2SIV 
estimations of cooperation (column (ix) in Tables 4.6a, b and c). Even when controlling for 
trust, reciprocity and the presence of the programme, the partial correlations between 
collective action and most statements are highly significant (columns (ii) and (iii) in Table 
4.8).  Individuals are significantly more likely to have participated in collective action when 
they believe that people like themselves can have a lot of influence in making their 
community a better place to live, or that members of their community are able to improve the 
quality of education and the quality of roads if they would jointly organize. This could partly 
result from reverse causality if participation subsequently increases confidence in oneself and 
                                                 
110
 Note that the direction of causality would partly run in the other direction if facilitators were initially recruited 
from communities more actively involved in politics in the first place.  
111
 The question “How is the relationship between the group and local government officials” could be answered 
as: 0. Opposing, 1. Ignoring, 2. Accepting, 3. Consulting, and 4. Other. (The answers are recoded such that 
higher values indicate higher support. Code 4. is put to missing).  
112
 The question: “What is the relationship of the more prosperous families toward the Mahila Samakhya 
group?” could be answered as: 1. Adversarial, 2. Interfering, 3. Indifferent, 4. Supportive/cooperative (The 
answers are recoded such that higher values indicate higher support).  
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other (disadvantaged) community members. But increased confidence in turn is likely to 
enhance future collective action. These findings corroborate the results from other studies that 
find a strong correlation between empowerment or self-confidence and collective action 
(Hirsch, 1990; Finkel and Muller, 1998; Small, 2002). We do not find such a strong 
relationship between confidence and the assistance index (column (i) in Table 4.8).  
 
Table 4.8 Empowerment and confidence (2SIV) 
 Dependent variable: Assistance Schools Infrastructure 
Specification:    
     
A. How much influence do you think people 
like yourself can have in making this 
community a better place to live? 
(1. none, 2. some, 3. a lot)113 
.077 
(.111) 
.187 
(.039)*** 
.161 
(.043)*** 
     
B. Parents cannot change the quality of the 
primary school. 
(1. agree, 2. neutral, 3. disagree) 
.100 
(.043)** 
.054 
(.016)*** 
.051 
(.017)*** 
     
C. Do you think that the members of this 
community would be able to improve the 
quality of education if they would jointly 
organize? 
(0. no, 1. yes) 
-.171 
(.098)* 
.126 
(.034)*** 
.102 
(.039)** 
     
D. Do you think that the members of this 
community would be able to improve the 
quality of the roads if they would jointly 
organize? 
(0. no, 1. yes) 
-.065 
(.095) 
.129 
(.033)*** 
.127 
(.038)*** 
     
Additional variables in all specifications: 
 Programme dummy Yes Yes Yes 
 Trust in community members (instrumented) Yes Yes Yes 
 Reciprocity Yes Yes Yes 
 Village level reciprocity, without self Yes Yes Yes 
 Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
 Community characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
 Block var. / district dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Estimates are weighted for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. The robust 
standard errors in brackets are corrected for clustering at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: 
p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Results are bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
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 The original codes are reversed to indicate increasing influence with an increasing code. 
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In sum, these findings suggest that a community development project that focuses on 
the building of trust and empowerment may indeed increase collective action, as long as it 
offers additional incentives and support to undertake the community projects. However, 
expecting a self-reinforcing mechanism between trust and collective action is probably too 
optimistic. Instead, the programme’s impact on collective action appears to run through other 
mechanisms than trust. Increased awareness, knowledge about government subsidies and 
confidence in one self and one’s neighbors may strengthen the capacity and willingness of the 
women to continue their joint efforts over time.  
 
4.7.2 Spillover effects on non-participants in programme villages 
The Mahila Samakhya programme positively affects the levels of trust and the levels 
of collective action in communities. However, to genuinely transform the social environment 
in programme villages, it should not only have an impact on participants in the women’s 
groups but also on non-participants in programme villages. This section shows the results of 
the main estimations of cooperation, excluding participants from the sample. That is, we 
estimate the impact of the programme on assistance, on participation in school projects and 
participation in infrastructure projects for non-participants in programme villages as 
compared to the control population.   
Note that the estimations suffer from a selection bias since we compare the entire 
population in control villages with the population in programme villages that voluntarily 
decided not to participate in Mahila Samakhya. Their decision is guided in part by 
unobservables that cannot be controlled for. However, it seems most likely that, if anything, 
non-participants would be inherently less likely to cooperate and participate in joint action for 
the benefit of the community, which would bias the estimates downwards. Therefore, it 
should be kept in mind that the results in this section are merely suggestive. The next chapter 
will discuss the measurement of externalities in much more detail and provide evidence of the 
(corrected) spillover effects on immunization and education.  
The results are shown in Table 4.9. The levels of assistance among households do not 
significantly differ between non-participants in programme villages and households in control 
communities (column (i)). However, the findings are suggestive of strong spillover effects on 
the propensity of the broader community to engage in collective action (columns (ii) and 
(iii)). When a Mahila Samakhya women’s group has been started in a village, households who 
are not a member of Mahila Samakhya themselves are 11.7 percentage points more likely to 
participate in a school project and 14.3 percentage points more likely to participate in 
infrastructure maintenance than households living in control villages. Box 4.1 provides 
examples and anecdotal evidence on the different mechanisms that may produce such 
externalities. 
 
Table 4.9 Spillover effects on non-participants in programme villages (2SIV and OLS)  
 
Dependent variable: Assistance 
 
 
(2SIV) 
(i) 
Schools 
 
 
(2SIV) 
(ii) 
Infrastructure 
 
 
(2SIV) 
(iii) 
Trust in 
community 
members  
(OLS) 
(iv) 
Reciprocity 
index   
 
(OLS) 
(v) 
      
Programme dummy -.057 
(.086) 
.117 
(.035)*** 
.143 
(.035)*** 
.251 
(.077)*** 
.022 
(.050) 
      
Trust in community 
members 
(instrumented) 
.382 
(.254) 
.076 
(.092) 
-.096 
(.100) 
  
      
Reciprocity .273 
(.141)* 
-.039 
(.048) 
-.133 
(.054)** 
  
Village level reciprocity, 
without self 
.686 
(.202)*** 
-.112 
(.069) 
-.054 
(.063) 
  
      
Household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Community characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Block var. / district dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
      
# observations 1189 1184 1191 1193 1193 
R-squared .108 .269 .101 .192 .099 
Participants in programme villages are excluded from the estimations. The robust standard errors in brackets are corrected for 
clustering at the village level. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. 2SIV results are bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
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The results in column (iv) of Table 4.9 suggest that non-participants in programme 
villages are also significantly more likely to trust their fellow community members than 
control households. As a comparison, column (v) shows the impact of Mahila Samakhya on 
norms of reciprocity. We do not find evidence that the programme has had an effect on the 
norms of non-participants.  
 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion and discussion 
 
An important trend in development aid is the shift from traditional, top-down 
programmes to community-based development (CBD) projects that actively involve 
communities in project design and implementation. Proponents of this approach advocate 
that, besides a number of other benefits, such projects will increase social capital in 
communities, thereby enhancing their capacity to further improve community life through 
collective action. However, empirical evidence of the impact of CBD projects on social 
capital is strikingly limited. This chapter evaluated the impact of the Mahila Samakhya 
programme that explicitly aims to increase trust and joint action among disadvantaged 
Box 4.1 Spillovers on participation in school projects 
 
Focus group interviews with many women’s groups that have set up an informal 
primary school for girls indicate that enrolment in their informal girls’ school is open to 
all. However, parents are required to help in cleaning the surroundings, finding a covered 
place to keep materials, etc. That is, in many communities selective incentives in terms of 
free school enrolment induce parents to contribute to school construction and 
maintenance.  
In Bajitpur Majhauli village, mobilization for school maintenance occurs on a very 
different basis. Mahila Samakhya participants regularly worked for the school, repairing 
the roof, filling in potholes, etc. The members of the Village Education Committee (VEC) 
or parent-teacher association, very passive until then, suddenly realized that ‘those low-
caste women’ were actually doing their job. Feeling too proud to let this happen, they 
subsequently started to organize activities themselves, involving other parents as well. 
In Kachrachak village, the women’s group organizes regular community meetings 
between the community, the VEC, the teacher and other government officials. Those 
meetings are meant to discuss the problems with the primary school in the village, and 
divide responsibilities for solutions. For example, the parents together with the teacher are 
responsible for building maintenance, the women’s group with parents work together to 
increase enrolment rates and the VEC deals with teacher-related issues. 
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women, on social capital and cooperation. It also examined whether the evidence supports the 
theoretical virtuous cycle between trust and cooperation.  
The findings show that Mahila Samakhya has substantially increased trust in 
programme villages as well as participation in collective action. On the other hand, it has not 
affected norms of reciprocity nor the propensity to assist other households in programme 
communities. However, we do not find strong evidence of the existence of a reinforcing cycle 
between trust and cooperation. In control villages, the relationship is not significant in either 
direction. In programme villages, past cooperation leads to higher trust, but higher trust only 
increases one-on-one assistance between households and not contributions to public goods. 
Thus, a virtuous cycle only exists between trust and assistance in programme villages.  
In line with theoretical predictions, social capital in terms of norms of reciprocity is 
strongly related to cooperative behavior. High village level norms of reciprocity that capture a 
threat of social sanctions significantly increase cooperation, mainly in the smaller 
communities. Individual level reciprocity plays a more ambiguous role. It positively affects 
assistance among households, but has a negative impact on contributions to the common 
good. This is not surprising when we notice that levels of collective action are very low in the 
study area. Under such circumstances, reciprocating behavior implies that people will not 
participate because others do not contribute either. This finding points out to an important 
issue. It is often assumed that social capital, in terms of strong norms, is beneficial for a 
community. However, this depends crucially on the specific context and the outcome under 
consideration.  
The empirical findings have several implications. First of all, the findings corroborate 
the theoretical hypotheses and results from many other studies regarding norms of reciprocity, 
i.e. the importance of sanctions and rewards for cooperation. The negative relationship 
between reciprocity and trust however may indicate a substitution effect that is less desirable 
from a long-term point of view. Second, from a methodological perspective, the results 
underscore the importance of looking beyond correlations and aiming to disentangle causality. 
The strong and positive partial correlations between trust and the collective action variables 
are not sustained in the instrumented estimations. Third and more importantly, the findings do 
not confirm the expectation that Mahila Samakhya has been able to set in motion a virtuous 
cycle between trust and collective action. If even a programme with such a strong emphasis 
on trust-building, solidarity and joint action as Mahila Samakhya does not initiate such a 
reinforcing mechanism, it casts doubts on the ability of other CBD projects to do so.  
This is not to say that CBD projects cannot affect a community’s propensity to engage 
in collective action. In fact, Mahila Samakhya has had a strong positive impact on joint action 
that spills over to non-participants in programme villages. What the findings show is that this 
impact does not run through trust. Potential mechanisms instead could be a greater awareness 
and agreement about the benefits of collective action, access to additional resources and 
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increased empowerment and self-confidence among the (low-caste) women in programme 
villages.  
This makes one wonder how sustainable the current changes in the levels of 
cooperation are. From discussions with Mahila Samakhya programme officers it appears that 
most of the women’s groups are not strong enough yet to be independent of the programme, 
even after a considerable number of years. That is, programme support is still necessary to 
keep collective action going. This replicates the finding from studies of other CBD projects 
that continuous support from external agents remains necessary for collective action (Mansuri 
and Rao, 2004; Rao and Ibanez, 2005). However this is not necessarily a major drawback. If 
the women’s groups accomplish certain objectives (such as increasing school enrolment) as 
well or better than the government at equal or lower costs, long-term investment in the 
programme could be a very sensible policy. 
The results also point out a number of limitations and suggestions for future research. 
For a more thorough understanding of the dynamics, a panel data set that includes a baseline 
survey of the social capital variables would greatly add to the analysis. In addition, including 
experimental evidence on the initial levels of trust would facilitate the interpretation of 
findings in view of the ongoing discussion regarding the validity of trust questions in surveys. 
The inclusion of information on motivations, on the intensity and frequency of cooperation, as 
well as on social networks, will further shed light on decisions and behavior.  
Especially a much more detailed focus on empowerment and confidence-building 
seems promising for further investigations. It is not commonly included in (economic) 
collective action theories, but it is likely to add substantially to our understanding of 
collective action among disadvantaged groups. Compare for example Bardhan (2000) who 
argues that effective decentralization should be accompanied by real efforts to empower 
minorities, change existing power structures and increase participation also of disadvantaged 
groups.114  
Finally, it is not straightforward to what extent the results on the impact of the Mahila 
Samakhya programme can be extended to other programmes. Mahila Samakhya is rather 
unique in its very careful but slow approach that puts a lot of effort in creating awareness, 
building trust and increasing confidence among the women before it goes on to any other 
activity. Most other CBD projects instead start with the mobilization of individuals to join in 
collective action, perhaps after one or two weeks of participatory meetings. Our results cannot 
predict whether such an approach is able to produce similar outcomes on the levels of joint 
action. Platteau and Abraham (2002) argue that such rapid disbursement procedures for CBD 
projects are likely to be unsuccessful, if not counterproductive. Building social capital, 
empowering minorities and breaking down existing social inequalities takes time and 
intensive facilitator efforts. Hence, a comparative study of the impact of different programme 
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 See also Sen’s capability approach (e.g. Sen, 1999), or Platteau’s discussion on participation and 
accountability versus elite capture (2003). 
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designs is necessary to further gain insights in the specific characteristics of projects that are 
successful in increasing a community’s propensity to engage in collective action. 
CHAPTER 5  
 
Measuring Externalities in Program Evaluation: 
 
Spillovers on immunization and school enrolment 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Impact evaluations are generally based on a comparison of the treatment group with a 
control group. However, if a project generates positive externalities and the control group 
benefits from the programme as well, such an approach might seriously underestimate the 
programme’s impact.115 Community-based development programmes are often assumed to 
increase cooperative behavior in a community (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Mansuri and 
Rao, 2004). The previous chapter showed how the Mahila Samakhya programme 
substantially increased collective action with respect to schools and infrastructural projects. If 
the collective activities result in improved public services and facilities that are accessible to 
non-participants, the impact of the programme will not be restricted to the programme 
participants only. It will reach other community members as well. 
Similarly, a development programme that increases knowledge among its participants 
might have an impact on the broader community if social interactions spread this new 
information among community members. A growing body of literature emphasizes the role of 
social interactions in shaping environments and outcomes. There is increasing evidence of the 
influence of neighborhoods and peers on outcomes such as child health and behavior (Case 
and Katz, 1991; Katz et al., 2001), student outcomes (Sacerdote, 2001; Lalive and Cattaneo, 
2006), technology adoption in agriculture (Besley and Case, 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 
1995; Munshi, 2004), retirement plan decisions (Duflo and Saez, 2002) and contraceptive 
prevalence (Behrman et al., 2002; Munshi and Myaux, 2002). 
As long as the impact evaluation covers all potential beneficiaries in the treatment 
group, it will capture the externalities. However, most impact studies of development 
programmes do not explicitly take into account potential spillover effects. There are a few 
exceptions. Kim et al. (1999) find that boys’ enrolment increases after the introduction of a 
girls’ primary school program in Pakistan. The impact of the Progresa programme in Mexico 
on school enrolment of non-eligible children is estimated in Behrman et al. (2001), Schultz 
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 Conversely, the omission of negative externalities on non-participants will overestimate a project’s impact. 
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(2004) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2006). Their evidence on the existence of spillovers is 
inconclusive, although the patterns suggest that any externalities would be positive. Miguel 
and Kremer (2004) measure externalities of a deworming program in Kenya and find that it 
significantly reduces disease transmission on children attending neighboring schools.116 
This chapter presents additional evidence on the potential presence and size of 
spillover effects. In particular, we estimate the impact of the Mahila Samakhya programme on 
the immunization and enrolment rates of two groups of children: children whose mothers 
participate in the women’s programme and children whose mothers do not participate but who 
live in a village where a women’s group is active. Girls and Scheduled Castes children will 
receive special attention in the remainder of the chapter. First of all, they are the main target 
group of the programme. Second, these children are especially disadvantaged on a large 
number of issues, including education and health (Drèze and Sen, 2002).117 
Our sampling methodology includes three sample groups in the survey: participants as 
well as non-participants living in programme villages, and households living in control 
villages. This survey design allows us not only to compare the outcomes of participants with 
those of non-participants, but also to examine the spillover effects of the programme through 
a comparison of non-participants in programme villages with the control group. 
The voluntary character of membership in a women’s group potentially causes 
participation selection bias in the estimation of the programme effect. We will correct for this 
using instrumental variables. It is usually difficult to plausibly argue that the exclusion 
restriction for the instrumental variables holds. In this chapter, we exploit our survey design to 
test the exclusion restriction directly. To further test the results, the impact of the program is 
also estimated using propensity score matching.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section shows the descriptive statistics 
on immunization and education, both prior to programme start and at the time of the survey. 
The third section outlines the empirical strategy and discusses the instrumental variables. The 
results are described in section four. That section also contains a discussion on potential 
underlying mechanisms. We conclude in the last section. 
 
                                                 
116
 Impact evaluations that account for general equilibrium effects are more common. For an overview of such 
evaluations of training and labor market policies, see Heckman et al. (1999). 
117
 See Rao et al. (2003) for a socio-cultural analysis of gender and caste differences in primary education in 
India, Thorat (2002) for a discussion of current day discrimination of Scheduled Castes, and Hoff and Pandey 
(2004) for an experimental investigation of deeply ingrained beliefs among Scheduled Castes elementary school 
children. Kishor (1993) and Das Gupta (1987) study gender differences in Indian child mortality and the 
underlying mechanisms that bring about these differentials. Pande (2003) analyses the gender inequalities in 
childhood nutrition and immunization in rural India. Whereas the differences in immunization between boys and 
girls are diminishing over time, the disadvantage in child health, child mortality and immunization coverage of 
Scheduled Castes children compared to other castes remains strongly present (International Institute for 
Population Sciences, 2000). The World Bank (2001) and Filmer et al. (1998) provide overviews of gender 
inequality research, also covering India. 
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5.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
5.2.1  Immunization 
The Government of India initiated the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) 
in 1978 to reduce morbidity, mortality and disability resulting from the major preventable 
diseases.118 In 1985 the Universal Immunization Programme (UPI) replaced the EPI. The UPI 
programme includes four types of vaccinations against six different diseases: BCG (Bacille 
Calmette-Guérin vaccine against tuberculosis), DTP (against diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis 
or whooping cough), measles and polio.  
The vaccinations are all free but differ in several respects. Tuberculosis is the only 
vaccination that is not administered locally but in the block hospital. DTP and measles 
vaccinations have in common that they are both due in a relatively short period after birth. 
The DTP and the polio vaccine consist of several doses. To eradicate polio, the national 
government has launched an additional large-scale immunization campaign in 1995, the Pulse 
Polio Immunization Programme, to immunize all children under five against polio. At a few 
years intervals, thousands of health workers are sent to all parts of the country to administer 
polio drops. Local community organizations such as Mahila Samakhya groups are encouraged 
to participate in the organization of the campaign. Finally, a traditional belief assigns the 
cause of measles to the will of a goddess. Immunization is thought to anger her, which might 
lead to even larger health problems. Especially in very traditional remote areas, this could 
hamper the increase of the measles immunization coverage rate.  
While we have no baseline data on immunization rates, we can construct a 
retrospective baseline using the variation in birth cohorts and in years of programme start in 
the villages (see Table 5.1 panel A). The vaccinations against polio, DTP and tuberculosis 
should not be administered to children after the age of five (Indian Academy of Pediatrics, 
2001). Taking a margin to account for rounding of years of existence as well as potentially 
imperfect adherence to this rule119, we can compare children who were eight years or older at 
programme start with children from the control group.  
For three of the five thus constructed birth cohorts we do not find statistically 
significant differences between the two groups on any of the immunization types. For the 
remaining two cohorts the differences are statistically significant. Among the nine year olds, 
the programme children are less likely to be immunized than control children against 
tuberculosis, DTP and measles. This underestimates programme impact. Among the eleven 
year olds on the other hand, the tuberculosis and DTP  
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  International Institute for Population Sciences (2000). 
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 We do not know how strictly these guidelines are followed in practice.  
  
128
Table 5.1 Retrospective baseline data 
Birth cohorts # 
observations120 
Control 
villages 
Programme 
villages 
P-value of the 
difference 
PANEL A.  IMMUNIZATION 
 
    
Tuberculosis     
9 year olds 62 44.8 15.6 .073* 
10 year olds 223 37.5 56.6 .218 
11 year olds 80 43.6 78.9 .004*** 
12 year olds 246 28.0 40.8 .272 
13 year olds 126 46.8 48.4 .926 
     
DTP     
9 year olds 61 41.7 15.6 .083* 
10 year olds 223 35.4 54.5 .212 
11 year olds 79 42.0 75.6 .011** 
12 year olds 246 26.2 40.5 .187 
13 year olds 124 48.7 43.7 .770 
     
Measles     
9 year olds 62 42.0 15.6 .079* 
10 year olds 223 32.1 42.2 .533 
11 year olds 79 39.2 27.5 .432 
12 year olds 246 22.1 22.7 .953 
13 year olds 126 40.7 26.9 .322 
 
    
Polio     
9 year olds 63 82.4 76.2 .699 
10 year olds 226 82.4 89.4 .434 
11 year olds 82 76.5 78.4 .892 
12 year olds 246 67.3 62.3 .685 
13 year olds 127 61.7 59.4 .888 
     
PANEL B.  PRESCHOOL ENROLMENT 
     
Preschool     
9 year olds 62 5.4 22.2 .274 
10 year olds 226 5.7 10.8 .642 
11 year olds 82 9.1 16.9 .587 
12 year olds 242 4.0 20.1 .074* 
13 year olds 127 5.4 18.1 .305 
Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors 
corrected accordingly. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01  
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 Subsamples consist of the entire birth cohort in control villages. In programme villages, children are only 
included in the birth cohort subsample if the programme started in their village eight years or more after they 
were born.  
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vaccination rates are statistically larger among the programme group. In other words, the 
findings suggest that there was no systematic pattern of significantly higher immunization 
rates in the programme group prior to the arrival of Mahila Samakhya. 
Once the programme starts in a community, almost all women’s groups want to 
improve their knowledge on health and hygiene issues. The programme offers health 
education through a variety of means. First of all, the programme directly disseminates 
information to the women’s groups through the regular visits of the facilitator. The 
programme also organizes health trainings for the women's groups.121 The trainings increase 
health knowledge and give information on such practical issues as the weekly immunization 
days in local health centers and block hospitals. It is likely that this information is passed on 
to other community members during the regular social interactions within the village. 
Apart from raising awareness among the participants, the trainings mobilize the 
women’s groups to participate in the nation-wide government polio campaign. Moreover, 
many groups initiate small immunization campaigns in their own village after having received 
training. They go from door to door in their neighborhood to inform other families of the 
importance of immunization and about the free possibilities of immunization in the health 
centers. Thus, the participating women consciously engage in collective action in their 
villages in order to disseminate their increased health knowledge among other households. 
These activities are likely to generate external effects on non-participants as well.  
Figure 5.1 shows the 
immunization rates for children 
aged 0 to 13 in the three sample 
groups: participants, non-
participants living in programme 
villages and children in control 
villages.122  On average, 
participant children are more 
likely to be immunized against 
tuberculosis, DTP or measles 
than non-participant children, 
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 To improve the quality of these health camps, Mahila Samakhya cooperates with health department 
functionaries such as Auxiliary Nurses and Midwives (ANMs), Lady Health Visitors and government doctors. In 
addition, the Mahila Samakhya programme is engaged in a partnership with the World Health Organization 
(WHO) to train barefoot health workers. Representatives of the women's groups participate in the WHO training 
and disseminate the newly gained information about health and nutrition on their return in the villages. 
122
 The descriptive statistics take into account the survey design through appropriate weighting of observations. 
We correct for the stratification in weights and standard errors. Moreover, weights and standard errors are 
adjusted for the clustering at the village level and the fact that villages were not sampled proportionate to size. 
Finally, appropriate weighting of the households in programme villages takes into account the disproportionate 
sampling of participating and non-participating households. 
Figure 5.1 Immunization (children aged 0-13) 
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although the difference is statistically significant only in the last case (see Table 5.2 panel A 
for details). On the one hand, this could indicate that the increased health knowledge spills 
over to a large extent to the rest of the community. On the other hand, the participants usually 
belong to the least educated, poorest groups of the village. Thus they would be expected to 
have a lower immunization rate. Indeed, the difference between the two groups becomes 
statistically significant for tuberculosis and DTP as well, once we control for household 
characteristics.  
More importantly, non-participant children are substantially more likely to have 
received these three vaccinations than children living in control villages. In chapter three we 
argued that control villages represent a good counterfactual for the programme villages. The 
retrospective baseline data earlier in this section support that assumption. That is, in the 
absence of externalities within the community we would expect non-participant children and 
control children to show similar immunization rates. The significant differences in 
vaccination rates between these two groups of children suggest substantial spillover effects 
within programme villages. 
Table 5.2 panel B indicates that, overall, children belonging to the General Castes are 
significantly more likely to be immunized against any of the four diseases (including polio) 
than other children. Muslim children show an alarmingly low coverage rate compared to the 
total Hindu population, including the Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes. 
Disaggregation by sex (Table 5.2 panel C) does not show a significant difference between 
girls’ and boys’ immunization rates.  
It is clear that immunization against polio is much more prevalent than immunization 
against any of the other vaccination types. The government polio immunization campaign 
seems to be equally effective in reaching children in villages with or without the Mahila 
Samakhya programme. An analysis of the mechanisms underlying polio immunization falls 
outside the scope of this thesis. Overall, immunization against tuberculosis is more prevalent 
than vaccinations against DTP and measles. Apparently, the more extended vaccination 
period of tuberculosis has a stronger positive effect than the potential downward effect of 
travel distance. Immunization against measles is least common among participants, non-
participants and control households alike. 
 
5.2.2 Education 
Baseline data for preschool and school enrolment prior to the implementation of 
Mahila Samakhya are not available. But again, we can construct a retrospective baseline for 
preschool enrolment of children aged 3 to 5 years old. Table 5.1 panel B shows the results of 
such a comparison. They confirm that the probability of preschool enrolment for children 
born eight years or more before the programme started in their village (whose preschool 
enrolment therefore could not have been affected by the programme, allowing for the  
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Table 5.2 Immunization rates (children aged 0 to 13 years) 
 
 
PANEL A.  Immunization by sample group 
 Control 
villages 
Programme villages P-values of the difference 
between: 
 
 Total 
programme 
villages 
Participants 
only 
Non-
participants 
only 
Control and 
programme 
villages 
Participants 
and non-
participants 
       
Tuberculosis 44.3 69.0 74.0 68.7 0.000*** 0.165 
DTP 41.7 65.7 70.6 65.4 0.000*** 0.174 
Measles 36.2 53.9 64.5 53.3 0.013** 0.028** 
Polio 88.9 88.4 88.9 88.4 0.838 0.811 
       
Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected accordingly. *: 
p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 
 
 
PANEL B. Immunization by caste 
 Scheduled Castes Other Backward 
Castes 
General Castes Muslims 
     
Tuberculosis 63.9 66.1 88.0*** 45.1*** 
DTP 64.8 61.0 88.0*** 43.6*** 
Measles 57.5 51.3 77.4*** 35.8*** 
Polio 86.2 86.9 94.6** 91.4 
     
Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected accordingly. *: 
p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values are calculated for the difference in means between a subpopulation 
and the rest of the child population (e.g. Muslims versus non-Muslims).  
 
 
PANEL C. Immunization by sex 
 Total Control Participants Non-participants 
 Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls 
         
Tuberculosis 66.1 67.6 45.7 43.0 75.6 72.1 67.6 69.7 
DTP 63.2 63.9 44.0 39.8 72.2 68.5 64.7 65.9 
Measles 52.1 52.6 37.6 35.3 66.7 61.8 52.7 53.7 
Polio 89.1 88.0 90.8 86.5** 90.1 87.6 88.8 88.1 
         
Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected accordingly. *: 
p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. P-values are calculated for the difference in means between boys and girls in a 
subpopulation (e.g. among participants only).  
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enrolment of slightly older children and taking into account the rounding of years) is not 
statistically different at the 10% level from that same probability for control children, except 
for the twelve year old birth cohort.123 
As long as migration to and out of the village is small, school enrolment rates prior to 
programme implementation will be correlated with the education levels of adults at the time 
of the survey. The highest education levels within sample households are very similar across 
the programme and control group at 3.3 and 3.1 respectively (p-value of the difference .473). 
124
 Looking at the highest female education levels, the averages are 2.0 and 1.8 for the two 
groups respectively (p-value .339).  
However, women usually move to another village once they get married as an adult. 
Therefore, current female education levels will not capture the pre-programme school 
enrolment rates in the sample villages very precisely. Alternatively, a comparison of the 
average pre-programme (1991) village level literacy rates across programme and control 
communities yields average female literacy rates of 14.2 and 14.4 respectively (p-value .929) 
and average male literacy rates of 39.9 and 37.7 respectively (p-value 0.583) (Census Office, 
2001b).125  
In sum, the available data suggest that the two treatment groups did not differ 
significantly from each other in terms of (pre-)school enrolment prior to the arrival of the 
programme. Education levels and literacy rates are not statistically different from each other 
in programme versus control villages and extremely low overall.  
 Improving educational outcomes is one of the focus issues of the Mahila Samakhya 
programme in Bihar. The programme aims to raise awareness among its members with 
respect to the importance of primary education, for girls as well as for boys. The facilitators 
and programme trainers also discuss with participants the role of preschool education in 
preparing young children for school.126 Women's groups are stimulated and supported to set 
up informal preschools in their community (so-called “bal jag jagi centers”) as well as 
informal primary schools for girls who are not enrolled in formal school (“jag jagi centers”)127. 
                                                 
123
 Note that the overall preschool enrolment of the ‘pre-programme’ birth cohorts is extremely low. The number 
of enrolled children in the sample is respectively 4, 18, 6, 31, and 12 for the birth cohorts aged nine to thirteen 
years. Of them, respectively 2, 10, 4, 27 and 10 live in programme villages. 
124
 Education levels are measured as: 1 = no schooling; 2 = primary school incomplete; 3 = primary school 
completed; 4 = middle school completed; 5 = high school completed or higher education. 
125
 Only 1991 literacy rates for Census revenue villages are available, which encompass one or more villages, 
dependent on their size.  
126
 For overviews of the evidence on the impact of early childhood education programmes, see for example 
Barnett (1995), Young (1997; 2002), Karoly et al. (1998) or Currie (2001). Individual impact evaluations of 
preschool programs are for example Behrman et al. (2004) for Bolivia, Paes de Barros and Mendonca (1999) in 
Brazil, Kagitcibasi et al. (2001) in Turkey, and the evaluation of Head Start in the United States (Garces et al., 
2002).  
127
 Both the preschools and the girls' primary schools are opened only on demand of the women's group. The 
Mahila Samakhya programme provides initial and follow-up training for the instructor and finances her 
honorarium. However, the operation of the centers is the responsibility of the group. The women need to find a 
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The preschools aim to prepare young children aged 3 to 6 for entrance in primary 
school through games, stories and songs. By March 2002, the women's groups in Muzaffarpur 
had set up 137 preschools, in Sitamarhi they were operating 110 centers and in Darbhanga, 
the youngest programme district, 23 preschools had been opened (Mahila Samakhya, 2002). 
For adolescent girls who have never been enrolled in primary school or have dropped 
out, the women's groups can open an informal girls’ primary school in their village. These 
primary schools operate a few hours per day during which the girls receive skills-based 
education with a focus on daily life issues. A second objective of the girls’ schools is 
mainstreaming. After passing three levels, a girl should be ready to enter the formal primary 
school system in the appropriate grade. In Muzaffarpur, 105 informal schools had been 
opened by March 2002, 115 in Sitamarhi and 74 in Darbhanga (Mahila Samakhya, 2002). 
Both the awareness raising activities and the opportunity to set up informal pre- and 
primary schools are likely to result in higher enrolment. Table 5.3 shows descriptive statistics 
about preschools in the study area. On average 24.6% of the control villages and 66.9% of the 
programme villages have at least one preschool in their community (Table 5.3 panel A).128 
Accordingly, the overall preschool enrolment rate in control villages is 7.7% compared to 
22.2% in programme villages (53.4% among participants and 20.4% among non-participants).  
Figure 5.2 gives a visual impression of preschool enrolment by age. It represents the 
percentage of children aged 3, 4 or 5 years old that go to preschool. For each age group, we 
see that Mahila Samakhya 
members send their children to 
preschool considerably more 
often than non-participants from 
the programme villages. Also, 
non-participants from 
programme villages send their 
children significantly more often 
to preschool than parents from 
control villages. These 
differences are significant at the 5 or 10% error level (see Table 5.3 panel B). Again, if there 
were no externalities of the programme we would expect the enrolment rate for non-
participants not to be statistically different from that of children in the control group. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
(covered) space for the center and to maintain the center. They choose the instructor (usually a woman from their 
own village) and monitor her. Also, the group is responsible for the payments to the instructor. 
128
 Not all preschools are financed by Mahila Samakhya. A number of preschools are Early Childhood Education 
centers run by the Bihar Education Project. The ICDS (Integrated Child Development Services) scheme of the 
Ministry of Women and Child Development operates so-called Anganwadi centers. The data do not allow us to 
distinguish between these types of preschools. 
Figure 5.2 Preschool enrolment by age
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Table 5.3 Preschool enrolment (children aged 3 to 5 years) 
 Control 
villages 
Programme villages P-values of the difference 
between: 
 
 Total 
programme 
villages 
Particip. 
only 
Non-
particip. 
only 
Control and 
programme 
villages 
Participants 
and non-
participants 
 
PANEL A. Availability of preschools 
       
Average # of 
preschools in village 
0.4 0.9   .004***  
% of villages with at 
least one preschool 
24.6 66.9   .000***  
       
PANEL B. Preschool enrolment rates of children 3 to 5 years old  
       
All children 7.7 22.2 53.4 20.4 .008*** .000*** 
       
3 years olds 6.2 18.7 44.5 17.1 .023** .000*** 
4 years olds 5.1 21.0 61.3 18.2 .012** .000*** 
5 years olds 11.2 26.2 54.1 24.8 .055* .000*** 
       
Boys 8.5 18.8 51.9 17.3 .065* .000*** 
Girls 6.9 26.1 54.8 24.0 .007*** .000* 
       
Scheduled Castes 0.0 24.0 48.4 21.1 .000*** .010** 
Other Backward C. 13.7 24.2 58.3 22.5 .180 .000*** 
General Castes 9.8 17.0 25.5 16.9 .556 .724 
Muslims 0.0 20.7 60.0 18.2 -- .078* 
       
PANEL C. Preschool enrolment rates ONLY in villages with AT LEAST ONE PRESCHOOL 
       
All children 17.9 27.2 62.2 25.1 .386 .000*** 
       
3 years olds 14.4 25.2 53.0 23.4 .275 .001*** 
4 years olds 11.0 24.0 69.1 20.8 .250 .000*** 
5 years olds 25.0 31.4 62.8 30.0 .671 .001*** 
       
Boys 21.6 22.9 60.4 21.1 .909 .000*** 
Girls 12.6 32.4 63.2 30.1 .124 .000*** 
       
SC 0.0 24.6 53.6 21.1 .001*** .014** 
OBC 27.8 29.0 75.8 27.3 .926 .000*** 
General Castes 100.0 17.9 25.5 17.8 .000*** .762 
Muslims 0.0 63.7 65.6 33.4 -- .260 
Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected accordingly. *: 
p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. The difference between boys and girls is not significant for any of the 
subgroups: participants, non-participants, control. The difference between the castes is never significant for 
participants or non-participants.  Among the control group children however, General Caste children are most 
likely to go to preschool and SC/ST and Muslim children are least likely to go to preschool. However, in panel 
C. the control group contains only a single General Castes child, a single Muslim child and 26 Scheduled Castes 
children.  
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The higher preschool enrolment rate in programme villages might be related mainly to 
the increased availability of preschools in the community, i.e. improved access. If we consider 
only the villages with at least one preschool within the community boundaries, the enrolment 
rates for control and program villages are 17.9% and 27.2% respectively (62.1% among 
participants and 25.1% among non-participants). This suggests an increase in demand for 
preschool as well. Table 5.3 panel C gives more details. 
The third child outcome we consider is enrolment in school of children 6 to 13 years 
old. These children can either be enrolled in primary or middle school. The enrolment rates do 
not take into account whether a child is enrolled in the appropriate grade. Nor do we look at 
actual attendance, since unfortunately these data are not available. Table 5.4 gives an 
overview of the net school enrolment rates. School enrolment in the study area is 75.5% in 
control villages compared to 80.2% in programme villages. Within programme villages we 
find an enrolment rate of 85.0% for children from participating households and 79.9% for 
non-participants. Whereas participants are more likely to be enrolled than both non-
participants and control children, the differences are not statistically significant.  
 
Table 5.4 School enrolment (children aged 6 to 13 years) 
 Control 
villages 
Programme villages P-values of the difference 
between: 
 
 Total 
programme 
villages 
Participants 
only 
Non-
participants 
only 
Control and 
programme 
villages 
Participants 
and non-
participants 
       
All 
children 
75.5 80.2 85.0 79.9 .307 .160 
       
Boys 82.8 80.1 87.6 79.6 .568 .035** 
Girls 66.3 80.8 81.8 80.7 .020** .821 
       
SC 55.0 76.8 77.0 76.8 .003*** .971 
OBC 82.1 77.9 89.5 77.1 .522 .021** 
General  90.2 98.4 88.6 98.5 .129 .082* 
Muslim 73.9 80.4 93.7 80.0 .473 .132 
       
Estimates are weighted for the stratified clustered sample design, with standard errors corrected accordingly. *: 
p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01 The difference in school enrolment between boys and girls is highly significant 
in control villages but not in programme villages. However, participants are less likely to send their daughters to 
school than non-participants (without correcting for household characteristics). Scheduled Castes children are 
significantly less likely to be enrolled in control villages, but not in programme villages. General Castes children 
are significantly more likely to be enrolled than other children, in both sample groups.  
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Disaggregation of the data by gender shows an entirely different picture (see Figure 
5.3 for a graphical representation). Without controlling for household characteristics, boys 
from participating households are 
significantly more likely to be 
enrolled than boys from non-
participating households. Since 
participants generally come from 
socially and economically 
marginalized groups, the 
descriptive statistics suggest a 
positive effect of the programme 
on the enrolment of boys whose 
mother participates. Differences 
between non-participating boys in programme villages and the control group are insignificant.  
However, the results for girls show a large and highly significant difference between 
programme and control villages. Both participants and non-participants in programme villages 
are substantially more likely to enroll their daughters in primary or middle school. These 
results suggest that the programme not only affects girls' enrolment of participants, but has 
significant spillover effects on non-participants' daughters as well. 
A similar pattern is revealed when comparing participants, non-participants and the 
control group by caste. Scheduled Castes households, whether participating in the programme 
themselves or not, show a significantly higher enrolment compared to the control group 
(Table 5.4). On the other hand, for the other castes we only find a significant increase in 
enrolment for participating households.  
To summarize, the descriptive statistics on education suggest that the programme 
increases both access to and demand for preschools in programme villages. Participating 
households are more likely to send their child to preschool than non-participant families in the 
community. In addition, children in programme villages are more likely to be enrolled in 
preschool, regardless of whether their own mother is a member of Mahila Samakhya. These 
findings are strongly suggestive of the presence of externalities. Regarding school enrolment, 
the effects of the programme seem more subtle. The data suggest that the programme 
influences school enrolment in the participating households for both boys and girls. 
Externalities on other households in the community appear to exist mainly for girls and 
Scheduled Castes children. 
 
Figure 5.3 School enrolment by gender
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5.3 Empirical strategy 
 
5.3.1 Econometric specification 
Although the descriptive data are suggestive of both a direct effect of the programme 
and an indirect or spillover effect on non-participants, these statistics do not control for 
differences in household and village characteristics between the sample groups. Participants 
usually belong to poorer, least educated households that are least likely to immunize and 
enroll their children. The estimation of treatment effects should control for such variables in 
order not to underestimate programme impact. On the other hand, a systematic difference 
between participants and non-participants on unobserved characteristics could lead to a 
selection bias. We will correct for this potential bias using instrumental variables.129  
Our analysis starts with the following econometric specification:  
 
(5.1) iiiiii PDPXaY ηϕγβ ++++=  
 
where =iY  1 if child i is immunized / enrolled in (pre-)school; and 0 otherwise.130 For 
immunization, only children in the age group of 0 to 13 years are included. For preschool 
enrolment, we only consider children in the age group of 3 to 5 years old. For primary / 
middle school enrolment, children from 6 to 13 years of age are included.  
iX  is a vector of explanatory variables containing child, household and community 
characteristics. The child characteristics refer to the sex and age of the child. They include a 
dummy variable for prior preschool enrolment in the estimation of primary / middle school 
enrolment. The household characteristics include dummy variables for Scheduled and Other 
Backward Castes as well as for the Muslim population. Moreover, they include income 
quintile, highest education level of adults in the household, and highest female education level 
in the household. Demographic characteristics of the household are measured by household 
size, the child dependency ratio and a dummy variable for female head of household. The 
community characteristics refer to the distance to the nearest town, a village development 
indicator capturing road quality and the availability of facilities, and the 1991 (pre-
programme) village level rate of female literacy.131 The immunization estimations also include 
the distance to the nearest health center. The preschool and school enrolment estimations 
                                                 
129
 For a review of experimental and non-experimental methods for the evaluation of social programmes and the 
estimation of treatment effects, see for example Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). 
130
 More correctly, the dependent variable in equation (5.1) should be the latent variable Y*i, with the observed 
variable Yi equal to 0 if Y*i  ≤ 0 and 1 if Y*i  > 0. The probability of a positive outcome of Yi is usually estimated 
with a probit or logit estimation. However, our two-stage instrumental variables estimation is based on a linear 
probability model in both stages. Using a linear approximation instead of a probit model does not significantly 
change the results. 
131
 Introducing village population totals, higher order terms or interaction terms does not qualitatively change the 
results.  
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include the number of pre- and primary schools in the community respectively, and the latter 
also includes the average child wage. Block and district fixed effects control for variation in 
unobserved regional characteristics.132 iη captures unobserved individual heterogeneity, 
assumed to be normally and identically distributed. 
=iP 1 if child i is living in a programme village; and 0 otherwise. iD  = 1 if a female 
household member of child i participates in a Mahila Samakhya women’s group; and 0 
otherwise. The estimate for γ captures the effect of 
participation versus non-participation when living in 
a programme village. The estimate for ϕ  represents 
the difference between living in a programme village 
and living in a control village (regardless of whether 
the individual belongs to a participating household or 
not). In other words, since γ represents the additional 
impact of participation versus non-participation, ϕ  
captures the spillover effects for non-participants. The 
sum of γ and ϕ  reflects the total programme impact 
on participants compared to the control group. Figure 
5.4 graphically shows these effects.  
As noted before, the voluntary character of 
participation in a women’s group potentially causes 
participation selection bias. For example, women that 
decide to join the programme might also be more motivated to learn about new information or 
be more aware of health issues. In that case, they would have been more likely to immunize 
their child anyway, irrespective of their participation in the Mahila Samakhya programme. If 
participation is correlated with the unobserved error term, a simple probit or linear probability 
model as in equation (5.1) will yield a biased estimate of the programme impact on 
participants. Instead, the coefficient γ will capture the effect of the programme on 
immunization/enrolment as well as the increased immunization/enrolment probability due to 
the higher awareness of participants compared to non-participants. 
However, before the programme starts, the awareness about child development and the 
importance of education is very limited overall and especially among the target group.133 
Starting up a women’s group is a very slow process. It takes nine months on average for the 
facilitators to convince women to organize. It seems likely that their interest in child issues 
increases mainly after the first contact with Mahila Samakhya officers. Nevertheless, we will 
                                                 
132
 In the school enrolment estimations, we use 1991 block information on female literacy levels and the 
percentage Scheduled Castes population instead of block dummy variables. 
133
 Based on interviews with Mahila Samakhya programme officials in October 2002 and during the field survey 
in 2003. 
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correct for potential participation selection bias using instruments for the decision to become a 
member. We use a two-stage instrumental variables (2SIV) approach with linear probability 
in both stages. The first stage reflects the participation decision and has the form:134 
 
(5.2) iiii ZXcD µδλ +++=  
 
where Xi  includes the respondent’s age and the household and community 
characteristics as described before. Zi contains the instruments, not included in Xi. We assume 
that the unobserved error term iµ  is normally and identically distributed. This equation is 
estimated only for the population living in programme villages. The estimated coefficients are 
used to predict participation for the entire sample.135 The second stage consists of an 
instrumental variables estimation of the likelihood of immunization or enrolment, using the 
predicted participation variable iDˆ  as instrument for actual participation iD  in equation (5.1).  
 
5.3.2 Validity of the instruments 
The instrumental variables method requires variables that are nontrivially correlated 
with the likelihood of participation but that are independent of the child outcomes. Two 
indicators are identified as potential instruments for participation in the programme: a 
‘civicness’-indicator and an ‘assistance’-indicator. 136, 137  
To test the first requirement of non-trivial correlation, Table 5.5 shows the results of a 
probit estimation that estimates the likelihood of participation in the Mahila Samakhya 
programme as a function of the instruments and the exogenous variables. The control 
                                                 
134
 See footnote 130. 
135
 For more details on two-sample two-stage instrumental variables estimation, see Angrist and Krueger (1992). 
136
 The two indicators are calculated using the loadings of the first rotated factor of a factor analysis. The 
‘civicness’-indicator is based on the answers to the following questions: "In the last three years have you 
personally: a) Voted in the elections?, b) Contacted your elected representative about a community problem? c) 
Taken part in a protest march, demonstration or sit-in? and d) Actively participated in an information 
campaign?”. The ‘assistance’-indicator is based on the answers to the following questions: “In the past year, has 
anyone in the household assisted someone else outside the household with: a) looking after children without 
getting paid; b) preparing food without getting paid; c) helping to build a house without getting paid; d) working 
without getting paid; or e) giving financial aid?” 
137
 Clearly, these variables capture attitudes that are likely to be influenced by participation in the programme. 
That is, they are endogenous to the participation equation. However, as long as the instruments are exogenous to 
the outcome equation, endogeneity in the first stage equation will not bias the results. To see this, note that we 
estimate an equation for child outcomes y (y = Xβ + ε1) where X contains two subsets of exogenous regressors 
(XA, the household and community characteristics, and XB, the child characteristics) as well as the (endogenous) 
participation variable x1. We estimate x1 = Sγ + ε2 and use the predicted values x-hat1 as an instrument in the 
outcome equation. S includes XA as well as additional variables SA (the instrumental variables). The regressors in 
SA are endogenous in the participation equation (so our estimate of γ is not consistent). However, the IV-
estimator of β is consistent provided that plim (Zε1) = 0 where Z contains all regressors in XA , XB with x1 
replaced by x-hat1. If SA has no direct effect on child outcomes, then plim (x-hat1 ε1) = 0. Hence plim (Zε1) = 0 
and therefore the IV-estimator is consistent.  
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households are omitted from this estimation, since they do not have the opportunity to 
participate. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level.138  
 
Table 5.5 Testing the instrumental variables (First requirement) 
Dependent variable: Participation in Mahila Samakhya 
only in programme villages 
(probit) 
 Coefficient s.e. 
Instrumental variables 
  
Civicness .918 .114*** 
Assistance .274 .061*** 
   
Individual characteristics 
  
Age -.009 .004** 
   
Household characteristics 
  
Scheduled Castes .862 .297*** 
Other Backward Castes .842 .253*** 
Muslim .560 .302* 
Household education .021 .030 
Female education .001 .036 
Income quintile -.034 .030 
Female household head .217 .132 
Household size -.029 .015* 
Child dependency ratio .129 .060** 
   
Community characteristics 
  
Distance to town .003 .009 
Village development index -.155 .270 
1991 village literacy rate -.004 .005 
Block /district dummy variables Yes  
   
# observations 1391  
Test of joint significance of instrumental 
variables χ
2(2) = 69.4 p-value = .000*** 
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Observations are corrected for the outcome-based 
sampling procedure. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level.  
 
The potential instruments are significantly correlated with participation, both 
individually and jointly, thereby satisfying the first condition for instrumental variables. On 
average, participants in the Mahila Samakhya programme are significantly more likely than 
                                                 
138 In this regression, the observations need to be corrected for the outcome-based sampling procedure in 
programme villages, because the sampling variable (participation or not) is the same as the outcome variable 
(Manski and Lerman, 1977).  
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non-participants to have engaged in civic behavior during the last three years. They also give 
more assistance to persons outside the household. These results are robust to changes in 
indicator calculations (using factor analysis, principal components or equal weights), and to 
changes in the specification (including additional village and block variables, trust and 
cooperation-related variables, and higher order terms).  
The second condition requires that the instruments do not affect immunization and 
enrolment rates directly but only through their correlation with the participation variable. 
‘Civicness’ is a measure of political engagement. In Bihar, political activities and 
demonstrations are generally related to caste-, violence- or gender-issues. Problems within 
communities often stem from land disputes, marriage arrangements, crime or domestic 
conflicts.139 That is, we do not expect civic attitudes as such to be directly related to awareness 
about health issues. It is not clear a priori whether civicness is related to a higher demand for 
children’s education or not. 
The increased health (education) information offered through the trainings will reach 
participants independently of their cooperativeness towards others. However, a household’s 
‘assistance’-index is significantly correlated with its (similarly constructed) ‘receiving-
assistance’ index, with a correlation coefficient of .173. If receiving assistance in turn is an 
important determinant of a household’s ability to go to the local or block health centre (to 
send a child to school), a cooperative attitude could be indirectly correlated with 
immunization (enrolment) rates beyond the pathway through participation. Given that almost 
all households report at least some assistance from or to others, this effect is probably small. 
Otherwise, it would overestimate the impact of the programme. If the assistance-index is an 
indicator of a household’s social interactions, than spillover effects might be largest for the 
most cooperative non-participants. In that case, using assistance as an instrument for 
participation will slightly underestimate the externalities in favor of the direct impact. In other 
words, without further information the validity of the assistance-score is less straightforward. 
We propose a direct test to see whether the exclusion restriction holds for both 
instruments. We estimate the likelihood of immunization or enrolment in control villages 
only. Apart from the child, household and community characteristics, this estimation contains 
the ‘civicness’- and ‘assistance’-indicators. Since the programme is not active in these 
villages, we expect to find a significant coefficient for the instruments only if they are directly 
related to the outcome variables. If in contrast the coefficients of the instruments are not 
statistically significant, this provides us with an argument to exclude the instrumental 
variables from the outcome equation. In that case, they can be used as instruments. A test of 
overidentifying restrictions will provide an additional test for the exclusion restriction. 
                                                 
139
 For example, the survey asked the respondents which common issues or problems had been jointly addressed 
by community members in the past year. Only 0.6 percent of the respondents mentioned a health-related issue 
(maintenance of the health centre). Six percent of the joint actions concerned an education or literacy campaign. 
These were virtually all in programme villages. The large majority of issues either related to the resolution of 
conflicts such as described above or to the maintenance of other community facilities and infrastructure. 
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The results of the probit estimations testing the exclusion restriction in control villages 
are shown in Table 5.6. As the results in columns (i) to (iii) show, the ‘civicness’ and the 
‘assistance’ indicators are not significantly related to the immunization outcomes. Excluding 
the potential instruments from the estimations hardly affects the sum and significance of the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables. A test of joint significance of the potential 
instruments, given in the last row of the table, does not reject the null hypothesis. However, 
the insignificant results for assistance in the tuberculosis estimation are not robust to changes 
in the calculation of this index. 140 Indeed, a test of overidentifying restrictions rejects the joint 
validity of the instruments for tuberculosis with a χ2(1)-value of 5.985 (p-value .014). 
Therefore, in the estimation of tuberculosis we will use only the civicness-indicator. The 
χ
2(1)-value for DTP is 1.340 (p-value .247) and for measles it is 0.785 (p-value .376), 
supporting the validity of the instruments for these two outcome variables. 
The exclusion restriction for the two educational outcomes is tested in columns (iv) 
and (v) of Table 5.6. The ‘civicness’- and ‘assistance’-index are not significant at the 5% error 
level for either preschool or school enrolment. A test of joint significance of the two 
instruments does not reject the null in either estimation. Likewise, a test of overidentifying 
restrictions yields a χ2(1)-value of .284 (p-value .594) for preschool enrolment and a χ2(1)-
value of 3.229 (p-value .072) for school enrolment. Hence, the validity of the instruments is 
not rejected at the 5% error level.  
The extrapolation of these results from the control villages to the entire sample rests 
on the absence of heterogeneity across the programme and the control group. As an 
illustration, Table 5.7 shows estimations of DTP immunization as a function of the 
instruments and the other variables for control as well as programme villages only. As column 
(ii) shows, the civicness- and assistance-indicator are strong predictors of immunization in 
programme villages. However, once we separate the sample in participants and non-
participants, both variables become insignificant. This suggests that the instrumental variables 
are indeed capturing the effect of participation instead of directly influencing health 
outcomes. A similar exercise for the other outcome variables repeats these results. 141  We will 
retain ‘civicness’ and ‘assistance’ as an instrument for all outcomes, except for tuberculosis 
for which we will only use the former variable.  
 
                                                 
140
 The difference between tuberculosis and the other immunization outcomes might be due to the fact that the 
former is administered in the block hospital instead of the local health center. A trip to the block hospital 
requires more planning and organization, which may be easier for households that are embedded in cooperative 
support networks. 
141
 The instruments are also (jointly) insignificant in the control villages (column i) but highly significant at the 
1% error level in the programme villages (column ii) for the other types of immunization and school enrolment. 
The only exception is the preschool estimation where the instruments are not statistically significant in 
programme villages either. In the estimations for participants and non-participants separately (columns iii and 
iv), the instrumental variables are not statistically significant at the 5 or 10% error level for any of the outcome 
variables, neither individually nor jointly.  
Table 5.6 Testing the instrumental variables in control villages (probit) 
 Tuberculosis DTP Measles Preschool (only if at 
least one presch.)† 
School 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Instrumental variables 
 
         
Civicness .198 .180 .102 .150 .211 .145 -8.307 4.658* .240 .137* 
Assistance -.021 .103 -.087 .106 -.114 .113 -1.074 .914 .082 .063 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Child characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sex  -.118 .096 -.142 .100 -.086 .100 2.147 1.619 -.547 .142*** 
Age -.058 .016*** -.057 .015*** -.041 .016*** 1.061 .690 .270 .025*** 
Prior enrolment in presch.         .369 .288 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household characteristics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SC -.339 .391 -.540 .379 -.693 .366*   -.247 .319 
OBC .142 .352 -.050 .354 .027 .305   .082 .210 
Muslim -.436 .403 -.338 .432 -.475 .388   -.135 .262 
Household education .086 .058 .065 .054 .107 .051** 6.553 4.195 .088 .058 
Female education .087 .077 .088 .079 .117 .077* -3.233 2.124 .072 .046 
Income quintile .152 .054*** .173 .062*** .097 .068 .817 .563 .150 .054*** 
Female household head -.045 .234 .001 .227 -.384 .281 …  .109 .351 
Household size -.045 .030 -.054 .035 -.040 .036 -.244 .199 .005 .025 
Dependency ratio -.190 .099* -.286 .099*** -.103 .077 12.883 7.960 .099 .105 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distance to health center -.045 .074 -.015 .079 -.112 .083     
Village/block/district var. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
           
# Observations 1102  1097  1099  52  848  
Test of joint significance of 
instrumental variables χ
2(2)=1.37 p=0.504 χ2(2)=1.31 p=0.518 χ2(2)=3.67 p=.160 χ2(2)=3.21 p=0.201 χ2(2)=4.15 p=.126 
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level. 
†: The small sample size of control villages with at least one preschool leads to considerable swings in the estimates. 
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Table 5.7 Extrapolation of the exclusion restriction (DTP)  
Dependent variable: 
Immunization against 
DTP 
Control 
villages only 
Programme 
villages only 
Non-
participants 
 only 
Participants 
only 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Instrumental variables 
        
Civicness .102 .150 .183 .070*** .192 .146 .122 .090 
Assistance -.087 .106 .108 .059* .096 .083 .140 .087 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Individual characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Household characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Community characteristics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Block / district dummy var. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
# observations 1097  3365  1638  1727  
Test of joint significance 
of instrumental var. (p-
value) 
 .518  .001***  .183  0.118 
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Observations are weighted for the outcome-based 
sampling procedure. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the village level.  
 
 
5.3.3 Interpretation of the IV estimates  
The central problem in programme evaluation is the missing counterfactual. A 
comparison of the outcomes of an individual that has been treated with the outcomes of that 
same individual without the treatment would yield the exact impact of the intervention. Since 
this is impossible, impact evaluations focus on finding an untreated control group whose 
outcomes are as similar as possible to the outcomes that the treated individuals would have 
experienced if they had not been treated.  
Selection bias undermines the validity of the control group whenever the treatment 
group systematically differs from the control group on unobserved characteristics. Due to the 
nested structure of our evaluation problem, we might encounter selection bias at two levels: 
the village level and the individual participation level.  
Let ii DPiY be the outcome Y for child i with iP  and iD  defined as in section 5.3.1. To 
emphasize that the population in control villages does not have the opportunity to participate 
in the programme, we denote the outcome 00iY  as 0iY . We can observe one of the three 
potential outcomes, 11iY , 10iY  or 0iY , for each individual, but never all three at the same time.  
A comparison of participants with non-participants in programme villages, i.e. 
)0,1,|()1,1,|( 1011 ==−== DPXYEDPXYE , yields the estimate γˆ . This estimate can be 
decomposed in the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), γ , for participants versus non-
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participants in programme villages + potential participation treatment heterogeneity + 
potential participation selection bias.142 Appendix 5A gives a detailed decomposition.  
As discussed in the previous sections, we use instrumental variables to correct for the 
potential presence of participation selection bias. Provided that there is no participation 
treatment heterogeneity, γˆ will then measure the ATE. Participation treatment heterogeneity 
refers to additional gains from the programme for participants compared to the average 
population due to unobserved characteristics. This will be the case when individuals act on 
private information about their personal gains from the programme relative to others that 
cannot fully be predicted by observable variables. 
There are two cases for which treatment heterogeneity is zero (Heckman, 1997). First, 
when there are no unobservable components of the relative gains for participants. That is, 
conditional on the X-variables, the effect of the programme is the same for everyone:  
0)1,|()0,1,|()1,1,|( 101110111011 ==−===−===− PXUUEDPXUUEDPXUUE   
where  ii DPiU  captures the unobservable characteristics of the individual.143 The second 
case for which treatment heterogeneity equals zero, but with 1011 UU ≠ given X, P and D, 
requires that the information on individual gains does not influence the participation decision 
of women. If women do not know what will be their individual gains compared to others, 
their best expectation might be the population gain, which equals zero. 
It is not clear whether participants in the Mahila Samakhya programme have 
additional unobserved relative gains from participation as compared to non-participants. Both 
groups seem to have a fairly similar perception of the general benefits of the programme. 
When asked to list the benefits of participation, both participants and the non-participants who 
know about Mahila Samakhya give a highly similar response.144 Likewise, a reason for non-
participants to expect less relative unobserved gains could stem from problems with their 
husband or family-in-law because of participation in the women’s group. But again, the 
percentage of non-participants that would expect domestic conflicts from participation is not 
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 We assume that the unobserved components are normally and identically distributed with mean zero, given 
X.  
144
 We asked both participants and non-participants to name the most important benefits of participation in 
Mahila Samakhya. About 45% of the non-participants do not know enough about Mahila Samakhya to respond 
to these questions. The participants and the non-participants who know the programme mention the following 
benefits (as a percentage of all benefits they mention and in decreasing order). Increased literacy: 27% vs. 29% 
(participants vs. non-participants), increased health knowledge: 23% vs. 25%, access to credit group: 18% vs. 
20%, emotional support: 13% vs. 6%, empower as a woman within the community: 7% vs. 2%, improved 
education for children: 6% vs. 9%, access to government subsidies: 3% vs. 5%, improved status within the 
household: 2% vs. 3%, no benefits at all: 1% in both groups. Better access to water, improved infrastructure and 
‘other benefits’ where mentioned in very few cases. The differences between participants and non-participants 
are not statistically significant except for the benefits derived from empowerment within the community and 
emotional support. Statistics are weighted for the survey design and the standard errors are adjusted accordingly. 
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significantly different from the percentage of participants that actually experienced 
problems.145  
Also, it is possible that women do not know beforehand what will be their personal 
gains from participation relative to others. Given the slow process to motivate women to 
participate at all, this is not implausible. Finally, the main motivation for women to participate 
might be related to other than the child outcomes, such as access to credit or gaining literacy. 
In that case, the relative individual gains in child outcomes (due to unobservable 
characteristics) might not influence their participation decision in a systematic way either. 
If there is treatment heterogeneity but no participation selection bias, γˆ  measures the 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATET). In case of participation treatment 
heterogeneity as well as selection bias for participants, the instrumental variables estimate γˆ  
will be a biased estimate of the ATET (Heckman, 1997). The estimated treatment effect then 
represents a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), i.e. the impact of the programme on 
those individuals who change their decision to participate with a change in the instruments 
(Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Angrist et al., 1996). Such an interpretation is useful when the 
instruments reflect different policies or intervention intensities for example. However, in our 
case the instruments refer to personal attitudes and characteristics. Hence the interpretation of 
the LATE is not straightforward.  
In section 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 we will estimate the treatment effects using instrumental 
variables. If we assume that participation treatment heterogeneity is negligible, then our 
estimate captures the ATE. In section 5.4.3, we will again estimate the treatment effects of the 
programme using propensity score matching instead. This allows for participation treatment 
heterogeneity, but it assumes instead that participation selection bias on unobservables is 
negligible. In that case, the estimate captures the ATET, i.e. the impact of the programme on 
participants for the women who indeed decide to participate. 
The second comparison that follows from our model is the comparison of non-
participants in programme villages with the average population in control villages, i.e. 
)0,|()0,1,|( 010 =−== PXYEDPXYE . This yields the estimate φ⌢ , decomposed as the Spillover 
Effect (SOE) + potential village treatment heterogeneity for non-participants + potential 
participation selection bias + potential village selection bias.146 Appendix 5A provides details.  
Given the discussion in Chapter 3, we assume that there is no village selection bias. 
We use instrumental variables for the decision to participate in order to correct for potential 
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 Of the participants, 16% indicate conflicts with their husband or family-in-law because of less time for 
domestic chores due to participation and 19% indicate problems within the household because of organizing as a 
woman. For the non-participants that are familiar enough with the programme to answer the question, 17% and 
22% can imagine to have these respective conflicts. The differences between participants and non-participants 
are not significant. 
146
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participation selection bias. If there is no village treatment heterogeneity, φ⌢ will provide an 
unbiased estimate of the SOE. Otherwise the estimate retrieves the Spillover Effect on the 
Treated (SOET, i.e. the spillover effect on the non-participating population that actually lives 
in a programme village). Village treatment heterogeneity can be ignored if: (a) the population 
in control villages would have benefited to the same extent as non-participants from 
unobserved gains from the programme if they had lived in a programme village, or (b) the 
programme villages are not selected on these unobserved gains for non-participants relative to 
control villages. A potential source of spillover treatment heterogeneity would arise if the 
patterns of social interactions in control villages are very different from those in programme 
villages. Using religious affiliation and caste as proxies for social connectedness, we do not 
find indications thereof. Village level heterogeneity with respect to religion is not 
significantly different between programme and control villages (with fragmentation indices of 
.10 and .12 respectively, p-value .454) nor is village heterogeneity with respect to caste (.45 
versus .38, p-value .163). Given these results and the process of village selection, it appears 
plausible to assume that there is no systematic village treatment heterogeneity. 
Finally, the comparison of the observed outcomes for participants in programme 
villages with the population in control villages yields the sum of the estimates γˆ  and φˆ . This 
sum can be decomposed into the Total Average Treatment Effect (Total ATE) for participants 
versus the control group + participation treatment heterogeneity + village treatment 
heterogeneity for participants + participation selection bias + village selection bias (see 
Appendix 5A).147  
 
 
5.4 Results  
 
5.4.1 Instrumented results for immunization 
Table 5.8 shows the estimations of the likelihood of immunization against 
tuberculosis, DTP and measles for children aged 0 to 13 years. In the linear probability 
estimations of columns (i), (iii) and (v) the participation dummy variable is not yet 
instrumented.148 Columns (ii), (iv) and (vi) show the results of the 2SIV estimation. 
Throughout the chapter, standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village 
level. The standard errors for the 2SIV estimations are bootstrapped with two hundred 
replications.  
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 Linear probability results are very similar to the marginal effects from probit estimations. Compare for 
example the treatment effects in columns (i) and (ii) in the overview of Table 5.11. 
Table 5.8 Immunization (children aged 0-13 years) 
Dependent variable: Tuberculosis (Lin 
Prob) 
Tuberculosis 
(2SIV) 
DTP 
(Lin Prob) 
DTP 
(2SIV) 
Measles 
(Lin Prob) 
Measles 
(2SIV) 
 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Programme variables             
Participation variable .084 .027*** .205 .027*** .097 .026*** .209 .028*** .092 .027*** .185 .027*** 
Programme village .204 .083** .149 .049*** .172 .067** .122 .050** .309 .084*** .268 .050*** 
             
Child characteristics             
Sex  -.046 .013*** -.052 .012*** -.047 .012*** -.052 .012*** -.043 .012*** -.045 .013*** 
Age -.015 .002*** -.015 .002*** -.013 .002*** -.012 .002*** -.008 .002*** -.007 .002*** 
             
Household characteristics             
SC/ST -.071 .055 -.094 .027*** -.125 .051** -.146 .028*** -.086 .054 -.106 .028*** 
OBC -.042 .050 -.058 .025** -.077 .047 -.093 .025*** -.034 .047 -.046 .026* 
Muslim -.181 .058*** -.176 .027*** -.170 .056*** -.166 .028*** -.141 .054** -.136 .030*** 
Household education .022 .008*** .021 .005*** .022 .008*** .020 .005*** .027 .008*** .026 .005*** 
Female education .040 .009*** .042 .005*** .045 .011*** .047 .006*** .043 .010*** .045 .006*** 
Income quintile .030 .009*** .033 .006*** .026 .009*** .029 .006*** .024 .009** .025 .006*** 
Female household head -.043 .044 -.046 .032 -.040 .043 -.043 .031 -.035 .044 -.037 .029 
Household size -.013 .004*** -.010 .003*** -.011 .004*** -.009 .003*** -.009 .004** -.008 .003*** 
Dependency ratio -.039 .016** -.044 .010*** -.045 .016*** -.052 .009*** -.013 .015 -.019 .009** 
             
Community characteristics            
Distance to town -.000 .002 -.000 .001 .001 .002 .000 .001 .001 .002 .000 .001 
Distance health center -.006 .006 -.005 .004 -.010 .007 -.010 .004*** -.010 .007 -.009 .004** 
Village development  -.021 .087 -.039 .046 .020 .085 .001 .043 .073 .092 .044 .048 
1991 village literacy  .001 .002 .001 .001 .001 .002 .001 .001 -.001 .002 -.001 .001 
Sitamarhi district .146 .061** .137 .085 .136 .066** .158 .096* .072 .059 .174 .085** 
Darbhanga district -.240 .125* -.466 .129** -.517 .073*** -.311 .106*** -.534 .068*** -.198 .146  
Block dummy variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
    
# obs 4517  4469  4489  4435  4486  4432  
R-squared .271  .260  .294  .283  .291  .283  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the village level. 2SIV estimations are bootstrapped with 200 replications. 
The coefficients in the probit estimations are calculated as the marginal effects for the average child. 
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In all estimations, both the participation and the programme village dummy variables 
are highly significant at the five or one percent error level. The linear probability estimates of 
the participation effect are 8.4, 9.7 and 9.2 for tuberculosis, DTP and measles respectively. 
They suggest that a child whose mother participates in the group is almost ten percentage 
points more likely to be immunized than a comparable child in the same village with a mother 
who does not participate.  
The 2SIV estimates of the participation variable correct for potential bias due to 
unobserved characteristics. They are approximately twice as high as the non-instrumented 
estimates at 20.5 percentage points tuberculosis, 20.9 for DTP and 18.5 for measles. 
Generally, one would expect to find an IV treatment effect to be lower than the non-
instrumented effect, if people that were already interested in the project outcomes are more 
likely to participate. However, the Mahila Samakhya programme aims at the most 
marginalized and uninformed women in the village, who are very difficult to mobilize. Thus, 
the higher instrumented estimates may actually indicate that the facilitators are effective in 
targeting (and convincing) especially those women that they want to reach. 
The programme village dummy variable captures the increased likelihood of 
immunization when living in a programme village, regardless of the household’s own 
participation. It represents the spillover effect of the programme on non-participants 
compared to the control group.149 The externalities of the programme appear to be substantial. 
A child that lives in a programme village is 14.9 percentage points more likely to be 
immunized against tuberculosis than her counterpart in a village without a Mahila Samakhya 
women’s group (column (ii) in Table 5.8). Results show that DTP immunizations among non-
participants have increased with 12.2 percentage points compared to the control group. In 
addition, non-participants are 26.8 percentage points more likely to be immunized against 
measles.  
A different but straightforward way to measure programme impact including the 
externalities within the village is to estimate the likelihood of immunization at the village 
level. Such estimations should use only the programme village variable to capture programme 
impact, and weigh observations for the outcome-based sampling in programme villages. 
Overall, children in programme villages are 19.5 percentage points more likely to be 
immunized against tuberculosis than children in control villages are. Their likelihood of 
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 Three percent of the non-participants report having been a member of Mahila Samakhya before (their main 
reason for dropping out being a lack of time). That is, the measured externalities might actually be a direct effect 
of the programme on former participants. We estimated the spillover effects again with two different 
specifications. First we included a dummy variable for non-participants who used to be a member. Second, we 
excluded these ‘dropouts’ from the sample. The results remain virtually unchanged compared to the original 
estimations (e.g. for tuberculosis, DTP and measles treatment effects are respectively .147, .121 and .269 in the 
first specification and .142, .128 and .276 in the second specification). The dummy variable for dropouts is 
significant only in the estimation for tuberculosis, but not for the other types of immunization. Thus, the 
externalities are not driven by prior participation of current non-participants. The same applies to the results for 
the educational outcomes. 
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immunization against DTP and measles is 16.0 and 29.6 percentage points higher than in 
control villages. Thus, the village level estimations corroborate the findings, although the 
estimates are somewhat less precise with standard errors of .113, .100 and .112 respectively.150 
The coefficients of the control variables have the expected sign151 and are generally 
highly significant. We find a significant negative coefficient for girls, indicating a 
substantially stronger gender bias than the descriptive statistics in Table 5.2 suggested. The 
coefficient for age is also significantly negative, which suggests that the immunization 
coverage rate is increasing over time. Children belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Other 
Backward Castes or the Muslim population are significantly less likely to be immunized than 
General Castes children. As expected, household education and income have a positive 
relation with immunization. Interestingly, the highest education level of women in the 
household has a significant and additional positive effect on immunization coverage that is 
twice as large as the effect of the highest overall (male) education level in the household. 
Larger households and households with more children per adult are less likely to immunize 
their child. Finally, the further away the nearest health center is from the village, the less 
likely children are to be immunized against DTP and measles. Absence of such an effect for 
tuberculosis is not surprising since this vaccination is administered at the block hospitals 
instead of the local health centers.  
In summary, women who participate in a Mahila Samakhya women’s group are 
significantly more likely to immunize their child against tuberculosis, DTP and measles than 
women who live in a programme village but who do not participate themselves. However, the 
highly significant coefficient for the programme village variable indicates that non-
participants living in programme villages are also significantly more likely to immunize their 
child than women living in a village where the programme is not active. That is, the spillover 
effect on immunization coverage within programme villages is substantial.  
 
5.4.2 Instrumented results for education 
Table 5.9 shows the results of several estimations for preschool enrolment of children 
aged 3 to 5 years.152 The first column shows the results of a linear probability estimation 
including all programme and control villages. As expected, the coefficient for the number of 
preschools within the village is large at .178 and highly significant. This coefficient reflects  
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 Alternatively, the total village effect can be estimated on the (weighted) mean outcomes per village, i.e. using 
the village as the unit of analysis. The estimated treatment effects (with standard errors in brackets) are as 
follows: tuberculosis: .216* (.123), DTP: .209* (.118), and measles: .375*** (.122). 
151
 Partha and Bhattacharya (2002) estimate the probability of immunization in four Indian states including 
Bihar. They find odds ratios below one for girls, for increasing birth order, for Scheduled Castes children and 
Muslim children. Odds ratios above one were found for increasing levels of father’s education, and for mother’s 
education in addition to father’s education. 
152
 Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level. In the 2SIV estimation, standard 
errors are bootstrapped with 200 replications.  
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Table 5.9 Preschool enrolment (children aged 3-5 years old) 
 
 All villages Only villages with at least one 
preschool 
Dependent variable: 
Preschool enrolment 
Lin Prob 
(i) 
Lin prob 
(ii) 
2SIV 
(iii) 
 
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
Programme variables   
  
  
Participation .174 .036*** .213 .0513*** .214 .071*** 
Programme village .204 .057*** .444 .101*** .443 .075*** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Child characteristics       
Sex  .024 .027 .036 .039 .023 .041 
Age .027 .014* .037 .023 .041 .023 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Household characteristics       
SC/ST -.018 .064 -.133 .143 -.129 .118 
OBC .052 .056 -.004 .141 -.012 .116 
Muslim -.007 .069 -.169 .183 -.174 .130 
Household education .011 .011 .010 .017 .010 .016 
Female education .001 .013 -.024 .018 -.020 .018 
Income quintile -.002 .012 -.008 .021 -.006 .017 
Female head of household -.089 .050* -.070 .104 -.070 .111 
Household size .001 .006 .008 .009 .007 .008 
Dependency ratio .019 .025 .063 .034* .054 .029* 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Community characteristics       
Distance to town -.000 .003 -.002 .005 -.003 .003 
Village development  .096 .129 -.147 .204 -.226 .120* 
# preschools .178 .040*** .134 .117 .169 .060** 
1991 village literacy  .002 .002 -.000 .003 .001 .002 
Sitamarhi district .139 .110 .495 .180*** .537 .111*** 
Darbhanga district -.249 .099** -.205 .152 -.195 .088** 
Block variables Yes  Yes  Yes  
  
 
 
 
  
# obs 1002  518  509  
R-squared .272  .298  .307  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the 
village level, and bootstrapped with 200 replications in the 2SIV estimations. 
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the importance of access in order to increase preschool enrolment. Simply put, if there is no 
preschool present in the village it becomes very difficult for parents to enroll their child.  
Whereas the Mahila Samakhya programme substantially increases availability of 
preschool facilities in programme villages, not all preschools are programme preschools. In 
order to separate to some extent the effect of increased access from increased awareness, 
columns (ii) and (iii) of Table 5.9 show estimations of the likelihood of preschool enrolment 
only for those villages with at least one preschool.  
Similar to the immunization results, participants are substantially (21.4 percentage 
points) more likely to enroll their child in preschool than non-participants, and non-
participants in turn are 44.3 percentage points more likely to send their child to preschool than 
the control group. Since access is not the main problem in these villages, the results strongly 
suggest that the programme has been able to raise awareness about the importance of early 
childhood education. Parents with equal possibilities send their children to preschool more 
often when they live in a Mahila Samakhya village compared to control villages, regardless of 
their own participation in the programme. The non-instrumented and instrumented 
participation estimates are of equal size.153 An estimation of the total village effect repeats 
these results with a total treatment effect of 38.2 percentage points (standard error .068).  
Most of the child and household characteristics included in the estimations are not 
significant. Children living in households with a higher child dependency ratio are more likely 
to be enrolled, suggesting that the need for child care is largest among households with more 
children per adult. Access remains important. Preschool enrolment is positively related to 
additional preschools in a community. Conditional on there being at least one preschool, 
households in the least developed villages are most likely to enroll their child. 
 Finally, we measure the impact of the programme on (primary and middle) school 
enrolment.154 Table 5.10 shows the results for enrolment in school of children in the age group 
of 6 to 13 years. 155 We find a highly significant positive effect of own participation in the 
programme of 14.5 percentage points in the instrumented estimation (column ii). The 
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 The introduction of village population size and an interaction term of village population size with the number 
of preschools in a village does not change the results. Population size and the interaction term are jointly and 
individually insignificant. 
154
 Since primary education is not compulsory in Bihar, a household’s decision to send a child to school will 
depend both on the costs of education and on the perceived benefits. Costs relate for example to tuition fees 
(absent or very low in the study region), travel costs, costs of books and uniforms, and opportunity costs of 
foregone child labor. The benefits are longer term and concern not only future income but also a better ability of 
women to take care of their family for example (Glewwe, 2002). To illustrate, a higher education of Indian 
mothers is found to be significantly related to reduced incidence of diarrhea among children (Jalan and 
Ravallion, 2003; Borooah, 2004), to reduced fertility (Drèze and Murthi, 2001), and to school enrolment of their 
children (Behrman et al., 1999), especially their daughters (Pal, 2004). Whereas the costs to the family are 
immediate, the potential benefits of education are not always apparent. For girls in rural Bihar moreover, these 
benefits will usually not accrue to her own family. Upon marriage, women are mostly expected to move and live 
with their parents-in-law (Nabar, 1995). 
155
 Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level. In the 2SIV estimation, standard 
errors are also bootstrapped with 200 replications.  
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programme village variable, which captures the spillover effects, is not significant for the 
total sample (columns i and ii) or for boys (column iv). It is significant and substantial for the 
subsample of girls (column iii).  
However, this last result holds only if we include an interaction term between the 
programme village variable and the 1991 village female literacy rate.  Whereas these two 
variables individually are positive and significant, their interaction term is negative. This 
indicates that the programme indeed has spillover effects on non-participant girls in the 
community, but mainly in those villages where pre-programme female literacy rates were 
low. In higher educated villages, the programme externalities on girls’ education are smaller 
and statistically insignificant.  
The estimates for the control variables do not change much between the different 
estimation methods. The child and household characteristics all have the expected sign. Girls 
as well as Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Castes and Muslim children are less likely to be 
enrolled in school. Household education and income have a positive effect. Female education 
in the household has an additional positive and significant effect for girls’ enrolment only. 
Children living in larger households with more children are less likely to go to school. The 
positive coefficient for age signals late enrolment. Including a variable for age-squared yields 
a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that this effect tops off. Finally, children that 
went to preschool at a younger age are more likely to be enrolled in primary / middle school. 
This could capture a higher awareness of parents regarding education. It could also stem in 
part from the stimulating effects of preschool on school preparedness and learning 
achievement.  
Most community characteristics such as distance to town, village level development or 
child wage, are not statistically significant. It is unclear why the number of primary schools 
has a negative coefficient in the estimations. The 1991 village level female literacy rates are 
significantly and positively related to girls’ school enrolment but not to the enrolment of boys.  
 
5.4.3 Propensity score matching results 
Since non-participants are usually wealthier and better educated than participants in 
their village, they might also represent a sub-population that is slightly better off than the 
average control household. Propensity score matching (PSM) allows us to compare non-
participants directly with similar children in the control group. Likewise, a comparison of 
participant children with comparable control children will yield a direct estimate of the total 
impact on participants. This method is explicitly based on the assumption that, given the 
observable covariates, participation in the program is independent of child outcomes. That is, 
it assumes that observable variables can capture any systematic differences between 
participants and non-participants (i.e. )1,|()0,|( 00 === DXYEDXYE ). 
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Table 5.10 School enrolment  
 
Dependent var.: 
School enrolment 
Lin. Prob. 
(i) 
2SIV 
(ii) 
2SIV – GIRLS 
(iii) 
2SIV – BOYS 
(iv) 
 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Programme variables 
Participation .072 .023*** .145 .036*** .111 .060* .181 .042*** 
Programme village .081 .056 .046 .034 .170 .061*** -.051 .045 
Interaction 
programme village 
& female literacy 
-.007 .003** -.007 .002*** -.010 .003*** -.005 .003* 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Child characteristics 
Sex  -.085 .023*** -.084 .017***     
Age .017 .004*** .018 .004*** .022 .005*** .015 .005*** 
Preschool .055 .027** .050 .019*** .032 .029 .056 .027** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household characteristics 
SC/ST -.089 .045** -.100 .034*** -.083 .052 -.124 .041*** 
OBC -.045 .032 -.053 .029* -.080 .045* -.032 .034 
Muslim -.064 .045 -.062 .034* -.046 .053 .075 .043* 
Household 
education 
.036 .008*** .035 .006*** .041 .009*** .031 .008*** 
Female education .008 .007 .007 .006 .022 .009** -.006 .008 
Income quintile .041 .010*** .042 .008*** .037 .011*** .043 .010*** 
Female hh head -.030 .057 -.034 .038 -.060 .058 .000 .050 
Household size -.007 .004* -.006 .003** -.008 .005 -.005 .004 
Dependency ratio -.001 .017 -.005 .014 .008 .020 -.014 .017 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Community characteristics 
Distance to town .001 .002 .000 .001 .001 .002 .001 .001 
# primary schools -.026 .020 -.024 .013* -.028 .020 -.024 .017 
Child wage .000 .002 -.000 .001 .001 .002 -.001 .002 
Village 
development  
-.065 .080 -.071 .044 -.099 .069 -.055 .059 
1991 village female 
literacy  
.006 .003** .006 .003** .009 .005** .004 .002 
 
     
 
  
Block/district var. Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
# obs 2447  2423  1104  1319  
R-squared .138  .132  .148  .123  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Robust standard errors, corrected for clustering at the 
village level, and bootstrapped with 200 replications in the 2SIV estimations 
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While the comparability of the treatment and control group increases with an 
increasing number of covariates, a larger number of controlling variables also significantly 
adds to the complexity of matching the two groups. However, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 
show that whenever it is valid to match on all the covariates separately, it is also valid to 
match on the propensity score. The propensity score is the conditional probability of 
participation given a vector of observed covariates.  
We first estimate the propensity score, i.e. the probability of participation in a Mahila 
Samakhya women’s group, with a probit model within programme villages only. The 
observations are weighted to correct for the choice-based sample selection within programme 
villages. The covariates consist of the same child, household and community variables as 
described in section 5.3.1. 156 Block dummy variables are excluded. Table 5.11 shows the 
results of this estimation for children aged 0 to 13 years old.  
Using the coefficients from this estimation, the propensity scores were calculated for 
the participants, the non-participants and the control group.157 A regression of the participation 
dummy variable on the covariates and the propensity score shows that, except for the 
coefficient of the propensity score, all of the coefficients are statistically insignificant, both 
jointly and individually. 
The observations are matched using nearest neighbour matching with replacement 
over the common support only. Figure 5.5 shows the histograms of the propensity scores 
before and after matching (weighted for the number of times that control observations are 
matched). The matched sample of participants with non-participants passes the balancing 
requirement test as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) using 20 as a cut-off point.158 
When participants or non-participants are matched with the control group, three ‘distance’-
variables (to the nearest town, the nearest market, and the nearest post office) are unbalanced, 
i.e. they show a substantial bias that is statistically significant. The exclusion of the 
unbalanced variables from the propensity score does not change the estimated PSM treatment 
effects substantially.159  
                                                 
156
 Instead of the calculated income quintile and village development index derived from a principal component 
analysis, we use the individual underlying variables for a more detailed matching process. The results are robust 
to this change in the specification of the propensity score. We exclude sanitation and land ownership which 
might have been influenced by participation in Mahila Samakhya, as well as the ownership of small assets (i.e. 
clock, radio, television, sewing machine). This does not qualitatively change the results. 
157
 This approach assumes that the participation decision process in control villages would be comparable to the 
one in programme villages. Moreover, it requires the assumption that there are no significant unobserved village 
characteristics affecting outcomes (compare Behrman et al. (2004)). 
158
 The balancing requirement is tested using the pstest-command in Stata suggested by Sianesi and Leuven 
(2001), http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html. This test calculates the reduction in covariate 
imbalance after propensity score matching for each covariate. The imbalance or bias is the difference of the 
sample means in the treated and non-treated sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the 
sample variances in the treated and non-treated group. 
159
 The only exception is the estimated participation impact on boys’ school enrolment which is significantly 
smaller using the restricted specification, but still positive and statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The 
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Table 5.11 Estimation of the propensity score (children aged 0 to 13 years old) 
Dependent variable: Participation in Mahila Samakhya 
(only in programme villages) 
 Coefficient s.e. 
Individual/ household characteristics   
Sex .080 .040** 
Age -.002 .005 
SC/ST  .625 .090*** 
OBC .448 .087*** 
Muslim .102 .097 
Household education .038 .015** 
Female education .041 .021** 
Household size -.050 .008*** 
Dependency ratio .072 .032** 
Female household head .155 .100 
   
Housing quality and assets   
High quality walls -.250 .057*** 
High quality roof .073 .059 
High quality floor -.202 .084** 
Separate kitchen .024 .045 
Fuel for cooking is not biomass -.078 .123 
Private water source -.084 .047* 
Electricity -.373 .077*** 
Own motor .191 .125 
Own fridge -.010 .275 
Own car -1.078 .227*** 
   
Distance to facilities   
Distance to market -.007 .012 
Distance to post office -.004 .015 
Distance to telephone boot -.019 .015 
Distance to bus stop -.005 .014 
Distance to bank .030 .011*** 
Distance to health center -.007 .012 
Distance to town -.003 .003 
   
Community characteristics   
1991 village level female literacy rate .002 .002 
Sitamarhi district .263 .065*** 
Darbhanga district .236 .064*** 
  
 
# obs. 3433  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Estimates weighted for outcome-based sampling in programme villages. 
                                                                                                                                                        
impact estimate using the restricted propensity score estimation is .066 with a standard error of .039; compare 
Table 5.11. 
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The results are shown in columns (v) and (vi) of Table 5.12. For ease of comparison, 
the results of the other estimation methods are included as well. Panel A shows the treatment 
effects for immunization. The programme impact of participation versus non-participation as 
calculated with PSM is highly significant and equals 8.8, 10.0 and 8.5 percentage points for 
tuberculosis, DTP and measles respectively (column v). These results are comparable to the 
participation effects from the other non-instrumented estimations (columns i and ii) and 
approximately half the size of the 2SIV treatment effects. 
The previous estimates are based on a comparison of participant children with 
comparable non-participant children in programme villages and do not take into account the 
fact that immunization rates among the non-participants might have increased as well. The 
estimates for the total direct impact on participants (i.e. comparing participant children in 
programme villages with comparable children in control villages) are substantially larger at 
20.2, 20.3 and 22.0 percentage points for tuberculosis, DTP and measles respectively (see the 
participation variables in column vi). This estimate is below the total direct impact as 
calculated in columns (i) and (ii), which is the sum of the village and participation effect 
(equal to 28.8, 26.9 and 40.1 in the linear probability estimation). Nonetheless, the effect is 
still sizeable.160 
The PSM method calculates the spillover effects on non-participants through a 
comparison of non-participant children with control children with similar propensity scores 
(i.e. the village estimate in column (vi)). The PSM treatment effects suggest that non-
participating children in programme villages are 10.8 percentage points more likely to be 
immunized against tuberculosis than children in control villages. The estimated spillover 
effects for DTP and measles are 9.0 and 8.9 percentage points respectively. Again, the 
estimates are lower than found in the other columns, but the effect remains substantial. 
Table 5.12 panel B provides a comparison of the treatment effect estimates obtained 
with the various methods for preschool enrolment in villages with at least one preschool. 
Except for PSM, all methods estimate the effect on preschool enrolment of participation 
versus non-participation at approximately 21 percentage points and the village or spillover 
effect between 34.4 and 44.4 percentage points. Based on the PSM method, the difference 
between participants and non-participants is lower at 16.2 percentage points. Overall, if there 
is at least one preschool in the village, participant children are still 38.9 percentage points in 
preschool than comparable control children. The spillover effect on non-participants is 18.5 
percentage points.  
Finally, Table 5.12 panel C shows the impact of the programme on school enrolment. 
Participation estimates for the total sample as well as for girls and boys separately indicate 
that participants are substantially more likely than non-participants and the control group to 
enroll their child. The total direct effect is estimated to be 11.4 percent using the PSM 
                                                 
160
 See Smith and Todd (2004), Dehejia and Wahba (1999) and Agodini and Dynarski (2004) for comparisons of 
PSM impact estimates with experimental estimates.  
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Figure 5.5 Histogram of propensity scores (children aged 0-13 years old) 
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Histogram participants vs. non-participants (matched sample only)
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Histogram participants vs. control (matched sample only)
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Histogram non-participants vs. control (matched sample only)
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Table 5.12 Overview of estimated treatment effects including PSM results 
 
 Probit 
(marginal 
effect)161 
 
 
 
(i) 
Linear 
prob. 
 
 
 
 
(ii) 
2SIV 
 
 
 
 
 
(iii) 
Total 
village 
estimation 
(OLS) 
 
 
(iv) 
PSM 
(part. vs. 
non-
part.) 
 
 
(v) 
PSM 
(part. / 
non-part. 
vs. 
matched 
control) 
(vi) 
PANEL A. IMMUNIZATION RATES 
 
       
Tuberculosis  Participation .076 
(.025)*** 
.084 
(.027)*** 
.205 
(.027)*** 
  .088 
(.026)*** 
.202 
(.026)*** 
 Village .193 
(.054)*** 
.204 
(.083)** 
.149 
(.049)*** 
.195 
(.113)* 
 .108 
(.025)*** 
        
DTP Participation .089 
(.029)*** 
.097 
(.026)*** 
.209 
(.028)*** 
 .100 
(.023)*** 
.203 
(.028)*** 
 Village .164 
(.053)*** 
.172 
(.067)** 
.122 
(.050)** 
.160 
(.100) 
 .090 
(.023)*** 
        
Measles  Participation .085 
(.026)*** 
.092 
(.027)*** 
.185 
(.027)*** 
 .085 
(.025)*** 
.220 
(.026)*** 
 Village .262 
(.100)*** 
.309 
(.084)*** 
.268 
(.050)*** 
.296 
(.112)** 
 .089 
(.024)*** 
 
       
PANEL B. PRESCHOOL ENROLMENT (only villages with at least one preschool) 
 
       
 Participation .212 
(.053)*** 
.213 
(.051)*** 
.214 
(.071)*** 
 .162 
(.061)*** 
.389 
(.080)*** 
 Village .344 
(.167)** 
.444 
(.158)*** 
.443 
(.075)*** 
.382*** 
(.068) 
 .185 
(.067)*** 
 
       
PANEL C. SCHOOL ENROLMENT 162 
 
       
School  
(total) 
Participation .069 
(.035)** 
.072 
(.023)*** 
.145 
(.036)*** 
 .077 
(.027)*** 
.114 
(.031)*** 
 Village .089 
(.035)*** 
.081 
(.056) 
.046 
(.034) 
.124 
(.050)** 
 .057 
(.031)* 
        
School  
(girls) 
Participation .062 
(.030)** 
.063 
(.029)*** 
.111 
(.060)* 
 .099 
(.038)*** 
.144 
(.043)*** 
 Village .185 
(.064)** 
.238 
(.096)*** 
.170 
(.061)*** 
.178 
(.072)** 
 .139 
(.042)*** 
        
School  
(boys) 
Participation .078 
(.042)* 
.082 
(.029)*** 
.181 
(.042)*** 
 .067 
(.033)** 
.202 
(.042)*** 
 Village .001 
(.000) 
-.020 
(.058) 
-.051 
(.045) 
.083 
(.062) 
 .051 
(.037) 
Robust standard errors (between brackets) are corrected for clustering at the village level. Results for IV and 
PSM are bootstrapped with 200 replications. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01  
                                                 
161
 The marginal effects are not calculated for the average individual, but as the average of the individual 
marginal effects. 
162
 The probit and regression estimates for impact on school enrolment include an interaction term between 
programme village and 1991 village female literacy rates. 
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results for the total participant group and even 20.2 percentage points for boys. With spillover 
effects of 13.9 percentage points, externalities on girls living in programme villages are 
estimated to be almost as large as the direct effect on participant girls of 14.4 percentage 
points. That is, once a Mahila Samakhya group is active in a village, girls’ school enrolment 
increases regardless of whether her mother participates. Such externalities are absent for boys.  
Using these results, it is possible to calculate the size of the spillover effect on non-
participants as a percentage of the total direct effect for participants. We use the treatment 
effects estimated with the propensity score method in column (vi). These are the most 
conservative estimates among the alternative methods. The estimated spillover effects show to 
be a very large percentage of the participation effects. In the case of immunization, the 
programme externalities on non-participants are at least forty percent of the direct programme 
effect on participants: 54 percent for tuberculosis, 44 percent for DTP and 40 percent for 
measles. Likewise, we find a spillover effect on preschool enrolment of non-participants that 
is equal to 54 percent of the size of the direct programme effects. Finally, programme 
spillovers on school enrolment of non- participants are 49 percent of the total impact on 
participants, but they are not significant for the sub-sample of boys.  
 
5.4.4 Mechanisms underlying the spillover effects 
The previous sections showed that the Mahila Samakhya programme yields significant 
externalities for children of non-participants living in programme villages. From a policy 
perspective, an important next step is to understand the mechanisms that lead to the 
externalities. A number of mechanisms could be at work. With respect to the immunization 
rates, the discussion so far has emphasized the role of information diffusion both through 
informal interactions in the village and the awareness raising campaigns organized by the 
women’s groups. Although we cannot test for such mechanisms directly, some suggestive 
evidence supports these hypotheses.  
To the extent that people interact mostly with others like themselves, we would expect 
to find the largest spillover effects among households that belong to the lowest castes. An 
interaction term between the programme village variable and the Scheduled Castes variable 
shows that externalities are especially strong for the Scheduled Castes.163 This could reflect 
communication patterns but also the effect of the informal immunization campaigns. 
Women’s groups approach especially the households in their own neighborhoods, and 
residence patterns in most villages strongly reflect caste divisions. The coefficients for the 
interaction terms with being Muslim are small (.054, .004 and .015 for tuberculosis, DTP and 
measles respectively) and not statistically significant. Given the extremely low immunization 
                                                 
163
 The interaction terms for tuberculosis, DTP and measles are .131, .124 and .178 respectively, significant at 
the 10 or 5 percent error level.  
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rates of Muslim children, this is a worrisome finding. It calls for a greater effort of Mahila 
Samakhya to lift the current under-representation of Muslim women in the groups.  
Caste and religion are rather crude proxies of social networks. An alternative measure 
of social interactions is given by asking non-participants how many women they know that 
are member of the group. We also asked whether they ever discussed participation in Mahila 
Samakhya with: a) participants, b) non-participants and c) the facilitator. Table 5.13 shows 
the correlation matrix of these variables with child outcomes. Although the coefficients 
should be interpreted with care (they may be endogenous if more interested households 
actively seek contact with participants), they again suggest that contacts between non-
participants and participants are a significant determinant of spillovers (columns i to iii). 
Discussions among non-participants themselves or with the facilitator are not significant. As a 
comparison, immunization against polio is not correlated with social interactions among 
participants and non-participants (column iv).  
Apart from information diffusion, externalities on immunization might be generated 
through improved health services. We do not have indications that government resources have 
shifted from communities where Mahila Samakhya is not implemented to programme 
communities, in which case the evaluation should have included the negatively affected 
villages as well.164 However, some evidence suggests that the presence of the programme puts 
pressure on local public health workers to increase their performance. When asked to evaluate 
the state of health services and facilities in their community (from bad: 0 to good: 1), the 
overall rating is very low. But respondents living in programme villages value health services 
substantially better at .34 than respondents in the control group with an evaluation score of 
.15. The difference is statistically significant. 
Spillovers with respect to education can be generated either through increased access 
or through increased demand, for example because of enhanced quality or greater awareness 
of the benefits of education. The strong relationship between preschool enrolment and the 
number of preschools in a community (Table 5.9) and the fact that the spillovers at the 
primary/middle school level remain limited to girls (Table 5.10) suggest that greater access 
plays an important role for externalities on enrolment. Of relevance for girls’ enrolment may 
also be the format of the informal schools that is substantially different from the type of 
primary education previously available. The informal school hours as well as the curriculum 
contents are strongly geared towards the usual role and responsibilities of daughters and 
future housewives in Bihar. 
 
 
                                                 
164
 Since most programme and control villages belong to different blocks (that have their own block hospitals 
and local health centers), it is unlikely that the measured impact captures worsened outcomes in a bereaved 
control group.   
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Table 5.13 Correlation matrix: Social interactions and child outcomes  
 
 Tbc. 
(i) 
DTP 
(ii) 
Measles 
(iii) 
Polio 
(iv) 
Preschool 
(v) 
School 
(vi) 
 
How many women that you know 
are participating in the Mahila 
Samakhya group in the village? 
 
[1]: no one I know, [2]: 1-5, [3]: 6-
10, [4]: 11-25, [5]: more than 25. 
 
.190 
(.000)*** 
 
.205 
(.000)*** 
 
.228 
(.000)*** 
 
.004 
(.885) 
 
.244 
(.000)*** 
 
.105 
(.005)*** 
 
Do you ever discuss participation 
in the group with members of the 
Mahila Samakhya group? 
 
[0]: no, [1]: yes 
 
.047 
(.075)* 
 
.078 
(.003)*** 
 
.079 
(.003)*** 
 
.035 
(.187) 
 
.156 
(.004)*** 
 
.028 
(.439) 
 
Do you ever discuss participation 
in the group with non-members of 
the Mahila Samakhya group? 
 
[0]: no, [1]: yes 
 
.011 
(.670) 
 
.040 
(.131) 
 
.014 
(.599) 
 
-.015 
(.561) 
 
-.042 
(.442) 
 
.022 
(.542) 
 
Do you ever discuss participation 
in the group with the facilitator of 
Mahila Samakhya? 
 
[0]: no, [1]: yes 
 
.006 
(.807) 
 
.037 
(.156) 
 
.060 
(.023)** 
 
.025 
(.341) 
 
.042 
(.441) 
 
-.003 
(.934) 
The sample includes children aged 0 to 13 years of non-participants only. “Don’t know” 
responses are put to missing. P-values in brackets are shown below the correlation 
coefficients. *: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01.  
 
  Greater access in turn is the result of joint parental efforts, i.e. increased levels of 
collective action in the community among participants as well as non-participants. 
Approximately one third of the groups has set up a preschool and one third of the groups has 
opened an informal primary school for girls.165 Chapter four showed that non-participant 
parents are 12 percentage points more likely than parents in the control group to have 
contributed to the construction or maintenance of a primary school in their community, 
controlling for other characteristics. Non-participants are also twice as likely to participate in 
preschool construction/maintenance, although overall contribution levels remain very low at 8 
percent. Box 4.1 provided anecdotal evidence of the spillover effects with respect to collective 
action. However, without the additional resources from Mahila Samakhya to train and pay the 
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 In March 2002, 12 percent of the active groups in Darbhanga had set up a preschool, 37 percent of the groups 
in Muzaffarpur and 32 percent of the groups in Sitamarhi. Primary schools for girls had been established by 39 
percent  of the groups in Darbhanga, 28 percent  of the groups in Muzaffarpur and 33 percent of the groups in 
Sitamarhi (Mahila Samakhya, 2002). 
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teachers, it would be difficult for parents to establish and finance the schools for longer 
periods. 
The construction and maintenance activities may have improved quality as well as 
access. Anecdotal evidence suggests that quality may also have increased as a result of the 
stronger representation of highly involved Mahila Samakhya members in the Village 
Education Committees (VECs). They put pressure on teachers and actively engage other 
parents in school improvements. Twenty percent of the participant households report to be 
member of the VEC, compared to 8 percent of non-participants and 5 percent of the control 
households. Indeed, when asked to evaluate the current state of educational services in their 
community (from bad: 0 to good: 1), households in programme villages give a higher score of 
.35 compared to the score of .27 in control villages. However, since better quality has not 
translated in a greater demand for boys’ education, changes should have occurred especially 
with respect to aspects that are relevant for girls, such as the availability of sanitation facilities 
or perhaps (female) teacher attendance.  
Finally, some evidence suggests that the Mahila Samakhya workshops on the 
importance of (preschool) education for future life outcomes have trickled down to other 
community members beyond participants. Significantly more non-participants than control 
respondents agree that “If children study hard and do their best at school, they will do better 
later in life” and disagree that “Girls going to school is a waste of time and money because 
they will have to stay in the house anyway.” Likewise, non-participants are more likely than 
control households to agree that “When children go to preschool at a young age, they will 
perform well in primary school” and to disagree that “Young children under 5 do not learn 
much by playing with each other. To acquire skills it is better that they help in the 
household”. However, the former difference is not statistically significant.  
Again, social interactions matter for awareness raising. Table 5.13 columns (v) and 
(vi) confirm that (especially preschool) enrolment is higher among non-participants who 
know many Mahila Samakhya members and who discuss participation with them. Introducing 
interaction terms in the 2SIV estimations indicates that externalities are strongest for non-
participant children belonging to the Scheduled Castes. The spillover effect on 
primary/middle school enrolment of the total Scheduled Castes population, i.e. boys and girls 
combined, is equal to .202 (standard error .098). Box 5.1 illustrates how Mahila Samakhya 
groups raise awareness among their fellow community members, both regarding 
immunization and education issues. 
A final word of caution is necessary. Some government officials and non-
governmental organizations mention a recent trend to channel resources for new development 
initiatives especially to Mahila Samakhya programme villages because the presence of a 
women’s group is perceived to leverage the effectiveness of such pilots. At the time of the 
survey for example, Unicef was piloting a sanitation project in cooperation with Mahila 
Samakhya based on such grounds. This could imply that the developmental gap between 
  
165 
programme and control villages may widen as future resources are increasingly geared 
towards the communities already benefiting from Mahila Samakhya.  
 
 
 
Box 5.1 Awareness raising and spillovers on child outcomes 
 
Based on discussions with Mahila Samakhya women’s groups in February 2004. 
 
Spreading the information on immunization  
“We go door to door to tell other women about the importance of immunization and 
about the days that the Primary Health Center (PHC) is open. We also go to 
neighborhoods in the village where none of us lives herself, in order to reach all parents. 
If parents are not reached for some reason then they will know anyway because we see 
to it that the information travels mouth to mouth to all village members. The local health 
center does not organize any health campaigns itself, except in one neighboring village, 
where there has been a campaign on family planning and leprosies.” (Bajitpur Majhauli 
village) 
 
“Every Tuesday there is the possibility to have your children immunized in the PHC. 
We have gone to the houses in the entire neighborhood (but not the entire village) to tell 
parents about this possibility and make them aware of the importance of immunization. 
Our Mahila Samakhya group has received a WHO health training through the Mahila 
Samakhya programme at the district level. This had raised our own awareness about the 
issue. Diphtheria and measles immunizations are available at the PHC in the village. 
Tuberculosis vaccines can be received at the block hospital.” (Patiasa Jalal village)  
  
Enrolment issues 
“Each year at the beginning of school (January/February), we go door to door to talk 
about enrolment and to emphasize the importance of schooling for girls as well. We tell 
parents that if they enroll their child in the beginning of the school year, they get many 
benefits, such as free books. However, we do not go to the richer families.” (Bajitpur 
Majhauli village) 
 
“In our village, all children go to school. The Mahila Samakhya members emphasize the 
importance of education at every opportunity that we get: At village meetings, sanitation 
meetings, meetings of the Village Education Committee (some of us are also member of 
the VEC), meetings of the Panchayat Raj etc.” (Mirjapur village) 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
The empowerment of low-caste low-educated women in India can have far-reaching 
consequences not only for the women themselves, but also for their children and for the wider 
community in which they live. The impact evaluation of the Mahila Samakhya programme in 
this chapter shows that the mobilization of women into women’s community groups can 
generate large externalities.  
The programme has a significant impact on the children of women participating in the 
programme. The participants are considerably more likely to immunize their children, and to 
send them to preschool and school than are parents who do no participate in the programme. 
Moreover, we find significant spillover effects of the programme on households that live in 
villages where a women’s group is active, but who do not participate in the programme 
themselves. These externalities are especially strong for immunization against tuberculosis, 
DTP and measles (but not for polio), for enrolment in preschool, and for enrolment in school 
of girls (but not of boys). 
We find these treatment effects regardless of the method we use to estimate impact. 
Probit and linear probability models, a two stage instrumental variables method, and 
propensity score matching all yield comparable results that are significant and large. Although 
PSM estimates are somewhat lower on average, the externalities remain statistically 
significant and substantial. They are equal to at least forty percent of the direct programme 
impact on participants’ immunization coverage, and half of the direct programme impact on 
preschool and school enrolment. 
These results show the importance of using the right comparison groups in programme 
evaluation to avoid a potentially double underestimation of the programme effects. Especially 
when a community-based development programme emphasizes awareness raising, 
information dissemination and collective action, externalities can be substantial. The 
effectiveness of development programmes might be seriously underestimated if such 
externalities are not taken into account.  
The results have several methodological implications for programme evaluation. First, 
especially new or pilot programmes that are still in the process of scaling up offer good 
opportunities for setting up a quasi-experimental survey design. The fact that the Mahila 
Samakhya programme expands very slowly to new blocks allows us to use very similar 
villages as a control group. An experimental design significantly contributes to the quality of 
the evaluation of treatment effects. If politically and organizationally feasible, a complete 
randomization of project implementation over villages provides the most simple and clear 
method to estimate treatment effects. However, in the absence of such an ideal programme 
design, an evaluation that uses the pilot character of a project might provide for a good 
alternative. 
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The second methodological implication relates to the use of instrumental variables for 
participation in a programme. Very often it is problematic to justify the exclusion of the 
instruments from the outcome equation. If, however, the survey is designed such that data are 
available for a highly comparable group that is excluded from participation, this provides an 
opportunity to test whether the instruments are valid. In this case, the control villages offered 
the opportunity to test directly whether the instruments are significantly related to 
immunization and school enrolment. 
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Appendix 5A. Estimation of treatment effects 
 
Let ii DPiY be the outcome Y for child i with 1=iP if the child lives in a programme village and 
0=iP otherwise; and with 1=iD if a female household member of child i participates in the 
programme and 0=iD otherwise. We never observe 0=iP and 1=iD at the same time. That is, 
people living in control villages cannot participate in the programme. To emphasize that the 
population in control villages does not have the opportunity to decide to participate in the 
programme, we will denote the outcome 00iY  as 0iY . 
 
The child outcomes for participants living in a programme village, for non-participants living 
in a programme village, and for the control group living in control villages, 11iY , 01iY  and 0iY  
respectively, are a function of observable characteristics Xi and unobservable characteristics 
Ui of the individual. The outcomes can be characterized as follows:  
111111 )( iii UXgY +=   if 1=iP and 1=iD  
(A1-a)  101010 )( iii UXgY +=   if 1=iP and 0=iD  
000 )( iii UXgY +=   if 0=iP  
 
We assume that the unobserved components are normally and identically distributed with 
mean zero. That is, we assume 0)|()|()|( 01011 === iiiiii XUEXUEXUE . We can observe 
11
iY ,
10
iY  or 
0
iY  for an individual but never all three at the same time. The observed outcome Yi 
can be described with a switching regression model: 
(A2)  01011 )1())1(( iiiiiiii YPYDYDPY −+−+=  
 
Substituting the outcome functions from equation (A1-a) in the switching regression model 
(A2) yields: 
(A3)  iiiiiiiii PXgXgDPXgXgXgY ))()(())()(()( 01010110 −+−+=  
   
00101011 )()( iiiiiiii UPUUDPUU +−+−+  
 
Using this model and omitting the i’s, we can define the treatment effects as: 
ATE  = )|( 1011 XYYE −    = )()( 1011 XgXg −    
ATET  = )1,1,|( 1011 ==− DPXYYE   = )1,1,|()()( 10111011 ==−+− DPXUUEXgXg  
SOE = )|( 010 XYYE −   = )()( 010 XgXg −  
SOET = )0,1,|( 010 ==− DPXYYE  = )0,1,|()()( 010010 ==−+− DPXUUEXgXg  
  
170
Total ATE  = )|( 011 XYYE −   = )()( 011 XgXg −    
Total ATET  = )1,1,|( 011 ==− DPXYYE  = )1,1,|()()( 011011 ==−+− DPXUUEXgXg  
where ATE and ATET stand for Average Treatment Effect and Average Treatment Effect on 
the Treated. SOE and SOET represent the Spillover Effect and the Spillover Effect on the 
Treated.  
 
To clarify the notation, we temporarily assume that the coefficients for the control variables in 
X are equal across the three treatment states. In practice, introducing interaction terms 
between the Xi ’s and the Pi - and Di -variables will allow for different coefficients. Similarly, 
we assume a linear functional form, to be modified introducing interaction terms and higher 
order terms of the Xi ’s. Then the outcome functions in (A1-a) become: 
1111 )( iii UXgY +++= φγ   if 1=iP and 1=iD  
(A1-b)  1010 )( iii UXgY ++= φ    if 1=iP and 0=iD  
00 )( iii UXgY +=    if 0=iP  
 
The switching regression model simplifies to: 
(A3-b)  iiiii PDPXgY φγ ++= )( 00101011 )()( iiiiiiii UPUUDPUU +−+−+  
 
Based on the switching regression model in (A3-b), the econometric model to be estimated 
has the following form: 
(A4)  iiiiii PDPXgY ηφγ +++= )(  
where )( iXg captures the effect of observable characteristics on the outcome and the 
coefficients γ and φ capture shifts in the outcome due to respectively participation in the 
programme when living in a programme village, and to living in a programme village. The 
latter parameter measures the spillover effect of the programme on non-participants. iη  
captures individual heterogeneity. 
 
In terms of the econometric model, the treatment effects are denoted as: 
ATE   = )|( 1011 XYYE −   = γ  
ATET  = )1,1,|( 1011 ==− DPXYYE  = )1,1,|( 1011 ==−+ DPXUUEγ  
SOE   = )|( 010 XYYE −   = φ  
SOET   = )0,1,|( 010 ==− DPXYYE  = )0,1,|( 010 ==−+ DPXUUEφ  
Total ATE = )|( 011 XYYE −   = φγ +  
Total ATET  = )1,1,|( 011 ==− DPXYYE  = )1,1,|( 011 ==−++ DPXUUEφγ  
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Which parameters can be recovered under which assumptions? We observe the following 
three outcomes:  
)1,1,|()()1,1,|( 1111 ==+++=== DPXUEXgDPXYE φγ   
)0,1,|()()0,1,|( 1010 ==++=== DPXUEXgDPXYE φ  
)0,|()()0,|( 00 =+== PXUEXgPXYE  
 
A comparison of the three sample groups, yields the following estimates: 
 
1) A comparison of the observed outcomes for participants with non-participants in  
programme villages, i.e. )0,1,|()1,1,|( 1011 ==−== DPXYEDPXYE , yields the estimate γˆ . 
Using the outcome equations (A1-b) and adding and subtracting an additional term, this 
estimate can be decomposed as follows: 
 
γˆ  = )0,1,|()1,1,|( 1011 ==−==+ DPXUEDPXUEγ  
= )0,1,|()1,1,|()1,1,|( 10101011 ==−==+==−+ DPXUEDPXUEDPXUUEγ  
= ATE + participation treatment heterogeneity within programme villages + 
participation selection bias 
= ATET + participation selection bias 
 
2) A comparison of the observed outcomes for non-participants in programme villages with 
the population in control villages, i.e. )0,|()0,1,|( 010 =−== PXYEDPXYE , yields the 
estimate φ⌢ . This estimate can be decomposed as follows: 
φ⌢  = )0,|()0,1,|( 010 =−==+ PXUEDPXUEφ  
= )0,1,|( 010 ==−+ DPXUUEφ  
  )0,|()1,|()1,|()0,1,|( 0000 =−=+=−==+ PXUEPXUEPXUEDPXUE  
= SOE + village treatment heterogeneity for non-participants  
+ participation selection bias + village selection bias 
= SOET + participation selection bias + village selection bias 
 
3) The comparison of the observed outcomes for participants in programme villages with the 
population in control villages, )0,|()1,1,|( 011 =−== PXYEDPXYE , yields the sum of the 
estimates γˆ  and φˆ :  
φγ ˆˆ +  = )0,|()1,1,|( 011 =−==++ PXUEDPXUEφγ  
= )1,1,|()1,1,|( 0101011 ==−+==−++ DPXUUEDPXUUEφγ   
 )]0,|()1,|([)]1,|()1,1,|([ 0000 =−=+=−==+ PXUEPXUEPXUEDPXUE  
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= Total ATE + participation treatment heterogeneity + village treatment 
heterogeneity for participants + participation selection bias + village selection bias 
= Total ATET + participation selection bias + village selection bias 
CHAPTER 6 
 
Heterogeneity and access to informal credit 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
A considerable body of literature examines the effect of social, cultural, economic and 
ethnic heterogeneity on cooperation in public goods provision or common resource 
management.166 One important conclusion of such studies is that diversity may harm 
cooperation because in heterogeneous communities the opportunities are limited to prevent 
free-riding behavior through informal monitoring and social sanctions (Miguel and Gugerty, 
2005). This chapter extends the analysis of heterogeneity beyond collective action to informal 
arrangements between households. In particular, it examines whether informal credit 
transactions among households are affected by the levels of caste and religious heterogeneity 
in the village. 
In Bihar, like in many developing regions, access to formal financial and insurance 
markets is restricted, especially for the poorest households. A lack of insurance and borrowing 
opportunities may induce poor households to forego profitable but risky investments such as 
crop diversification or additional schooling. It also seriously restricts their capacity to cope 
with financial emergencies. Poor households are least able to resort to individual coping 
mechanisms such as the sale of productive assets or dissaving in order to deal with 
unexpected events. Moreover, such strategies will further deteriorate their already vulnerable 
asset base, with potentially serious consequences for their future income-generating capacity. 
Thus, when access to formal credit or insurance is limited, poor households are likely to 
benefit enormously from informal credit arrangements.  
However, households that lend money to friends, neighbors or relatives have little 
legal enforcement opportunities at their disposal in case of default. In such circumstances, the 
threat of social sanctions in the form of gossip and peer pressure can be an effective means to 
enhance repayment. In addition to immediate sanctions, communication on defaults may 
decrease access to future loans from other households as well as from the current lender, 
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 For references, see for example Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2001), Varughese and Ostrom (2001) or 
Alesina and La Ferrara  (2005). 
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further strengthening the penalty on default. If social monitoring and sanctions are less 
effective in heterogeneous communities, we would expect informal credit provision across 
households to be accordingly lower.  
Research increasingly suggests that heterogeneity can hamper cooperation in a number 
of ways, although the effect is not always uniformly negative (Bardhan, 2000; Khwaja, 2000; 
Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2001; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2005). Heterogeneity decreases participation in voluntary organizations if individuals have a 
preference to deal mostly with others like themselves (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000). 
Heterogeneity, especially the dominance of one group over the other, can increase the 
probability of conflict in ethnically diverse societies (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Differing 
preferences in diverse communities can make it difficult to agree on public good provision 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Altruism may be weaker towards individuals who belong to a 
different subgroup (Vigdor, 2004). In addition, in more heterogeneous communities the 
opportunities are limited for informal monitoring and social sanctions to prevent free-riding 
behavior. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) show detailed and convincing evidence that 
contributions to primary schools at public fundraising events (but not of private school fee 
payments) are significantly lower in more diverse communities. Their findings strongly 
suggest that the discrepancy in contributions to a common good is related to a lower 
prevalence of sanctions in heterogeneous populations.  
Especially the latter effect, i.e. the lack of social capital associated with heterogeneity, 
is explored and extended to the context of informal credit. Chapter two extensively discussed 
the social mechanisms that can deter households from free-riding. The threat of both 
immediate social sanctions and withdrawal of future cooperation will be stronger, the larger 
the number of group members that punish a defaulter. But the threat of future exclusion 
matters only for current borrowers who expect to need and receive assistance from those 
others in the future.  Moreover, direct sanctions, such as social pressure or gossip, will only be 
effective when the borrower cares about the opinion of the sanctioning parties, for example 
because they regularly interact in daily life. In addition, members in a network can only 
sanction defection if they learn about the defaulting behavior. That is, communication 
between individuals on others’ behavior is of crucial importance.167   
These mechanisms suggest that informal penalties on default across groups will be less 
effective in fragmented communities with little interaction or cooperation across network 
boundaries. Hence, we expect informal credit transactions among households to be less 
prevalent in more heterogeneous communities. In Bihar, a straightforward measure of 
heterogeneity is the fractionalization in terms of caste and religion. Interaction among 
households from different castes or religions is relatively limited. Focus group interviews 
showed, for example, that inter-caste marriage still encounters many taboos, that General 
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 The positive effect of group size will gradually diminish as it becomes increasingly difficult to remain aware 
of all group members’ behavior. 
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Caste women are often not allowed or willing to eat in the same area as Scheduled Caste 
women, that neighborhoods in the village are often segregated along caste and religious lines, 
that Scheduled Caste parents are hesitant to send their children to schools in Other Backward 
Castes parts of the community, that Muslim households form a separate community within the 
village etc. In such circumstances, it seems likely that information flows mainly within 
subgroups, and that both direct and future social sanctions are most effective among members 
of the same caste or religion.  
Not all studies find an unambiguously negative relationship between heterogeneity and 
cooperation. Although heterogeneity may represent a challenge to communities, effective 
rules and informal institutions can overcome its potential downsides (Khwaja, 2000; 
Varughese and Ostrom, 2001). To a certain degree heterogeneity and inequality may be 
necessary to initiate collective action for public good provision or common resources 
management, for example in situations of high start-up costs  (Baland and Platteau, 1999; Lall 
et al., 2004). Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) find an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between ethno-linguistic fractionalization and civil war, presumably because the costs of 
coordination for rebels are highest in very homogeneous as well as very heterogeneous 
populations. To incorporate a potentially U-shaped relationship between heterogeneity and 
cooperation, the empirical analysis will include the squared value of heterogeneity. 
In addition, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) argue that heterogeneity may actually 
enhance innovation and economic performance because cultural diversity (language, life 
style, attitudes) can positively affect creativity, task performance and production. If increased 
opportunities for production translate into an increased demand for investment loans, 
heterogeneity may have two opposite effects on credit transactions among households: a 
positive as well as a negative effect. To further shed light on this issue, we will make a 
distinction between investment and consumption loans throughout this chapter. 
A number of empirical studies examine the role of heterogeneity in access to informal 
credit. For example, Karlan (2001) finds that the repayment rates of credit groups in Peru are 
significantly lower when the group composition is more culturally heterogeneous. Fafchamps 
(2000) shows that ease of access to trading credit for African business entrepreneurs depends 
crucially on ethnicity, which affects social connections and information sharing within the 
business establishment. La Ferrara (2002) finds that it is easier for an individual in Nairobi to 
access cheap loans from the self-help group or from fellow group members, if the individual 
belongs to the same ethnicity as the group’s chairperson. However, ethnic heterogeneity at the 
group level does not affect the ability for within-group borrowing.  
The studies just described look at the relationship between credit and heterogeneity 
within voluntary formed groups, such as credit groups, self-help groups or entrepreneurial 
networks. Instead, this chapter investigates whether heterogeneity at the community level is 
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an important factor in explaining households’ access to credit.168 The community seems to be 
a natural unit of analysis for informal arrangements among households. However, an 
increasing number of studies suggests that informal credit and risk-sharing arrangements do 
not cover entire villages but instead are limited to households’ social networks, be it in terms 
of social, geographic or ethnic proximity (Grimard, 1997; Dekker and Hoogeveen, 2002; 
Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Park, 2006). Since heterogeneity affects social networks, it is 
likely to affect informal arrangements as well.  
To our knowledge, few studies have explicitly examined the role of village-level 
heterogeneity in the access to loans from friends, relatives or neighbors. La Ferrara (2003) 
includes religious fractionalization at the village level as one of the control variables in her 
model of credit transactions among kin in Ghana. She finds that religious fragmentation, 
proxied by the number of religious groups in the community, negatively affects the likelihood 
of borrowing from relatives and non-relatives (excluding moneylenders) compared to 
borrowing from the bank or cooperatives. She does not, however, distinguish between 
different effects of heterogeneity on consumption versus investment loans.  
At first sight, confirmation of the hypothesis would seem to provide little guidance for 
policy recommendations. Most communities are heterogeneous to a greater or lesser extent 
and their social composition is difficult to change without coercion. However, the Mahila 
Samakhya programme explicitly tries to overcome caste and religious barriers. The statistics 
in chapter three described how the women’s groups are relatively diverse in terms of socio-
cultural composition. Chapter four showed that Mahila Samakhya significantly increases 
cooperation and trust within programme villages, also among non-participants. If such 
processes influence the general interaction patterns across castes and religious groups, the 
programme may counteract the expected negative effect of heterogeneity on monitoring and 
sanctions for default. This in turn would enhance informal credit transactions among 
community members. An additional aim of this chapter is therefore to examine the 
consequences of the presence of the programme on the relationship between heterogeneity 
and informal credit. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The next section will first describe the 
prevalence, sources and uses of credit in the study region. Section three then briefly outlines 
the decision problem for the lender as well as the borrower. It applies this framework to the 
characteristics of loans from the different types of lenders that are present in northern India. 
The subsequent section describes the empirical approach based on multinomial logit 
estimations. The econometric analysis in section five examines the role of heterogeneity in 
control villages only, differentiating between investment and consumption loans. Section six 
                                                 
168Village compositions are not purely exogenous either since households may sort into communities of differing 
heterogeneity levels dependent on their preferences for interactions with other social groups. Vigdor (2004) 
explicitly tests how sorting into neighborhoods of various degrees of heterogeneity affects the impact estimates 
of heterogeneity on his measure of collective action. To the extent that sorting plays a role in our study area, we 
would expect that it leads to an underestimation of the impact of heterogeneity.  
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includes the programme villages into the analysis to analyze the effect of the programme on 
access to credit from friends, neighbors or relatives. The final section of the chapter concludes 
and summarizes the policy implications.  
 
6.2 Access to credit in rural Bihar  
 
Before further discussing the role of heterogeneity in access to credit, this section will 
first give a general overview of the prevalence of credit in Bihar. How many households in 
our study region have taken up credit in the past year? How large were their loans on average 
compared to their income? Is households’ access to the formal banking sector indeed as 
restricted as implied above? How common are loans from friends and neighbors as compared 
to loans from the often dreaded moneylenders? In other words, how important is the issue of 
access to informal credit in rural Bihar?  
The dataset contains information on new loans taken in the year prior to the survey 
(which took place from March to June 2003), but not on applications for credit that were not 
granted. Hence, we will only analyze the actual credit transfers that took place in the past 
year. Throughout, the descriptive statistics will compare control and programme villages with 
each other, as well as participants and non-participants in programme villages. Unless 
mentioned otherwise, the descriptive statistics are weighted for the survey design and standard 
errors are corrected for the stratification, clustering at the village level, and the outcome-based 
selection within programme villages. 
 
6.2.1  Access to credit and financial assistance 
Taking and giving loans 
As is common to many rural areas in India169, the households in the districts of 
Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga and Sitamarhi rely heavily on credit to finance expenditures. 
Approximately two thirds of the households in the study region, 63 percent, have taken at 
least one loan in the past year.170 Of them, 13 percent have taken more than one loan. The 
control and the programme villages do not differ significantly from each other in this respect. 
In the former group, 68 percent of households have taken at least one loan. In the latter group 
this percentage is 62 (the p-value of the difference is .472). Table 6.1 panel A provides 
details. However, at 72 percent, participants are substantially more likely to have taken a loan 
in the past year than non-participants (p-value .074). On the one hand, this could reflect the 
higher vulnerability to shocks of the participants who mostly belong to the poorest 
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 See for example Parker and Kozel (2005). 
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 Of the 1991 households in the sample, 1357 (or an unweighted 68 percent) have taken a loan for a total of 
1622 loans in the dataset. 
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households. On the other hand, their membership in the Mahila Samakhya credit group might 
facilitate their access to credit, both for consumption and investment purposes.  
 
Table 6.1 Percentage of households that took or gave a loan in the past year  
 Control 
villages 
Programme villages 
  Total programme 
villages 
Non-
participants 
Participants 
     
PANEL A. Did anyone of the household members take a loan in the past year? 
     
Yes 68.0 62.4 61.9 71.8 
No 30.1 35.9 36.4 27.7 
Missing data 2.0 1.7 1.7 0.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
PANEL B. Did anyone of the household members give a loan in the past year? 
     
Yes 2.1 8.0 7.9 9.2 
No 96.8 89.2 89.2 88.7 
Missing data 1.2 2.9 2.9 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
If we compare the percentage of households who took a loan in the last year with the 
percentage of households who gave a loan, the differences are striking (Table 6.1 panel B). 
More than ninety percent of all households did not give any loans. Only 2.1 percent of the 
households in control villages and 8.0 percent in programme villages lent money to other 
individuals. For the remainder of the households data are missing. Almost half of the 
households that gave credit, 46 percent, also took credit in the past year. This could indicate 
that households take up loans in order to finance out-going transfers. Such financial 
intermediation is consistent with Bell’s (1990) findings that the borrowings of traders and 
moneylenders in Bihar in 1980-1981 represented 20 percent of the total amount borrowed in 
that period.  
In contrast to the demand for credit, the supply of credit is significantly different 
between programme and control villages (p-value .002), whereas the likelihood of providing 
credit to others does not significantly differ between participants and non-participants within 
programme villages (p-value .626). Thus, both the treated and the non-treated communities 
report an equal overall demand for credit. However, in the treated communities such credit 
appears to be given more often by fellow community members.  
However, the data on loans given should be treated with caution. As will be discussed 
in the next section, the number of lenders to friends, relatives or neighbors in the sample is 
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substantially below the number of borrowers from friends, relatives or neighbors. This could 
partly reflect a tendency for a few wealthy households to lend to many others, or for lending 
households to live mainly in the urban areas not included in our sample. It is more likely, 
however, that the discrepancy results from underreporting of credit given. This is in line with 
other studies that report a general reluctance of respondents to talk about loans given but not 
about loans taken (Bell, 1990; Drèze et al., 1997). Therefore, we will not use the data on loans 
given in the econometric analysis. 
Table 6.2 gives more details on the size of the loans taken. The average amount of new 
credit in the past year was Rs. 10,229 (approximately US$ 218).171 This may seem modest, but 
at daily wages of Rs. 50 for unskilled labor (slightly more than one dollar per day) such 
amounts represent a high burden on many households. These amounts are not necessarily 
equal to outstanding debt. Part of the loans taken in the past year were already repaid at the 
time of the survey, whereas loans taken before last year are not included in the analysis unless 
their repayment was financed through a new loan. Since especially the largest loans are least 
likely to be paid back within a year, we expect the extent of outstanding debt to be 
significantly larger than past year’s credit taken. 
At an average loan size of Rs. 7,391 participants borrow significantly less per loan 
than non-participants who have borrowed on average Rs. 10,955 (p-value .016), and than 
control households whose average loan size was Rs. 13,801 (p-value .016). Again, the 
difference between non-participants and the control group is not significant (p-value .322). 
Thus overall, participants take a higher number of loans at lower values.  
 
Table 6.2 Average (unweighted) amount of loans taken  
 Control 
households 
Non-
participants 
Participants Total 
     
Average 
(rupees) 
13,801 10,955 7,391 10,229 
Standard error 2,570 1,282 722 848 
Minimum 20 100 100 20 
Maximum 172 1,000,000 500,000 365,000 1,000,000 
Median 5,000 5,000 3,000 5,000 
Mode 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
# of observations 423 526 667 1616 
 
                                                 
171
 The average exchange rate over the period from March 1st, 2003 until June 30th, 2003 was 47 Rupees per US$ 
1. 
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 The maximum loan amounts are exceptional. Ninety nine percent of the control households (or non-
participants resp. participants) borrow less than Rs. 60,000 (or Rs. 80,000 resp. Rs. 50,000). In each treatment 
group, there are 6 to 8 outliers, who generally belong to the upper income quintiles. Loan amounts are not used 
as a variable in the econometric analysis. 
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Credit versus financial assistance 
Loans do not represent all transfers of money between households in the past year. 
Apart from one reported loan of Rs. 20, all loans amount to at least Rs. 100 (approximately 
US$ 2). It seems most likely that households also regularly lend money to each other at small 
amounts of a few rupees only, which is not captured in our data. Thus, small interest-free 
loans from social relations are likely to be underreported in our dataset.  
Moreover, the credit data in the previous section do not include remittances of 
household members currently living elsewhere. In addition, gift exchanges among households 
are not included. Such informal exchanges are fairly common, although considerably less 
prevalent than the provision of credit. Almost 32 percent of all households have received 
some form of financial assistance in the past year. Again, levels of assistance are virtually 
identical across programme and control villages (p-value .936). But participants in a Mahila 
Samakhya women’s group are significantly more likely to have received assistance at 38.0 
percent than non-participants at 32.0 percent (p-value 0.088). See Table 6.3 panel A for 
details. 
Table 6.3 panel B shows the percentages of households who have given financial 
assistance to other households (without being paid) in the past year. The results mirror the 
statistics for the receipt of assistance. Approximately 33 percent of the households gave 
financial assistance to others. The differences between treatment groups are all statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Table 6.3 Percentage of households that received or gave financial assistance in the past 
year 
 Control 
villages 
Programme villages 
  Total programme 
villages 
Non-
participants 
Participants 
 
Panel A. Did anyone in the household receive financial assistance (without paying for it) 
from others outside the household in the past year? 
Yes 30.8 32.3 32.0 38.0 
No 68.0 67.1 67.5 60.9 
Missing data 1.2 0.6 0.6 1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
Panel B. Did anyone in the household give financial assistance (without being paid for it) 
to others outside the household in the past year? 
Yes 33.6 33.1 32.7 39.4 
No 65.7 66.9 67.3 60.5 
Missing data 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 181 
 
The correlation between giving and receiving financial assistance is strong and 
significant at .712 (p-value .000). This indicates a reciprocal nature of financial aid within 
social support networks. However, such mutual arrangements appear insufficient to take care 
of all financial needs and in fact do not replace the demand for credit. Households that 
received financial assistance in the past year are equally likely to have taken credit (that is, 
69.4 percent) as are households who did not receive assistance (67.4 percent).  
Summary 
The previous description indicates a number of patterns. First of all, the demand for 
credit is large in the study region and average loan amounts are very high compared to daily 
wages. Second, there is no difference between the programme and the control villages with 
respect to the average number or amount of loans taken. In addition, the statistics do not show 
a significant difference with respect to giving and receiving financial aid, suggesting that the 
two groups are comparable with respect to their social support networks for gifts, small 
transfers and remittances. The main difference between the two groups lies in the number of 
loans given to friends, neighbors, relatives and others. Households in programme villages are 
significantly more likely to have lent money to their social relations. However, as we 
discussed, the data on loans given are likely to suffer from underreporting. To analyze this 
difference in more detail, the next section will therefore look at the main sources of received 
credit by treatment group. 
Within programme villages, participants and non-participants differ in one important 
respect. Participants have taken up substantially more loans in the past year, but at a lower 
amount per loan. If the loans were used for similar purposes among the two groups, this 
difference would indicate that participants either need to, or prefer to go to several lenders in 
order to collect the same amount of credit. If the purpose of loans differs among the two 
groups, something else must be going on. This issue is taken up further in section 6.2.3. 
 
6.2.2  Sources of credit 
This section will examine the extent to which households rely on different sources to 
get access to credit. Table 6.4 displays the sources of credit for each of the three treatment 
groups, conditional on taking a loan. Only 7 percent of all households have taken a loan from 
a bank in the past year. This corroborates the findings of many other studies that poor and 
disadvantaged households, which comprise the majority of the population in our sample, have 
difficulties in obtaining formal credit (Drèze et al., 1997; Bhattacharyya, 2005; Parker and 
Kozel, 2005). The importance of the moneylender as an informal credit institution in rural 
villages is undeniable. In the control villages the moneylenders are the source of almost three 
quarters of all loans, whereas in programme villages almost half of the loans are taken from a 
moneylender. Participants are substantially less likely to borrow money from a moneylender 
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at 37 percent of their loans. The differences between the three treatment groups are 
statistically significant.  
Participants extensively use the credit group in their community as a lending source. 
Thirty-eight percent of participants’ loans stems from the credit group. A small percentage of 
non-participants are also allowed to participate in the Mahila Samakhya credit groups. In 
control villages on the other hand, credit groups are non-existent. Social relations such as 
friends, neighbors and relatives, account for 20 percent of the loans in control villages. In 
programme villages, participants (who have access to the informal credit group) get a similar 
percentage of loans from their social relations. This percentage doubles in size for the non-
participants. The “other”-category is very small throughout. This category would capture 
loans from landlords, employers, traders and others, for example.  
 
Table 6.4 Sources of credit (conditional on taking a loan) 
 
 Control 
villages 
Programme villages Average 
amount per 
loan (Rs.) 
  Total 
programme 
villages 
Non-
participants 
Participants  
      
Bank 7.9 7.0 7.2 3.8 17,526 
Moneylender 72.3 49.4 50.3 37.2 9,252 
Credit group 0.0 4.2 1.7 38.2 2,337 
Social relations 19.4 39.2 40.6 19.7 8,411 
      
Friends 2.3 6.6 6.6 6.5 14,784 
Relatives 5.4 12.5 13.0 5.6 11,561 
Neighbors 11.7 20.1 21.0 7.6 4,459 
      
Other (employers, 
traders, etc.) 
0.5 0.2 0.2 1.1 22,668 
      
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 9,271 
      
# of loans in the 
sample 
424 1192 524 668  
 
The last column in Table 6.4 shows the average amount of the loans for each source of 
credit. As is to be expected, loans from formal banks are significantly higher than loans from 
other sources at Rs. 17,526. Friends and relatives are the second largest credit providers, both 
providing average loans of more than Rs. 10,000. Loans from neighbors on the other hand are 
generally considerably lower at Rs. 4,459. Although participants have more easy access to 
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loans through the credit groups, the average amount that they generate through this source is 
only Rs. 2,337. However, such amounts may be sufficient to cope with small problems and 
prevent the situation from worsening, for example in the case of ill health. Similarly, if 
participants apply for small loans in order to start up a business, this may enhance their future 
income-generating capacity. Other households, who do not have access to credit on such 
favorable terms, may forego investment opportunities and be forced to lend more money in 
the future if shocks occur. To gain better insight in the objective of the loans, the next section 
will give more details on the purpose of obtaining credit with an emphasis on the difference 
between consumption and investment loans.  
In sum, loans from the formal banking system are scarce. The bulk of loans comes 
from the moneylender for all three sample groups. Two findings stand out. First, non-
participants are significantly more likely to borrow from their social relations than control 
households. This observation is in line with the data from the previous section, where non-
participants reported significantly more often to give loans to others. Second, participants 
make extensive use of their membership in a credit group. 
 
6.2.3  Use of credit 
Consumption versus investment loans 
Households can borrow money for different reasons. We categorize the use or purpose 
of the credit according to whether it is: a) a human capital loan, b) a consumption loan, or c) 
an investment loan. Human capital loans are taken to increase or restore the human capital of 
one of the household members, i.e. to finance expenditures on health or education. 
Consumption loans consists of the loans for food (or other daily consumption), durables such 
as a radio or stove, funerals, dowries and other purposes. Investment loans consist of loans for 
business, agriculture, cattle, land or construction purposes.173  
Almost 30 percent of the households in the study region have taken a loan for human 
capital purposes in the past year, mainly to pay for medical expenditures. Indeed, Parker and 
Kozel (2005) find that the costs of medical care are one of the main causes of extreme poverty 
in Bihar. The differences between the sample groups are not statistically significant. Loans for 
investment purposes are substantially less common. Only 20 percent of control households 
and 17 percent of non-participant households have taken an investment loan in the past year 
(p-value .414). However, at 28 percent, participant households are significantly more likely to 
have taken an investment credit than non-participants (p-value .022) or control households (p-
value .045). Dowries are the most important reason to take up a consumption loan. One out of 
                                                 
173
 This distinction does not necessarily capture emergency versus production loans. For example, medical 
expenditures are usually a response to a negative health shock but can also result from preventive health 
measures which are investments in future health. Conversely, credit to buy seeds will increase the future harvest, 
but may be necessary because rodents have ruined a household’s stock of seeds.  
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every seven households (13 percent) has taken a loan to pay for a dowry in the past year. 
Differences between the sample groups are insignificant. 
Strictly speaking, human capital loans are investment loans because they increase a 
household’s future income-generating capacity, restore it after a shock or prevent it from 
deteriorating. However, from the perspective of the lender human capital loans –especially 
medical expenditures—are more similar to consumption loans. The benefits of the credit are 
not alienable from the borrower and cannot serve as collateral in the way land, cattle, a house 
or future crop can be used. Thus, taking into account the risk of and returns after default, a 
lender would be more inclined to provide production loans than either human capital loans or 
consumption loans. Fungibility, which plays a role in cases of information asymmetries, is of 
little relevance for most village moneylenders, friends, neighbors and relatives. In general, the 
reason that they are willing to lend money to a particular household for a particular purpose is 
precisely because they are able to observe the behavior of the household members. 
This chapter examines specifically how heterogeneity affects the prevalence of credit 
transactions among households in situations of limited enforcement. Therefore, in the 
remainder of this chapter, both human capital and (other) consumption loans will be grouped 
under one “Consumption” heading. Whenever the results for human capital and (other) 
consumption loans differ from each other, the analysis will explicitly mention the differences. 
Table 6.5 shows the percentage of loans categorized by purpose. Approximately forty 
percent of all loans are spent on human capital, one third is meant for other consumption 
purposes, and one quarter of the loans increases future production capacity or a household’s 
asset base. Health expenditures are the main reason to obtain a consumption loan. They 
account for 36.8 percent of all loans in control villages and 42.9 percent of all loans in 
programme villages (p-value .511). Dowries are the second main reason to take up a 
consumption credit. They represent 18.2 percent and 20.2 percent of all loans in control and 
programme villages respectively (p-value .984). Investment loans are mostly used to finance a 
business, agricultural expenditures or construction activities.  
The final column of Table 6.5 shows the average loan amount per purpose. Investment 
loans are much larger than consumption loans at an average of Rs. 11,576 versus Rs. 8,540. 
However, there are large differences between the different items. Whereas health expenditures 
are the most common purpose, they are also the least ‘expensive’ from the loan uses at Rs. 
4,843. Credit for dowries on the other hand is generally very high at an average loan size of 
Rs. 16,700.   
Table 6.5 shows that control households and non-participants in programme villages 
do not significantly differ with respect to the uses of their credit. The two exceptions are loans 
for food which are significantly more common in control villages, and loans for funerals 
which are more common among non-participants. Whereas similar percentages of participant 
households obtain human capital-related loans, overall a significantly lower proportion is 
spent on consumption purposes and a larger proportion of their loans is spent on investment 
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Table 6.5 Use of credit  
 Control 
villages 
Programme villages Average 
loan size  
  Total 
programme 
villages 
Non-
participants 
Participants (Rs.) 
Education (fees / 
uniforms / books 
etc.) 
0.5 0.4 0.4 0.9 2,443 
Health (hospital, 
medicines) 
36.8 42.9 43.3 36.7 4,843 
Human capital 
purposes 
37.5 43.3 43.7 37.5 4,820 
      
Food (daily 
consumption) 
9.8* 2.8 2.7 3.5 4,897 
Durables (TV, cycle, 
etc.) 
1.1 0.4 0.4 0.7 8,781 
Funeral 1.8 6.1 6.4* 1.7 9,734 
Marriage of 
daughter 
18.2 20.2 20.3 17.7 16,700 
Other 4.7 2.4 2.4 2.5 8,147 
Other consumption 
purposes 
35.7 31.9 32.3 26.1* 13,383 
      
CONSUMPTION 
LOANS 
72.2 74.8 75.6 62.8* 8,540 
      
Business 6.7 7.3 7.0 11.3* 17,528 
Agriculture 8.2 5.9 5.8 6.5 4,776 
Purchase of cattle 3.1 2.7 2.6 3.5 5,584 
Purchase of land 2.0 2.3 2.3 1.9 11,252 
Purchase/construct 
house 
6.7 6.7 6.3 13.2* 13,826 
      
INVESTMENT 
LOANS 
26.8 24.8 24.0 36.3* 11,576 
      
Missing 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0  
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 9,271 
      
# of loans in sample 424 1193 527 666  
* indicates that the value for one treatment group is significantly different at the 10% error 
level or less from to the other two groups. The number of loans by use is not exactly equal to 
the number of loans by source in the previous table due to missing data. Loans without source 
will not be used in the econometric analysis. 
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purposes. This suggests that the membership in the credit groups has increased their ability to 
generate future income and perhaps decreased their need for emergency loans. 
Cross-tabulations of credit use and credit source 
To analyze this issue further, we briefly discuss whether different sources of credit are 
used for different purposes. In particular, Table 6.6 panel A shows that loans from friends, 
neighbors, the credit group or the moneylender are mostly used for health purposes. Bank 
loans on the other hand are mainly directed towards business investments. Loans from 
relatives are used mostly for dowries.  
In Table 6.6 panel B the percentages are given per use instead of per source. This 
panel shows that, if financed with credit, expenditures on food and durables are mostly 
financed through loans from neighbors. The loans for the other consumption purposes are all 
mainly received from the moneylender, again underscoring the importance of this institution 
for access to credit. Whereas credit for both educational expenditures and business is mostly 
likely to be obtained from a bank, credit for the purchase of cattle mainly comes from 
relatives. Again, all the other investment purposes are financed mainly through loans from the 
moneylender.  
The differences among the treatment groups are small. However, there is one 
important exception. Whereas the control group and the non-participants follow the overall 
table, participants are indeed more likely to borrow money for investment purposes from the 
credit group than from the money lender. Also, they take their loans for health expenditures 
equally likely from the moneylender and the credit group. That is, the credit group seems to 
be an important source of investment as well as an insurance mechanism for participating 
households. 
Summary 
The two main reasons for borrowing money, ignoring potential fungibility, are health 
and dowry expenditures. This applies equally to the three treatment groups. Both types of 
expenses are mainly financed with loans from the moneylender, except for Mahila Samakhya 
participants who can use credit from the credit group. Social relations also seem to be an 
important source of credit tapped for these purposes, with loans from friends and neighbors 
mainly used for health expenditures and loans from relatives mainly used to pay dowries. This 
suggests that a larger pool of informal loans would help households to better cope with events 
such as falling ill or bearing a daughter.  
Overall, investment loans are not common, although participants benefit from cheap 
access to credit through Mahila Samakhya. These results underscore the findings of Parker 
and Kozel (2005) in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. They find that upper caste households borrow 
mostly for investment in productive assets (i.e. economic advancement), either from the bank 
or from their extended social networks. Lower caste households on the other hand, which 
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comprise the majority of our sample, usually borrow to deal with shocks. They may receive 
small-scale assistance from their social network but need to resort to moneylenders or other 
wealthy households to deal with large-scale monetary needs. Given most households’ limited 
capacity to survive the harsh reality of daily life, such low levels of investment for the future 
are highly problematic. 
 
 
Table 6.6 Cross-tabulation: Use versus source of credit  
 Bank Friends Relatives Neighbors Credit 
group 
Money-
lender 
Other  Total 
PANEL A. Use of loan per credit source 
 
        
Consumption purposes 
Education  4.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0  
Health  4.5 36.3 11.4 51.9 62.1 50.7 30.0  
Food  0.8 6.0 2.4 7.1 1.4 2.6 0.0  
Durables  0.0 0.7 0.3 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.0  
Funeral 0.2 21.1 11.1 4.7 0.9 4.2 0.0  
Marriage of daughter 2.6 18.3 46.7 15.7 9.2 19.1 1.6  
Other 0.0 0.3 0.9 3.7 2.6 3.1 52.0  
         
Investment purposes         
Business 49.9 8.7 3.4 4.4 7.1 3.3 0.0  
Agriculture 7.1 2.2 5.7 3.6 5.3 7.6 0.0  
Purchase of cattle 9.0 1.2 7.6 1.7 4.2 1.3 0.0  
Purchase of land 0.0 3.8 2.5 2.3 0.7 2.4 0.0  
Purchase/construct 
house 
21.1 1.2 8.0 3.7 5.0 5.2 16.5  
         
Missing 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0  
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
         
PANEL B. Source of credit per use of loan 
         
Consumption purposes 
Education  74.6 3.4 0.0 2.3 10.4 9.3 0.0 100.0 
Health  0.8 5.2 3.2 23.6 5.5 61.6 0.2 100.0 
Food  1.7 10.6 8.2 39.3 1.5 38.8 0.0 100.0 
Durables  0.0 9.8 6.9 54.3 3.3 25.7 0.0 100.0 
Funeral 0.2 22.5 22.8 15.8 0.6 38.0 0.0 100.0 
Marriage of daughter 0.9 5.6 27.5 15.1 1.7 49.2 0.0 100.0 
Other 0.0 0.7 4.1 27.0 3.7 59.8 4.7 100.0 
        
 
Investment purposes         
Business 48.7 7.3 5.6 11.6 3.7 23.2 0.0 100.0 
Agriculture 8.2 2.2 11.0 11.2 3.3 64.1 0.0 100.0 
Purchase of cattle 23.4 2.6 32.8 11.8 5.7 23.6 0.0 100.0 
Purchase of land 0.2 10.4 13.4 20.1 1.2 54.7 0.0 100.0 
Purchase/construct 
house 
24.4 1.2 15.4 11.5 3.1 43.8 0.6 100.0 
Bordered cells indicate the most common use per source of credit (panel A), or the most common source per use 
of credit (panel B). 
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6.3 Heterogeneity and the risk of default 
 
This section will outline a simple theoretical framework of credit transactions among 
lenders and borrowers. It then applies this framework to the different types of lenders in 
northern India and discusses the loan characteristics such as interest rates and collateral per 
lender type. The section ends with the formulation of three hypotheses.  
 
6.3.1  The decision problems of the lender and the borrower 
A potential borrower in need of funds will compare the costs of a loan from a 
particular lender to the cheapest alternative option available to him. Alternative options could 
be a loan from a different lender, but also individual strategies such as dissaving, increasing 
household labor, or foregoing the investment or consumption opportunity altogether. The 
expected utility for an individual i of a loan from lender L  will decrease with increasing 
costs Lir . Costs contain the interest due, but also more intangible costs such as potential loss 
of prestige for asking relatives for help174 or the danger of falling victim to fraudulous 
accounting practices for example. The expected utility of a loan also decreases with the 
penalty on default Lip , which captures issues such as the (market and emotional) value of 
collateral, legal prosecution, social disapproval, the exclusion from future informal assistance 
or feelings of guilt and shame. In general, potential borrowers are more likely to accept a 
credit arrangement if the costs of the loan are low, if the penalties on default are low, if they 
have few attractive outside options and if they urgently need funds, i.e. when the discount rate 
on future payments is high. 
At the other side of the transaction stands the lender. A lender will grant a credit to an 
individual only if the expected returns on the credit are at least as large as the expected returns 
on the most profitable alternative investment available to the lender. Expected returns increase 
with the net returns on the loan if it is repaid and with the value of the amount that can be 
retrieved in case of default. Returns to credit are usually thought of as the interest rates on the 
loan. They may also include less tangible benefits such as the pleasure of helping a friend or 
expected future reciprocity in case of need. The net returns after default generally come in the 
form of collateral, if any, and may entail costs such as the efforts necessary to retrieve part of 
the loan or to publicly.  
As long as the net returns on default cover the loan amount (for example through 
collateral), the risk of default Lipi will be of relatively little concern to the lender. However, in 
situations of limited enforcement, the default risk is a serious factor to take into account. A 
borrower will default with certainty if the penalty on default is smaller than the costs of 
                                                 
174
 In addition to the loss of prestige, Drèze et al. (1997) find that households are reluctant to borrow from 
relatives not to jeopardize good family relations, in case of unintended and unavoidable default.  
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repayment and interest (i.e. if LiLi pr >+1 ). Otherwise, Lipi is a function ),,( iiiLi eX ηpi of 
exogenous characteristics iX  of the individual, of the repayment efforts ie  of the individual 
and of random shocks iη  to the individual’s income.175 The larger the penalties on default are, 
the more efforts the individual will exercise to repay the loan. As a consequence, the 
probability of default will decrease. 
An agreement will take place between the borrower and the lender if the utility of the 
transaction is at least as high as the utility on their alternative options. We will not fully 
characterize the equilibrium agreements between lenders and borrowers or go into the details 
of the bargaining process. The main point is that, when enforcement opportunities for a 
certain agreement are limited (i.e. when the penalties on default are low and hence the risk of 
default is high), providing credit will not be an attractive investment opportunity to the lender. 
Consequently, the borrower must look for an alternative solution. 
 
6.3.2  Interest rates and collateral for different lender types 
Different lenders will charge different interest rates and resort to different penalties on 
default. Unfortunately, data on interest rates and collateral requirements are not available for 
our study area. However, several studies on access to credit in the two states adjacent to Bihar 
suggest a pattern of loan characteristics across lender types that is consistent across regions 
and consistent with the theoretical framework described above. We will assume that a similar 
pattern of credit characteristics holds for the villages in Bihar.  
Table 6.7 shows the average interest rates and required collateral by lender type in two 
rural areas of Uttar Pradesh –the state to the west of Bihar, and in a rural area of West-Bengal 
–the state to the east of Bihar. Ravi (2005) collected credit data in 2002 in the largely agrarian 
district Kannauj in Uttar Pradesh. The data on the rural village of Palanpur in Uttar Pradesh 
were collected in 1983-1984. They are discussed extensively in Drèze et al. (1997). 
Bhattacharyya (2005) collected the dataset in West-Bengal in 1993-1994 for an economically 
advanced and a backward region of the state. Only the data of the latter region are included to 
match the circumstances in northern Bihar.  
Banks have limited information on potential borrowers and are restricted to charge the 
low, official interest rates that range from approximately 10 to 20 percent annually. To limit 
the risk of default, banks usually ask for collateral in terms of land or other marketable assets, 
or else apply strict eligibility criteria. This usually implies that the wealthier have better  
 
                                                 
175
 Information asymmetries arise when the potential lender cannot fully observe the exogenous characteristics Xi 
or the efforts ei of the individual. This may lead to adverse selection or moral hazard respectively, increasing the 
costs of providing credit as the lender cannot set the interest rate or penalties on default accordingly. To avoid 
the risks from imperfect information, most informal arrangements are among individuals that know each other 
well and can observe each other’s behavior and efforts fairly accurately. Hence, informal risk-sharing networks 
usually encompass relatives, friends, or neighbors for example. 
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Table 6.7 Loan characteristics in West-Bengal and Uttar Pradesh 
 
 Annual interest rates Collateral requirements 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 (Range) (Range) (Average)    
 
      
Banks 10-16 9-18 
(public 
inst.) 
n.a. Land: 77% 
Other: 10% 
None: 13% 
 
None n.a. 
Cooperative 
societies 
12-15 n.a. n.a. Land: 50% 
Future crop: 17%: 
Other: 8% 
None: 25% 
 
n.a. n.a. 
Moneylenders 
(ml) 
60-120 30-60 
 
Standard 
rate: 60 
Agricultural 
ml: 79 
 
Professional 
ml: 112 
 
Land: 7% 
Gold/silver: 9% 
None: 80% 
Village ml: 
Usually 
none  
 
Urban ml: 
gold/silver 
85%: none 
5%: 
gold/silver 
4%: land  
Neighbors 
and relatives 
0-120 
 
Generally: 
0 
0176 
 
3 Land: 10% 
Gold/silver: 4% 
None: 81% 
 
None None 
Other (e.g. 
employer, 
landlord, 
trader) 
0-60 n.a. Trader: 38 
Landlord: 
95 
Future crop: 35% 
None: 50% 
 
n.a. n.a. 
 
      
Region Uttar 
Pradesh 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
West-
Bengal 
Uttar Pradesh Uttar 
Pradesh 
West-
Bengal 
Period 2002 1983-84 1993-94 2002 1983-84 1993-94 
 
(1) Source: Ravi (2005); (2) Source: Drèze et al. (1997); (3) Source: Bhattacharyya (2005)  
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 Refers to credit from all social relations, called “allies and patrons” in the paper. 
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access to formal credit, while the poorest are effectively denied access.177 In addition, the 
case-study in Palanpur  suggests that discrimination of the lowest castes and Muslim 
households by bank officials is prevalent (Drèze et al., 1997). To overcome discriminatory 
practices, many banks now run special government schemes of credit aimed at Scheduled 
Castes. However, disadvantaged households seem to be disproportionately vulnerable to 
fraudulous accounting practices and corruption within the formal banking system. Since this 
increases the costs of a formal loan considerably, marginalized households indicate a 
hesitation to apply for formal credit, which further increases their limited representation 
among formal borrowers (Drèze et al., 1997).  
Cooperative societies ask similar interest rates as banks and often require that credit is 
backed by land, future crop or other assets (Ravi, 2005). In addition, such cooperative 
societies generally have eligibility criteria of land ownership, excluding landless households. 
Since the respondents in our survey did not report being member of cooperative societies, 
they will be left out of further consideration.  
Moneylenders in India are notorious for the extremely high interest rates charged. 
Indeed, the average annual interest rate in the three studies is approximately 60 percent. 
However, many loans are given at rates of well above 100 percent, although in some cases 
credit is given at lower concessional rates. Bhattacharyya (2005) finds that average interest 
rates are consistently higher for lower socio-economic classes. Interest rates bear a negative 
relation with the share of the loan covered by a mortgage and with the value of the collateral. 
In addition, the higher the marketability of the collateral (land versus gold or silver versus 
utensils, etcetera), the lower the interest rates charged. The poorest classes, unable to provide 
collateral in terms of land or high valued goods, often have to agree to usurious interest rates.  
To overcome problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, rural moneylenders 
usually confine their credit to well-known and longstanding clients from the same village so 
that the moneylender can more easily distinguish between bad performance and bad luck 
(Bell, 1990).  In contrast, urban-based moneylenders have less reliable information on the 
characteristics of loan applicants and less enforcement opportunities. Indeed, they generally 
ask for collateral, mostly in the form of jewelry, that is worth at least as much and often much 
more than the credit taken, especially in the eyes of the borrower (Drèze et al., 1997). Most 
village moneylenders do not ask for collateral. This suggests that they have other means of 
enforcement at their disposal. Drèze et al. (1997) suggest that rural moneylenders are 
particularly successful in preventing defaults due to their authority, their close connections 
with influential individuals in the community, an above-average ability to judge the credit-
worthiness of potential borrowers, and in some exceptional cases the threat or use of violence.  
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 To supply to the poor nonetheless, an increasing number of banks is currently engaged in group lending, in 
which a group of individuals receive loans but continuation of credit is dependent on the repayment by all group 
members. Hence, in this way banks shift the responsibility of monitoring and enforcement to the group. In the 
study region, the government runs a similar programme of group lending. Many Mahila Samakhya credit and 
saving groups report to benefit from this scheme.  
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Neighbors, friends and relatives usually provide interest-free credit. Benefits from 
lending money could stem partly from altruistic feelings and other-regarding preferences. As 
discussed in chapter two, an additional motive for credit agreements among households is 
based on considerations of mutual insurance and assistance (e.g. Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). 
Whereas informational asymmetries are less relevant for households that know each other 
well, the commitment problem may be especially problematic as such agreements usually lack 
legal enforcement and are not backed up by collateral. This strongly suggests that households 
need alternative penalties to reduce the risk of default, such as direct social sanctions (e.g. 
social disapproval, ostracism, gossip) or the denial of access to future informal loans.  
Several theoretical models explain how informal credit and/or risk-sharing 
arrangements among households may emerge in situations of limited enforcement (Coate and 
Ravallion, 1993; Udry, 1994; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001; Ligon et al., 2002). These 
models either rest on the assumption of repeated transactions, which offers a threat of 
withdrawal of future cooperation, or on immediate penalties on default, or on both. However, 
they do not specify how immediate penalties on default are enforced nor do they take into 
account how the strength of sanctions differs with the size of the social network. But those are 
precisely the issues of interest in situations of limited enforcement. The severity of penalties 
depends crucially on the number of sanctioning parties. Hence, credit from social relations 
will be enhanced if backed up by the threat of sanctions from a large number of households. 
This chapter explores how village-level heterogeneity, assumed to influence the size of a 
household’s social network, affects informal loan agreements among households.  
An interesting exception is La Ferrara (2003). In her model of matched credit 
transactions among kin in Ghana, defaulting parents will not receive an old-age transfer from 
their children as a punishment. Children either inflict this punishment directly by withholding 
the transfer, or they are unable to transfer funds because their own future access to informal 
loans is restricted by the credit market. In La Ferrara’s model, information and sanctions are 
shared among kin. Our chapter looks at the effectiveness of informal sanctioning across castes 
and religious groups.  
Credit from other sources, such as traders, landlords or employers, varies in its 
characteristics with interest rates between zero and 100 percent, and different degrees of 
collateral requirements. However, in our study region (as in the three regions of Table 6.7) the 
prevalence of such credit is limited and will not be discussed further. 
A final source of credit not included in Table 6.7 is credit from rotating savings and 
credit associations, such as the credit groups formed by the Mahila Samakhya women’s 
groups. The groups do not ask for collateral and set very low interest rates, at for example one 
percent per month. 
To summarize, banks offer credit at reasonable terms but effectively constrain and 
discourage access for households without collateral or for otherwise disadvantaged groups. 
Credit from moneylenders is relatively easy to access but comes at a cost of usurious interest 
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rates. Loans from social relations such as friends, neighbors or relatives, are generally 
interest-free and collateral-free. Although there may be additional costs attached to such loans 
(loss of prestige, jeopardizing good family relations), we would expect potential borrowers to 
have a preference for informal loans over loans from the moneylender. However, access to 
loans from friends, neighbors and relatives depends crucially on opportunities for informal 
enforcement.  
 
6.3.3  Research questions and hypotheses 
In most Bihari villages, interaction across subgroups is limited. In turn, this would 
limit the willingness of households to lend money to individuals outside their own subgroup 
because monitoring opportunities and sanctions on default will be less effective.  For a given 
level of village population, we therefore expect heterogeneity to decrease the risk pool to 
which a household belongs. Given the very low overall levels of household wealth, such a 
restriction to a subgroup implies that there may not be sufficient resources within a subgroup 
to cater to all income shocks. This decreases the probability that a household in need can 
obtain a loan from a friend, relative or neighbor. Especially the poorest, low-caste households 
will suffer from this restriction to one’s own ‘bonding’ social network. 
Hence, our first hypothesis is that, for a given population size, in more heterogeneous 
communities the probability that households borrow money from friends, neighbors and 
relatives, is smaller than in more homogeneous communities. This is based on the explicit 
assumption that borrowers have a preference for credit from friends, neighbors or relatives 
over credit from moneylenders. This seems a plausible assumption in view of the different 
loan characteristics in terms of interest requirements and collateral as discussed in the 
previous section.  
Confirmation of this hypothesis does not appear to yield many attractive policy 
recommendations to solve the issue (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Miguel and Gugerty, 
2005). Segregating households into homogeneous communities is neither a feasible option, 
nor a desirable one. However, chapter four showed that in communities where Mahila 
Samakhya is implemented, trust and cooperation among community members increases 
substantially, even among non-participants. If these attitudes also translate to other areas of 
interactive behavior, we would expect that Mahila Samakhya is able to counteract part of the 
negative consequences of heterogeneity on the willingness of households to lend money to 
each other.178 Hence, our second hypothesis states that for a given level of heterogeneity, 
households in programme villages are more likely to borrow money from friends and 
                                                 
178
 In that case, the arrival of the Mahila Samakhya programme could actually result in equilibrium effects. 
When people in heterogeneous communities start to borrow more from their neighbors, moneylenders may 
adjust their own interest rates downwards to regain some of their lost clients. However, given the large gap 
between interest rates from other households and interest rates from moneylenders, we expect this effect to be 
limited.  
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neighbors than households in control communities. More precisely, we expect the negative 
impact of heterogeneity on informal credit to be attenuated by the presence of the programme.  
Finally, if heterogeneity and diversity stimulate creativity and investment, then 
heterogeneity is not only a liability for communities but also an asset. In that case, 
heterogeneity would result in a larger demand for investment loans (irrespective of their 
source). Hence, our third hypothesis to be tested is that in more heterogeneous communities, 
the probability that households borrow for investment purposes is larger.   
 
6.4 Empirical strategy 
 
 
The main point of interest is the effect of village level heterogeneity on credit 
agreements made in the past year between friends, relatives or neighbors, holding all other 
explanatory variables constant. Households choose between five distinct options: a) borrow 
from a moneylender, b) borrow from friends or neighbors, c) borrow from relatives179, d) 
borrow from another source such as the bank, and e) not to borrow.  
This chapter will use a multinomial logit (MNL) model to examine the likelihood of 
all outcomes simultaneously. The main disadvantage of MNL models is that they assume 
independence in the unobserved error terms across choice categories.180 This so-called 
assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) implies for example that the 
choice between credit from a moneylender versus not taking credit at all is independent of 
whether the household has an option to take credit from relatives. We will test the validity of 
this assumption with a Hausman test (see section 6.5.2).  
We estimate a reduced form of the demand and supply of credit. The individual and 
community characteristics in the estimation capture the factors that influence a household’s 
need for financial resources as well as the terms on which different lenders would offer credit 
to this particular household. For example, the occurrence of droughts reflects a potential need 
for credit, land ownership captures the availability of collateral, caste dummies reflect the 
                                                 
179
 In most studies, loans from social relations such as friends, neighbors and relatives, are all grouped under one 
category. However, the role of heterogeneity need not be equal for relatives versus non-relatives, although La 
Ferrara (2003) finds a significantly negative coefficient of heterogeneity for both categories. To keep a separate 
account of potentially distinct effects, the analysis focuses on the more detailed credit categories of 
friends/neighbors and relatives respectively.  
180
 The most preferred model to analyze the choice between several unordered options is a multinomial probit 
(MNP) model, which allows all the unobserved error terms of the different options to be correlated with each 
other. Unfortunately, the MNP model does not reach convergence in our case, even with a very parsimonious 
model and using different estimation techniques. Alternatively, a nested MNL allows for correlation of the 
unobservables within nests (e.g. across the credit sources) but not across nests (e.g. between particular credit 
sources and not taking a loan at all). This relaxes the IIA assumption to a certain extent but not entirely. More 
seriously, the inclusive value parameter (that should lie between 0 and 1) is  
-124, strongly rejecting the underlying choice structure. 
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effect of social stigmas on loan characteristics, educational levels proxy for a household’s 
vulnerability to fraud, and community level heterogeneity affects the opportunity for informal 
monitoring and sanctioning.  
Especially the fifth option, “not to borrow”, requires further explanation in this 
respect. We assume that there is no stochastic rationing of credit, i.e. loan applications are not 
unexpectedly denied. Instead, a potential borrower knows beforehand whether and on what 
terms he might obtain a loan from a particular lender. Such knowledge is captured in the 
control variables. As an illustration, a Scheduled Castes household could get a formal loan 
from a bank through the special scheme for the Scheduled Castes. But if the household 
members are illiterate and fear fraud, a formal loan would come at such high potential costs 
that they decide not to apply for the loan. Likewise, a Muslim household in a highly 
segregated community will not seriously try to get a loan from a Hindu community member 
because he knows that the other will not trust him sufficiently to offer a loan at any reasonable 
terms.  
Including the option not to borrow is an important difference with the empirical 
approach in La Ferrara (2003). She estimates the probability of borrowing from different 
sources conditional on taking a loan.181 Such an approach cannot distinguish between the 
effect of heterogeneity on investment versus consumption loans. In her interpretation, the 
regressors capture supply factors but she includes a number of variables to control for 
differences in demand.  
The explanatory variables include a vector of individual characteristics (age, caste, 
religion, land ownership, total and female household education, gender of the head of 
household, household size, child dependency ratio), a vector of community characteristics 
(village development index, village population, occurrence of floods and droughts in the past 
three years, distance to bank, distance to town, 1991 village level female literacy rate, 1991 
block level female literacy rates, 1991 block level Scheduled Castes percentage and district 
dummy variables to capture regional differences) as well as a heterogeneity variable and its 
squared value to capture non-linear effects.  
We measure heterogeneity using the fractionalization index as proposed in Alesina 
and La Ferrara (2000), which measures the probability that an individual would randomly 
encounter another individual belonging to the same social group.182 We focus on heterogeneity 
at the village level. Households are classified according to whether they belong to the 
Scheduled Castes, to Other Backward Castes, to the General Castes, or to the Muslim 
population. 
 
                                                 
181
 That approach does not explicitly account for unexpectedly denied loan applications either.  
182
 Other types of heterogeneity are for example heterogeneity in the benefits derived from cooperation, 
locational or geographic differences, differences in ability, or ethnic diversity (Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 
2001). See the literature on polarization for an interesting extension of the measurement of heterogeneity, mostly 
applied to heterogeneity in income, wealth or access to resources (Esteban and Ray, 1994; Duclos et al., 2004).  
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where g represents village g, k represents the four groups, and kgs  is the share of group 
k in village g. The heterogeneity index is multiplied by 100. An index of 0 represents a 
completely homogeneous village. At the index of 100, each individual would belong to a 
separate group. 
Our heterogeneity index is a proxy of the real levels of fractionalization in each 
community, because we observe only a random sample of 20 households per village. The 
average heterogeneity index in the study region is 44, with a minimum of 0 in seven 
communities and a maximum of 73 in one community. The control villages and programme 
villages do not differ significantly from each other with heterogeneity indices of 38 and 45 
respectively (p-value .163).183       
A number of control variables needs more elaboration. It is often suggested that 
mobility increases the temptation to defect and hence the risk of default because it weakens 
the threat of future exclusion. To the extent that road quality is positively correlated with 
mobility, we would expect the sign of its coefficient to be negative for loans from friends, 
neighbors and relatives. Village population size may have two opposed effects on informal 
loans. The larger the overall group size, the stronger the threat of social sanctions. Moreover, 
in larger villages, the size of subgroups increase for a given level of heterogeneity, and hence 
the size of a household’s risk pool. That is, population size would be favorable to informal 
loans. On the other hand, communication patterns and thus social sanction become weaker as 
villages becomes larger, with a potential negative effect on informal credit. We test this by 
introducing squared values of village population size as well as an interaction term with 
village heterogeneity. Income is not included as explanatory variable because it is endogenous 
in the estimations. Instead, land ownership is used as proxy both for wealth and for potential 
availability of collateral. However, as Table 6.5 showed, 2 percent of all households (9 
control households, 14 non-participant households and 16 participant households) have used a 
loan in the past year to purchase land. These households are omitted from the analysis to 
avoid simultaneity problems. Throughout, a household’s caste is included to test the 
hypothesis that lower castes are less likely to borrow for investment purposes from their 
friends, neighbors or relatives than the upper castes are.  
To test the first hypothesis on the relationship between heterogeneity and credit from 
friends, neighbors or relatives, only the control villages will be included in the analysis. To 
test the second hypothesis on the impact of the programme, non-participants are included as 
well, but not the participants. Participants usually have an additional option to get credit from 
                                                 
183
 Other heterogeneity measures are equally comparable across the two treatment groups. For example, the 
average heterogeneity index for religious groups is 10 in control villages and 12 in programme villages (p-value 
.454). The average Gini-coefficient of land ownership is 68 and 65 in control and programme villages 
respectively (p-value .463). 
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the rotating savings and credit association that most women’s groups have started. The third 
hypothesis is tested with an analysis not only of the total sample of loans, but also of 
investment and consumption loans separately.  
 
6.5 Results: Access to credit in control communities 
 
6.5.1  Taking a loan or not 
Section 6.2.1 showed that approximately two thirds of the households in our study 
region have taken a loan in the past year. Descriptive statistics do not control for exogenous 
variables that capture household and community differences. Therefore, the econometric 
analysis starts with a logit estimation of the probability that a household has taken a loan, 
including all explanatory variables in the estimation.184 The analysis in this section only 
includes households living in control villages. The results are shown in Table 6.8. Standard 
errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level.  
As column (i) shows, village level heterogeneity with respect to caste does not affect 
the overall likelihood that a household has taken a new loan in the past year. Most household 
characteristics are not statistically significant either. The results suggest that larger households 
are more likely to take a loan. This is in contrast with what one might expect, as it is often 
argued that members of large households can insure against shocks among themselves.185   
Credit is most prevalent in large communities, although the effect diminishes as 
village size grows. That is, village population has a positive sign and its squared value, when 
included, is significantly negative. Credit is also most common in villages that are close to 
town. For a given level of development, households are more likely to borrow money when 
the closest bank is far away. This may seem surprising, but remember that most loans are 
taken from a moneylender, not from official credit institutions.  
Columns (ii) and (iii) distinguish between investment and consumption loans as 
defined in section 0. The heterogeneity variables now become statistically significant in both 
estimations but with different signs. In heterogeneous communities, households are 
significantly more likely to have taken a loan for investment, but significantly less likely to 
have taken a loan for consumption purposes. The marginal effect of a one point increase in the 
heterogeneity index is plus 0.6 percentage point for investment loans and minus 0.9 
percentage point for consumption loans. This suggests that the larger diversity in more 
heterogeneous communities increases the odds that some households identify profitable 
investment opportunities. But at the same time, heterogeneity seems related to a restricted
                                                 
184
 The signs and levels of significance of the control variables remain mostly the same regardless of whether 
heterogeneity variables are in- or excluded.  
185
 See for example Fafchamps and Gubert (2005) for references.  
 Table 6.8 The probability of taking a loan (in control villages only) 
 
 All loans 
 
(i) 
Investment loans 
 
(ii) 
Consumption loans 
 
(iii) 
Human capital loans 
 
(iv) 
 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Heterogeneity variables         
Caste heterogeneity .006 .014 .050 .013*** -.036 .010*** -.044 .023* 
Caste heterogeneity squared -.000 .000 -.001 .000*** .000 .000** .001 .000 
         
Individual characteristics         
Age -.005 .008 -.015 .012 .007 .009 .012 .009 
SC/ST  .192 .573 -.871 .619 .645 .477 2.056 .667*** 
OBC .458 .417 -.047 .454 .366 .282 1.251 .650* 
Muslim -.334 .442 -1.243 .545** .287 .340 1.452 .691** 
Land ownership -.006 .004 .001 .001 -.010 .005** -.008 .005 
Household education -.125 .082 .017 .075 -.096 .077 .003 .096 
Female education -.210 .136 -.219 .132* -.048 .136 -.081 .142 
Female hh head .617 .437 -.997 .781 .729 .437* -.240 .547 
Child dependency ratio .040 .182 -.359 .298 .175 .180 .537 .215** 
Household size .137 .054** .114 .046** .048 .050 -.046 .052 
         
Community characteristics         
Village development 1.484 1.380 .262 .993 1.635 .997 -.477 1.302 
Village population total (x100) .202 .071*** .262 .070*** -.038 .055 -.056 .063 
Flood  .219 .236 -.188 .294 -.184 .304 .137 .219 
Drought .169 .336 -.647 .595 .051 .278 -.605 .568 
Road quality -.206 .150 -.825 .214*** .184 .105* .001 .156 
Distance to bank .265 .068*** .108 .094 .243 .079*** .176 .107 
Distance to town -.036 .011*** .034 .014** -.049 .009*** -.056 .018*** 
Census control var. and district dummies         
         
F-test heterogeneity variables (p-value)  .639  .000***  .002***  .094* 
#obs 488  488  488  488  
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level. 
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capacity of households to deal with unexpected shocks in income through credit, resorting to 
alternative coping mechanisms instead.  
As shown in column (ii), investment loans are significantly less common among 
Muslim households. Such low levels of investment could have a detrimental impact on the 
future income-generation capacity of this already disadvantaged population group. The 
variable for landownership becomes positive and highly significant once we introduce its 
square value. Thus, households that own more land (which may serve as collateral) are more 
likely to invest. The positive coefficient on household size that was found in column (i) stems 
from the higher probability to borrow for investment of large compared to small households. 
When squared values are introduced in the estimation, the distance to the nearest bank has a 
strong and negative effect on the probability of taking an investment loan. In other words, the 
further away the nearest bank is, the less likely a household is to obtain an investment loan. 
This is in line with the descriptive statistics from Table 6.6. In contrast to consumption loans 
(not taking into account the rare loan for education), credit to invest in business is mostly 
obtained from formal banks. The results also suggest that investment is most common among 
households living in large villages that are far away from town with low quality roads. 
The results for the probability of taking a consumption loan are shown in column (iii). 
They indicate that disadvantaged groups such as landless households and female headed 
households are substantially more likely to borrow money for consumption purposes than 
others. This underscores their limited buffer capacity to cope with shocks individually. The 
child dependency ratio becomes positive and significant when its squared value is included in 
the estimation. That is, households with many children per adult are significantly more likely 
to borrow for consumption purposes. Consumption loans (mostly made up of health and 
dowry loans as shown in Table 6.5) are most prevalent in well developed villages that are 
close to town with high quality roads.  
Column (iv) looks at human capital-related loans only, i.e. credit for medical and 
educational expenditures.186 They form the bulk of the ‘consumption’-loans and consist 
mainly of credit for health purposes. Again, credit for such expenditures is negatively related 
to village level heterogeneity.187 A one point increase in the heterogeneity index decreases the 
proportion of households that took a loan to cope with health shocks in the past year with 0.8 
percentage point on average. Such loans are particularly likely among the lower castes and 
Muslim population, as well as for households with a high child dependency ratio. Apparently, 
households with many children per adult are most vulnerable to health shocks that they cannot 
cope with using their own means. The very low proportion of educational loans suggests that 
they are not the driving force behind the significant coefficient of the child dependency ratio. 
                                                 
186
 Since more than ninety percent of loan transactions take place between individuals who know each other 
personally (moneylenders, friends, neighbors, relatives), we do not expect fungibility to play an important role in 
this respect. 
187
 The relationship between heterogeneity and consumption credit other than for human capital purposes is not 
statistically significant. Results not shown here.  
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The negative coefficient on distance to town for human capital expenditures probably reflects 
the better but more expensive opportunities for health care and education close to town.  
In sum, the results suggest that heterogeneity does not affect the overall number of 
credit transactions because of two counteracting effects. A higher diversity in the village is 
correlated with a higher percentage of households that obtain credit for investment but with a 
lower proportion of households that obtain a loan for consumption purposes. This confirms 
our third hypothesis. The differences between these two types of credit will be taken up 
further in the next section. 
 
6.5.2  Multinomial logit estimations of the source of credit 
Whereas the previous section looked at the prevalence of credit per se, this section will 
estimate a multinomial logit model for the alternative sources of credit separately. Again, the 
analysis is restricted to the control communities only. Getting a loan from the moneylender –
the most prevalent choice-, is taken as the base outcome. We hypothesize that heterogeneity 
restricts access to informal credit from other households. As a consequence, households living 
in heterogeneous communities need to resort to the moneylender more often than households 
living in homogeneous communities. Hence, we expect to find a negative coefficient on the 
heterogeneity variable for friends and neighbors as well as for relatives. In addition, we would 
expect a positive coefficient in the estimation of ‘no credit’ if the increased dependency on the 
moneylender implies that households are more likely not to borrow at all. The heterogeneity 
coefficient on credit from banks should not be significant, once we control for household 
characteristics.  
Results for all loans, irrespective of their purpose, are given in Table 6.9. In line with 
our first hypothesis, households living in heterogeneous communities are significantly less 
likely to borrow from their friends and neighbors in favor of loans from the moneylender. In 
contrast to the hypothesis, we do not find evidence that credit from relatives is affected by 
community level heterogeneity. This suggests that social sanctions within the community are 
much more important to support informal arrangements among friends and neighbors than 
among family relations. Thus, our findings only partly corroborate the results in La Ferrara 
(2003), who finds a significantly negative effect of heterogeneity on loans from relatives as 
well as non-relatives. As expected, bank loans are not affected by heterogeneity. The 
coefficients for heterogeneity on the ‘no credit’ option are not statistically significant either.188  
However, the coefficients in multinomial logit models are often difficult to interpret.189 
Therefore, we also look at the marginal effects, evaluated at the mean, of a small increase in 
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 The results do not change qualitatively if the ‘no credit’-option is excluded from the analysis. Results not 
shown here.  
189
 A positive MNL coefficient usually indicates that an increase in the explanatory variable leads to an increase 
in the likelihood that a particular option is chosen, compared to the base outcome. However, if the likelihood that 
another option is chosen increases even more, the ultimate effect of the increased regressor on the option under 
consideration may actually be negative.  
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the heterogeneity variables on the probability of observing one of the credit transaction 
categories.  The marginal effect of a one point increase in the heterogeneity index is a 0.8 
percentage point decrease in the probability of lending from friends and neighbors versus a 
1.1 percentage point increase in the probability of taking credit from the moneylender.  The 
marginal effect of heterogeneity on loans from relatives is substantially lower at minus 0.1 
percentage point although the coefficient is not statistically significant.190  
As discussed, village population size plays an ambiguous role. On the one hand, the 
threat of sanctions is stronger when coming from a larger population. But at some level of 
population size, communication becomes more difficult, which in turn diminishes the threat 
of social sanctions. Indeed, village population size has a positive coefficient and its squared 
value a negative coefficient for the probability of borrowing from friends and neighbors, 
although they are not statistically significant. In addition, population size might matter for the 
size of the risk pool to which households belong. That is, for a given level of heterogeneity, 
access to informal loans from neighbors would increase with population size. However, the 
introduction of an interaction term between village population and heterogeneity does not 
confirm this hypothesis. The coefficient is small and statistically insignificant, although it has 
the expected positive sign.  
Overall, the results suggest that heterogeneity leads to a shift in the source of credit 
within communities, but not in the amount of credit asked. However, as the previous section 
showed, there is a distinct effect of heterogeneity on the prevalence of investment versus 
consumption loans. To investigate this issue further, Table 6.10 shows the results of the 
multinomial logit estimations for investment and consumption loans separately. For sake of 
brevity, the table only shows the estimates for the heterogeneity variables.  
Panel A of Table 6.10 shows the likelihood that a household has taken an investment 
loan from a particular lender type in the past year. The estimates suggest that, when 
heterogeneity is large, households can resort to fewer friends and neighbors to borrow for 
investment purposes (column i). This effect is especially strong for Scheduled Castes 
households who borrow hardly any funds for investment from other households, consistent 
with the anecdotal evidence in section 6.2.3. Very few of the investment loans in control 
communities are financed by relatives. Therefore, this choice category is dropped from the 
analysis (column ii). 
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 Results are similar when friends, neighbors and relatives are grouped under one category of ‘social relations’. 
In that case, the coefficient on the heterogeneity variable is -.073 with a standard error of .033 (significant at the 
5%-error level). The marginal effect of a one point increase in the heterogeneity index is a 0.8 percent decrease 
in loans from social relations. 
Table 6.9 Multinomial logit: Probability of taken a loan by source (control villages only)  
 
 Friends/ 
neighbors 
Relatives Bank No loan 
 Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. 
Heterogeneity variables         
Caste heterogeneity -.108 .043** -.232 .173 -.011 .040 -.025 .018 
Caste heterogeneity squared .001 .001** .005 .003 .000 .001 .000 .000 
         
Individual characteristics         
Age  .025 .016 .010 .022 -.036 .017** .005 .008 
SC/ST  .315 1.027 .888 1.447 -.269 .759 .190 .562 
OBC -.356 1.049 1.428 1.275 -.701 .642 -.302 .383 
Muslim -.802 1.491 1.388 1.589 -1.069 .855 .493 .576 
Land ownership .015 .007** -.001 .013 .016 .008** .016 .008** 
Household education .198 .148 .011 .170 .136 .168 .161 .098 
Female education -.245 .160 .368 .175** .130 .215 .182 .154 
Female head -.123 .484     -.577 .457 
Dependency ratio .663 .331** .221 .432 -.385 .343 .086 .222 
Household size -.120 .066* -.117 .122 -.058 .066 -.188 .058*** 
         
Community characteristics         
Village population total (x100) -.094 .113 .524 .806 .095 .206 -.222 .082*** 
Village development -2.292 1.912 -5.040 -10.717 -4.549 4.124 -.790 1.491 
Flood  -.901 .629 -.330 .694 .305 1.541 -.285 .303 
Drought -.922 .811 3.651 3.463 -2.447 1.122** -.514 .346 
Road quality -.453 .254* .106 1.186 -.608 .549 .007 166 
Distance to bank  -.127 .183 .778 .449* -.408 .332 -.227 .073*** 
Distance to town -.056 .027** .173 .123 .037 .030 .033 .011*** 
Census control var. & District dummies         
         
F-test heterogeneity variables (p-value)  .036**  .282  .890  .350 
#obs 525        
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level. Taking a loan from the moneylender is the base 
outcome. Because of multicollinearity, the dummy variable for female headed households is excluded from the relatives and bank choices. The district dummy 
variables are excluded from the bank outcome. 
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Investment loans from banks appear to be largely unrelated to heterogeneity in the 
community (column iii). However, in heterogeneous communities, households are 
significantly more likely to borrow money in order to invest, as the negative coefficient on 
‘no loan’ (column iv) indicates. The increase in credit transactions is mainly financed with 
loans from moneylenders. If the heterogeneity index increases by one point at the mean, this 
would increase the percentage of households who take credit for investment with almost 0.7 
percentage point, financed through a 0.5 percentage point increase in credit from the 
moneylender and a 0.2 percentage point increase in credit from the bank. The marginal effect 
on loans from friends and neighbors is very small.191 
 
Table 6.10 Multinomial logit: Probability of taking a loan by source for investment and 
consumption loans separately (control villages only)  
 
 Friends/ 
Neighbors 
(i) 
Relatives 
 
(ii) 
Bank 
 
(iii) 
No loan 
 
(iv) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. 
         
PANEL A. Investment loans  
         
Heterogeneity -.103 .090   .020 .066 -.071 .026*** 
Heterogeneity 
squared 
.001 .001   -.000 .001 .001 .000*** 
         
F-test heterogeneity 
variables (p-value) 
 .048**    .628  .004*** 
# observations         
         
PANEL B. Consumption loans 
         
Caste heterogeneity -.079 .039** -.142 .090 -.145 .070** .012 .013 
Caste heterogeneity 
squared 
.001 .001 .002 .001 .001 .001 -.000 .000 
         
F-test heterogeneity 
variables (p-value) 
 .016**  .253  .093*  .679 
# observations         
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the village level. 
Taking a loan from the moneylender is the base outcome. 
 
The estimates of the probability that a household has taken a consumption loan in the 
past year are given in panel B of Table 6.10. The coefficients in column (i) show that, when 
heterogeneity is high in the village, households are significantly less likely to obtain loans 
from their friends and neighbors for consumption purposes relative to loans from the 
moneylender. Households are also less likely to borrow from relatives in heterogeneous 
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 Percentages are not exactly equal to the percentages in the previous section due to rounding. 
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communities, although a test of joint significance of heterogeneity and heterogeneity squared 
does not reject the null. Although the heterogeneity coefficient is statistically significant in the 
estimation for bank loans, its marginal effect is very small. Overall, a one point increase in the 
heterogeneity index leads to decrease of approximately 0.5 percentage point in loans from 
friends and neighbors and a 0.2 percentage point decrease in loans from relatives versus a 0.1 
percentage point increase in loans from the moneylender and a 0.7 percentage point increase 
in the proportions of households who do not take a loan for consumption purposes. Note that 
the latter increase is not statistically significant.192  
A Hausman test of the IIA assumption does not reject the null hypotheses that the 
exclusion of the ‘no loan’-option, the ‘relatives’-category and the ‘other’-category from the 
choice set do not significantly affect the estimates. The test produces chi-squared values 
below zero for the exclusion of the ‘moneylender’- and ‘friends/neighbors’-options. This 
could suggest a strong confirmation of the null, but is usually due to a small sample size of 
one or some of the (remaining) options.193  
The ‘consumption’-loans category consists of ‘human capital’-loans and ‘other 
consumption’-loans. The marginal effects of heterogeneity are similar in the estimation for 
‘human capital’-loans only, although they are smaller at slightly lower levels of significance. 
One exception is credit from relatives which becomes significantly (and negatively) related to 
heterogeneity. That is, in more heterogeneous communities, households are less likely to 
obtain ‘human capital’-loans from relatives. Similarly, the coefficients remain comparable to 
the full consumption-estimation when we consider only ‘other consumption’-loans, although 
the marginal effects change slightly.  
 
6.5.3  Summary and discussion 
The analysis of credit transactions in control communities yields a number of 
interesting findings. First of all, there is a clear distinction between investment loans and 
consumption loans. The prevalence of the former is enhanced by heterogeneity in the village. 
The moneylender takes up the bulk of the increased investment loans. In contrast, the 
probability of a consumption loan is substantially lower in heterogeneous communities. The 
results strongly indicate that access to credit from other households is seriously hampered by 
                                                 
192
 Again, the results are very similar if we use a joint category for all ‘social relations’ combined instead of 
‘friends and neighbors’ and ‘relatives’ separately. In the estimation for investment loans, the coefficient on 
‘social relations’ is equal to -.060 and statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, the marginal effects of 
heterogeneity on each of the sources of credit remain 0.5, 0.0, 0.2 and -0.7 for moneylenders, social relations, 
bank loans and no credit respectively. In the estimation of consumption loans, the coefficient on ‘social 
relations’ equals -.078 and is significant at the 5% error level. Marginal effects of heterogeneity are 0.1, -0.8, -
0.0 and 0.7 for moneylenders, social relations, bank loans and no credit respectively.  
193
 The Hausman test does not allow for clustering at the village level. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to use 
it on our survey sample.  
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community level heterogeneity. In those cases, households appear to opt more often for 
alternative coping mechanism beyond credit to deal with consumption needs.  
Thus, heterogeneity is not only a liability for the community as diversity may increase 
the incentives and opportunities for investments. However, to the extent that heterogeneity 
lowers households’ ability to cope with unexpected income shocks, it is surely worth 
exploring policy measures to counteract its negative effect. As discussed in section 6.3, the 
main channel of heterogeneity’s downward effect on informal credit arrangements is thought 
to lie in the limited interaction and trust across groups. As a result of the reduced social 
monitoring and social sanctions, informal credit transactions remain confined to a small 
subset of households. Such a small risk pool may not be capable to deal with all idiosyncratic 
shocks of its members and may even be subject to relatively more covariate shocks.  
 
6.6 Results: Access to credit in programme villages  
 
In this section we will explore the role of Mahila Samakhya in influencing the 
probability that households in a community provide credit to each other. Chapter 4 showed 
that the level of trust in Mahila Samakhya villages is significantly higher than in control 
villages. Moreover, programme households contribute significantly more often to community 
projects. This increase in social capital may also affect the ability of households to borrow 
money from others belonging to different castes, for example because a larger percentage of 
the village is involved in the monitoring and sanctioning process. In that case we would 
expect the programme to have an attenuating impact on the negative effect of heterogeneity.  
In addition to the control households, this section will include non-participants living 
in programme villages in the analysis. Participants in the women’s groups are omitted from 
the analysis since they also have access to a credit group. Hence, they face a different decision 
problem. The potential selection bias resulting from their omission is discussed further in 
section 0.   
 
6.6.1  Multinomial logit estimations of the programme effect on credit 
Table 6.11 shows the coefficients of interest from six multinomial logit estimations. 
Each specification estimates the probability that a household has taken a certain type of loan 
in the past year. Panels A and B look at all loans combined, panels C and D look at 
investment loans only, and panels E and F look at consumption loans only, as defined in 
section 0. For each outcome variable, two alternative specifications are shown. The first 
specification introduces a dummy variable equal to one for households who live in a 
programme village, and zero otherwise. As discussed in chapter three, if there were no impact 
of the programme, we would expect the dummy variable to have a statistically insignificant  
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Table 6.11 Multinomial logit: Probability of taking a loan by source (control and non-
participants)  
 Friends/ 
neighbors 
Relatives Bank No loan 
 
Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Cf. s.e. Cf. s.e. 
A. All loans         
         
Caste heterogeneity -.006 .020 -.051 .026** .037 .030 -.012 .014 
Caste heterogeneity squared .000 .000 .000 .000 -.000 .000 .000 .000 
Programme dummy .688 .218*** .973 .342*** .334 .343 .899 .193*** 
         
F-test of var. above  .017**  .002***  .496  .000*** 
# observations 1261        
         
B. All loans (include interaction term) 
         
Caste heterogeneity -.013 .020 -.045 .026* .041 .034 -.012 .014 
Caste heterogeneity squared -.000 .000 .001 .000 -.000 .000 .000 .000 
Programme dummy -.709 .665 1.762 .803** .613 .947 .892 .525* 
Interaction term 
progr.*heterogeneity 
.032 .016** -.018 .018 -.006 .020 .000 .011 
         
F-test of var. above  .014**  .000***  .663  .000*** 
# observations 1261        
         
C. Investment loans 
         
Caste heterogeneity .014 .051 -.044 .050 .034 .044 -.048 .023** 
Caste heterogeneity squared .000 .001 .000 .001 -.000 .001 .001 .000** 
Programme dummy 2.083 .691*** 2.148 .610*** .463 .433 .907 .243*** 
         
F-test of var. above  .007***  .001***  .595  .000*** 
# observations 1167        
         
D. Investment loans (including interaction) 
         
Caste heterogeneity .014 .059 -.029 .053 .044 .051 -.052 .022** 
Caste heterogeneity squared .000 .001 .000 .001 -.000 .001 .001 .000*** 
Programme dummy 1.937 1.868 3.235 1.254** .906 1.117 .399 .562 
Interaction term 
progr.*heterogeneity 
.004 .041 -.026 .053 -.009 .025 .012 .012 
         
F-test of var. above  .017**  .000***  .672  .001*** 
# observations 1167        
         
E. Consumption loans         
         
Caste heterogeneity .001 .019 -.040 .031 .034 .035 .014 .009 
Caste heterogeneity squared .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 -.000 .000 
Programme dummy .467 .245* .457 .429 .610 .622 .573 .168*** 
         
F-test of var. above  .273  .264  .060*  .004*** 
# observations 1226        
         
(see next page)         
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(Table 6.11 cntd.) (Friends/ 
Neighbors) 
(Relatives) (Bank) (No loan) 
 Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e. Cf. s.e. Cf. s.e. 
 
        
F. Consumption loans (including interaction) 
         
Caste heterogeneity -.006 .019 -.031 .030 .033 .033 .014 .010 
Caste heterogeneity squared -.000 .000 .000 .000 -.000 .001 -.000 .000 
Programme dummy -.911 .729 1.417 .990 -.212 1.316 .624 .478 
Interaction term 
progr.*heterogeneity 
.031 .015** -.021 .021 .018 .025 -.001 .010 
         
F-test of var. above  .077*  .171  .082*  .010** 
# observations 1226        
         
*: p<0.10, **: p<0.05, ***: p<0.01. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at 
the village level. Taking a loan from the moneylender is the base outcome. 
 
coefficient. The second specification introduces the programme dummy variable as well as its 
interaction term with heterogeneity. If the programme affects loans from friends, neighbors 
and relatives by lowering the negative effect of heterogeneity, the coefficient on the 
interaction term should be positive and statistically significant. Otherwise, any programme 
effect on informal loans runs through other channels. The remaining control variables are also 
included in the estimations but not shown in the table.194  
Column (i) gives the results for the probability that a household has taken a loan from 
friends or neighbors in the past year instead of a moneylender. Overall, the findings clearly 
show that households in programme villages are significantly more likely than control 
households to have borrowed from their friends or neighbors. The programme dummy 
variables in panels A, C and E are large, positive and significant. Caste heterogeneity 
negatively affects this likelihood for all loans combined, although the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Including the interaction term (panels B, D and F) suggests that the 
main channel through which the programme affects informal credit transactions is through the 
reduction of negative heterogeneity effects. The programme variable becomes insignificant 
but the interaction term with heterogeneity is positive and highly significant. However, we do 
not find evidence of this channel for investment loans.  
The results for the probability of borrowing from relatives versus moneylenders are 
given in column (ii). Panels A, B, C and D show a strong positive relationship between the 
programme and informal lending among family. Loans from relatives for consumption 
purposes are not more prevalent in programme villages however, only loans for investment 
purposes. The results also confirm the negative effect of heterogeneity on loans from 
relatives. However, the coefficients on the interaction term between programme and 
                                                 
194
 The village development index is dropped from the estimations in panels A and B because of 
multicollinearity.  
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heterogeneity are not statistically significant (panels B, D and F). This suggests that any effect 
of the programme on credit from relatives is generated via other pathways. In other words, the 
mechanisms underlying loans from friends and neighbors versus loans from relatives seem to 
diverge in this respect.195  
Access to formal credit from banks (column iii) is not related to the presence of the 
programme, or to levels of heterogeneity. Although the variables are jointly significant at the 
10% error level in panels E and F, the predicted probability that households would borrow 
money from the bank to pay for consumption purposes is extremely small at less than 1 
percent. Overall, these findings indicate that the restricted access to formal credit is unaffected 
by the Mahila Samakhya programme. 
Finally, column (iv) gives the estimates for the option of not taking credit versus 
borrowing from the moneylender. Households in programme villages are significantly less 
likely to take a loan (panels A, C, E). 196 The insignificant coefficients on the interaction terms 
suggest that this finding holds irrespective of the levels of heterogeneity in the community 
(panels B, D, F). As found in the control villages only, heterogeneity is not significantly 
related to the overall probability of taking a loan. But it is positively related to borrowing for 
investment purposes and negatively related to borrowing for consumption purposes, although 
the latter effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels.  
 
6.6.2  Marginal effects of heterogeneity and the programme on informal credit 
In terms of marginal effects, the programme has a rather striking impact on investment 
loans in programme villages. The programme has a positive effect on loans from friends and 
neighbors and on loans from relatives of 1.4 and 0.2 percentage points respectively. These 
small increases in absolute terms are far from sufficient to make up for the drop in loans from 
moneylenders of 6.0 percentage points. Overall, a change in the programme dummy variable 
from zero to one leads to a reduction of households taking investment loans with 5.7 
percentage points. In other words, the programme appears to have substantially reduced the 
number of investment loans. Although the relative prevalence of loans from social relations 
compared to credit from moneylenders is substantially larger in programme villages, the 
overall reduction in investment loans results in a small absolute increase in informal social 
credit. The marginal effect of the interaction term between the programme and heterogeneity 
is negligible and statistically insignificant. 
                                                 
195
 An alternative specification combines friends, neighbors and relatives into one ‘social relations’-category as 
source of credit. Wherever the coefficients for the ‘friends/neighbors’-category are similar to the coefficients for 
the ‘relatives’-category, the results are robust to the aggregation into one combined category. However, in some 
specifications the coefficients of the programme dummy variable mirror each other, such as in panel B. In those 
cases, the coefficients for the combined category are statistically less significant and marginal effects become 
smaller. 
196
 Compared to a logit estimation of the probability of taking a loan, the signs of the coefficients will be 
reversed. 
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Similarly, non-participants in programme villages are 11.1 percentage points less 
likely to have taken a loan for consumption purposes in the past year. Again, the reduction in 
credit transactions affects mainly the percentage loans from moneylenders, which decreases 
with 12.6 percent. Although non-participants in programme villages obtain significantly more 
credit from friends and neighbors instead of from the moneylender than control households, 
the ultimate effect on the absolute percentage of social borrowing is small with a marginal 
increase of 1.0 and 0.3 percentage points for friends/neighbors and relatives respectively.  
In contrast to investment loans, the interaction between the programme and 
heterogeneity is positive and significant for consumption loans. In fact, once this interaction 
term is introduced in the specification (panel F), the marginal effect of the programme 
variable on loans from friends/neighbors becomes minus 11.6 percent. The marginal effect on 
loans from relatives stays positive at 3.3 percent. The effect on loans from moneylenders 
remains negative at minus 9.1 percent.  
This does not yet take into account the positive and significant effect of the interaction 
term. Evaluated at the mean of the variables, each point increase in the heterogeneity index 
reduces consumption loans from friends and neighbors with 0.1 percent in control villages. 
But in programme villages, each point increase is related to a separate increase of 0.3 percent, 
i.e. a net increase of 0.2 percentage points per additional heterogeneity point. Around the 
mean of the explanatory variables, the heterogeneity index is 44 points. Assuming a linear 
marginal effect, the impact of the programme on loans from social relations is small in 
communities of average heterogeneity. As heterogeneity increases and such loans become 
increasingly less likely in control villages, the programme appears to counteract this effect. 
That is, for high levels of heterogeneity, households have significantly more access to 
informal loans if they live in a programme village. This confirms our hypothesis regarding the 
problems of limited enforcement in more diverse communities, and the positive impact of 
Mahila Samakhya on attenuating this problem.  
The other side of the coin is more unexpected. At very low levels of heterogeneity, i.e. 
in homogeneous communities, the negative impact of the programme on the absolute 
prevalence of informal loans actually dominates the programme’s positive effect on trust and 
resource sharing. The next section 6.6.3 will discuss in more detail some potential 
explanations for this decrease in the number of loan transactions, both of investment and 
consumption loans. 
A final specification, not shown here, estimates the likelihood of investment and 
consumption loans per credit source conditional on taking a loan. That is, the option not to 
take up credit is omitted from the choice categories. These alternative specifications yield 
highly comparable coefficients for both investment and consumption loans as in Table 6.11. 
However –and quite naturally-, the marginal effects are different because they do not take into 
account the drop in loans. They only record the relative shifts across lender categories.  
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Omitting the ‘non-borrowers’ from the analysis yields the following marginal effects. 
In programme villages, households who borrowed for investment last year were 22.0 
percentage points less likely to do so from moneylenders and instead 17.7 and 3.6 percentage 
points more likely to borrow from friends/neighbors and relatives respectively (compare the 
specification in panel C). Again, the interaction term between the programme and the 
heterogeneity variable does not yield additional insights in investment loans (compare panel 
D).  
In addition, households living in programme villages who took up credit for 
consumption in the past year are 8.7 percentage points less likely to borrow from 
moneylenders. Rather, they are 6.2 and 2.2 percentage points more likely to borrow from 
friends/neighbors and relatives (compare panel E). Although the marginal effect of the 
programme has a negative sign when the interaction term is included in the specification, the 
effect is not statistically significant. The interaction term itself, equal to 0.5 percentage point 
for each additional heterogeneity point in programme villages, is significant at the 5% error 
level (compare panel F). These findings indicate that any negative effects of the programme 
on informal credit are due mainly to a lower demand for credit in general, not due to a 
decrease in credit from friends, neighbors or relatives. 
 
6.6.3  Summary and discussion of Mahila Samakhya’s impact 
The findings reveal several patterns. First of all, households in programme villages are 
substantially more likely to borrow from friends and neighbors instead of the moneylender 
than households in control villages. Especially for consumption loans, this increase in social 
lending seems to be related to an attenuating effect of the programme on the negative 
consequences of heterogeneity, confirming our second hypothesis. The programme appears to 
have enhanced informal credit transactions among households especially in very 
heterogeneous communities. In homogeneous communities on the other hand, such informal 
arrangements are less likely in programme villages.  
Second, the results show that households in programme villages are also significantly 
more likely to borrow from relatives. However, this finding remains confined to investment 
loans. Moreover, we do not find evidence that the programme has diminished the negative 
effect of heterogeneity on the number of credit transactions among family members. That is, 
borrowing from relatives seems affected by other processes than borrowing from friends and 
neighbors.  
Third, access to bank loans is not affected in any way by the presence of the 
programme, at least not for non-participants in programme villages.197 Finally, households in 
programme villages are substantially less likely to have taken up a new loan in the past year, 
                                                 
197
 Participants in programme villages can access loans through group lending schemes via the Mahila Samakhya 
savings and credit groups. 
 211 
whether it be investment or consumption loans. The following paragraphs will discuss this 
further.  
A first explanation for the drop in loan transactions is a substitution of informal credit 
arrangements with informal risk-sharing arrangements in programme villages. The evidence 
from previous chapters strongly suggests that Mahila Samakhya has increased interactions 
across castes and religions (chapter 3) as well as trust and collective action within the broader 
community (chapter 4).The results from the last section show how informal credit 
transactions become more prevalent as well, largely because the programme attenuates the 
negative effect of heterogeneity on informal arrangements. It seems very likely that the 
programme would have a similar effect on mutual risk-sharing arrangements such as gift-
giving and other transfers among households. That is, a plausible explanation for the 
reduction in informal loans would be a simultaneous increase in informal transfers. 
To test this explanation requires a model that incorporates all coping mechanisms, 
including gifts, transfers and remittances. Unfortunately, our crude measures of financial and 
other assistance do not allow for such an analysis. The dummy variables capture only whether 
or not a household has received any assistance at all in the past year, but not how often nor 
how much. The descriptive statistics in section 6.2.1 could not capture a significant difference 
in financial aid received between programme and control households. However, the results in 
chapter 4 suggest that, controlling for a large number of household and community 
characteristics, the programme might in fact have increased financial aid and non-paid labor, 
although food-sharing and care-giving activities are not significantly more common in 
programme villages.  
Second, it is possible that control households (who are more likely to borrow from 
moneylenders than from friends, neighbors or relatives) are forced more often to take new 
loans in order to repay all debts plus the very high interest rates involved. That is, the means 
of financing expenditures may push control households in a long-lasting indebted position 
towards moneylenders. Unfortunately, our data do not contain information on whether loans 
were taken for the first time or meant to repay loans from the previous year. But qualitative 
evidence suggests for example that escaping the tight grip of the moneylenders is one of the 
main reasons for many participants to join the Mahila Samakhya credit group.  
A third explanation could be that the programme has somehow affected the shocks 
occurring in programme villages, thereby affecting the need for credit as a coping mechanism. 
For example, Mahila Samakhya may have increased knowledge in programme villages not 
only on immunization and education (chapter 5) but also on special government schemes for 
disadvantaged groups or on innovative agricultural methods for example. If such knowledge 
has reached non-participants as well, it might have improved households’ self-insurance 
capacity, thereby reducing the overall demand for emergency credit. Indeed, control 
households are significantly more likely to have borrowed for food purposes (Table 6.5), 
which might be an indication that they have run more often into acute liquidity problems.  
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We do not find any indication that the lower levels of borrowing among non-
participants versus control households are related to selection bias. If especially the 
households that were most interested in taking up credit would join Mahila Samakhya, then 
our approach could yield biased estimates. The analysis compares the entire group of 
households in control villages with the smaller group of households in programme villages 
who did not decide to join Mahila Samakhya. To further examine this possibility, we also 
estimated the models including the participants in the analysis. The results are weighted for 
the disproportional sample selection of participants and non-participants in programme 
villages. Loans from the credit groups are included jointly with bank loans under one ‘other’-
category, in addition to loans from moneylenders, from friends and neighbors, from relatives 
or not taking a loan at all.  
The results, not shown here, do not differ substantially from the results for the 
restricted sample. The coefficients of the multinomial logit estimations both for investment 
and consumption loans are of the same order of magnitude and statistical significance. The 
two exceptions are the programme variable coefficients for the ‘other’-category that are .742 
(standard error .420) and 1.139 (standard error .386) for investment and consumption 
respectively. That is, as expected, the programme significantly increases loan transactions in 
the ‘other’-category that now also contains loans from the Mahila Samakhya credit group. 
Marginal effects of the programme on access to credit are highly comparable as well, 
mirroring the findings as described in the previous section. Hence, we do not find indications 
that the lower percentage of borrowers among non-participants is due to an important and 
distorting selection bias in our analysis. 
The evidence also does not support the explanation that participants disproportionately 
‘jumped’ into good investment opportunities, at the detriment of non-participant households. 
Participants’ membership in the credit groups especially affects women’s investment 
opportunities. But a comparison of the income-generating activities of women in control 
households versus non-participant households shows that non-participants do not perform 
significantly worse in this respect. An equal percentage of female household members has 
engaged in production, collection, trade or other activities. In fact, the one activity in which 
both groups differ is farming, which is slightly (but significantly) more prevalent among non-
participants than control women at 3.4 percent versus 0.8 percent. 198  
In sum, the drop in informal credit arrangements in programme villages most likely 
results from one of three mechanisms: a simultaneous increase in informal risk-sharing 
arrangements, a reduced need to roll over debt, and perhaps a reduced demand for 
                                                 
198
 The percentages of households within the control group and the non-participant group respectively where 
female household members are engaged in production activities: 1.8 versus 1.8 percent (p-value .989), collection 
of wood, fruits, dung for sale: 0.4 versus 0.1 percent (p-value .342), trade: 0.6 versus 2.4 percent (p-value .221), 
farming: 0.8 versus 3.4 percent (p-value .092), other income-generating activities: 6.6 versus 7.3 percent (p-
value .799). 
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(emergency) credit because of enhanced risk prevention and mitigation strategies among non-
participants compared to the control group. 
  
6.7 Conclusion 
 
Access to formal bank loans remains problematic for many households in Bihar. As a 
result, especially the more disadvantaged households have no other option than to accept the 
usurious interest rates asked by local moneylenders. Consequently, they mainly borrow for 
emergency purposes and initiate relatively little investments that could increase their future 
buffer capacity. Although a greater share of credit from other households would benefit many, 
the prevalence of credit from friends, neighbors or relatives is limited. An important reason 
for the lack of informal transactions lies in the limited enforcement opportunities among 
households that increase the risk of default.  
This chapter investigated the role of heterogeneity as a main factor in preventing 
informal credit arrangements from taking place. To the extent that informal sanctions are less 
effective across caste or religious boundaries, we would expect community level 
heterogeneity to decrease the size of the risk pool to which a household belongs. As 
hypothesized, we find a significant negative relationship between heterogeneity in the 
community and the share of credit transactions from other households versus the 
moneylender. This strongly suggests that heterogeneity substantially reduces the ability of 
households to engage in informal credit arrangements. 
However, heterogeneity does not only have a negative effect on loan transactions. 
Whereas consumption loans are substantially less common in heterogeneous villages, 
investment loans for business, cattle, construction or agriculture are positively related to 
heterogeneity. In other words, diversity in a community seems to increase the odds that 
households identify profitable investment opportunities, enhancing the risk-management 
strategies of poor households.  
Nonetheless, the negative effect of heterogeneity on loans from friends, neighbors or 
relatives is worrisome. This implies that households in heterogeneous communities will be 
even more vulnerable to fall into destitute poverty after an income shock. However, as 
discussed in chapter four, the Mahila Samakhya programme significantly affects the social 
capital in programme villages in terms of trust and cooperative behavior. Indeed, the results 
indicate that these processes extend to informal credit transactions as well. Households in 
programme villages are significantly more likely to borrow money from other households 
instead of the moneylender. The programme attenuates the negative impact of heterogeneity 
on loans from friends and neighbors, especially in the very heterogeneous communities. 
Programme effects on loans from relatives on the other hand do not run through an interaction 
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with heterogeneity. This suggests that friends and neighbors rely more heavily on social 
sanctions than relatives, who may have other enforcement strategies at their disposal. 
In addition, we find a substantial reduction in the total number of loans in programme 
villages. We hypothesize that this decrease may be matched by a simultaneous increase in 
informal risk-sharing arrangements, a reduced need to roll over debt, and improved risk 
management strategies in programme villages. Unfortunately, we cannot test for these 
explanations directly, due to data limitations. 
Policy measures to reduce heterogeneity are undesirable as they are likely to increase 
communal conflicts and cause further marginalization of disadvantaged groups. Moreover, 
they are difficult to implement without coercion. In addition, heterogeneity can also have 
positive effects on communities’ development that are often ignored in the discussion. The 
results in this chapter point towards a different direction. Instead of designing measures to 
enhance homogeneity, community-based development programmes that encourage trust, 
solidarity and joint action across castes and religious groups may be an attractive policy 
instrument to circumvent the negative consequences of heterogeneity on cooperation, while at 
the same time preserving the positive effects of diversity.  
 Chapter 7  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
There is an increasing call among tax-payers and financial donors to evaluate the 
effectiveness of development aid. However, quantitative impact evaluations of development 
projects, especially of community-based development (CBD) projects, are still limited. Based 
on a unique dataset this dissertation evaluates a particular CBD project, the Mahila Samakhya 
programme in India. It estimates the programme’s effect on social capital, cooperation, 
immunization, school enrolment and credit.  
The most prominent finding of the thesis relates to the substantial externalities that the 
programme generates for the broader community. Not taking into account such spillover 
effects can lead to a substantial under- (or over-) estimation of a programme’s impact. In 
addition, the dissertation refutes the pessimistic stance that the impact of development aid 
cannot be measured.199 Even without a randomized implementation and in the absence of a 
baseline survey, the slow scaling up of a programme can offer good opportunities to construct 
a comparable control group as counterfactual.  
This concluding chapter will first briefly describe the Mahila Samakhya programme in 
Bihar. Next, it recapitulates the three main research questions. Section three summarizes the 
findings from the empirical chapters. The results are followed by a discussion of 
methodological issues. Section five sketches the limitations of the dissertation and provides 
suggestions for further research. The final section draws a number of policy 
recommendations.  
 
7.1 Background: The Mahila Samakhya programme in Bihar 
 
Living conditions in the North-Indian state Bihar are extremely harsh. Poverty is 
widespread. Many government services are of poor quality. Markets such as the credit market 
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 See for example the report of the Commissie Draagvlak en Effectiviteit Ontwikkelings-samenwerking (de 
‘Commissie Dijkstal’), “Vertrouwen in een kwetsbare sector?”, 6 April 2006. 
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are malfunctioning. These features of the Bihari economy, common to many other developing 
regions, call for action of the population to jointly address public good provision where the 
government fails and to engage in informal transactions among each other where access to 
formal markets is restricted. But despite the benefits attached to cooperation, few households 
in Bihar actually participate in collective action or in informal credit- and risk-sharing 
arrangements.  
Especially the often illiterate women, regularly confined to a life of seclusion and 
subordination, remain conspicuously absent from the public domain. To address the lack of 
collective action and solidarity among women, the Mahila Samakhya programme was 
introduced in Bihar in 1992. This women’s empowerment programme mobilizes and supports 
low-caste and otherwise disadvantaged women to identify and address their most urgent needs 
through joint action. In spite of the initial focus on education, over time the women’s groups 
have addressed a broad range of issues. 
The approach of Mahila Samakhya to development is far from exceptional. 
Development organizations increasingly recognize the importance of involving communities 
in project design and management. Among many other anticipated benefits, community-based 
development (CBD) would strengthen social capital in terms of trust, social interactions and 
norms of cooperation among community members. In turn, this would enhance communities’ 
propensity to engage in collective action and empower them to become increasingly in control 
of their own future. In addition, enhanced social capital might generate potentially important 
externalities on the broader community, affecting socio-economic outcomes of households 
regardless of their own contributions to village life. 
 
7.2 Recapitulation of the research questions 
 
Given the increasingly large amounts of development aid devoted to CBD projects and 
the extensive literature on social capital and cooperation, surprisingly few quantitative 
empirical studies test the commonly accepted assumptions regarding social capital, 
cooperation and CBD projects. Empirical research that measures the spillover effects of CBD 
projects on the broader community is even scarcer. However, quantitative evidence on 
programme impact is necessary to make sound policy decisions. It either provides support for 
further expansion of CBD funding or else it might temper the too optimistic expectations 
regarding this channel of development aid. In addition, evaluations can highlight strong 
project components or point out opportunities for further improvement. 
Using a unique, large-scale dataset of the Mahila Samakhya programme in Bihar, this 
dissertation has aimed to fill in parts of the gap in empirical evidence. The dataset 
encompasses 1991 households in 102 villages. It consists of 74 villages where the programme 
is active, and 28 comparable control villages where the programme is not yet implemented. 
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We randomly selected 20 households in each village for inclusion in the survey. In 
programme villages, both participants in the women’s groups and non-participants were 
interviewed.  
Three general research questions were leading throughout the thesis. First of all, does 
the evidence yield support for the existence of a virtuous cycle between social capital and 
cooperation? And if so, is a CBD project such as Mahila Samakhya able to set in motion this 
self-reinforcing mechanism? This has been the main point of interest in chapter four.  
Second, to what extent has Mahila Samakhya, through its impact on social capital and 
cooperation, been able to improve socio-economic outcomes in the programme villages? 
Chapter five focused on outcomes in terms of immunization and school enrolment. It 
discussed enhanced collective action as well as information diffusion as the most important 
underlying mechanisms for the generation of externalities. Outcomes in terms of informal 
credit transactions among households were the main topic of chapter six. In this respect, 
decreased monitoring and enforcement costs were put forward as the mechanism through 
which social capital influenced cooperation.  
The third general research question that was addressed in the three empirical chapters 
refers to spillover effects. The generation of externalities among members of a group is one of 
the core aspects of most definitions of social capital. To what extent has the Mahila Samakhya 
programme been able to generate externalities on non-participants in programme villages, in 
terms of cooperative behavior, child outcomes or access to credit? Especially chapter five 
paid a lot of attention to the measurement of externalities in programme evaluation. This is 
hardly ever done in impact evaluations. 
 
7.3 Summary of the findings 
 
Overall, the results support part of the hypotheses while rejecting others. Chapter four 
examined the relationship between social capital in terms of trust and norms of reciprocity on 
the one hand and cooperation in terms of informal assistance and collective action on the 
other hand. It finds evidence of a strong relationship between norms of reciprocity, both at the 
individual and at the community level, and cooperation. Especially in small communities, the 
threat of social sanctions is effective in enhancing cooperation. However, individual norms of 
reciprocity are not unambiguously positive for cooperation. They will encourage an individual 
to cooperate or not, depending on the average levels of cooperation of others in the 
community.  
In contrast to expectations however, trust only increases informal assistance but not 
participation in collective action. Conversely, positive past experiences with cooperation 
increase trust, but only in programme villages. This could stem in part from the explicit trust-
building efforts of the programme. It could also indicate a critical level of cooperation that a 
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community needs to reach before households adapt their expectations regarding the 
cooperative intentions of others. Thus, we find evidence of a virtuous cycle between social 
capital and assistance in programme villages, but not between social capital and collective 
action. In other words, Mahila Samakhya will not be able to create a multiplier effect on 
communities’ joint actions, at least not through this pathway.  
Nonetheless, the results suggest a strong direct programme impact on collective 
action. Contributions to school maintenance and infrastructure projects are substantially larger 
in programme villages, probably due to several processes: a greater awareness about the 
benefits of joint action, the availability of additional resources, and enhanced confidence in 
one’s own and one’s neighbors’ ability to change the status quo. Moreover, the findings 
indicate that both participants and non-participants in Mahila Samakhya villages have become 
more trusting and more likely to engage in collective action.  
Increased trust and cooperation are valuable outcomes in themselves of course, but 
ultimately CBD projects such as Mahila Samakhya aim to improve socio-economic outcomes 
of the households involved. Therefore, chapter five explicitly looks at the impact of the 
programme on the immunization and school enrolment rates of children in programme 
villages, with a specific emphasis on externalities. The findings show that the programme has 
had a significant and large impact on immunization rates, preschool enrolment and school 
enrolment of children whose mothers participate in Mahila Samakhya. In addition, it has had 
a substantial spillover effect on children whose mothers do not participate themselves, but 
who live in a village where the programme is active. The immunization rates against 
tuberculosis, DTP and measles (but not polio), the preschool enrolment rates and the school 
enrolment rates of girls (but not boys) are significantly larger among non-participants than 
among the control group. These indirect effects are at least forty percent of the direct impact 
on participants.  
The main mechanisms that have led to the externalities on immunization are thought 
to lie in information diffusion through daily social interactions as well as immunization 
campaigns organized by the women’s groups. In addition, there is some evidence that the 
programme may have increased the pressure on public health officers to improve their 
performance. The increased enrolment rates are to a large extent related to the improved 
access. In many programme villages, parents have jointly set up informal preschools and 
primary girls’ schools. In addition, demand for education has increased due to a greater 
awareness about the importance of education and perhaps better school quality. The fact that 
spillovers are found mainly among the Scheduled Castes population and a lot less among 
Muslims underscores the importance of interactions within social networks shaped by caste 
and religion. 
Chapter six takes up the issue of caste and religious heterogeneity further and relates it 
to informal credit transactions among households. In situations of limited enforcement, 
repeated social interactions are essential for monitoring and social sanctioning, which in turn 
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reduce the risk of default. For a given population size, heterogeneity reduces the size of social 
networks, or risk pools, and hence the likelihood that a household can borrow money from its 
friends, neighbors or relatives. In that case, households have no other option than to accept the 
usurious interest rates of local moneylenders. The results confirm that heterogeneity in the 
village has a negative effect on the probability of lending from friends, neighbors or relatives 
instead of the moneylender. However, they also indicate that heterogeneity can have a 
positive impact on the risk management strategies of households. In more diverse villages, 
households are more likely to obtain credit for investment (in contrast to credit for 
consumption) and thus more likely to improve their future income-generating capacity. This 
positive effect of heterogeneity is often ignored.  
The Mahila Samakhya programme attenuates the negative impact of heterogeneity on 
informal loans from friends and neighbors, most likely because it enhances trust, interactions 
and cooperation across caste barriers. Nonetheless, we find that the overall number of loans, 
regardless of their source, is lower in programme villages. Potential mechanisms that lead to 
this reduction in credit transactions are a simultaneous increase in informal risk-sharing 
transactions (such as gifts or other forms of assistance), a reduced need to roll over debt with 
extremely high interest payments, and improved risk management strategies in programme 
villages versus the control group. The results in chapter six apply to non-participant 
households, i.e. they capture spillover effects of the programme on the broader community. In 
contrast, participants in programme villages make extensive use of their access to the rotating 
savings and credit groups of Mahila Samakhya.  
 
7.4 Methodological issues 
 
From the analysis, a number of methodological issues emerge. First of all, it is 
indisputable that a truly randomized implementation of the programme or at least the 
availability of baseline data would have made the impact evaluation a lot more 
straightforward. But often randomization is politically or practically unfeasible. Likewise, the 
number of programmes that start with a baseline survey before implementation is so limited 
that it would reduce evaluation opportunities dramatically. A restriction to such optimal 
conditions would imply that it is too late to evaluate the large majority of currently ongoing 
projects. However, organizational constraints often lead to a gradual expansion of 
development programmes. The slow scaling up of programmes allows for a quasi-
experimental survey design. As discussed in chapter three, the matching procedure of the 
Mahila Samakhya programme blocks with control blocks resulted in a treatment group and a 
highly comparable control group to serve as counterfactual.  
Second, our approach of using three sample groups including both participants and 
non-participants in programme villages as well as control households is a relatively easy way 
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of capturing externalities of community programmes on the broader community. On the other 
hand, the treatment group may be defined such that it encompasses all potential beneficiaries, 
both direct and indirect, of a programme. In that case, the impact estimates will capture the 
entire programme effect. However, such broad categories dilute the effect on participants that 
most programme managers will be interested in, and do not allow for a separate analysis of 
externalities. 
Another advantage of having a control group as well as participants and non-
participants in programme villages is that it allows for a direct test of the exclusion restriction 
for instrumental variables. It is often very difficult to plausibly argue that a variable only 
affects an outcome variable through its effect on the participation decision. When the 
correlation between the instrument and the outcome variable can be tested directly in the 
control group and is found to be small and insignificant, this provides a strong argument for 
its exclusion from the outcome equation and hence for its validity as an instrument. 
A fourth methodological comment resulting from the empirical analysis is the 
importance of looking beyond correlations and trying to disentangle the direction of causality 
instead. This can yield surprising and unexpected findings, as chapter four shows regarding 
the relationship between trust and collective action.  
Fifth, the ambiguous relation between individual norms of reciprocity and cooperation 
underscores once more that strong norms cannot always be considered as “good”. The social 
capital literature often assumes that strong norms are beneficial for group members. But 
whether that is true depends crucially on the context and the outcomes under consideration.  
Finally, the last chapter clearly showed how aggregation into a single group can mask 
otherwise strong but opposite effects of a variable on the underlying categories. The negative 
effect of heterogeneity on the prevalence of (informal) consumption loans is counteracted by 
the positive effect on investments in diverse communities. An analysis of the total amount of 
loans does not pick up either effect but results in a small and statistically insignificant 
coefficient on the heterogeneity variable.  
 
7.5 Suggestions for further research 
 
A number of limitations, especially with respect to the available data, points towards 
directions of further research. As mentioned before, a panel dataset would have greatly 
facilitated the analysis, not only of programme impact, but also of the underlying dynamics in 
terms of trust, norms and cooperation. Two survey rounds at a one-year interval for example 
would allow for a direct comparison of initial with ultimate levels of trust and link the change 
to collective activities during the intermediate period. This is likely to yield more precise 
estimates that are easier to interpret. Such an approach would also allow testing our 
assumption of relatively stable norms of reciprocity over time.  
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In addition, the measurement of trust and reciprocity would have benefited if 
complemented with alternative proxy variables. Such variables could be derived from 
behavior in experimental games or from standardized, validated psychological tools. The 
ongoing discussion regarding the validity of survey measures of trust certainly warrants the 
additional efforts of collecting attitudinal data in a variety of ways. A substantial number of 
experiments focuses on the measurement of trust. A similar exercise for the measurement of 
norms of reciprocity would be very useful in this respect. Likewise, it would be interesting to 
test the validity of empowerment-related survey questions with experiments specifically 
designed to measure empowerment in situations of household bargaining as well as collective 
action in the public domain. 
To improve our understanding of the underlying mechanisms, additional research that 
explicitly incorporates social network effects appears to be a logical next step. Survey data 
yield suggestive evidence that externalities are generated through the daily social interactions 
among women in a village. But a social network analysis can provide a much more thorough 
analysis of the type of links (in terms of strength, distance, etc.) that are particularly important 
to disseminate specific types of information. This would yield valuable guidelines to optimize 
the effects of awareness raising campaigns for example. Similarly, better insights into the 
characteristics of social links among households that facilitate credit and other informal 
transactions would further increase our understanding of how to reduce the obstacles to 
cooperation among households when formal markets are still malfunctioning.  
More detailed information on the motivations of individuals to contribute to 
community projects would also be very valuable. A greater emphasis on the role of 
empowerment and self-confidence seems to be especially promising. Perhaps the virtuous 
cycle, absent for the relationship between collective action and trust, is found instead for the 
relationship between collective action and empowerment, self-confidence and voice. This 
would suggest including a more psychological perspective into theories of collective action, 
incorporating concepts such as the locus of control in addition to the economic building 
blocks of behavior. 
The disadvantaged position of the Mahila Samakhya target group in Bihar may be 
representative of the role and experiences of women in South Asia, but not in other parts of 
the world. In most African countries for example, women’s associations and other voluntary 
community groups play a strong and important role in daily life. In such circumstances, it is 
possible that prior experiences with collective action induce individuals to fully participate in 
a new CBD project right from its introduction in the community. This calls for care when 
transposing the findings to a different social context. 
Finally, the extrapolation of the results to other types of CBD projects is not as 
straightforward as it may seem. The Mahila Samakhya programme puts a strong emphasis on 
the initial period of sensitization and trust-building which may take up to a year in some 
cases. In contrast, many CBD projects provide community members with a only a few days or 
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a few weeks at most of participatory training activities, based on a philosophy of ‘learning-
by-doing’. However, many projects are dealing with minorities such as Scheduled Castes, 
indigenous populations or women. It is highly questionable whether such a short period of 
capacity building is sufficient to overcome people’s long-term habituation to exclusionary 
mechanisms within a social system. In that sense, our results may provide an upper bound of 
the impact to be expected from CBD projects that work especially with minority groups. 
Therefore, it would be very interesting to set up a comparative impact evaluation of CBD 
projects that share their objectives but differ in their design. Is Mahila Samakhya successful 
because of its careful but slow approach or would a different project be able to reach similar 
results with a substantially more rapid initial stage of mobilization?  
 
7.6 Policy recommendations 
 
What do these findings and results teach us for future development policies? First of 
all, it is clear that a women’s empowerment programme such as Mahila Samakhya, which 
focuses on trust-building, solidarity and collective action, can have a substantial impact on the 
social and economic situation of the households involved.  
Moreover, the effects may reach far beyond its direct participants. Children are 
substantially more likely to be immunized and enrolled when a women’s group is active in 
their community regardless of their mothers’ own participation. Households become 
significantly less dependent on the notorious moneylenders for credit, even if they are not a 
member of Mahila Samakhya themselves. Not taking into account such externalities in impact 
evaluations might seriously underestimate programme impact. To the extent that continuation 
of funding is dependent on cost-benefit analyses, biased impact estimates could ultimately 
lead to the termination of effective projects.  
Despite their successes, the Mahila Samakhya groups do not reach all disadvantaged 
children in the villages to an equal extent. Whereas Scheduled Castes children benefit a lot 
from the spillovers, Muslim children are affected substantially less by the programme. Given 
the extremely low immunization and enrolment rates among Muslims, the programme should 
pay considerably more attention to the active involvement of Muslims in order to counteract 
any exclusionary mechanism that hampers the participation of Muslim women in the 
women’s groups.  
The Mahila Samakhya programme not only improves child outcomes, it also 
attenuates the negative impact of heterogeneity on informal loan transactions among friends 
and neighbors. Meanwhile, diversity can also positively affect the demand for investment 
loans, which is often ignored in discussions about heterogeneity. It is considered a challenge 
to formulate policies that lift the negative impact of heterogeneity on informal credit without 
resorting to the undesirable measures of coercive migration or segregation and without 
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hampering the positive effects on investment loans. Our results show that a programme that 
fosters inter-caste and inter-religious trust and cooperation may be a good alternative. 
Some reservations are in place. The programme appears to be very successful in 
improving a number of outcomes that were identified to be the main benefits of Mahila 
Samakhya by the community members. Except for school enrolment, these outcomes were 
not identified as such in the original project objectives. Moreover, the women’s groups 
operate at their own pace and take up new activities at their own demand. The careful period 
of sensitization and empowerment by facilitators prevents the programme from rapidly 
coming to scale. That is, funders of the programme are neither fully in control of financial 
disbursements nor of project outcomes. Obviously, this asks for a great patience on their part 
as well as a considerable devolution of control to local communities. It is to be seen whether 
this is compatible with the internal incentive and reward mechanisms of multilateral and other 
donors.  
Despite the evidence of the positive impact of Mahila Samakhya, the findings do not 
support the hypothesis that the programme has set in motion a self-reinforcing cycle of 
increasing trust and collective action within the community. This result casts serious doubts 
on the potential of other CBD projects to do so, especially since Mahila Samakhya is rather 
unique in the amount of time and efforts that it puts in enhancing social capital and 
cooperation.  
One implication of the absence of such a cycle is that sustainability remains an 
important issue. In fact, at the time of the survey it seemed unlikely that the individual 
women’s groups could function independently of the programme’s support, resources, 
training and stimulation. This is not necessarily a disqualification. If the women’s groups 
reach certain social objectives as effectively and efficiently as the government would, long-
term financial support for the programme would relieve an already overburdened government 
of some of its tasks while at the same time empowering local communities. It does however 
temper the sometimes very optimistic expectations regarding the potential impact of 
community-based development. It also warns against a too rapid withdrawal of development 
organizations out of local communities. A subsequent collapse of collective action could 
throw the entire community into a state of mistrust and apathy, as anecdotal evidence 
suggests. 
Finally, development organizations often seem hesitant to subject themselves to 
rigorous, outside evaluations. Hopefully, this dissertation helps to take away some of their 
fears. Studies should and can be set up broad enough to encompass the most important 
outcomes and the most important beneficiaries of a programme. A positive evaluation will 
provide a powerful tool for fund-raising. Some of the results may be below expectations and 
an evaluation will point this out. But thereby it can help to improve project design and 
enhance future outcomes. Think for example of the finding that Muslim children, who are 
most in need of health interventions, benefit substantially less from the programme than 
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others. In the most extreme case, an evaluation might show that a project performs 
systematically worse than other project types with similar objectives. Also this knowledge is 
important. In a world of limited financial and human resources, evaluations can guide 
decisions of policy-makers and programme managers to invest in the best alternative for 
development.  
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
 
Dit proefschrift bevat een kwantitatieve impactevaluatie van het Mahila Samakhya 
programma in India. Dit ontwikkelingsproject stimuleert vrouwen uit de laagste kasten en 
armste gezinnen om in hun dorp een vrouwengroep op te zetten en met elkaar de meest 
urgente problemen in hun leefsituatie op te lossen. Hoewel dergelijke gemeenschapsprojecten 
een steeds groter aandeel uitmaken van de ontwikkelingshulp bestaan er nauwelijks 
impactstudies die hun effectiviteit beoordelen. Met behulp van een unieke, zelfverzamelde 
dataset analyseert deze dissertatie de effecten van Mahila Samakhya op het sociaal kapitaal, 
de samenwerking en een aantal sociaal-economische uitkomsten in programmadorpen.  
De evaluatie vindt geen bewijs voor het bestaan een virtueuze cirkel tussen toenemend 
sociaal kapitaal en collectieve actie. Wel heeft Mahila Samakhya een directe, positieve 
invloed gehad op het vertrouwen en samenwerking van de deelnemers in de vrouwengroepen. 
Ook heeft het programma de inentingenspercentages, scholing en toegang tot krediet 
substantieel verhoogd. Bovendien zijn er substantiele externe effecten van Mahila Samakhya 
op gezinnen die zelf niet deelnemen aan het programma maar die wel in een programmadorp 
wonen. Dergelijke externaliteiten worden zelden meegenomen in evaluaties. 
 
 
Ontwikkelingsorganisaties betrekken steeds vaker de lokale bevolking in het bedenken 
en uitvoeren van ontwikkelingsprojecten. Een dergelijke benadering wordt ook wel aangeduid 
met de engelse term “Community-based development” (CBD), ofwel “ontwikkeling vanuit de 
gemeenschap”. Men verwacht veel voordelen van CBD projecten ten opzichte van de meer 
traditionele programma’s die door een externe instantie, zoals de centrale overheid, worden 
bedacht en uitgevoerd. Zij zouden bijvoorbeeld beter op de lokale behoeften inspelen en 
efficienter zijn. Een belangrijk effect van CBD projecten zou liggen in de toename van het 
sociaal kapitaal in de dorpen. Het grotere vertrouwen, de toegenomen sociale interacties en 
sterkere samenwerkingsnormen in de lokale gemeenschap zouden op hun beurt de bereidheid 
van de bevolking doen toenemen om met elkaar samen te werken. Indien dit een virtueuze 
cirkel in gang zet, zullen dorpelingen meer en meer in staat zijn om samen hun toekomst in 
eigen hand te nemen.  
 Ondanks de groeiende populariteit en de stijgende budgetten voor CBD projecten zijn 
er nauwelijks kwantitatieve studies die de bovenstaande claims toetsen aan de werkelijkheid. 
Zonder evaluaties is het niet mogelijk om een gedegen oordeel te vellen over de effectiviteit 
van CBD projecten. Dit proefschrift levert nieuwe inzichten in de effecten van CBD 
projecten. 
Het proefschrift omvat een impactevaluatie van het Mahila Samakhya programma in 
India. Dit programma stimuleert vrouwen uit de laagste kasten en armste gezinnen om in hun 
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dorp een vrouwengroep op te zetten en met elkaar hun meest urgente problemen op te lossen. 
In vergelijking tot andere gemeenschapsprojecten besteedt Mahila Samakhya veel aandacht 
aan het opbouwen van vertrouwen en solidariteit om samenwerking mogelijk te maken. Als 
zodanig is het erg geschikt voor een studie naar sociaal kapitaal en coöperatief gedrag. De 
unieke dataset in deze dissertatie is speciaal verzameld voor deze studie. 
Drie algemene onderzoeksvragen liggen ten grondslag aan dit proefschrift. De eerst 
vraag betreft de dynamiek tussen sociaal kapitaal en coöperatief gedrag. Wordt de 
samenwerking in een dorp beïnvloed door het sociaal kapitaal in termen van vertrouwen en 
normen van reciprociteit? Wordt de mate van vertrouwen op haar beurt bepaald door 
samenwerking in het verleden? Zijn er aanwijzingen dat Mahila Samakhya de samenwerking, 
het sociaal kapitaal of beiden heeft beïnvloed en daarmee een virtueuze cirkel in gang heeft 
gezet? 
De tweede onderzoeksvraag meet de impact van Mahila Samakhya op drie indicatoren 
van ontwikkeling: inentingspercentages, scholingspercentages en toegang tot krediet. Hoewel 
samenwerking en sociaal kapitaal waardevol op zichzelf kunnen zijn, gaat het de meeste 
ontwikkelingsprojecten uiteindelijk om het verbeteren van sociale en economische 
omstandigheden.  
De derde onderzoeksvraag analyseert de externe effecten van het programma op de 
bredere gemeenschap, dat wil zeggen op de gezinnen die zelf niet deelnemen aan het 
programma maar die wel in een programmadorp wonen. Dergelijke externaliteiten worden 
vaak in verband gebracht met de effecten van sociaal kapitaal. Tot op heden worden zij 
nauwelijks meegenomen in impactevaluaties van ontwikkelingsprojecten.  
 
Hoofdstuk twee geeft een overzicht van de literatuur op het gebied van sociaal 
kapitaal en coöperatief gedrag. In ontwikkelingslanden is samenwerking tussen gezinnen vaak 
van levensbelang om de dagelijkse harde werkelijkheid van armoede, ontbrekende sociale 
voorzieningen en slecht functionerende markten het hoofd te kunnen bieden. Desondanks 
blijft samenwerking tussen gezinnen vaak uit. Traditioneel verklaren economische theorieën 
het onvermogen om samen te werken aan de hand van het welbekende “prisoner’s dilemma” 
en coördinatieproblemen. Hoewel daarmee het ontbreken van coöperatief gedrag wordt 
uitgelegd, kunnen zulke theorieën niet verklaren waarom in veel andere situaties mensen juist 
wel de handen ineen slaan. Het niveau van sociaal kapitaal, zoals vertrouwen, gedragsnormen, 
sociale interacties en altruïstische motieven, is een vaak ontbrekende maar cruciale factor in 
de analyse van coöperatief gedrag.  
Hoewel er geen algemeen geaccepteerde definitie van sociaal kapitaal bestaat, hebben 
de meeste definities een aantal kenmerken met elkaar gemeen. De interactiepatronen binnen 
sociale netwerken en informele vormen van organisatie (structureel sociaal kapitaal) zijn 
essentieel voor het ontstaan van samenwerking in sociale dilemma’s. Ze creëren vertrouwen 
tussen de leden van de groep, versterken sociale normen en voorkeuren, en vergroten de 
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effectiviteit van sociale sancties en beloningen wanneer normen worden overtreden of juist 
gehandhaafd. Vertrouwen, normen en sancties (cognitief sociaal kapitaal) beïnvloeden op hun 
beurt de prikkels en verwachtingen van mensen en dientengevolge hun bereidheid om samen 
te werken met anderen. Hierdoor genereert sociaal kapitaal externaliteiten voor de leden van 
een groep: het welzijn van de individuen wordt beïnvloed ongeacht hun eigen bijdrage aan het 
sociaal kapitaal. Dit externe effect is niet noodzakelijkerwijs positief voor alle betrokkenen. 
Sterke groepsnormen kunnen bijvoorbeeld leiden tot achterstelling van bepaalde individuen, 
zoals vrouwen in Noord-India. Ook kan een sterk vertrouwen binnen een sociale groep leiden 
tot uitsluiting van anderen buiten de groep. Vooral minderheden worden hier vaak de dupe 
van.  
Dit proefschrift behandelt vier manieren waarop sociaal kapitaal externe effecten 
creëert door het stimuleren van coöperatief gedrag. Het eerste mechanisme gaat over de 
bereidheid om deel te nemen aan collectieve activiteiten ten behoeve van een gezamenlijk 
belang. Het tweede mechanisme gaat over de informele hulp en het uitwisselen van middelen 
tussen gezinnen, zoals geld, goederen, tijd, arbeid of emotionele steun. Het derde mechanisme 
betreft de rol van vertrouwen, normen en sancties in het verminderen van transactiekosten die 
zijn verbonden aan economische handelingen. Dit speelt voornamelijk wanneer het moeilijk is 
om anderen aan hun afspraak te houden, bijvoorbeeld in geval van een wankele rechtstaat, en 
wanneer het kostbaar is om informatie over het gedrag van anderen te verkrijgen. Het vierde 
mechanisme tenslotte gaat over de verspreiding van kennis en over sociale beïnvloeding 
binnen sociale netwerken.  
 
Hoofdstuk drie beschrijft het vrouwenprogramma in de context van de Indiase staat 
Bihar. Ook bespreekt het de quasi-experimentele onderzoeksmethodologie en de 
dataverzameling. De leefomstandigheden in Bihar zijn buitengewoon zwaar. Armoede, 
corruptie en criminaliteit zijn wijdverbreid. Veel overheidsdiensten, zoals de gezondheidszorg 
of het onderwijs, zijn van slechte kwaliteit. Ook de infrastructuur laat zeer te wensen over en 
elektriciteitsproblemen zijn aan de orde van de dag. Bovendien heeft de bevolking te maken 
met slecht functionerende krediet- en andere markten. Er zijn veel voordelen verbonden aan 
samenwerking in deze omstandigheden. Desondanks zijn er maar weinig huishoudens in 
Bihar die daadwerkelijk deelnemen aan collectieve activiteiten of bijvoorbeeld informele 
kredietovereenkomsten aangaan met elkaar.  
Vooral de vrouwen, vaak analfabeet en afgezonderd binnen de vier muren van hun 
huis, schitteren door afwezigheid in het publieke domein. Om het gebrek aan collectieve actie 
en solidariteit onder vrouwen tegen te gaan werd het Mahila Samakhya programme in 1992 
geïntroduceerd in Bihar. Dit programma mobiliseert en stimuleert vrouwen uit de laagste 
kasten en armste gezinnen op het platteland om met elkaar hun meest urgente problemen te 
identificeren. Vervolgens geeft het programma actieve steun aan de op te richten 
vrouwengroepen in elk dorp om deze problemen collectief op te lossen. Zij krijgen 
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bijvoorbeeld trainingen over gezondheidskwesties, leren hoe ze overheidssubsidies kunnen 
aanvragen, of ontvangen beperkte financiele middelen om een kleuterschoolleidster aan te 
stellen.  
Gezien de moeilijke uitgangssituatie duurt het vaak een half jaar tot een jaar van 
wekelijkse bezoeken aan een dorp voordat de vrouwen voldoende vertrouwen hebben in de 
programmamedewerker en in elkaar om een groep op te starten. Zelfs het vinden van vrouwen 
die als programmamedewerker willen, kunnen, en mogen werken van hun familie is in de 
landelijke, traditionele gebieden van Bihar een hele opgave. Hierdoor is een snelle uitrol van 
het programma onmogelijk. 
Na een oorspronkelijke focus op onderwijs en alfabetisering, hebben de 
vrouwengroepen in de loop der tijd een breed scala aan activiteiten ondernomen van 
gezondheidstrainingen en het opzetten van informele kredietgroepen tot het voeren van 
campagnes tegen huiselijk geweld. De belangrijkste voordelen die deelnemers ondervinden 
van het programma zijn scholing, kennis op het gebied van gezondheid en verbeterde toegang 
tot krediet. Deze uitkomsten worden in hoofdstuk vijf en zes nader bekeken.  
Om de onderzoeksvragen zoals hierboven beschreven te beantwoorden heb ik in 2003 
een grootschalige kwantitatieve dataset verzameld. Deze unieke dataset omvat 1991 gezinnen 
in 102 dorpen. In 74 van de dorpen wordt het Mahila Samakhya programma uitgevoerd. In de 
28 resterende dorpen is het programma nog niet geïmplementeerd. Door de trage uitbreiding 
van het programma was het mogelijk om een sterk gelijkende controle groep te construeren 
als tegenhanger van de programmadorpen. De populatie in de programma- en de 
controlegroep verschilt niet significant van elkaar op een groot aantal aspecten zoals kaste, 
religie, onderwijs, inkomen, en gezinsstructuur. Ook de kenmerken van de dorpen zelf, zoals 
de aanwezigheid van scholen, banken, of gezondheidscentra, zijn statistisch gelijk aan elkaar. 
De enige uitzondering hierop, afstand tot de dichtstbijzijnde stad, is niet rechtstreeks van 
invloed op de uitkomstindicatoren in de hierna volgende analyses.  
Binnen elk dorp werd een willekeurige selectie van 20 gezinnen geïnterviewd. In de 
programmadorpen bestond de selectie uit 10 gezinnen waarvan een vrouwelijk gezinslid 
deelneemt aan het programma, en uit 10 gezinnen die niet deelnemen aan het programma. 
Door deze onderzoeksopzet is het mogelijk om externe effecten van het programma te meten 
op niet-deelnemers in programmadorpen door hun uitkomsten te vergelijken met de 
uitkomsten van gezinnen in controledorpen. Ook zijn in elk dorp groepsgesprekken gevoerd 
met de vrouwengroepen en andere inwoners. 
Deelnemers behoren voornamelijk tot de doelgroep van laagste kasten. De 
vrouwengroepen zijn redelijk homogeen in termen van scholingsniveau en 
beroepskenmerken, maar vertegenwoordigen vrouwen uit verschillende kasten en religies. Er 
zijn geen aanwijzingen dat vrouwen met een hogere opleiding of uit hogere kasten 
bovengemiddeld vaak leiderschapsposities innemen in de vrouwengroepen, zoals in andere 
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programma’s voorkomt. Moslims zijn enigszins ondervertegenwoordigd, hetgeen kan duiden 
op onbedoelde uitsluitingsmechanismen.  
 
Hoofdstuk vier is het eerste empirische hoofdstuk. Het analyseert de dynamische 
relatie tussen sociaal kapitaal en samenwerking. Ook onderzoekt het of Mahila Samakhya een 
zichzelf versterkende cyclus in gang heeft kunnen zetten. De literatuur over sociaal kapitaal 
heeft een nieuwe impuls gegeven aan de academische en beleidsdiscussies omtrent 
samenwerking. Is het mogelijk voor buitenstaanders zoals de overheid of 
ontwikkelingsorganisaties om te investeren in sociaal kapitaal en daarmee collectieve actie in 
een gemeenschap te stimuleren? De vraag is nog prangender geworden met de hernieuwde 
belangstelling in de afgelopen decennia voor CBD projecten. Deze zijn immers expliciet 
gebaseerd op de veronderstelling dat mensen uit de lokale gemeenschap actief zullen 
samenwerken en deelnemen aan het project.  
In dit hoofdstuk meten we sociaal kapitaal als vertrouwen in anderen en als normen 
van reciprociteit zowel op individueel als op dorpsniveau. Samenwerking wordt gemeten met 
behulp van drie indicatoren: informele hulp aan andere huishoudens, bijdrage aan het bouwen 
of repareren van een school, en bijdrage aan het bouwen of repareren van de weg of een brug. 
Vertrouwen in anderen, of de verwachting dat anderen je vertrouwen niet zullen schaden, is 
vaak een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor coöperatief gedrag in situaties waarin men kan 
profiteren van de inspanningen van anderen zonder zelf iets te hoeven doen. Normen van 
reciprociteit leiden tot sociale sancties op wangedrag of sociale waardering voor coöperatief 
gedrag, hetgeen de samenwerking ten goede komt. Positieve ervaringen met samenwerking 
doen op hun beurt het vertrouwen van een individu in anderen toenemen. Dit suggereert de 
mogelijkheid van een opwaartse spiraal tussen vertrouwen en samenwerking, ondersteund 
door normen van reciprociteit.  
Kwantitatieve studies van sociaal kapitaal en coöperatief gedrag houden vaak geen 
rekening met endogeniteit. Hierdoor kunnen ze correlaties niet onderscheiden van 
daadwerkelijke causaliteit. Maar voor het bestaan van een virtueuze cirkel moet er zowel een 
positieve relatie bestaan van vertrouwen naar samenwerking als van samenwerking naar 
vertrouwen. Om de richting van causaliteit te bepalen is de econometrische analyse in dit 
hoofdstuk gebaseerd op een instrumentele variabelen-benadering voor vertrouwen. Religieuze 
donaties en ongelijkheid op dorpsniveau worden gebruikt als instrument. 
De resultaten duiden op een sterke relatie tussen normen van reciprociteit, zowel op 
individueel als op dorpsniveau, en coöperatief gedrag. Vooral in kleine dorpen is de dreiging 
van sociale sancties (gemeten met behulp van de dorpsnormen) effectief in het versterken van 
onderlinge samenwerking. Dit is in lijn met de theoretische voorspellingen en de resultaten 
van andere onderzoeken. Individuele reciprociteitsnormen aan de andere kant hebben geen 
eenduidig effect op het samenwerkende gedrag van een individu. Of ze coöperatief gedrag 
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bevorderen hangt in grote mate af van het coöperatieve gedrag van anderen, dus van de 
context.  
In tegenstelling tot de verwachtingen leidt een groter vertrouwen in anderen niet tot 
meer deelname aan collectieve actie. Het is wel gerelateerd aan meer informele hulp aan 
anderen. Andersom leiden positieve ervaringen met samenwerking in het verleden tot een 
groter vertrouwen, hoewel dit alleen het geval is in programmadorpen. Wellicht komt dit 
laatste resultaat door de expliciete aandacht van Mahila Samakhya voor het opbouwen van 
vertrouwen. Het kan ook betekenen dat een kritisch niveau van samenwerking bereikt moet 
worden in een dorp vooraleer gezinnen hun verwachtingen ten aanzien van andermans 
coöperatieve intenties gaan bijstellen. De bevindingen uit hoofdstuk vier verwerpen de 
aanname dat dit specifieke CBD project een virtueuze cirkel tussen sociaal kapitaal en 
collectieve actie in gang heeft gezet. Zelfs een programma als Mahila Samakhya dat een 
sterke nadruk legt op het vergroten van vertrouwen, solidariteit en gezamenlijke actie blijkt 
niet in staat om zulk een zelfversterkend mechanisme te initiëren. 
Desalniettemin suggereren de resultaten dat het programma een sterk direct effect 
heeft op collectieve actie. Gemeenschappelijke activiteiten om scholen of wegen te repareren 
komen aanzienlijk vaker voor in programmadorpen. Zowel deelnemers aan Mahila Samakhya 
als niet-deelnemers in programmadorpen zijn meer geneigd om bij te dragen aan dergelijke 
projecten. Potentiële mechanismen zijn een groter bewustzijn van de voordelen van 
collectieve actie, toegang tot additionele middelen zoals overheidssubsidies en het 
toegenomen zelfvertrouwen van de vrouwen uit de programmadorpen om de status quo te 
kunnen veranderen. 
Gezien deze bevindingen, bevestigd door kwalitatieve informatiebronnen, kan men 
vraagtekens stellen bij de duurzaamheid van de in gang gezette veranderingen. Het lijkt niet 
waarschijnlijk dat de vrouwengroepen een zelfde niveau van samenwerking zouden 
handhaven indien Mahila Samakhya zou ophouden te bestaan. Dit is natuurlijk niet 
noodzakelijkerwijs een diskwalificatie van het project, zolang het programma maar minstens 
even effectief en efficiënt is als de alternatieven in het behalen van 
ontwikkelingsdoelstellingen zoals het bevorderen van scholing. 
 
Hoofdstuk vijf kijkt daarom naar de impact van het programma op de inentings- en 
scholingspercentages van kinderen. Toegenomen vertrouwen en samenwerking zijn 
waardevolle uitkomsten op zichzelf. Maar uiteindelijk trachten ontwikkelingsprojecten zoals 
Mahila Samakhya om de sociaal-economische positie van arme gezinnen te verbeteren.  
Waar het vorige hoofdstuk geen expliciet onderscheid maakte tussen deelnemers en 
niet-deelnemers in programmadorpen, is dit onderscheid de kern van hoofdstuk vijf. Het 
analyseert expliciet de externe effecten van Mahila Samakhya op kinderen van niet-
deelnemers die in een programmadorp wonen. Dit wordt mogelijk gemaakt door de 
onderzoeksopzet, waardoor niet-deelnemers met een controlegroep vergeleken kunnen 
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worden. Op een enkele uitzondering na worden externaliteiten niet behandeld in de 
impactliteratuur.  
Het vrijwillige karakter van deelname aan een vrouwengroep kan leiden tot een 
onjuiste schatting van het programma-effect wanneer deelnemers bij voorbaat al verschillen 
van niet-deelnemers, bijvoorbeeld in hun interesse voor scholing. De econometrische analyse 
corrigeert hiervoor met instrumentele variabelen. Over het algemeen is het moeilijk om 
aannemelijk te maken dat de instrumenten kunnen worden uitgesloten van de 
uitkomstvergelijking. De onderzoeksopzet van deze dissertatie biedt de mogelijkheid om deze 
voorwaarde rechtstreeks te toetsen met de data van de vergelijkbare controledorpen. Wanneer 
de variabelen die de participatiebeslissing verklaren geen significante relatie hebben met de 
inentings- en scholingsvariabelen in de controlegroep, kunnen ze gebruikt worden als 
instrument. 
De analyse schat de impact van het programma met verschillende econometrische 
methoden. Probit en lineaire modellen, een instrumentele variabelen-methode, en ‘propensity 
score matching’ tonen allen vergelijkbare, significante en grote effecten.  
De resultaten laten zien dat kinderen van vrouwen die deelnemen aan Mahila 
Samakhya significant vaker zijn ingeënt tegen tuberculose, DTP, mazelen en polio dan 
kinderen wiens moeder niet deelneemt in de vrouwengroep. Inentingspercentages onder 
kinderen van deelnemende gezinnen zijn 20 tot 22 procent hoger dan in de controlegroep. 
Ook gaan ze substantieel vaker naar school dan kinderen van niet-deelnemers. De 
scholingspercentages voor de kleuterschool en de lagere school zijn respectievelijk 39 procent 
en 11 procent hoger dan in de controledorpen. 
Bovendien heeft het programma een substantieel spillover effect gehad in 
programmadorpen. Kinderen van moeders die zelf niet deelnemen in een vrouwengroep maar 
die wel in een programmadorp wonen, zijn significant vaker ingeënt tegen tuberculose, DTP 
en mazelen (maar niet tegen polio) dan de kinderen in controledorpen. Inentingspercentages 
liggen 9 tot 11 procent hoger. Ook gaan ze vaker naar een kleuterschool met een toename van 
19 procent. Meisjes (maar niet jongens) gaan daarnaast significant vaker naar de lagere 
school. Ten opzichte van de controlegroep zijn de scholingspercentages met gemiddeld 6 
procent gestegen. Deze indirecte effecten zijn minstens veertig procent van de directe effecten 
op kinderen van deelnemers. 
Verschillende mechanismen kunnen ten grondslag liggen aan deze grote 
externaliteiten. Vrouwen uit de vrouwengroepen krijgen gezondheidstrainingen die hen 
wijzen op het belang van inentingen en de dagen waarop deze –gratis– worden verstrekt in de 
gezondheidscentra. De dagelijkse sociale interacties evenals de bewustwordingscampagnes 
die veel vrouwengroepen in hun dorp organiseren, zorgen vervolgens voor de verspreiding 
van deze nieuwe informatie. Ook zijn er aanwijzingen dat de vrouwengroepen druk 
uitoefenen op gezondheidsmedewerkers om hun taken beter uit te voeren.  
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De hogere scholingspercentages zijn voornamelijk te danken aan een betere toegang 
tot scholing. In veel programmadorpen hebben ouders samen met de vrouwengroepen 
informele kleuterscholen en meisjesscholen opgericht. Ook is de vraag naar onderwijs 
gestegen omdat ouders in programmadorpen bewust zijn gemaakt van het belang van 
onderwijs. Groepsgesprekken in de dorpen doen vermoeden dat ook de kwaliteit van het 
onderwijs is gestegen door een grotere betrokkenheid van ouders.  
De externe effecten worden voornamelijk gevonden onder de Hindu bevolking uit de 
laagste kasten. De indirecte effecten op Moslims zijn een stuk kleiner. Dit benadrukt het 
belang van interacties binnen sociale netwerken die in Bihar vaak langs kaste- en religieuze 
scheidslijnen lopen.  
De bovenstaande resultaten laten zien dat de emancipatie van laag opgeleide, arme, 
gemarginaliseerde vrouwen in India verstrekkende gevolgen kan hebben. Dit geldt niet alleen 
voor de vrouwen zelf, maar ook voor hun kinderen en voor de bredere gemeenschap waarin 
ze wonen. Impactevaluaties zijn over het algemeen gebaseerd op de enkele vergelijking van 
een programmagroep met een controlegroep. Indien een ontwikkelingsproject positieve 
externaliteiten genereert voor de niet-deelnemers, kan een dergelijke benadering de 
effectiviteit van het project flink onderschatten.  
Een geheel experimentele opzet is de meeste simpele en betrouwbare methode om de 
effectiviteit van een project te meten. Een compleet gerandomiseerde invoering van een 
project is echter vaak onmogelijk vanuit politiek of organisatorisch oogpunt. Ook starten veel 
projecten zonder het uitvoeren van een nulmeting. In de afwezigheid van een dergelijke ideale 
situatie kan het pilot-karakter van een project een goed alternatief bieden in de vorm van een 
quasi-experimentele onderzoeksopzet. Het feit dat Mahila Samakhya slechts langzaam 
uitbreidt naar nieuwe regio’s maakt het mogelijk om een controlegroep te vormen van 
vergelijkbare dorpen waar het programma nog niet is gearriveerd. 
 
Hoofdstuk zes onderzoekt de rol van sociaal kapitaal in de toegang tot informele 
leningen van familie, vrienden of buren. Voor veel huishoudens in Bihar is het vrijwel 
onmogelijk om een formele banklening te verkrijgen. Vooral de armste gezinnen hebben vaak 
geen andere optie dan het accepteren van de hoge rentes van de informele, lokale geldschieter. 
Het gevolg hiervan is dat ze vooral zullen lenen om economische schokken op te vangen, 
bijvoorbeeld wanneer een gezinslid zijn baan verliest of ziek wordt, en niet zozeer voor 
investeringen die hun toekomstige buffercapaciteit kunnen verhogen, zoals 
gewasdiversificatie of extra scholing. Wanneer de toegang tot formeel krediet beperkt is, 
kunnen arme huishoudens enorm profiteren van informele leningen van andere gezinnen, om 
zo te ontsnappen aan de ijzeren greep van de geldschieters. Desondanks is het aantal leningen 
van vrienden, buren of familieleden laag in Bihar.  
Een belangrijke oorzaak van het gebrek aan informele transacties is het risico dat een 
lening niet wordt terugbetaald. Wanneer rente- en terugbetalingen juridisch niet gemakkelijk 
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kunnen worden afgedwongen, zijn de interacties binnen sociale netwerken essentieel om het 
risico van wanbetaling te verkleinen. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan morele druk vanuit de sociale 
omgeving, de schande verbonden aan roddels, en de dreiging dat het gezin in de toekomst 
wordt buitengesloten van nieuwe informele leningen. Dit verhoogt de (immateriële) kosten 
van het in gebreke blijven.  
Het is aannemelijk dat informatie vooral wordt uitgewisseld tussen gezinnen binnen 
eenzelfde sociale, culturele, economische of etnische groep. In Bihar zullen zowel directe als 
toekomstige sociale sancties het meest effectief zijn tussen mensen die tot dezelfde kaste of 
religie behoren. Hoe groter het aantal leden van een sociale groep dat sancties kan uitdelen, 
hoe zwaarder de straf op wanbetaling en hoe ‘veiliger’ het is om geld te lenen aan vrienden, 
buren of familieleden. In een dergelijke situatie hoeven gezinnen in financiële nood dus 
minder vaak naar een lokale geldschieter te stappen. Voor een gegeven bevolkingsomvang 
zullen informele leningen dus vaker voorkomen in dorpen die homogener of minder 
gefragmenteerd zijn. Met andere woorden, dit hoofdstuk bestudeert hoe het gebrek aan sociaal 
kapitaal in heterogene gemeenschappen de toegang tot informeel krediet beïnvloedt. 
Heterogeniteit wordt hier gemeten in termen van kaste- en religieuze fragmentatie.  
Alesina en La Ferrara (2005) beargumenteren dat heterogeniteit bevorderlijk kan zijn 
voor innovatie en economische groei omdat het een positieve invloed kan hebben op 
creativiteit, werkprestaties en productiviteit. Als dit zich vertaalt in een toename van de 
investeringsmogelijkheden, dan zou heterogeniteit twee tegengestelde effecten kunnen hebben 
op krediettransacties tussen huishoudens: een positief effect door een grotere vraag naar 
investeringkrediet en een negatief effect door het grotere risico van wanbetaling. Om dit 
verder te analyseren, maakt het hoofdstuk onderscheid tussen investerings- en 
consumptiedoeleinden van krediet. 
De resultaten bevestigen de bovenstaande hypothesen. Heterogeniteit op dorpsniveau 
heeft een negatief effect op de waarschijnlijkheid dat een gezin geld leent van vrienden, buren 
of familieleden in plaats van een lokale geldschieter. Daarnaast heeft heterogeniteit een 
positief effect op investeringskrediet. In dorpen met een grotere diversiteit aan kasten en 
religies verkrijgen gezinnen significant vaker een lening om te investeren in hun 
productiviteit, zoals de aanschaf van een buffel, van landbouwmiddelen, of het opzetten van 
een bedrijfje. Zij zullen dus beter in staat zijn om ook in de toekomst inkomen te genereren. 
Dit positieve effect van heterogeniteit wordt vrijwel niet bestudeerd in de literatuur over 
informeel krediet.  
De negatieve relatie tussen heterogeniteit en leningen van sociale relaties is 
zorgwekkend. Het betekent dat gezinnen in heterogene dorpen nog kwetsbaarder zijn om na 
een inkomensschok in chronische armoede te vervallen. Beleidsmaatregelen om heterogeniteit 
te verlagen zijn over het algemeen onwenselijk aangezien ze conflicten tussen sociale groepen 
kunnen veroorzaken en minderheidsgroepen verder kunnen marginaliseren. Bovendien 
kunnen dergelijke maatregelen de positieve effecten van diversiteit teniet doen.  
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Het tweede deel van hoofdstuk zes wijst in een andere richting. CBD projecten zoals 
Mahila Samakhya bevorderen het vertrouwen, de solidariteit en de gezamenlijke activiteiten 
tussen kasten en religieuze groepen. Zulke projecten kunnen een aantrekkelijk instrument zijn 
om de negatieve gevolgen van heterogeniteit te verminderen terwijl de positieve effecten van 
diversiteit blijven bewaard. De resultaten bevestigen dit. Voor een gegeven niveau van 
heterogeniteit lenen gezinnen in programmadorpen significant vaker geld van andere 
huishoudens dan in de controledorpen. Deze bevinding geldt met name voor huishoudens in 
programmadorpen die zelf niet deelnemen aan een vrouwengroep. Huishoudens die wel lid 
zijn van een vrouwengroep lenen vaak geld via de roterende kredietgroepen die de vrouwen 
oprichten.  
Desondanks is het totale aantal leningen, ongeacht hun bron, lager in 
programmadorpen. Een aantal mechanismen kan tot deze afname in krediettransacties hebben 
geleid: een gelijktijdige toename in andere informele transacties zoals giften en non-monetaire 
hulp aan elkaar; een afgenomen behoefte om oude leningen en de extreem hoge rentes van 
geldschieters te financieren met nieuwe leningen; of verbeterde strategieën om met risico om 
te gaan in programmadorpen, waardoor gezinnen minder worden blootgesteld aan 
onverwachte inkomensdalingen.  
Het programma verzacht de negatieve gevolgen van heterogeniteit op leningen van 
vrienden en buren vooral in de bovengemiddeld heterogene gemeenschappen. Dit geldt echter 
niet voor leningen van familieleden. Dit suggereert dat familieleden minder zwaar leunen op 
sociale sancties door andere dorpelingen om wanbetaling te voorkomen dan vrienden en 
buren.  
 
Wat leren deze resultaten en bevindingen ons voor ontwikkelingsbeleid? Hoofdstuk 
zeven van deze dissertatie geeft een samenvatting van de empirische resultaten en maakt een 
aantal methodologische opmerkingen. Het bespreekt de beperkingen van deze studie en geeft 
suggesties voor verder onderzoek. Het eindigt met de volgende beleidsmaatregelen.  
Ten eerste laat de evaluatie van Mahila Samakhya zien dat een CBD project dat zich 
richt op arme, laagopgeleide, gemarginaliseerde vrouwen in India grote positieve effecten kan 
hebben voor hun eigen welzijn en dat van hun gezin.  
Het meest opvallende resultaat in het proefschrift gaat over de grote externe effecten 
die het programma genereert voor de gemeenschap, zelfs voor hen die niet zelf deelnemen aan 
een vrouwengroep. Wanneer dergelijke externe effecten buiten beschouwing worden gelaten 
in een evaluatie, kan dat tot een substantiële onderschatting van de effectiviteit van het 
programma leiden. In geval van negatieve externaliteiten zal de effectiviteit worden 
overschat. Indien de financiering van projecten gebaseerd is op kosten-baten analyses, kan 
een verkeerde inschatting van hun impact in het uiterste geval leiden tot stopzetting van 
effectieve projecten en vice versa.  
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Ondanks de positieve effecten van Mahila Samakhya vindt de studie geen bewijs dat 
het programma een zichzelf versterkende cyclus in gang heeft gezet van toenemend 
vertrouwen en toenemende collectieve actie. Dit resultaat stelt vraagtekens bij de 
duurzaamheid van de veranderingen. Ten tijde van de dataverzameling leek het 
onwaarschijnlijk dat de individuele vrouwengroepen zouden kunnen blijven functioneren 
onafhankelijk van de steun van het programma. Wellicht vergt het opbouwen van sociaal 
kapitaal nog meer tijd. Ook doet het de vraag rijzen of andere CBD projecten daar dan wel toe 
in staat zijn. Mahila Samakhya is redelijk uniek in de hoeveelheid tijd en moeite die het 
programma steekt in het vergroten van het (zelf-) vertrouwen en de bewustwording van de 
deelnemers. De meeste CBD projecten besteden veel minder aandacht aan de daadwerkelijke 
emancipatie van minderheden. Een vergelijkende studie naar de effectiviteit van verschillende 
typen CBD projecten kan hier meer uitsluitsel over geven. 
Een kanttekening is hier op zijn plaats. Het programma is succesvol in het verbeteren 
van de uitkomsten die door de vrouwen zelf als belangrijkste voordeel van het programma 
worden gezien. Afgezien van de toegenomen scholingspercentages komen deze niet voor in 
het oorspronkelijke projectvoorstel. Bovendien werken de vrouwengroepen in hun eigen, vaak 
langzame, tempo. Het voorzichtige, stapsgewijze bewustwordingsproces weerhoudt het 
programma ervan om snel op grote schaal te worden ingevoerd. Subsidiegevers hebben dus 
geen volledige controle over de financiële betalingen noch over de projectuitkomsten. Dit 
vergt vanzelfsprekend een hoop geduld en een substantiële overdracht van 
verantwoordelijkheden naar het lokale niveau. Het is maar de vraag of dit te verenigen is met 
de interne beoordelingsmechanismen van multilaterale en andere donoren.  
De vraag naar de effectiviteit van ontwikkelingshulp wordt steeds luider onder 
belastingbetalers. Sommigen, zoals de Commissie Draagvlak en Effectiviteit 
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (de ‘Commissie Dijkstal’)200, stellen daarbij dat het meten van 
de effectiviteit van hulp überhaupt niet mogelijk is. Inderdaad zijn kwantitatieve 
impactevaluaties lastiger uit te voeren in de afwezigheid van een nulmeting en wanneer een 
project niet gerandomiseert is ingevoerd. Desondanks verwerpt dit proefschrift hun 
pessimistische standpunt. Zelfs in dergelijke gevallen kan de langzame uitbreiding van een 
project een mooie kans bieden om een controlegroep te construeren aan de hand van de 
gebieden of groepen waar het project nog niet is begonnen. Vervolgens kunnen toekomstige 
ontwikkelingsprojecten een expliciete basis leggen voor een gedegen evaluatie. In een wereld 
van beperkte financiële en menselijke middelen zijn evaluaties immers van essentieel belang 
om te kunnen investeren in de projecten met de beste resultaten.  
                                                 
200
 Commissie Draagvlak en Effectiviteit Ontwikkelings-samenwerking, “Vertrouwen in een kwetsbare sector?”, 
6 april 2006. 
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